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The Arctic to date has been a relatively peaceful and stable region in global politics, having 
successfully undergone a major transformation from being a strategic military theatre during 
the Cold War to a circumpolar region of international political cooperation in the post-Cold 
War era. However, as an area of regional political research, the Arctic has, until recently, been 
largely under-developed in the study of International Relations (IR), even though it has the 
potential to make a significant and meaningful contribution to the discipline. Taking a historical 
approach, the key research question of this thesis asks ‘how can political change be understood 
in the Arctic from the Cold War to the present day?’   
English School Approaches (ES) suggest that order is not historically determined through 
cyclical patterns of great power interaction but can instead be constructed (or re-constructed) 
through the creation of shared norms, ideas and values. This is achieved firstly through the 
utilising the concept of international society and secondly by investigating how the 
development of international society within the Arctic impacts the level of regional security 
cooperation. It will be advocated that throughout the three historical periods under 
investigation from 1946-2019: that the United States, Russia, Canada and Finland have all 
expressed leadership capabilities at specific times.  
ES approaches also highlight the important role regional institutions have played in broadening 
the security agenda in the post-Cold War era. One of the key objectives of this thesis is to show 
how the current division in Arctic political literature between environmental cooperation and 
indigenous politics on the one hand, and military security on the other, is a false dichotomy. 
This is demonstrated through the important role that Canadian civil society played in 
contributing to the creation of the AC in the early 1990s, by outlining how their objectives for 
creating a circumpolar Arctic institution were two-fold: to achieve full political participation 
of indigenous leaders while developing a broad, integrated security agenda inclusive of Arctic 
demilitarization and arms control issues. Two further issues relating to the role of the AC that 
are investigated within this thesis include: 1) how and why regional powers take on specific 
leadership roles in an effort to maintain or change the regional order and 2) why the US 
prevented the inclusion of military security dialogue within the AC and what are the future 
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CHAPTER ONE -                                                                                                    
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW   
1.0 Introduction to the political Arctic – defining where North begins 
One of the most fundamental issues within the circumpolar north at the beginning of the 21st century is how 
to define the ‘north’ (Konrad & Nicol 2008, p264). 
Far from being a frozen no-man’s land or terra nullius1, the Arctic polar region is a unique 
‘humanized landscape’ which has evolved over thousands of years with a complexion and 
complexity not found in its southern counterpart, the Antarctic region (Chaturvedi 1996, p18). 
It seems incredible that amidst such extreme conditions there are approximately four million 
people living in the Arctic today, according to the Arctic Human Development report (Heleniak 
and Bogoyavlensky 2014:53).  
The most common way to define the Arctic is by delineating it as the region above the Arctic 
Circle - an imaginary line of latitude that circles the globe at 66° 33’ North. The Arctic Circle 
marks the latitude above which the sun does not set on the summer solstice and does not rise 
on the winter solstice (NSIDC 2013). At more southern latitudes, the duration of the polar day 
and polar night decrease. Somewhere in the centre of the Arctic Ocean, there are four north 
Poles.2 The Geographic North Pole, situated at the northern end of the Earth's axis, is the 
northern-most point on the planet and from which all directions on Earth lie south (Smithsonian 
Institute 2013). At the North Pole, the sun rises once each year and sets once each year: there 
are six months of continuous daylight and six months of continuous night. The Arctic is also 
known for its special light conditions, particularly the Aurora Borealis more commonly known 
as the ‘Northern Lights’. Consisting of charged particles from the sun that become trapped in 
the Earth’s magnetic field, the Aurora produces spectacular displays of moving lights which 
can be viewed at night throughout the winter in latitudes above the Arctic Circle. 
The circumpolar Arctic region is also identified in several other ways by researchers. For 
example, some scientists define the Arctic landmass as the area north of the tree line where the 
landscape is frozen and dotted with shrubs and lichen, but where no trees grow (NSIDC 2013). 
 
1 Terra Nullius can be understood from its Latin translation to mean ‘land belonging to no-one’ 
2 The four north poles include 1) The North geographic pole at 90N, is the fixed cap of the earth, 2) The North Magnetic Pole, 
which continually moves across the Arctic and currently lies in northern Canada, about 1000 miles south of the geographic 
North Pole (Smithsonian Institute 2013), 3) The North Geomagnetic Pole, which centres the Earth’s magnetic field and also 
shifts, 4) The Northern pole of Inaccessibility, which is the point in the Arctic Ocean farthest from land approx. 680miles/1,100 
km north of Alaska (Wheeler 2009, p5).  
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Still others define the region according to the distribution of Arctic animals, the presence of 
permafrost or even the southern limit of pack ice during the winter (Smithsonian Institute 
2004). Meanwhile, cartographers often use the isothermal line to define the Arctic, including 
all the places where the long-term mean temperature of the warmest month is below 10⁰C 
(ibid). Alternatively, maritime Arctic researchers focus on those areas of water that are covered 
by sea ice in winter. Yet because of climatology and ocean currents, even this definition has 
problems given that different areas of the Arctic ocean behave differently. For instance, the 
Barents Sea, north of Norway doesn’t freeze in the winter, whereas the Sea of Okhotsk in the 
Far East, can freeze as far south as Japan. The point here is that understandings of the Arctic 
differ depending where in the Arctic you are – there are subarctic, low arctic and high arctic 
areas of the region that all have unique features and characteristics.  Thus, it can be surmised 
that the varying definitions of the region reflect the fact that the region is not homogenous.  
In the same way, the political Arctic is neither homogenous nor an easily defined region, even 
though geographically speaking, the Arctic constitutes the northernmost territories of eight 
states: Russia, Canada, Greenland, The Faroe Islands (autonomous countries under the 
Kingdom of Denmark), the United States (Alaska), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. 
Spanning a vast area of approximately fourteen million square kilometres, The Russian 
Federation and Canada account for nearly 80 percent of this land; the Nordic countries, about 
16 percent; and the United States some 4 percent (Arctic.ru 2013). However, when discussing 
the processes of Arctic politics, the fact is that many important decisions relating to the Arctic 
are made in the capital cities far from the region itself. Thus, the political map of the Arctic 
generally tends to include the entire geographic area of Arctic states and it is therefore 
necessary to engage with national government perspectives from the eight Arctic states.  
Of the eight Arctic states which have territory in the Arctic region, there are only five states 
with a coastline bordering the Arctic Ocean. These states, known as the ‘Arctic five’ (A5), 
include Greenland (Denmark), Norway, Russia, the Alaska (USA) and Canada. A key factor 
distinguishing the Arctic region in international politics is that the High Arctic and the North 
Pole has not been claimed as the sovereign territory of any state, while also being protected 
from such claims by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)3.  
 
3 Formally adopted in 1982, UNCLOS is one of the most widely adhered-to conventions in the world with 149 signatories 
including all of the countries in the UN Security Council with the exception of the United States, which did not ratify the treaty 
(Jarashow, Runnelsy and Svensonz 2006 :1640). Although in agreement with the majority of the Convention, restrictions on 
deep sea mining provisions outlined in the Draft were deemed unacceptable to the U.S. and believed to be contrary to vital 
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The Arctic Ocean, which occupies about one-third of the region - is largely frozen for most of 
the year and covered with a permanent layer of ice which advances and retreats with the seasons 
(Arctic.ru 2013, Vitebsky 2000). While this ocean is largely landlocked, there are small number 
of sea-routes in and out of the Arctic4. Increased climate change and global warming has caused 
a startling decrease in the levels of sea ice within the Arctic Ocean, and each summer, this 
offers increasingly longer periods of maritime access through the ice-free waters. This has led 
to an increase of political, military and commercial activities, causing the Arctic to gain a new 
strategic importance in the early 21st century. This has led to new economic and political 
interest from non-Arctic states particularly China, Japan and the two Koreas, all of which 
declare that they have vested interests in the region. Climate change in the Arctic has also raised 
questions concerning control over new shipping routes, such as the Northeast Passage, the 
Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route (see image 1.0). These routes all significantly 
decrease shipping times compared to conventional routes through the Panama and Suez Canal. 
As Huitfeld (1994:16) explains, the main sea lines of communication (SLOC) into and out of 
this ocean are of special interest, since they are vital for controlling the maritime traffic (both 
civilian and military).  
To conclude, writing about the Arctic from a political science and international relations 
perception requires a flexible understanding of the Arctic. Just as the geophysical landmass 
and maritime areas of the Arctic are not homogenous, the region accommodates many diverse 
socio-cultural perspectives of the people who inhabit it and thus I will not aspire to adopting a 
single definition. For an outsider, it is not an easy task to recount the many historical and 
present-day perspectives representing individual Arctic states and sub-regions, as well as 
indigenous voices, yet this research will attempt to do so. In the next section, I will outline the 
overall structure and focus of this research, while justifying a historical approach towards 
understanding Arctic regional development as a method of depicting long-term political change 
in the region. 
 
 
national interests (Malone 1983, p29). The Treaty establishes a twelve-mile zone for territorial waters and a larger 200-mile 
economic zone in which a country has exclusive drilling rights for hydrocarbon and other resources (Frolov 2007). According 
to UNCLOS, any country may claim territory past its 200 nautical mile economic exclusive zone granted that the territory 
rests on an extension of its continental shelf (Cornjeco 2012). 
4 The main Arctic SLOC include; the Bering strait - which connects the Pacific and Arctic Oceans; the Davis Strait - which 
lies between mid-western Greenland and Canadian Nunavut and Baffin Island; the Fram Strait – a passage situated between 
Greenland and Svalbard; and finally the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. 
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Image 1.0: Map of the Arctic region showing the Northeast Passage, the Northern Sea Route and 




1.1 Outlining the Research focus and Thesis structure   
The purpose of this research is to trace the political and security developments in the Arctic 
over a 70-year period from 1945-to the present day (2020) in order to understand the underlying 
causes of change and transformation in the region.  
One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the present-day Arctic regional order did not 
emerge as a singular logical outcome of historical progression in international relations. 
Instead, it will be advocated that Arctic has, since the end of World War II, been shaped by 
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pre-conceived ideas of order, security and stability held by the leaders of the most powerful 
Arctic states. Robert Cox (2008:87) argues that the point of studying international relations is 
to try to understand the world as people are making it. By doing so, he argues that it is possible 
to gain some control over where we are going so it is possible to “forgo speculation about an 
immanent logic of history that will turn out to be an illusion”. From this statement, Cox implies 
that when assessing change in historical structures, they must be viewed critically as products 
of history. Historical structures such as the international system of states (the Westphalian 
political system), and in the context of this research, the Arctic regional order, can therefore be 
considered as a historical outcome that emerged as a result of a prevailing set of conditions. 
For this reason, I argue that only by evaluating political developments over the long-term is it 
possible to understand the deeper consequences that change has on inter-state relations and the 
underlying regional order. According to Paul (2012:5) “change means serious alterations have 
occurred in relations among states, and in terms of their core national interests, strategies, 
behavioural patterns, perceptions and institutional structures”. A failure to acknowledge 
historical lessons runs the risk of repeating past mistakes through poor decision-making and 
being unprepared in the face of unexpected developments. Therefore, rather than simply 
describing and analysing current themes in Arctic politics, this thesis pursues a historical 
approach in order to engage with the deeper questions such as why Cold War security structures 
have been retained in the Arctic while politically, the Arctic has been transformed through 
regional cooperation.  
To assist with the task of researching the sources of political change in the historical and present 
day Arctic, I will adopt the English School (ES) theory of International Relations (IR), as it 
serves as a broad, overarching framework to engage holistically with the three different levels 
of the international system of interest in this study; the global/international system, the Arctic 
region and at the individual state level. A key concept of English School theory that 
distinguishes it from realism and liberal institutionalism is international society – a concept 
that outlines how state behaviour is shaped through interactions with other states which over 
time, helps to develop rules, norms and shared ideas that are structured as ‘institutions’ of 
international society. The concept has also more recently been applied to the regional level, to 
explain the development of regional international society – as such, I have applied ES 
approaches to the Arctic region to the degree to which regional international society is evident 
across the three historical stages of Arctic development. An important finding of this research 
identifies that a relationship exists between international society and security cooperation. 
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Utilising Buzan’s (2012b) typology of international society combined with Bailes and Cotty’s 
(2006) forms of regional security cooperation I produced a matrix that illustrates that where 
there is a high risk of regional conflict, (such as the Cold War Arctic), there will be only very 
basic forms of inter-state cooperation and regional society. However, if the region is peaceful 
and politically stable then it is possible for regional international society to evolve into more 
complex and integrated forms of political and security cooperation.    
To understand political change also requires an investigation of the power dynamics and 
capabilities of states to take up a regional leadership role at specific times. To achieve this aim, 
I will also utilise Stewart-Ingersol and Frazier’s (2012) Regional Powers and Security 
Framework (RPSF), which is also based on English School approaches and neatly fits into the 
overall theoretical design. The RPSF serves to explicitly outline the role that regional powers 
(i.e. powerful states) have in changing or maintaining the regional order. I demonstrate how 
the United States and the Soviet Union have each acted as regional leaders at particular times 
during the first and second historical stage of Arctic development. I also show how it is possible 
for small and medium states to take up a regional leadership role where the regional powers 
are themselves unable or unwilling to do so. This was the case in the post-Cold War 
transformation of the Arctic when instead of the United States becoming a regional unipolar 
power, the task fell to Finland and Canada to establish a new circumpolar inter-governmental 
organisation. This began with Finland’s Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 
1991 and culminated in Canadian efforts to establish the Arctic Council (AC) in 1996.    
In Table 1.1. I have outlined the main findings of my research to demonstrate to the reader the 
progression of the research through three stages of historical developments. In addition to 
outlining the regional structure, the table also illustrates how components of the ES (regional 
society/security cooperation) and RPSF (regional security order and regional leadership) 
contribute to the overall depiction of the Arctic regional order through the three historical 
stages.   
Oftentimes, the historical development of the Arctic is implicitly categorised into two stages: 
The Cold War Arctic followed by the post-Cold War Arctic. However, in order to fully 
understand how the Arctic region has changed over time, it is essential to map out the political 
structure of the Arctic before, during and after the series of critical transformations that took 
place at the end of the Cold War and in the early 1990s. The question of how to categorise 
periods of change in the Arctic region over the long-durée of history has been under-theorised 
in the Arctic literature. However, one exception in the literature is Lassi Heininen’s (2018:180) 
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paper on ‘Arctic geopolitics’ which explicitly outlines Arctic political developments with 
respect to three distinct periods. These include 1) The Cold War era of geopolitics (circa 1949-
1979), 2) The transitional period of the 1980s and 1990s and 3) the post-Cold War geopolitics. 
While Heininen’s third stage of ‘post-Cold War’ geopolitics is not proscribed a specific time 
period it can be assumed that the third stage begins roughly in 2000, at the beginning of the 
new century and continues to the present day.     
Like Heininen, I will advocate that change in the Arctic order can best be understood through 
three historical stages although I moderate the dates to align with specific political events. For 
instance, I outline that the first stage of development - ‘The Cold War Arctic’, lasted from the 
end of World War II in 1945 to Mikhail Gorbachev’s influential Murmansk speech in 1987 
during which he proposed several new initiatives for the Arctic including the creation of an 
international Arctic region.  Major changes occurred in global politics and in the Arctic thanks 
to Mikhail Gorbachev’s Murmansk initiative and these essentially heralded the end of the Cold 
War and the beginning of a new stage of political cooperation.  
Returning to the first stage of Arctic development, in Chapter 3, I will show how the Cold War 
Arctic order replicated features of the bipolar international system. Essentially, the Cold War 
Arctic was divided into an east and western bloc with a buffer zone in between that was held 
by the two neutral Scandinavian states, Sweden and Finland. In the Western Arctic, security 
was organised through the US-led NATO alliance against the Soviet Union. Only a basic form 
of international society existed (namely a coexistent society) because the bipolar balance of 
power severely restricted regional cooperation between east and west. Throughout the Cold 
War, I identify how gradual changes occurring at the systemic level of the international system 
manifested in the Arctic sub-systemic level the Arctic. To provide an account of how political 
change can occur in seemingly rigid bipolar system, I adopt Jones’ categorization of three Cold 
War stages (the tight bipolar era, the loose bipolar era and incipient multipolarity). Focusing 
on the Cold War Arctic, in Chapter 3 I analyse the tight and loose bipolar periods of the Cold 
War (for more on Cold War periodization see section 1.2.2 in this chapter). Although the Cold 
War did not officially end until 1991, in Chapter 4, I demonstrate how the increasing rate of 
change that occurred in both the international system during the era of incipient multipolarity 
that lasted from 1970 to the mid-1980s heralded the beginning of a transformation that 
impacted global and local political processes. I show the interconnection between the two 
through a state-by-state analysis of key political events during this era. Many of the Arctic 
political developments to occur during the 1970s and 80s such as the growing indigenous and 
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environmental movement, the anti-nuclear proliferation agenda and the rise of non-state actors 
all contributed to processes that culminated in events that occurred during the transformation 
stage at the end of the Cold War. While Heininen loosely categorises this second ‘transitional 
stage’ of Arctic development as lasting for two decades from the 1980s throughout the 1990s, 
I propose that the transitional era of Arctic politics lasted for only nine years, from 1985-1996. 
This corresponds to the year that Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed 
to the role of Secretary General of the Soviet Union. Two years later, he proposed his formative 
1987 Murmansk initiative which would eventually culminate in the establishment of the Arctic 
Council intergovernmental organisation in 1996. Identified as a critical juncture in both Arctic 
and global politics, I illustrate how this transitional era offered a degree of flexibility to re-
shape both the international system and the Arctic regional order not witnessed at other times. 
I argue that owing to the rate of accelerated change occurring during this time, a short nine-
year period served as a critical juncture both in the history of global politics and for Arctic 
regional development. During critical junctures, the system becomes more fluid and susceptible 
to change and for a time, multiple decision pathways for future development exist. It will be 
argued that during this transition period, the Arctic and broader European system was 
undergoing a systemic transition away from bipolarity which created a level of fluidity for 
political leaders to be agents of change. 
As American-Soviet relations ‘thawed’ in the late 1980s, radical changes occurred in global 
politics that were initially proposed in the Arctic under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
‘Murmansk initiative’ of 1987. Gorbachev served as a key agent of change in the Arctic, for in 
addition to proposing the twin policies of glasnost and perestroika5 in the USSR, Gorbachev 
spoke of his desire to see a ‘Zone of Peace’ in the Arctic region (Sale and Potapov 2010, p138). 
He also envisioned the Arctic becoming an international region of east-west collaboration. 
These processes acted as confidence-building mechanisms for increasing trust between the US 
and the Soviet Union and effectively led to US-Soviet arms reductions talks and the 
culmination the Cold War. Fortunately, Gorbachev’s proposal for international Arctic 
cooperation did not disappear off the political agenda once arms reductions with the US had 
been negotiated but was instead taken by other political and indigenous leaders – all of whom 
 
5Glasnost signified openness and transparency in the discussion of political and social issues, including criticism of the 
government while also allowing greater freedom to the media. Perestroika was concerned with restructuring the Soviet system: 




increasingly called for environmental change and circumpolar cooperation amongst Arctic 
states and northern indigenous groups. These developments resulted in the Arctic transforming 
from a coexistent to a cooperative region society and signified that the Arctic underwent a 
regional transformation at the end of the Cold War from being a militarized theatre of 
superpower conflict, to a peaceful region of circumpolar cooperation. However, I also 
demonstrate that the political preferences of western leaders ultimately shaped whether new 
structures would emerge or if old ones were retained. Power dynamics between east and west 
strongly contributed to this process during the transitional era. Bridging the last years of the 
Cold War and the early post-Cold War years of the 1990’s this time period can be further sub-
divided into two time periods; the late 1980s (Chapter 4) and the early 1990s (Chapter 5).  
As such, in Chapter 5, I begin by analysing the factors influencing the creation of the post-
Cold War international order from 1991 to 1996. I will also explain how, during the post-Cold 
War transition period, the decision to retain security structures from the Cold War alongside 
the adaption of new regional institutions, created a dualistic regional order in the Arctic. One 
of my main arguments in this chapter is that to gain a comprehensive understanding of Arctic 
security at the end of the Cold War involves an analysis of the US decision to retain the NATO 
alliance. This is because to date, NATO remains the sole security organisation engaging in 
military security issues in the Arctic. Because NATO continues to exclude Russia and has 
blocked it from acquiring membership, Not only did the US continue to inherently mistrust 
Russia and view it as a rival state, but the US also viewed NATO as the best institute in which 
to ensure that American political and military preponderance would continue. I argue that this 
has prevented the development of comprehensive security cooperation mechanisms in the 
Arctic. Furthermore, I outline how this decision has led to the occurrence of regional security 
overlap both in the Arctic and the broader Euro-Atlantic area. Devised by Adler and Greave 
(2009), regional security overlap can be understood as a situation whereby two distinct sets of 
political and security practices coexist within the same space that can lead to contradictory 
forms of state behaviour and unanticipated outcomes. At the Arctic regional security level, 
the US decision to retain NATO also meant that military security cooperation was withheld 
from the Arctic Council to prevent power from being siphoned away from the US and NATO. 
I argue that the reason behind the US’ decision was based on adherence to American post-
Cold War grand strategy. The cornerstone of this policy envisioned NATO as the de-facto 
security actor in the post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic system and the Arctic regional sub-system. 
Therefore, the US sought to prevent the rise of new European security organisations that could 
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threaten the US-led order previously guaranteed through NATO - a decision that ultimately 
had broad implications for the post-Cold War international system. Rather than accepting the 
continuation of NATO in the post-Cold War era as a pre-determined outcome of history, this 
research advocates that it is necessary to delve more deeply into temporal and political 
conditions occurring in the international system during the transitional stage (1985-1996). The 
aim is to raise awareness about the alternative pathways available for Euro-Atlantic security 
that existed during this time as this ultimately impacted the prospects for post-Cold War Arctic 
regional security cooperation.  
At the same time, I argue that the emergence of the Arctic region at the end of the Cold War 
needs to be understood as a part of the broader historical global trend of regionalism and to be 
increasingly included in mainstream IR research on regional security. In the final years of the 
Cold War, political leaders in Arctic states and northern indigenous peoples gradually began 
to view the Arctic as “a cluster of states that are proximate to each other and are interconnected 
in spatial, cultural and ideational terms in a significant and distinguishable manner” (Paul 
2012:4). While regionalism as a political idea can be understood as a commitment to organize 
the world order in terms of regions: it can be more narrowly defined as a specific regional 
project (Söderbaum and Hettne 2009:2). Historically, there have been two main waves of 
regionalism – the first or ‘old’ wave and the second or ‘new’, wave of regionalism6.  The Arctic 
region, established at the end of the Cold War, falls into the latter category. As a theoretical 
sub-field of International Relations (IR), regionalism it is also tied to the major theoretical 
debates within the discipline. Here it is important to explain the distinction between 
regionalism and regionalisation as a way of demonstrating the differences in a top-down or 
bottom-up approach. I argue that the emergence of a cooperative regional society in the Arctic 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s simultaneously unleashed the twin process of regionalism 
and regionalisation. ‘Regionalism’ represents a general phenomenon, denoting formal and 
 
6 The first wave of regionalism peaked between the late 1940s and the 1960s and was dominated by the European experience6 
(Wunderlich 2007:1). Although linked to the development of European integration theory, first wave regionalism was also 
concerned with bigger issues such as peace and security (Söderbaum and Hettne 2009). For instance, Wunderlich (2007:1) 
mentions how first wave regionalism sought to assess the implications of the security dilemma that arose from the anarchical 
international system. In Europe, the solution was to develop a post-war economic community to promote inter-dependence 
and eradicate the possibility of another war between the European powers.The second wave of regionalism, also referred to as 
‘new regionalism’ emerged in the latter half of the 1980s and developed in a fundamentally different way than the first wave 
owing to changing systemic factors and the accelerated rate of globalization that occurred at the end of the Cold War. Hurrell 
(2007, p241) demonstrates this trend by illustrating how, out of a total of fifty-eight regional groupings, twenty of these were 





often state-led projects and processes. It can also encompass a body of norms, values, 
objectives, ideas and a type of international order or society (Schultz et al 2001, cited in 
Wunderlich 2007:3) As such, this holistic understanding of regionalism is complementary to 
the ES approaches to IR – which as referred to earlier, is the chosen theoretical framework of 
this thesis. In contrast, the importance of the latter term – ‘regionalisation’ – lends itself to a 
more informal approach that represents a drive by non-state actors for more formal regulatory 
mechanisms and issue-specific regional governance (Wunderlich, 2007:3),  
In section 5.3 of Chapter 5, I will also demonstrate how the current institutional structure of 
the Arctic Council (AC) - established in 1996 as the Arctic’s primary inter-governmental 
regional organisation - is not only the product of contemporary political developments but 
goes back to “idiosyncratic factors” that led to the AC’s creation, thus it is necessary to 
understand the path-dependencies these factors set in motion (Wunderlich 2007:2). Because 
the Arctic Council inter-governmental organization is a key component of the Arctic regional 
project, the political conditions surrounding its creation need to be carefully analysed as this 
serves to demonstrate the twin processes of regionalism and regionalisation occurring in the 
Arctic during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, a major component of this chapter is to 
demonstrate how changes in the Arctic were not only due to developments occurring in the 
international system in a top-down manner but in fact were also the result of a pro-active 
engagement by Arctic peoples with the process of regionalisation. Wunderlich (2007:2) 
advises that only through a careful historical analysis is it possible to attain a full 
comprehension of current developments and problems faced by regional organisations. One 
such problem is the question surrounding the AC’s role in regional security cooperation. It 
will be shown how a coalition between Canadian indigenous groups and disarmament 
movements formed an advocacy coalition to engage with the Canadian government to create 
a circumpolar Arctic regional organisation. The Canadian advocacy coalition envisioned an 
organisation that would not only be inclusive of indigenous northern leaders, but which would 
also put Arctic security and arms control on the political agenda.  
The formative roles played by the Soviet leadership, Finland (through the development of the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 1991) and Canada with the creation of the AC, all 
suggest that the post-Cold War Arctic regional order was not shaped by the United States. 
American disinterest and negligence of the region in the early post-Cold War years essentially 
created a political vacuum which was quickly filled by other Arctic states. Although the 
Canadian government undoubtedly demonstrates a regional leadership role in the negotiations 
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leading up to the creation of the AC – I argue that the region did not become a true multipolar 
system. This is because the US’ ultimately exerted its power in the region when it insisted 
during AC negotiations that security remained excluded from the Council’s forums. This 
demonstrates that the post-Cold War Arctic emerged as neither a unipolar or multipolar 
system. Instead it can be best described using Samuel Huntington’s (1999:36) term ‘uni-
multipolar’ system. Huntington outlines how this “strange hybrid” is a system that consists of 
“one superpower and several major powers” (ibid). Applying uni-multipolarity to the Arctic 
regional level, it can be seen how Canada and Russia are representative of secondary powers 
in this regional system.  Huntington explains that although the settlement of key international 
issues requires action by the single superpower it is always with some combination of other 
major states (p.36). This is evident in the post-Cold War Arctic where AC decision-making 
processes require the consensus of all eight Arctic states. However, Huntington cautions that 
the single superpower is nonetheless capable of veto action on key issues – a tendency that 
has already proven to be accurate with respect to the US’ decision to prevent military security 
issues being discussed in the AC.   
In Chapter 6, I will review the present-day Arctic political order focusing on non-military 
aspects of Arctic cooperation from 1997 up to 2020. Since the establishment of the AC in 1996 
served as a milestone for Arctic regionalisation, I argue that the beginning of a new, third stage 
of Arctic political development occurred after this time. A main component of this chapter will 
involve analysing the United States (section 6.1) and Russia’s (Section 6.2) Arctic strategies 
from 1996-2020, in addition to an assessment of the performance of the two regional powers 
within the AC; their perceptions of the role and responsibilities of the AC institutional structure, 
and their willingness to utilise the AC forums as the primary means through which to engage 
in political cooperation. This will determine the degree to which the Arctic regional powers are 
satisfied or dissatisfied with the regional order as per the RPSF.   
 In section 6.1.1. I address some prevalent themes underlying the US’ strategic doctrine on the 
Arctic – I focus on two non-strategic and normative issues; internationalism and 
territorialisation. This serves the purpose of providing deeper insights into American political 
culture and determine why certain key features of US Arctic policy have remained consistent 
despite changes in political leadership. I show how the threat of internationalism has led the 
US to confine the AC’s role to that of a regional forum for dialogue rather than a legally binding 
international institution. I argue that a key motivation behind this action is to prevent the US 
from being legally restricted by the AC and to retain a freedom to pursue unilateral actions in 
28 
 
the Arctic and internationally. This is considered a necessary requisite for an American grand 
strategy based on global primacy; an issue that also has important ramifications for regional 
security overlap in the Arctic. Secondly, I argue that the US Arctic policy is also informed by 
the issue of territorialisation – particularly US concerns over bids by other Arctic states to 
extend their maritime waters through UNCLOS. For example, Canadian and Russian claims 
that the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route/Northeast Passage are internal waters 
- has led to the US to reassert the importance of the freedom of the seas and open access to the 
Arctic Ocean.  
In section 6.1.2, 6.1.3 and 6.1.4  respectively, I will analyse US participation in the Arctic 
Council from 1997 up to the year 2020, dividing it into three stages based on consecutive US 
presidencies – (the Clinton-Bush presidencies 1998-2009; the Obama presidency 2009-2017 
and the Trump presidency up to 2020). In each section I discuss corresponding US Arctic 
strategies and other relevant policy documents to determine if the US has exhibited regional 
leadership tendencies within the current Arctic order. While the opportunity for the US to 
demonstrate Arctic regional leadership presented itself during the two times it held the 
chairmanship of the AC (1998-2000 and again in 2015-2017) I argue that the US has not 
behaved as a regional leader as defined by the RPSF and while it has suggested new projects, 
these have been issue-specific.  
Nonetheless, I argue that the United States still exerts a considerable amount of influence under 
uni-multipolarity in the Arctic and continues to pursue a mainly status-quo approach to the 
region. Evidence of this is shown in section 6.1.4., where I illustrate how a major challenge to 
the AC occurred in 2008 in the form of a proposal to create a new mini-lateral forum consisting 
of the five Arctic coastal states (the United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark [Greenland] and 
Norway) that have territory bordering the Arctic Ocean. Referred to as the Arctic Five (A5) - 
the forum produced the Illulissat Declaration which proclaimed the A5’s stewardship over the 
Arctic Ocean. However, a backlash of international condemnation led to the US reconsidering 
the role of the A5 forum, and instead choosing to re-commit to the AC. I summarise that the 
US decision to re-prioritise the AC over the A5 forum demonstrates the latent ability of the US 
to act as a regional leader in strengthening or weakening Arctic institutional processes. 
However, while the US’ actions demonstrate that it still has the power capacity to play a 
regional leadership role in the region - to date, the US has not acted as a regional leader in the 
Arctic since it has not proposed any new initiatives or influenced the long-term development 
of regional cooperation. Instead, I argue that the US can be more accurately described as a 
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regional custodian and enforcer of the status quo since at times the US has shown that it will 
exert power to achieve consensus on specific issues. 
Turning the focus towards Russia, in section 6.2.1, 6.2.2. and 6.2.3. I outline how domestic 
Russian political developments from 1997-2020 have impacted the development of Russia’s 
Arctic policies and its participation in the Arctic Council during three sub-phases of 
contemporary Russian political history (Putin’s first and second terms (1999-2007), the 
Medvedev presidency (2007-2011) and Putin’s third and fourth terms (2011-2020). In a similar 
vein to the United States, I argue that the Russian Federation (RF) has not behaved as a regional 
leader during this stage of Arctic development. Instead, it will be shown how domestic politics, 
economic interests and the pursuit of great power status and Arctic hegemony continue to be 
the driving force influencing the RF’s Arctic strategy. Russia’s intensive development strategy 
for the Arctic and increased industrial activities, particularly in the area of resource extraction, 
also raises concerns over the future of indigenous rights and the continuing participation of 
indigenous peoples of the Russian north in international forums such as the AC. All these 
issues, I argue leave little room for Russia to initiate new projects that strengthen circumpolar 
cooperation. Current media framings of the Arctic as well as some western political literature 
has presented Russia as a revisionist power in the Arctic. I will address this claim by reviewing 
Russia’s behaviour through an assessment of its participation in the Arctic Council from 1998 
to the present-day to discern if Russia behaves as a status quo or revisionist power in the Arctic 
regional order. I conclude that Russian satisfaction with the present-day Arctic political order 
can be explained through its inclusion as a respected and equal member of the AC and A5 
forums, while it also receives political benefits from participating in these structures and 
furthermore, Russia’s adherence to international maritime law can be explained on the grounds 
that UNCLOS has served as a safeguard to preserve Russian territorial integrity and 
sovereignty,  
In section 6.5., I summarise how political developments discussed throughout the chapter fit 
into the gradual expansion of regional society in the current Arctic order as illustrated through 
Buzan’s (2012) model. This includes assessing the extent to which Arctic regional society has 
expanded since the early 1990s and to ascertain if it has evolved to a more advanced form.  I 
conclude that while Arctic regional society has not evolved past a cooperative society it has 
nonetheless built on the successes achieved during the post-Cold War transition years and has 
expanded considerably over the past thirty-years. Strong evidence of this can be observed 
through the growing range of issue-specific institutions in existence in the Arctic region (see 
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Table 6.1 in Chapter 6), especially in the policy areas of indigenous rights and participation, 
but also with respect to Arctic environmental governance. More recently, the Canadian 
initiative to establishment of the AEC may imply that economic cooperation may be the next 
step towards greater levels of regional integration in the Arctic. In time, this could lead to the 
development of an Arctic security institution. I argue that first however, the problem of regional 
security overlap must be overcome. Only then it will be possible for Arctic regional society to 
evolve to more advanced forms of security cooperation.  
In Chapter 7, I return to focusing on military security issues through an investigation of  US 
and Russian defence strategies (sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3) to discern how these two regional 
powers interpret 21st century security challenges in the region. I will seek to assess if the US 
intends to utilise NATO as the primary mechanism through which to implement its Arctic 
defence strategy and to discuss how important NATO is in the Arctic. In section 7.1.2., I 
discuss the United States-NATO relationship to determine the degree of domestic American 
political support for the alliance along with challenges surrounding the future of NATO 
particularly over the divisive issue of military spending amongst alliance members. Concerning 
Russia, in section 7.1.3., I will evaluate changes in Russia’s Arctic military strategy, especially 
in the post-Ukraine period to examine if Russia is increasingly behaving as a revisionist state 
in the Arctic. While climate change and environmental issues will undoubtedly continue to 
steer Arctic regional political cooperation, I argue that the Arctic security order is still 
constrained by regional security overlap and the continuation of Cold War security structures. 
Through the lens of ES approaches, I seek to highlight the danger that should the US-led NATO 
alliance and Russia continue to increase their respective militaries in the High North that this 
could lead to the re-securitization of the Arctic. I discuss recent events that have triggered a 
new urgency surrounding arms control and nuclear safety in the Arctic - the US’ withdrawal 
of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty in February 2019, responses from Arctic 
states and implications for the future.  
In section 7.2.2., NATO’s activities in the post-Cold War Arctic will be discussed. I 
demonstrate how NATO retained a latent military presence in the Arctic in the immediate post-
Cold War years, while the 2000s witnessed a resurgence of interest by the US and NATO in 
the High North. This resulted at first in a gradual increase of military activity, followed by a 
faster pace of change that witnessed a sharper increase of deployments and military exercises 
in the Arctic in the aftermath of Ukraine in 2014 (section 7.2.3). Following this, I identify 
Russia’s position on NATO and Arctic security post-Ukraine in section 7.2.4, arguing that 
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Russia has retained a constant anti-NATO stance that has only been strengthened in the post-
Ukrainian era by Western sanctions, the suspension of the NATO-Russian Council and other 
military and diplomatic channels of communications. Nonetheless, I will show through 
deconstructing political statements from high level Russian officials how Russia continued to 
support the AC in the aftermath of Ukraine, while also declaring that the Arctic was a relatively 
peaceful region where a stronger NATO presence is not required. I then turn to addressing the 
contentious issue of US-Russian nuclear arms control, Russia’s development of new BMD 
systems in the Arctic, the ‘Skyfall’ incident of August 2019 and its reaction to the US 
withdrawal from the INF treaty. While a positive outcome emerged from the Skyfalll disaster 
– the creation of a new AC working group on radiation and nuclear incidents – I argue that 
NATO nuclear deterrence in the Arctic remains a key concern for Russia particularly amidst 
the increasing uncertainty surrounding the future of nuclear arms agreements in the post-INF 
era .  
In Chapter 8, I continue with an analysis of the Arctic security order, focusing on the small 
and medium Artic states to determine the level of consensus that they hold towards NATO. As 
in previous chapters, I first assess relation between NATO and the Arctic member states 
Canada (section 8.1.1), Denmark/Greenland, Iceland and Norway (section 8.1.2). This is 
followed by a discussion of non-NATO members Sweden and Finland (8.1.3.) and a discussion 
surrounding how likely is it that these states will pursue NATO membership in the near future. 
Having already outlined in Chapter 7 that NATO does not currently have an Arctic strategy, 
nor has it expressed plans to develop one, I nonetheless argue in section 8.2.1. that NATO’s 
activities have increased in the Arctic throughout the third stage of Arctic regional development 
(1997-2020).  Table 8.1 provides a list of large-scale multinational and NATO military 
exercises - exclusive of Russia - that have taken place in the Arctic from the first Cold Response 
exercise in 2006 up until 2020. In section 8.2.2. I then address the issue of Russian military 
exercises in the Arctic, lack of adherence to the OSCE Vienna Document (2011) and 
withholding advanced notice of exercises. I argue that a specific issue regarding Russian 
military exercises in the Arctic is that snap-exercises have been called during, or in the 
immediate aftermath of NATO Arctic exercises. While this can be seen as a political statement 
and show of force to the West, I nonetheless argue in section 8.3 that both NATO and Russian 
military exercises in the Arctic are part of an ongoing security dilemma. At the same time, the 
risks associated with such exercises are downplayed by the media and military officials. In the 
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conclusion (section 8.4) I provide a summary of the key features of the Post-Cold War Arctic 
security order (see table 8.1) 
Finally, in Chapter 9, I review the key findings of the thesis from Chapter 1 – 7, before 
providing some suggestions for further research on Arctic security cooperation in section 9.5. 
I consider ways in which the problem of regional security overlap could be resolved, by 
engaging with debates surrounding the potential for developing collective security 
arrangements in the Arctic. Since the institutionalization of Arctic security cooperation is a 
strongly contested topic, the merits and demerits of this proposal will be weighed. Arguably, 
the biggest obstacle impeding the creation of Arctic security cooperation mechanisms will 
likely be opposition from the US and NATO. With its continued monopoly on European 
security, it is likely that the US and NATO would perceive an Arctic security forum inclusive 
of Russia as a threat to the cohesion of the alliance and create a conflict of interests.  I 
nonetheless utilise the ES and RPSF to advocate the overall long-term benefits that 
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1.2 Reviewing the Arctic political literature during the three stages of 
regional development 
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I will engage with key trends within the Arctic 
literature spanning the three historical stages of development; the Cold War Arctic (section 
1.3), the transitional stage of Arctic development (1.4) and the present-day Arctic regional 
order (1.5).   
First, I will review some of the challenges I will face when engaging with the configuration of 
the Cold War Arctic, particularly how to identify sources of change in the apparently stagnant 
and unchanging bipolar system of the Cold War Arctic (section 1.3.1). Following from this, in 
section 1.3.2, I will address the question of Cold War periodization - how to divide the Cold 
War into stages or different time periods. This serves the purpose of showing how revisions 
and change in foreign policy can induce gradual systemic changes. I argue that such changes 
can be observed through the shifting alliance structures of the Cold War that in turn contributed 
to gradual alterations within the bipolar international system. These systemic shifts also 
contributed to changes in the Cold War Arctic order and led to the eventual creation of the 
post-Cold War Arctic region. In section 1.3.3., I suggest that looking at leadership turnover 
serves as a useful way of navigating changes in the foreign policy of the US and Soviet 
leadership respectively. In section 1.3.4, I then turn my attention to the social and political 
literature written during the Cold War era in addition to retrospective historical studies of the 
Cold War Arctic. Because of language constraints, my reviewing primarily focuses on the 
Anglophone literature written throughout all three stages of Arctic development. The literature 
review is conducted on a state-by-state basis in order to compare key social, political and 
security issues occurring across the eight Arctic states. Given the United Kingdom’s long- 
standing interest in polar affairs, I also refer to British Cold War Arctic studies published 
through British academic journal Polar Record. 
In section 4.1. I address the literature of the transitional stage of Arctic development, 
corresponding to the late 1980s and early 1990s. This represented a significant time where 
academics enthusiastically engaged with Arctic regionalism and regionalisation along with 
new proposals for Arctic regional cooperation and later the structure and functions of the AC. 
Geir Hønnenland (2013) describes this literature period as the ‘first wave’ of Arctic regional 
literature. The first wave of Arctic political literature emerged in the 1980s and continued 
throughout the transition stage of Arctic regional development, into the contemporary era of 
Arctic politics. In section 4.2., I focus on the shortcomings of the first wave of Arctic literature. 
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I raise the issue of how there were significant gaps in the literature regarding discussions 
surrounding the post-Cold War Arctic regional security order. I emphasise that it was a failure 
on behalf of academics and Arctic researchers not to consider the long-term impact that the 
decision to exclude security cooperation from the AC would have on the regional security 
order. Similarly, there was no discussion about how the continuation of NATO in the post-
Cold War era would affect Arctic security cooperation.  
In section 1.5 I review the literature of the contemporary Arctic regional order from 1997 
onwards. According to Hønnenland, a turning point in the Arctic discourse occurred in 2007, 
after Russia planted a titanium flag on the floor of the Arctic Ocean at the North Pole. This 
heralded in the ‘second wave’ of literature that witnessed the return of geostrategic issues and 
inter-state competition in the Arctic. I discuss the second wave literature in section 1.5.1 before 
proposing that in addition to the first and second waves, there has also been a more recent third 
wave of literature that emerged in the aftermath of the Ukrainian conflict in 2014 (section 
1.5.2). I outline how the Arctic political literature has now begun to engage with the issue of 
‘spill-over’ – how events occurring in the international system could impact Arctic regional 
cooperation. Russia’s role in the Arctic undoubtedly remains central to these debates. I argue 
however that third wave literature also raises questions surrounding the future of Arctic 
regional security cooperation. The rapid changes occurring in the Arctic due to climate change 
means that non-Arctic states are increasingly drawn to the region and seek to have a stronger 
role in Arctic affairs. To summarize these findings, table 1.1. illustrates the three stages of 
Arctic regional development and the corresponding literature ‘waves’ that I have utilized to 
show change within these time periods.  
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Table 1.4 The Three Stages of Arctic Regional Development and the corresponding 
waves of literature 
 
 
Stage 3:The Post-Cold War Arctic Regional Order: 1997-2020
Chapter 6 - 8  
Hønnenland’s (2015) two 'waves' of Arctic literature and Young's (2006) corresponding 
discourses
Eco-system based managment 
(liberal institutional discourse) 
First Wave Literature 1989-2007
Realist/geopolitical 'Race for 
the Arctic' discourse                               
Second Wave 2007-2014
English School approaches
Proposed new 'third' Wave  
2014-present day (2020)
Stage 2: The Transitional stage
Including the era of Incipient Multipolarity: 1970-1984 and 
the Transitional Arctic Order: 1986-1996 
(Chapter 4 and 5) 
Adler and Greave (2009) 'Regional Security Overlap'
Incipient Multipolarity - 1970-1984 
Although the Cold war arguably continued during 
this time, new transnational forces began to 
influence changes within the international system, 
thus beginning the global transformation away from 
bipolarity that would continue into the 1990s 
The Transitional Arctic Order - 1985-1996
Arctic Region-building initatives and 
institutional development leading to a revised 
Arctic political order. However the retention of 
Cold War security structures (NATO) led to 
Regional security overlap
The First Wave of Arctic regional Literature 
emerges in the late 1980s and continues 
throughout the transition period 
Stage 1: The Cold War Arctic Order: 1945-1969 
(Chapter 3)
Jones' (1991) alliance structures and the Cold War 
1) The Tight Bipolar Era 
1946-1953  




1.3 The Cold War era - Literature Review 
1.3.1 How to depict change in the Cold War Arctic   
Renowned sociologist Charles Tilly (2002:568) suggests that in order to review historical 
political processes we must draw attention to the ways in which temporal and spatial 
interdependencies affect the nature of social interactions. Tilly advises that engaging in 
historical political analysis requires a systematic description and explanation of social 
processes - particularly such processes involving governments; since these will vary 
significantly “as a function of their location in space and time”. In the context of this research 
it is therefore important to pay attention to the distinct differences in political culture and 
processes amongst the eight Arctic states during the historic Cold War era. There are many 
theoretical and methodological ways which historical analysis could be undertaken; for 
instance, a bottom-up analysis of public policy approaches could be utilised, or alternatively,  
critical security theory could be adapted to engage in different understandings of the political 
and security environment expressed by indigenous peoples in the historical Arctic. However, 
in this research I mainly focus on a top-down approach as this provides a comprehensive way 
of recounting the inter-state relations of all eight Arctic states throughout the 70-year timespan 
at all three levels of the international system (systemic, sub-systemic/regional and state levels). 
Although taking this approach does require some sacrifices including a loss of detail at the sub-
state level, it is hoped that this study will contribute to IR theory by demonstrating how macro 
systemic changes occurring at the international level impacted the development of Arctic 
regionalism at the end of the Cold War. The historian Marc Bloch has emphasized that history 
can be understood as the science of change. Yet Bloch argues that the most important lessons 
of history are derived not from thinking that what happened yesterday will necessarily happen 
tomorrow, or that the past will repeat itself. Instead, he argues that the study of history demands 
a detailed explanation of how and why yesterday differed from the day before, so that it is 
possible to envisage how the future may differ from the past (Bloch 2013 cited in Monaghan 
2015:12). History can therefore teach us significant lessons about change. One of the key aims 
of this section is to outline how I will identify the processes of change occurring in the Arctic 
sub-system in the otherwise ‘fixed’ bipolar, Cold War international system. Within the Cold 
War Arctic, I will primarily engage with two levels of analysis since the regional (third level) 
only emerged at the end of the Cold War during the second, transitional stage of Arctic regional 
development, amidst the growing complexity and increasing rate of change occurring in the 
international system. I argue that only through evaluating the foreign policy choices of the 
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Arctic states and the historical conditions in which they were operating in, is it possible to 
create a clear understanding of the forces contributing to regional and systemic transformation 
at the end of the Cold War. 
1.3.2 The challenge of Cold War periodization 
A basic view of evaluating change in the Cold War is to divide the era into two periods referred 
to by Cold War scholars as ‘the standard model’. The first period, known as the ‘Hot War’ or 
early Cold War, was a forty-year period that lasted roughly from 1949 to 1958 culminating in 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. After this period, a temporary suspension of the arms race known as 
detente ensured. Although further periods of escalated tensions occurred later in the Cold War 
during the 1980s, at no point did it reach the heightened tensions of the earlier period where 
the world tethered on the brink of global nuclear war.  
Alternatively, some scholars have developed their own model of periodization for categorising 
and explaining the events of the Cold War. For example, Ralph Levering (1994) considers that 
there were three dangerous phases of the Cold War, based on trends in foreign policy and 
superpower relations. In agreement with the standard model, Levering suggests that the first 
and most dangerous phase of the Cold War lasted from 1950 to 1952, when the bipolar structure 
of the international system had consolidated in such a way that it created patterns of action and 
reaction largely contingent on the superpowers misinterpreting the other's intentions. One 
example of this was with respect to the US’ inability to formulate a clear strategy regarding 
Asia resulting in the outbreak of the Korean War. While many Americans didn’t approve or 
understand the US’ involvement in the Korean War, the US leadership and policymakers 
considered it of vital importance: President Harry S. Truman stated in April 1951 “In the 
simplest of terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world 
war.” The 'Second Dangerous Phase' from 1956-1962' corresponds to the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and again relates to misinterpretation - this time on the Soviet side, of an American response 
to the positioning of Soviet nuclear arms in Cuba and its intentions for the Caribbean region.  
The final 'Third Dangerous Phase' from 1980-1984 of the Cold War, coincides with the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and US President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). 
According to Levering (1994), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the worst setback since 
the Cuban missile crisis since it divided the previous decade of detent from the ensuing years 
of containment and confrontation.  
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Although Levering’s model is useful in highlighting changes in superpower relations as well 
as shifts in the international structure of bipolarity, I believe that adapting this model would 
overly-restrict my analysis of the Arctic to superpower relations alone - even while considering 
that changes occurring elsewhere in the global bipolar system may not be experienced in the 
peripheral Arctic until a later time or may not have any demonstrable effect at all.  For instance, 
while Levering’s model considers the influence that 'proxy' wars had on increasing tensions 
between the superpowers system, it is not clear how this would translate to changes in the 
Arctic besides an increase or decrease of military defence activities. Fortunately, the Arctic 
remained relatively peaceful throughout the Cold War therefore no proxy wars or 'hot' conflicts 
occurred that can be directly correlated to changes. The absence of such conflicts may be 
credited not only due to the remote and inhospitable environment but also to the role of the 
small Arctic states, particularly Norway, for ensuring that NATO activities did not occur close 
to the Norway/Russian border and escalate into armed conflict.  
Instead, I will argue that changes occurring in the Arctic were not only a result of international 
events but domestic policy influences: both of which contributed to defining distinct phases 
during the Cold War and eventually leading to the emergence of regional initiatives. However, 
when dividing history into periods of time, there are also some pitfalls to be recognised. James 
Hershberg (2000, p303) points out that periodization can be a dangerous and tricky business as 
selecting 'turning points' immediately invites deconstruction. While orthodox Cold War 
scholars may recount changes in political leadership and foreign policy as the key to 
periodization, revisionists such as Hershberg invite us to rethink this conception:    
If one new challenge facing Cold War historians is, in fact, a 're-periodization' of the era, another is the 
need for at least a partial 'retroactive de-bipolariazation' of much of the Cold War's history. Increasingly, 
just as the 'post-Cold War' world's multipolar nature has been spotlighted by analysts, the emerging 
evidence of complex two-way relations between superpowers and their allies during the Cold War hardly 
conforms to the classic models of blocs marching in lock-step unison presented to the public at the time. 
There is a need for increased attention to the roles of neutral or semi-neutral states and groupings (not only 
the formal 'Non-aligned Movement' but regional, national, and transnational forces....who struggled....to 
break out of the Cold War narrative scripted by and in Washington and Moscow (Hershberg 2000: 304) 
In agreement with Hershberg, I feel that a necessary part of this work is to re-write the small 
Arctic states back into the Cold War bipolar structure and identify their contribution towards 
change and regionalization. While Canada is categorised in this work as a medium state and 
the other five Arctic states are 'small states', I propose that all six states can assist in the process 
of identifying change throughout the Cold War period, by illustrating how small states also 
configured the international system through their relations with the superpowers and through 
their own foreign policy choices of alignment or non-alignment. The adopted Cold War model 
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of periodization must also be able to demonstrates how the subtle and not-so-subtle shifts in 
superpower relations influenced the nature of bipolarity. Furthermore, it should demonstrate 
how the other Arctic states contributed to either endorsing, or alternatively, reassessing the 
Cold War Arctic order at these critical turning points to better negotiate their position relative 
to the United States and the Soviet Union. My solution is to look towards leadership turnover, 
changes in foreign policy and event analysis to draw out the details relevant to the making and 
shaping of the Cold War Arctic, while also navigating key historical turning points in Arctic 
history, detailing how the High North advanced from a Cold War militarised theatre towards 
becoming a fully recognised international region.  
While Chapter 3 will engage with the superpower competition between the United States and 
the Soviet Union and their relations with the small and medium Arctic states, Chapter 4 will 
outline the beginning of the transitional period of Arctic regional development. It is therefore 
my intent to apply the same model of periodization for both chapters to allow for consistency 
and cross comparisons. To accommodate for these requirements, I have chosen to adopt Walter 
S. Jones’ (1991) periodization of Cold War bipolarity in which there are not two stages as in 
the standard model, but three. The difference is not so much in the extra stage, (after all 
Levering’s (1994) model also has three stages) but what this model can contribute to my 
research, that is, to more effectively capture the role of smaller states in the alliance structures. 
This is achieved in Jones model through sub-dividing the bipolar era into tight and loose stages, 
followed by a period of incipient multipolarity. Together these three stages exhibit the nuances 
of alliance structures while also demonstrating how the end of bipolarity did not occur 
unannounced but had been in the making from the mid-1970s. As such, I believe that by 
utilising Jones’ model, these gradual structural developments can, in hindsight, become much 
clearer.  
1.3.3 Leadership turnover and foreign policy analysis: identifying sources of change in 
Cold War Arctic politics 
For most of the Cold War era, the Arctic region experienced great power influence in the form 
of military and economic doctrines that were in turn structured by a combination of internal 
and external influences. Cole (1974, p5-6) explains that as domestic and external influences 
each seek to steer foreign policy in alternative directions, political leaders and policymakers 
are then confronted with having to proscribe a 'middle of the road' solution. However, because 
interests are not fixed, and individual actors can significantly contribute to the outcomes of 
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foreign policy we must also consider how differences between American and Soviet political 
institutions and the role of human agency (leadership) influenced patterns of change in the 
Arctic.  
Christopher Jönsson (1984:74) highlights how the US and Soviet systems differed with respect 
to leadership turnover. Constitutionalised succession in the American political system ensures 
a relatively quick and regular turnover rate in the highest offices. However just as significant 
as the presidential turnover was the turnover in foreign policy staff –the crucial role of George 
Kennan and Paul Nitze in their respective strategies of containment cannot be understated. Paul 
Nitze can be credited with altering US foreign policy when he became Head of Policy Planning 
in the early 1950s, the first major foreign policy shift that occurred in the United States during 
the Cold War. In practice, the Nitze concept brought into effect a more diverse range of 
aggressive military strategies used towards containing the Soviet threat. For the Arctic this saw 
the emergence of what authors such as Tamnes (1991) and Petersen (2011) refer to as the ‘Polar 
Strategy’ that saw heightened militarisation in the Arctic in the late 1950s and consolidated 
through the establishment of NORAD for the joint military planning of North American and 
Arctic defence.  
In contrast to the United States, the lack of regulated succession in the Soviet Union meant that 
there was far less regular turnover in the Soviet political leadership (Jönsson 1984:75).  
Although the Stalinist leadership underwent a continual turnover owing to the succession of 
purges, Soviet Arctic strategy remained largely consistent with the Sectoral Theory/ Historical 
Waters Doctrine for most of the Cold War. This strategy supported the idea that the northern 
waterways of the Soviet Arctic were ‘internal waterways’ and as such could be defended from 
international shipping, preventing Western submarines operating along the Soviet Union’s 
northern maritime area. Then, under Khrushchev a major upheaval occurred when coming into 
power in 1957, he instigated a purge of the ‘anti-party group’ and a denouncement of Stalinism 
took place, resulting in a drastic change of the top-level leaders in the Politburo. However, after 
Khrushchev’s fall, turnover rates took a sharp downturn with the Soviet leadership 
experiencing a period of stagnation under Brezhnev (ibid). The slow Soviet leadership turnover 
also signified longer periods of continuation in foreign policy with the Soviet Union being 
resigned to reacting to Western policies rather than taking proactive measures of change. This 
changed when Mikhail Gorbachev came into office in 1985 and we see the emergence of a 
proactive Soviet foreign policy. Overall, the slower rates of change in Soviet leadership 
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turnover and foreign policy can be contrasted to the more frequent changes in the United States 
foreign policy as a result of higher rates of leadership turnover.  
1.3.4. The Arctic Cold War literature from the social and political sciences (1945-1969)  
Having investigated the challenges associated with writing and re-writing Cold War history, 
this section will engage with the political literature written during, and retrospectively, about 
the Cold War Arctic. A general observation is that the majority of Cold War Arctic literature 
was written from a national or sub-regional (i.e. the North American Arctic or the Nordic 
countries) perspective. I will therefore engage with the literature on a country-by-country basis 
discussing the political, social and environmental literature to discern the impact this had on 
the development of early Arctic regional studies.  
 
1.3.4.1 American Arctic literature 
Beginning with the United States, Marsden (1954:39) outlines how the Arctic Institute of North 
America was established in 1945 to record and disseminate knowledge of the North American 
Arctic gained during the closing years of WWII. This was a private organisation, created not 
by the US federal government but by individuals seeking to coordinate mainly geophysical 
Arctic research. However, the growth of government agencies, university departments and 
institutes dedicated to polar research in the post-Cold War years both served to diversify the 
literature while at the same time to politicise it. As a result it can be argued that American 
political literature on the North American Arctic in the post War and the early Cold War period 
was written from a predominantly realist/geopolitical or interest-based perspective, focusing 
on such topics as the legal status of the Arctic (Svarlien 1958), military operations in the polar 
regions (Cruzen 1949), the Soviet threat and the role of Alaska in the superpower conflict 
(Gould 1948, Reed 1958, Roucek 1983, Purver 1984, Bloomfield 1981). The British Journal 
Polar Record published an early Cold War report based on US and Canadian newspaper 
publications detailing ‘[military] manoeuvres in the North American Arctic 1946-47’ by the 
United States and Canadian naval and air forces. Maritime military literature on the Cold War 
Arctic is relatively plentiful, such as from the Naval War College Review, (see Garde 1985, 
Weir 2005), The Journal of Strategic Studies, The Journal of Navigation, (Lyon 1984) and 
from RAND – an American military think tank that has published defence intelligence reports 
on the Soviet maritime Arctic (see for example Olenicoff 1972).   
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However, literature written on Alaska includes a broad range of topics from Sonnenfeld’s 
(1959) paper on the Arctic Reindeer Industry in Alaska, to anthropological papers on 
indigenous peoples of the North American and Canadian Arctic (e.g. Moran 1981) and socio-
economic and geographical studies. For example, Anders (1989) retrospectively engages in an 
account of how the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 impacted the Native people 
of Alaska. Hummel (2005) provides a comprehensive account of US military activities in 
Alaska during the Cold War and demonstrates that a strong military presence affected Alaskan 
demographics economic development and infrastructure. Finally, there are also several texts 
engaging with the political, social and economic history of Alaska spanning the Cold War era, 
however these are mostly written retrospectively (Brown and Thomas 1996, Naske & Slotnik 
2014, Falk 2006, Haycox 2002).   
 
1.3.4.2 Soviet Arctic Literature 
Some of the early Western accounts of the Soviet Arctic come from the British journal Polar 
Record. For example, Roberts and Armstrong (1956) describe the Arctic Institute, in Leningrad 
(St Petersburg) during a British-Soviet scientific exchange. There are several social science 
and geographical accounts of the military and economic development of the Soviet Arctic 
written by westerners (Smolka 1937, Webster 1950, Archer 1988, Brigham 1991, Horensma 
1991). Alternatively, Anderson (1952) provides an excellent account of Soviet perspectives 
towards Northern Europe. He outlines how Soviet ideology guided foreign policy towards a) 
the Baltic Sea, b) Finland and Scandinavia and c) The Arctic. Accounts of Soviet scientific 
expeditions in the Arctic were occasionally published in English such as Gordienko’s (1961) 
paper that appeared in Scientific American.  
 
1.3.4.3 Canada 
In a similar vein to the US and the Soviet Union, Canadian Cold War Arctic literature primarily 
focused on discussions of military security in the Canadian Arctic and ‘the national interest’ 
(see Cohen 1970/71, Critchley 1987, Eyre 1987). Writing retrospectively, Lackenbaur and 
Farish (2007) provide a comprehensive account of the Cold War militarization of the Canadian 
Arctic, while Lee-Anne Broadhead (2015:284) specifically addresses the ‘toxic legacy of 
Arctic militarism’ on Canadian Arctic policy. Broadhead asserts that Canada’s present-day 
response to the tremendous threats facing the Arctic (and by extension to the planet), continues 
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to be steered by policymakers and officials relying on a mental map dating from the Cold War. 
This is a salient point which I also argue throughout my thesis as I challenge conventional 
perceptions of the present-day Arctic security order based on the Cold War US/Russian rivalry. 
Broadhead further draws attention to how Canadian Arctic policy has, since the beginning of 
the Cold War, been led by the rhetoric of the two traditional governing parties in Canada; the 
Conservatives and the Liberals, who have framed the Arctic in terms of ‘northern nationalism’. 
For example, Lester B. Pearson, who would later become Canadian Prime Minister in 1958, 
was one of the first to discuss the Canadian Arctic from a standpoint of national identity and 
power; Writing in 1953, Pearson claimed that 
Canadians have every reason to look north. We are now aware of its possibilities. What-ever direction and 
emphasis of our activity, the Arctic is coming into its own; and, with it, new opportunities and new 
responsibilities for Canada (Pearson 1953: 591). 
Military collaboration with the US and the construction of the DEW line of radar stations across 
the Canadian Arctic led to a surge of scientific literature on this project during the 1950s and 
60s (see for example The Science Newsletter 1955, 1957 and 1965), Retrospective Canadian 
analyses on the DEW line have also been produced by a number of academics (e.g. Campbell 
2017, Trudgen 2015, Neufeld 1998), along with discussions on the long-term impacts of the 
DEW line stations on both the environment and indigenous Canadian northerners (Hird 2016, 
Contenta 2012) while other literary sources discuss remediation efforts made on DEW line 
stations and other former military bases in the Canadian Arctic (Poland, Mitchell and Rutter 
2000).   
 
 1.3.4.4 Greenland, Iceland and Norway 
The Cold War political literature and retrospective Arctic historical literature concerning the 
Nordic Arctic states (Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland) covers a diverse range of 
topics from foreign policy, military defence and environmental security. The 
Nordic/Scandinavian countries have also been discussed collectively with respect to military 
intelligence cooperation (Petersson 2006, Jacobsen 2010). Retrospective efforts to discuss the 
Nordic region historically during the Cold War era have produced contributions such as Bailes 
(2012) discussion of the Nordic Countries ‘From War to Cold War’ and Dahl’s (2014) history 
of the Nordic-Baltic region from the Cold War to the present-day. Other contributions on 
Nordic security during the Cold War include Orvik’s (1966) paper on ‘Scandinavia, NATO 
and Northern Security’ which discusses the importance of the Northern Balance and the 
46 
 
strategic implications this arrangement could have had for the Nordic states if war had broken 
out between the West and the USSR. Similarly, Brundtland (1966) also debates the key features 
of the Nordic Balance and emphasises the value of the special position of Norway in NATO.     
An overarching theme of political writings on Iceland, Greenland and Norway during the Cold 
War involved discussions surrounding NATO membership and US basing rights. Early 
historical publications from American authors justifying the need for a US military presence in 
Greenland and Iceland appeared as early as 1939, (see Mosely 1939, Weigert 1944). Another 
early Cold War article written by the autonomous ‘G.L’ for The World Today appeared in 
(1956). The article discussed Iceland’s 1951 revision of the defence agreement it signed with 
the United States that called for the withdrawal of US troops from Keflavik Naval Air base. 
Neucheterlein’s (1961) publication provides an in-depth analysis on the early Cold War 
militarization of Iceland, while later accounts including Sparring (1972), Bjorgulfsdottir (1989) 
and Ingimundarson (2010) all discuss Iceland’s historical participation in NATO.  
Turning to Greenland, Tagholt’s (1982) article serves as a useful assessment outlining the 
general historical and political development of Greenland during the post-War and Cold War 
era. The geopolitical literature on the American militarization of Greenland during the Cold 
War is quite plentiful (see for example Fogelson 1989, Möller and Pehkonen 2003, Nielsen 
2013), while the growing importance of Greenland to US Polar Strategy in the 1960s is 
recounted by Sørensen (1979) and retrospectively by Petersen (2011). Other retrospective 
writings on the early Cold War in Greenland engage in topics such as US military science and 
technological research (Petersen 2013, Heymann et al 2010) and the search for uranium 
(Nielsen and Knudsen 2013).  
With respect to Norway, Krosby’s (1964) paper is one of the few English language publications 
that reflects on Norway’s Cold War role in NATO during the 1960s. Dyndal (2011) provides 
a much-needed retrospective Cold War history of NATO in Norway as does Fagertun (2015) 
who focuses on geopolitics and threat scenarios in the Norwegian north during the Cold War.  
Wicken (1997) discusses Norway’s space research during the Cold War – referring particularly 
to the launch of a rocket in 1962 at Andøya in Northern Norway as the beginning of a new 
phase in Norway’s space efforts and suggests that it intersected interests in the scientific, 
defence and foreign policy fields. However, he also highlights how ionospheric science and 




1.3.4.5 Sweden and Finland For semi-neutral Sweden, relations with the West and covert 
military and intelligence cooperation with the US appear to take precedence in Cold War 
writings (see Dalsjö 2013, Nilsson 2010, Aid 2006, Moores 2002). Sweden’s pursuit of nuclear 
non-proliferation from 1968 onwards was also a topic of academic interest during this period 
(see Van Dassen 1998). For Finland, discussions on Finnish foreign policy, and the pursuit of 
Cold War neutrality take precedence (Törngren 1961, Maude 1976, Tornudd 2005). However, 
environmental literature engaging with the history of the forests and timber industry of Finnish 
Lapland in the post-WWII/Cold War years has been written about retrospectively (Ahvenainen 
1990, Suopajävari 2003).  
  
1.4 Arctic literature from the era of Incipient Multipolarity (1970-1984), the 
Transitional stage (1985-1996) and the emergence of the first wave of Arctic 
regional literature 
1.4.1 Understanding the emergence of the first wave of Arctic regional literature in the 
latter years of the Cold War 
While the majority of Cold War Arctic political and social science literature was narrowly 
focused on the domestic and foreign policy interests of the individual Arctic states, including 
national perspectives on the US-USSR superpower conflict, or topics of interest discussed from 
a sub-regional perspective such as the North American Arctic or Northern Scandinavia. In this 
section I will outline the Arctic literature during the late Cold War (during the era of incipient 
multipolarity and the transition years) demonstrating that it was during the transition era that 
the first wave of Arctic regional literature emerged. In Chapter 4, I will discuss how Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s proposal for the creation of an international Arctic region heralded the beginning 
of new ideas for Arctic cooperation. However, it is important to mention that there were some 
earlier ideas for circumpolar cooperation that also contributed to this line of thinking.    
One example of this is Roberts’ (1949) paper ‘International Organisations for polar 
exploration.’ The article traces the history of international cooperation in the polar regions back 
to 1879 when Karl Weyprecht, an Austrian explorer and physicist first advanced “a definite 
scheme for investigating the polar regions on an international level.” (p.332). The outcome 
eventually resulted in the first International Polar Year (IPY) which took place from 1881-1884 
and witnessed a series of scientific expeditions taking place in the Arctic. Due to the success 
of the first IPY, science developed into an open activity where international collaboration and 
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sharing of data became the new basis for polar research. The International Geophysical Year 
(IPG) - often referred to as the third IPY7 - which took place in during the Cold War in 1957-
58, serves as a good example of how limited possibilities for international Arctic cooperation 
existed during this time.   
Yet the key point here is that although the seeds for cooperation existed prior to, and during 
the Cold War, the superpower conflict would ensure that the idea remained dormant. As such, 
the concept of an Arctic region did not appear within the literature until the late 1980s, which 
reflects how the idea had not yet taken root in politics nor conceived of as even a theoretical 
possibility. Thus, it was only after Gorbachev’s Murmansk proposal in 1987 that the idea of 
Arctic political cooperation became normalized in both theory and practice. In the following 
subsections (1.4.1.1 – 1.4.1.5), I will briefly discuss the national literature of Arctic states 
during the 1970s and 1980s which corresponds to the periods of incipient multipolarity and the 
transition stage. I will then turn to outlining the first wave literature in section 1.4.2 followed 
by a discussion on its shortcomings in section 1.4.3. 
 
1.4.1.1 Alaska, and American Arctic literature  
One persistent theme in the Alaskan political literature during the transition stage focused on 
Indigenous people’s calls for greater political autonomy amidst a time of major social and 
economic change. Within the American Arctic, there was a focus on evaluating the landmark 
1971 Alaska Native claims Settlement Act, with respect to the 1987 amendments. This also 
included addressing the ongoing legacy of previous Alaskan land claims (see for example 
Morehouse 1987, Flanders 1989, Bowen 1990/91, Haycox 1990, Naske 1991, McNabb 1992, 
and Hirschfield 1992). From the 1970s onwards American scientific reports began circulating 
about the effects of pollution and climate change in the Arctic (example Science News 1970, 
Kerr 1981).  Economic security and Diversification of the Alaskan economy also appears in 
the literature during this time as security agendas broaden from the military domain. For 
instance, Freeman (1994) discusses the sustainable management of wildlife and subsistence 
economies in Alaska while Brown and Thomas (1996) similarly discuss economic 
 
7 Due to the importance of polar research conducted during the program in addition to the close connections it had 




diversification. Hamilton and Seyfrit (1993) consider Alaskan youth aspirations in Arctic 
regions.  
However, US literature on the Alaskan oil extraction industry appears to have dominated North 
American Arctic literature during the later years of the Cold War as authors discuss how the 
industrialisation of the North Slope of Alaska impacts northern politics (for example see 
Gallagher 1969, Mc Laren 1984, Weeks and Weller 1984, Westermeyer 1984). Alaskan 
Environmental literature of the time focuses on the wide-reaching impacts of the oil industry 
on the North Slope community. Barbara Leibhardt (1986) provides a discussion on the legal 
and cultural change to indigenous peoples hunting practices along Alaska’s North slope coast 
as a result of oil development up until 1985. Amstrup et al (1986) reviewed how industrial 
activities and an increase of human population in Alaska’s northern regions affected polar bear 
numbers directly and indirectly. Others such as Ellanna and Wheeler (1989) emphasise the 
importance of Alaskan wetlands as the foundation for many Alaskan Native’s subsistence-
based economies during the 1980s. The 1989 Exon Valdez Oil spill in Prince William Sound 
Alaska was a watershed for Arctic environmental policy and maritime safety legislation as it 
was one of the worst oil spills in history to date. When the Exon Valdez tanker ran aground on 
24th March 1989 it spilled an estimated 11 million gallons of oil into pristine waters. Although 
the spill occurred in south Alaska - Birkland and Lawrence (2002:17) explain how the accident 
nonetheless had long term consequences for the North American Arctic - the most prominent 
of which relates to the ongoing debate over whether to open the coastal plain in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to further development. While some authors discussed the 
policy lessons to be learnt from the Exon Valdez oil spill (see Pain et al 1996 and Kurtz 2004), 
others reviewed the socio-economic implications for affected Alaskan communities (e.g. 
Goldberg 1994).  
For Alaskans, the perestroika era offered new opportunities for regional cooperation with their 
Russian neighbours directly across the Bering Strait in Chukotka. One regional effort towards 
breaking the ‘Ice Curtain’ – the Cold War boundary that divided the strait and the two nations; 
was a friendship flight between Nome, Alaska and Provideniya8 in Russia’s Chukotka region. 
Organised in 1988 during the era of glastonost and perestroika, the friendship flight, chartered 
by Alaskan Airlines, carried about seventy Alaskans including officials, academics, business 
leaders, entrepreneurs, artists, Native elders, and students from Nome to Provideniya. The 
 
8 Provideniya is a settlement of several thousand people on the eastern tip of the Soviet Union opposite Alaska. 
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importance of the era of ‘friendship flights’ was that they created new or re-established former 
social bonds between Alaskans and the peoples of Chukotka. This in turn generated new 
academic literature on area-specific cooperation between Alaska and Chukotka (Sheldon 1989, 
Rosen 2013). However, expectations that the friendship flight would produce an increase of 
trade and business and new partnerships in natural resource development did not come to 
fruition (see Tichotsky and Knapp 1992, Chance and Andreeva 1995). This is because the 
inconvertibility of the rouble and Soviet bureaucratic red tape inevitably stifled joint US-Soviet 
business ventures (Dobbs 1991).   
Strategic US military literature on the Arctic continued to be published during the transition 
stage of Arctic development, discussing such topics as conventional and nuclear defence, 
submarine activity and maritime strategy in Arctic waters (e.g. Jacobsen 1987, Gidadhubli 
1991), However, changes in the American military literature on the Arctic can also be observed. 
A good example of this is the signing of the 1991 US-Soviet maritime boundary agreement 
between Bush and Gorbachev (McNeill 1991). Another example is David Orr’s (1989) paper 
‘Dial 911-USSR’ which emphasised that the United States was not on par with the Soviet 
Union in terms of Arctic capabilities (especially icebreakers) – a theme that would re-emerge 
in Arctic literature two decades later. Of further interest in Orr’s paper is the recognition that 
Soviet Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities also exceeded those of the United States. 
He demonstrates this by referring to an incident that occurred near Barrow Alaska in 1988 
when the Soviet’s freed two grey whales trapped under the ice. While it would take almost 
another three decades before US-Russian cooperation in the area of SAR emerged – it can be 
seen how there was a growing awareness amongst military planners for the need to develop 
comprehensive Arctic SAR infrastructure. The importance of SAR and other non-traditional 
security areas can be considered part of the post-Cold War expansion of security issues that 
was aided by the US-Soviet détente in military rivalry that emerged during the transition period.   
A fundamental theme in the immediate post-Cold War years of the early 1990s was the US-
Russian efforts to clean up former military sites in the Russian Arctic. This included the 
decommissioning of Soviet nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered submarines, while also 
preventing spills by correctly disposing of spent radioactive fuel from nuclear components. In 
1994, the US Department of State issued a fact sheet on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, 
which was responsible for US-Russian environmental and technical cooperation in addition to 
scientific data sharing on Arctic ice (see also Arms Control Today 1994, Cerniello 1997, Milius 
1997). Following this, in 1995, the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment published 
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a book on Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic which revealed that lack of funds and government 
leadership hindered the Commission’s environmental work. Later, further indiscretions about 
the Commission would be revealed including lack of transparency and oversight (Broder 2000). 
Similarly, Palosaari and Möller’s (2004) paper outlines how the US’ primary objective in the 
post-Cold War Arctic remained strategically focused on nuclear decommissioning while efforts 
to tackle environmental problems including the clean-up efforts at former military bases and 
processing nuclear waste treatment remained secondary objectives that were not successfully 
realized. Other relevant post-Cold War Arctic literature on nuclear waste emerged from US 
military institutions; for example, Commander Hamilton II’s (1994) report on radioactive 
waste in the Nordic and Far East seas, while retrospective literature includes Sawhill’s (2000) 
article which engages with post-Cold War clean-up efforts of nuclear waste in the Arctic and 
military environmental cooperation.  
 
1.4.1.2 The Soviet and post-Soviet Arctic  
There are a range of sources on Arctic environmental literature from the late Soviet and early 
post-Soviet years. Early Soviet environmental literature emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Western literature on environmental issues focused on topics such as pollution control in the 
Soviet Arctic (Butler 1972) and the repercussions of Soviet river diversions on the Arctic 
Ocean (Cattle 1985). On the other hand, Soviet scientists produced circumpolar publications 
on the external sources of pollution of the Arctic seas – for instance, the documentation of 
radioactive waste from Western European nuclear plants rather than from Soviet sources, 
although this mainly served as a means of avoiding Soviet censorship (for example see 
Vakulovskii et al 1985).  
The Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 contributed to a new surge of Arctic environmental 
literature on the Soviet Union with Vincent Utsi’s (1987) paper on the effects of the Chernobyl 
accident on reindeer husband in Sweden being one such example. Later authors such as 
Slipchenko (1991) engaged with the topic of east-west Arctic environmental cooperation, 
Arikayanen (1991) outlined the necessity of implementing sustainable development in the 
Soviet Arctic, while both Franckx (1992) and Volkov and Korte (1994) discuss protected 
nature areas in the Russian Arctic. In their article ‘Mushroom clouds in the Arctic’, Harrison 
and Hughes (2013) retrospectively discuss the impact of decades of nuclear testing on Novaya 
Zemlya island in the Russia Arctic. The authors argue that while official testing ended in 1990, 
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the date of the last test is in dispute. They state that Novaya Zemlya is an environmental 
disaster; “a giant contamination field that will put not only Russian lives in danger but also 
those of nearby countries such as Norway” (p20). Bjerke (1994) highlights the danger of 
unsatisfactory management of nuclear waste, arms-related environmental hazards and nuclear 
reactors in the Russian Arctic. Hønneland (2003) also retrospectively engages with 
environmental and nuclear pollution in the Soviet and Russian Arctic. However, Davis (1996) 
controversially argued that the influx of pollution into the Arctic Basin from Soviet and post-
Soviet industrial and agricultural contaminants posed a far greater threat than radioactive 
elements from military systems. Rees and Kapista (1994) similarly argued that the greatest 
industrial pollutant in the Kola Peninsula were emissions from the nickel smelters at 
Monchegorsk and Nikel.  
With respect to the literature on Russian Arctic indigenous peoples, Bartels and Bartels (2006) 
provides a comprehensive retrospective account of how Western scholarship on the smaller 
indigenous peoples of the Russian north and far east were shaped by Cold War ideology. In 
their paper, the authors argue that ideology distorted representations of Soviet policy towards 
Northern Peoples and address this issue by analysing the consequences of such distortions such 
as the suppression of the Committee of the North and rebellious factions within northern 
groups. Rising Soviet Arctic environmentalism coincided with the politicisation of the 
indigenous peoples of the Soviet Union and later, the newly established Russian Federation. 
For example, Vitebsky (1990) analysed how proposals for oil and gas drilling in the late Soviet 
Arctic led to rising environmentalism amongst indigenous and local peoples in the Yamal 
peninsula, while Pika and Bogoyavlensky (1995) similarly discuss the impact of oil and gas 
development in the Yamal Peninsula on demography and health among indigenous 
populations. Varantov and Roginko (1990) provide a holistic view of Soviet Arctic policies 
taking into consideration the impact of former political and economic activities on the small 
peoples of the Russian north while also discussing solutions such as compensation for damages 
and federal support for self-governing structures. Tomtosov (1991) reviews the establishment 
of the Soviet Union’s Association of Northern Peoples’, while Baer (1994) outlines the role of 
the Barents Euro Artic Region (BEAR) in promoting cooperation between Russian Saami and 
their Nordic neighbours. Llater Poelzer and Fondahl (1997) reflect on a decade of political 




Concerning the literature on Mikhail Gorbchev’s formative Murmansk Initiative, early articles 
to appear include Armstrong’s (1988) English translation of Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1987 
Murmansk speech and Ron Purver’s (1988) paper that discusses in detail the responses by other 
Arctic states to Gorbachev’s proposal. Similarly, in his paper ‘Russia’s Arctic Dimension’ 
British academic Clive Archer (1988) discussed security issues he expected to arise from the 
Murmansk initiative in addition to outlining western responses. A detailed retrospective 
analysis is provided by Åtland (2008) who reviews how Mikhail Gorbachev’s Murmansk 
initiative impacted the descuritization process and interstate relations in the Arctic.  Later on, 
Jonson (1991) considers the role of Russia in Nordic Regional Cooperation during Russia’s 
chaotic post-Soviet transition and considers how Nordic countries could establish contacts with 
both the Russian republic and individual regions while keeping old diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet government. Regarding post-Soviet Arctic institutions, both Laruelle (2013) and 
Foxhall (2014) retrospectively discuss the disintegration and disorganisation of Goskomsever 
– the political unit responsible for formulating Russia’s Arctic policy during the 1990’s.  
Western accounts of Soviet and post-Soviet military activities in the Arctic includes papers  
within the Naval War College Review including; Petersen’s (1987) account of Soviet Military 
Objectives in the Arctic Theatre’; Vego’s (1986) assessment of the Soviet threat to the Northern 
Flank; Egan and Orr’s (1988) discussion on Soviet maritime capabilities in the Arctic (with 
recommendations for what the United States should do about it) and Rosenberg’s (1988) paper 
depicting Soviet thoughts on the US Maritime Strategy of 1986. Regarding the early 1990s 
Western literature on the post-Soviet maritime Arctic - Åtland (2007) provides a retrospective 
analysis of Russia’s northern strategic bastion concept from 1992-1999.    
Contributions from Russian sources include Makeev’s (1994) report for the Center of 
Geopolitcal and Military Forecasts Moscow which focuses on naval aspects of arms control. 
Included is a discussion on specific agreements such as the 1989/90 ‘Agreement on the 
Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities’, naval aspects of START, and decommissioning 
of aged submarines in Northern and Pacific Fleets. A later contribution from Sokolov (1998) 
considers the prospects for converting former Soviet military facilities towards the 
development of NRS infrastructure.  
Western academics also expressed an ongoing interest in the Soviet Maritime Arctic during 
this time, as demonstrated Brigham’s (1988) report on an International workshop on the Soviet 
Maritime Arctic and a similar panel on ‘legal regimes in the Arctic’ held as part of the annual 
meeting of the American society of international law (see Richardson et al 1988). The law 
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literature available during the transition period therefore also contributes to discussions of the 
Arctic maritime region. Late Soviet and early post-Soviet literature is concerned with issues 
such as the Soviet Union’s signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
in 1983 and implications for innocent passage (see Butler 1987), in addition to the legal regime 
of the Soviet maritime Arctic and the legal status of the NSR (see Kolodin and Volosov 1990 
and Timchenko 1994). However, for an in-depth discussion on commercial shipping through 
the NSR see Drent (1993). 
 
1.4.1.3 Canada 
The oil discoveries at Prudhoe Bay Alaska also intensified academic interest in the oil and gas 
potential of the Canadian Arctic. For example, Stabler and Olfert (1980) discuss how, in the 
aftermath of the 1972-73 energy crisis, the Canadian federal government began to plan a 
transportation corridor along the MacKenzie River Valley. This led to opposition from both 
northerners and environmentalists. At the same time, Canadian indigenous land claims also 
gained momentum. In 1976 the Inuit in the Northwest Territories (NWT) began negotiating a 
comprehensive land claim with the Canadian federal government. This attracted the attention 
of academics who published papers based on discussions surrounding the case for dividing the 
NWT and governing practices (e.g. Salisbury 1986, Dacks 1986, White 1991) which would 
eventually result in the creation of the state of Nunavut two decades later. Minor (2002) 
retrospectively discusses the gender imbalance and political Participation of Inuit Women in 
ggovernment in the NWT and Nunavut, while Bonesteele (2006) also traces the history of the 
government of Canada’s relationship with the Inuit of NWT and Nunavut and an evolution of 
policy developments affecting Canadian indigenous peoples.  
Access through the North-west passage and its impact on US-Canadian relations on the North 
American Arctic also appears as a reoccurring theme in the Canadian literature during the 
1970s, 80s and into the transition stage (e.g. Fletcher 1978, Tynan 1979). The uncertainty 
surrounding the future of the NWP remained a key issue in Canada-US relations during the 
transition stage (see Griffiths 1999). This led to new Canadian initiatives in policy that resulted 
in changes to maritime jurisdiction and management of Arctic marine transportation 
(Westermeyer and Goyal 1987). Other authors such as Elliot-Meisel (1999), Huebert (1995), 
Lajeunesse (2013), Trudgen (2015), and Rothwell (2015), retrospectively discuss incidents 
along the NWP such as the 1985 sailing of the US icebreaker Polar Sea. This event was 
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considered to have steered Canada’s northern foreign policy. In its efforts to protect Canadian 
sovereignty and its northern waters, Canada becoming a forerunner in international maritime 
law. Huebert (1996/1997) has also retrospectively written about Canada’s ratification of the 
UN Law of the Sea Convention in 1982.    
With respect to security and foreign policy, an important global development to emerge in the 
1970s was the disarmament movement and anti-nuclear proliferation campaign. For Canada, 
this involved a revision on its stance to host US nuclear weapons, an issue which Trudgen 
(2009) retrospectively engages with in his paper.  In 1987, the Canadian government issued a 
new White Paper on Defence titled ‘Challenge and Commitment’ (for an analysis see Cox 
1988, Wu and Fetterly 1990, Lackenbaur and Lajeunesse 2014). One issue that stood out in 
this defence policy was the decision to invest in nuclear propelled submarines (SNNs) to 
protect Canadian Arctic sovereignty. While this seemingly contradicts Canada’s earlier stance 
on non-proliferation, Canada’s decision was both strategic and political – to patrol the sub-
surface of Canadian Arctic waters while at the same time protecting Canada’s Arctic 
sovereignty. Canada’s SNN program is discussed by several authors such as Langdon and Ross 
(1987), Alexander (1988), and Tracy (1988), while Rauf and Desjardins (1988) consider the 
impact the program would have on global nuclear proliferation.  
There are also a number of papers written during the transition stage that demonstrate Canada’s 
active approach to Arctic cooperation on a bilateral level. For example, Dobell (1991) has 
exclusively focused on Canadian-Soviet relations and Arctic cooperation during perestroika. 
US-Canadian cooperation in the field of security has been written about by MacFarlane 
(1990/1991) while Arctic maritime concerns has been engaged with by Lamson and 
VanderZwaag (1987). Friedheim (1986) also provides ‘Impressions from the American Co-
chair of The US Canada Arctic Policy Forum’ while Kirkey (1995) discusses the 1988 Canada-
United States Arctic co-operation agreement.   
 
1.4.1.4 Greenland, Iceland, Norway 
Several authors focus on the political and economic development of Greenland during the 
transition era. Beginning with the political changes resulting from Greenlandic Home Rule, 
authors such as Lyck (1998), Benoit and Martens (1992), Ørvik (1984) and Høyem (1988) 
trace policy developments and the growing competencies of local authorities. Greenlandic 
fishing policy also appears as a theme during the transition period. For example, Poole (1990) 
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provides a detailed account of fisheries policy and economic development in Greenland in the 
1980’s while Nuttall (1991) similarly argues that fishing is an essential component of the 
modern Greenlandic economy and society. However, Nuttall encapsulates fisheries within his 
broader discussion of the development of ‘Greenlandization’ and national identity in the decade 
of the 1980s. In a separate article Nutall (1990) discusses the rise of the international animal 
rights movement and Greenpeace’s campaign to end sealing which is considered as a threat to 
Inuit cultural survival in Greenland, while Christensen (1992) highlighted the growing tourism 
sector in Greenland during the transition era in his short paper titled ‘Greenland wants tourism’.  
Natural resource development also appears as a theme in the literature. For example, Sinding 
and Poole (1991) briefly report the discovery of a multi-billion-dollar gold deposit in Greenland 
in 1990, while Høyem (1988), also discusses natural resource exploitation in Greenland as part 
of a more general discussion on political and economic development in Greenland. On a 
separate note, Høyem, who served as the last Danish Minister to Greenland wrote that 
“concurrently with the Danish Greenlandic policy, Denmark has an Arctic policy” (1988:12). 
It is unlikely that he is referring to an official Danish Arctic Policy, but rather as a loose term 
to describe Danish foreign relations with other Arctic states. He outlines that Denmark has “an 
extra responsibility for enhancing cooperation in the region” yet does not otherwise provides 
examples of how Denmark has carried out such a responsibility other than bilateral cooperation 
with the USA/Alaska, Canada, Norway “and if possible with the Soviet Union too” (p12). 
Nonetheless it shows how Denmark was considering greater prospects for Arctic regional 
cooperation at the time.    
Regarding Greenlandic military and defence issues, there are at least two articles engaging in 
the 1987 modernization of the US Radar Installation at Thule, Greenland. The first paper 
written by Zimmerman (1987) argues that both the US and the Soviet Union were in violation 
of the 1972 AMB Treaty with regards to the construction of Large phased-array radars 
(LPARs). Meanwhile, the second paper, written by Fischer (1993), engages solely with the 
debate surrounding the modernization of the Thule radar. Fischer considers the arguments for 
and against the decision while also outlining Danish foreign policy and security perspectives. 
Archer (2003) retrospectively discusses Greenlandic security throughout the Cold War 
including the 1980s upgrade of the Greenlandic Ballistic missile defence. He argued that  
the US’ desire to upgrade Thule presented new opportunities in its relations with Greenland 
and outlined the changing relations from a two-level negotiation setting between the US and 
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Denmark to a three-level setting between the US Denmark and Greenland; a development that 
set a new trend for changing US relations with Greenland in the post-Cold War era.  
Icelandic literature during the era of incipient multipolarity focuses on a series of incidents 
involving Iceland and Britain from 1975 to 1976 that became known as the ‘Cod Wars’. 
Ingimundarson (2011) provides a retrospective analysis of the Cod Wars, discussing the impact 
this crisis had on diplomatic and security relations between the two countries in addition to 
cohesion within the NATO alliance. Security and defence issues also continue to be a key 
political theme. Gunnarsson’s (1982) paper serves not only as an overview of Icelandic security 
policy throughout the Cold War but also sheds light on national developments in security 
affairs during the 1970s and 1980s. This includes the creation of The Icelandic Commission on 
Security and International Affairs in 1979 which was established to strengthen Icelandic 
expertise on security and foreign policy. He also evaluates Icelandic political debates involving 
the positions of the four main political parties on NATO and the basing issue up until the early 
1980s. Duke (1989) provides a discussion on the US’ plans for upgrading its air defence 
systems in Iceland during the early 1980s and highlights the growing importance of economic 
security to Iceland by drawing attention to a dispute between the US and Iceland concerning 
freight services and raised Icelandic political awareness about the importance of distinguishing 
economic from security interests. Gunnarsson (1990) and Ingimundarson (2005, 2007) both 
address Icelandic security issues for the decade of the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
Ingimundarson’s (2005, 2007) analysis on Icelandic security during the transition stage 
suggests that political discussions revolved around two key themes: the status of Keflavik air 
base and US-Icelandic relations on one hand; and Icelandic economic and security relations 
with the EC/EU on the other. While Gunnarsson (1990) perceived that the US-Icelandic 
bilateral defence agreement and Icelandic membership in NATO was unlikely to change, 
Ingimundarson argued that the traditional transatlantic discourse based on the two pillars of 
Icelandic foreign policy – the Defence Agreement and NATO had become unsustainable. 
Finally, during the transition stage, Iceland begun to develop its environmental policies, and 
this is reflected in some of the literature from international organisations such as the OECD 
(2001) which has published retrospective environmental performance reviews on Iceland 
commencing in 1993.  
In the 1970s, Norway’s political attention focused around the 1972 referendum to join the 
European Community and resulted in the Norwegian people rejecting membership. In the 
political literature, Ørvik (1974) debates how Norway’s decision to remain outside the EC 
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would impact security. Although Ørvik did not anticipate Sweden and Finland’s later 
membership, at the time of writing he concluded that by remaining outside of the EC, Norway 
would be compelled to strengthen Scandinavian security cooperation through the Nordic 
Council. Interestingly, he also predicted the “intensification of cross-national cooperation in 
the Scandinavian Arctic” (p.87). Hveem (2000) discusses the 1994 referendum where Norway 
voted for a second time to reject membership into the EU and considers how the outcome 
impacts Norway’s position concerning Nordic cooperation. Similar to Ørvik (1974), Hveem 
suggests that although Norway refused to participate in European regionalization it nonetheless 
would seek to engage in sub-regional projects in the North such as the Barents regional 
cooperation – which is what eventually happened. In Bjørklund’s (1997) analysis he compares 
the two referenda and remarks that one of the most significant comparison between the two 
referenda is the continuity of voting patterns. He outlined that a strong contrast existed between 
the centre and periphery - with the North having the highest number of ‘no’ votes amongst all 
other regions. Alternatively, in his review of Norwegian foreign policy trends, Knudsen (1990) 
outlines how both domestic and external factors have influenced political developments in 
Norway. Overall, he considers that in the absence of high great power tension, (i.e. during the 
final years of the Cold War), economic foreign policy became more salient for Norway (p115). 
This he concludes, influenced Norway’s decision to remain outside of the EC (and later the 
EU), based on protecting its petroleum and fishing industries, while pursuing its own 
independent developmental path. Finally, in a paper titled ‘Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe 
after the Cold War’ Ole Waever (1992) outlines how Nordic states faced an identity crisis at 
the end of the Cold War with the EU posing a new challenge to Nordic culture and society. He 
considered different scenarios in how the Nordic states relationship with the EU will play out 
with respect to political, economic and security developments.  
Another issue dominating the Norwegian political agenda from the 1970s onwards was the 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation movement. Both Riste (2004) and Njølstad (2004) 
recount relating how the Norwegian Labour Party’s decision to reopen the debate surrounding 
NATO’s nuclear strategy in Norway significantly influenced the anti-nuclear movement. This 
led to greater academic discussions from Norwegian authors on the possibility of a Nordic 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ) or an Arctic Nuclear Free Zone (see section 1.4.2. for 
more details). Prospects for greater cooperation on Arctic research amongst the Nordic 
countries also appears in the literature during the transition years. For example, Emmelin’s 
(1984) paper called for more Nordic scientific cooperation in the Arctic which demonstrates 
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how ideas of the Arctic as an international cooperative region were beginning to emerge in the 
context of scientific collaboration on environmental research.  
Finally, turning to military security, there are numerous papers written during the 1970s and 
1980s on Norwegian defence policy amongst NATO’s rejuvenated interest in the ‘Northern 
flank’. During this time, the US sought to revise its naval strategy which had the effect of 
increasing NATOs maritime presence in the High North. However, for Norway this also raised 
issues concerning US basing-rights and the deployment of nuclear weapons onboard US 
submarines docking off the coast of Norway. To this end, Norwegian security policy during 
the last two decades of the Cold War is discussed extensively by Holst (1972, 1981a, 1981b, 
1982), while Norwegian-Soviet relations of this time is outlined by both German (1982 and 
Knudsen (1992). Concerning US/NATO naval strategy in the High North, US-Norwegian base 
agreements and maritime law see Fredholm (1972), Laursen (1987, Duke (1989), Tamnes 
(1991), Riste (2004), and Børresen (2011). Lastly, Holst (1990) also discusses Norwegian 
prospects for security and arms control.  
  
1.4.1.5 Sweden and Finland 
Neutrality remains a key theme in the foreign policy literature on both Sweden and Finland 
during the transition era. For example, Sundelius (1990) credits the success of Swedish 
neutrality to its economic links with Western economies, its liberal attitude towards 
international commerce and its willingness to promote international change both in North-
South issues and East-West negotiations. Erikkson (2003) refutes this by arguing that Sweden 
conducted a double policy during the Cold War – seeking Western military help yet claiming 
to be neutral. However, Wachtmeister (1990:106), a former Swedish Ambassador to the United 
States from 1974-1989, defends Swedish neutrality on the basis that there is no rule in 
international law stipulating that a neutral state should possess a military capacity to stave off 
all incursions.  Swedish military security and foreign affairs at the end of the Cold War is 
engaged with by authors such as Hattendorf (1980) who underlines the ongoing importance of 
Swedish naval Defence in the 1980s, while Jonson (1990) discusses the ‘normalization’ process 
of diplomatic relations between Swedish and the USSR under Gorbachev. Eriksson (2003) 
retrospectively engages with Sweden’s attempts to attain closure to the Cold War chapter of 
Swedish history through official public inquires. These he argues, not only reveal the extent of 
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Sweden’s informal military ties to the West and NATO but also have an impact on Swedish 
security policy today.  
In contrast to Sweden, Finland was often regarded as ‘Finlandized’ during the Cold War, that 
is - a country that towed the policy line with its large and powerful Soviet neighbour (Järvenpää 
1990). In this way, Finnish relations with the Soviet Union and the process of ‘Finlandization’ 
remained a salient political issue during the era of incipient multipolarity and the transition 
stage (see Kwak 1984, Karsh 1986) along with Finnish-US relations (Hanhimäki 1994). Yet 
Quester (1990) considered how, during the Gorbachev era of détente, ‘the model of Finland’ 
demonstrated many positive aspects of friendly East-West relations and be used as a model for 
the WARSAW pact states of Eastern Europe. Sutela (1992/93) and (2007) provides an account 
of Finland’s bilateral trade relationship with Russia and how it changed during the final years 
of the Soviet Union. Both Suominen (1994) and Koskinen (2019) provide details of Soviet-
Finnish relations during the Gorbachev era and recognition of Finland’s neutrality. For Lukacs 
(1992) Finnish political neutrality, although marked by struggles and compromise, has 
arguably been vindicated by the peaceful end of the Cold War.  
Later in the transition stage, Ericsson (1995:70) optimistically discusses how Sweden’s newly 
gained membership into the European Union would serve as the foundation on which a new or 
altered Swedish security policy could be built. Likewise, Suominen (1994) and Blank (1995) 
review the evolution of Finland’s neutrality policy its growing relationship with the EU and 
the impact this had on Finland’s bilateral relations with Russia. Writing on Finland’s accession 
to the EU in 1995; Blank (1995) cautioned that “Finland’s proximity to Russia and the difficult 
history of Fenno-Russian relations have imposed on Finnish policymakers the need for 
penetrating and sober analysis of Finland’s and Europe’s security situation”. Tiilikainen (1998) 
later discusses the impact of European integration on the Nordic region and the different 
political orientations being adopted by the three EU members – Denmark, Sweden and Finland. 
She explains that of all the Nordic countries Finland has been the most willing to adopt changes 
in its security policy. However, she cautioned that “the different courses chosen by the Nordic 
states may even have a decisive impact on the Nordic community, since the implications will 
no longer be limited to the upper layers of foreign policy but may reach instead to the very core 
of social and political identity” (Tiilikainen 1998:54). 
Concerning environmental politics and developments with the Saami indigenous peoples of 
Fennoscandia, there are a number of papers from this time. Korsmo (1988) discusses the 
contrasting views held by the Saami people and the government authorities. Although much of 
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the article is concerned with legal and territorial rights, Korsmo explains that throughout most 
of the Cold War, the northern areas of Fennoscandia were viewed primarily in strategic terms 
by the West and NATO – a view that the Saami who lived in these territories strongly opposed 
since the state often prioritised security over the protection of Saami indigenous rights. 
However, Baer, (1994) is more optimistic stating that the Saami of Scandinavia and Russia 
have, since World War II, made “great Strides towards Self-Determination”.  He discusses the 
Saami political goals for the 1990s outlining that the primary political goal is the right to self-
determination or at least to autonomy within existing state boundaries, including collective and 
private rights to Saami land.  
The aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in April 1986 witnessed a sharp 
increase of Arctic environmental literature on radioactive pollution being published in both the 
natural and social sciences. A particular research focus by Scandinavian authors is the long-
term medical and social impact of trans-uranium elements in the lichen-reindeer-human food 
chain in Saami territories across Finland and Sweden (for example, see Utsi 1987, Odsjö et al 
2007, Paatero and Salminen-Paatero 2019). However, both Anderson (1987) and Stephens 
(1987) provide a social and anthropological assessment on the impact of Chernobyl on the 
Saami people of Fennoscandia.  
Finally, Räsänen and Laakkonen (207) retrospectively discuss the role of Finland in 
international environmental politics in the Baltic Sea region in the 1970s. Although not 
specifically concerning the Arctic region, this paper is of interest as it demonstrates how 
Finland succeeded in bringing both the Soviets and the Western states into agreement and at 
the Helsinki Convention in 1974 established the Baltic Marine Environment Protection 
Commission, quite possibly lending Finland confidence that it would utilise in the 1980s when 
proposing the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). 
1.4.2 The emergence of Arctic regional literature – the first wave 
Through the adaptation of Geir Hønnenland’s (2013: xvii) method of assessing the Arctic 
literature through consecutive ‘waves’, I will engage in this section with a review of the ‘first 
wave’ of Arctic political literature, taking into consideration the main themes and discourses 
that are relevant to my research question.  The first wave of Arctic political literature emerged 
during the 1980s and lasted roughly until 2012. Gorbachev’s proposal for the creation of an 
Arctic region during his Murmansk speech in 1987, serves as a key moment when a window 
of opportunity opened for Arctic political literature to be written from a new trans-national 
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perspective and ideas for an international Arctic region took root in the political science and 
IR literature. In this way, Stein (2008:202) reflects on how the field of IR responds to real-
world events and historically has shifted the substantive focus of investigation to reflect 
changing reality. While academic writings from a nationalist or sub-regional perspective 
continued, the general optimism surrounding the future of the region, and this can be observed 
in the Arctic literature from this time. While authors began to investigate new opportunities for 
international political cooperation in the Arctic as a result of détente at the end of the Cold War, 
it was unclear as to what kind of cooperation would take place and the direction which it would 
take.  
A sub-stream of first wave literature investigates new political developments in polar politics 
as a result of the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty. Drafted in 1959 and ratified in 1961, the 
Antarctic Treaty inspired Arctic academics to consider how certain aspects of the Treaty could 
be modified and adopted to the Arctic with the aim of promoting environmental conservation 
in the north. However, heightened tensions between the superpowers during the 1960s 
prevented any definitive action and it would take until the détente of the late 1980s for authors 
to begin to look for the new opportunities becoming available for Arctic region-building, 
especially scientific and environmental cooperation. There are multiple examples of 
Antarctica-inspired literature that emerged in the 1980s, discussing comparative polar politics. 
For instance, an early first wave paper written by Holdgate (1984) emphasizes the need to 
conserve Arctic species from exploitation such as whales, musk oxen, and caribou as well as 
calling for the development of ‘management plans to incorporate environmental safety 
measures for the exploitation of mineral resources’. What Holdgate suggested was essentially 
the development of an environmental regime for the Arctic but did not go so far as to explicitly 
outline such a proposal. Beck’s (1989) paper considers the ‘new polar factor in International 
Relations’, while a Swedish polar study written by Elzinga and Bohlin (1989) compared the 
political developments in the Arctic and the Antarctic region. The authors recognise that 
political agendas in these regions impacts topics of scientific research. Similarly, Sugden’s 
(1989) scientific article called for greater understanding about natural polar systems arguing 
that since they play a key role in modulating the global environment more attention should be 
paid in order to understand them and make realistic forecasts about global climate change.  
A sub-category of first wave Arctic literature that was also inspired by the Antarctic Treaty 
engages with the issue of nuclear disarmament and the creation of an arms-free area in the 
Arctic to mirror the Antarctic demilitarized zone established within the Antarctic Treaty. 
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Although the idea was supposedly first suggested by the Soviet leader Bulganin in 1958, the 
first academic article to be published on this topic appeared in 1964 in the Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists. Jointly written by an American and a Soviet scientist – Alexander Rich and 
Alexsandr Vinogradov – the authors proposed that the Arctic region may provide an area in 
which the initial stages of a disarmament agreement could be developed. It was then taken up 
by other authors such as Armstrong (1965), Newcombe (1981), Purver (1984)9 and Axeworthy 
and French (2010. Other authors such as Holst (1983,1984), Maude (1984) and Lumsden 
(1990) focus specifically on the creation of a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ).    
Perhaps one of the most important papers written from a polar perspective is Young’s (1994) 
article that discusses the effect of institutional linkages with respect to the polar regions and 
their impact on international society – a concept that I return to in Chapter 2 when I discuss 
my chosen theoretical framework. Young explains how issue-specific regimes in international 
society are deeply embedded in overarching institutional arrangements because they operate 
from a set of shared principles and practices. In the Arctic he outlines how   
The regime for Svalbard articulated in the 1920 Treaty of Spitzbergen, the 1973 Agreement on 
Conservation of Polar Bears, the various components of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), and the newly 
emerging environmental protection regime for the Arctic, for example, are all predicated on an 
understanding of international society as a society of states possessing exclusive authority over their own 
domestic affairs, enjoying sovereign equality in their dealings with one another, and refusing to be bound 
by rules of the game to which they have not consented explicitly (p.3). 
Finally, another informative work on comparative polar politics from the first wave Arctic 
literature is Chaturvedi’s (1996) The Polar Regions: A Political Geography. Chaturvedi wrote 
that “the past decade has witnessed a dramatic transformation in the amount of attention 
focused upon the polar regions, especially in the policy priority accorded to environmental 
protection” (ix). He also predicted that in the 21st century, “Arctic and Antarctic research will 
be valued for both its intrinsic polar merits and its contribution to understanding global 
problems” (Chaturvedi 1994:ix).  
Much of the early first-wave literature written exclusively on the Arctic is concerned with 
devising cooperative regimes that make it possible to address interrelated Arctic issues in a 
sustainable manner (Young 2009: 432). Early writings associated with the first wave literature 
focus on the potential for greater scientific cooperation within sub-regions of the circumpolar 
Arctic. However, authors focusing on northern indigenous issues also considered the positive 
 
9 Purver (1984) discusses security and arms control at both poles from a comparative polar perspective 
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impact that circumpolar cooperation could have for improving indigenous rights. For example, 
Müller-Wille (1987) discusses ongoing political issues of importance for indigenous peoples 
including land use conflicts and economic development from a circumpolar perspective. 
Similarly, Wenzel (1987) discusses ‘Trans-National Problems and Northern Peoples’.  
In a more general context, Stokke’s (1990) paper titled ‘The Northern Environment: Is 
cooperation coming?’ reflects the shifting international political environment and the growing 
optimism for the development of mechanisms for Arctic regional cooperation. Osherenko 
(1989) similarly discussed prospects for circumpolar Arctic environmental cooperation in her 
paper that also sought to address the specific question of ‘will the Soviet’s participate?’ 
Archer’s (1990) paper on ‘Arctic Cooperation: A Nordic Model’, draws on the Scandinavian 
experience of regional cooperation with reference to the Nordic Council while Lyck (1989) 
considers a pathway towards the internationalization of the Arctic with the aim of achieving 
sustainable development.  
One of the most seminal texts of the first wave of Arctic literature is undoubtedly Oran Young 
and Gail Oshenko’s (1989) Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities. Its main 
contribution to the literature is that Young and Oshenko were possibly the first authors to 
explicitly write about the Arctic as a distinctive region in international politics. They also 
foresaw that the development of circumpolar Arctic institutional structures would serve to 
further promote political and environmental cooperation. Writing about the Arctic as a region-
that-was-not-yet-a-region, the authors nonetheless advocated that the Arctic could be best 
studied through conflict analysis, an approach that reflects a distinctive Cold War viewpoint, 
with the authors stating in the very first sentence that ‘conflict is a fact of life’. However, they 
view conflict in a multi-dimensional way and discuss not only the strategic nuclear 
confrontation between the superpowers in the Arctic but also sought to rebalance Arctic politics 
with respect to local conflicts including indigenous rights, environmental degradation, hunting 
and land disputes. 
Like most of the late-Cold War literature in politics, IR, and area studies: Young and Oshenko 
failed to contemplate the peaceful dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, instead 
believing that “the militarization of the Arctic will therefore constitute an international fact of 
life for the foreseeable future” (1989:29). This was unfortunate given that from 1987 onwards 
the Arctic was at the forefront of changes in global politics, beginning with Soviet Leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s famous Murmansk speech which called not only for the creation of an 
Arctic region through greater scientific and environmental cooperation between east and west, 
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but also for the re-initiation of détente through his revolutionary perestroika and glasnost 
policies, which together contributed greatly towards the end of the Cold War. While the 
majority of western IR scholars and policymakers were sceptical and distrusted Gorbachev’s 
intentions, therefore downplaying this pivotal moment in Cold War history, Arctic experts, in 
addition to some national politicians from Finland and Canada were keen to take advantage of 
this excellent opportunity.  
The first wave of Arctic literature is said to have continued throughout the transitional stage 
from 1987-1996 leading into the early 1990s and the establishment of Arctic regional 
institutions. Finland first took the initiative to establish the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy (AEPS) in 1991, followed later by the Canadian proposal of an Arctic Council (AC) 
which was established in 1996. For this reason, Østerund and Hønneland (2013:156) point out 
that the English-language literature that dominates the field of Arctic politics is largely framed 
in institutional terms. For Keskitalo, writing in ‘Negotiating the Arctic’ (2004) Canada is the 
Arctic state mostly responsible for disseminating the institutional literature, owing to its pivotal 
role in the creation of the AC. However, Keskitalo argues that “there are significant differences 
across the eight-state ‘Arctic’, and that these are not brought out through the focus on Canadian 
descriptions” (2004:4-5). This point is a salient one, as differences are bound to exist amongst 
the eight Arctic states.  
When early circumpolar Arctic cooperation of the 1990s gradually led to regional cooperation, 
Arctic scholars mainly concerned themselves with describing the developments occurring with 
institution-building efforts. This trend continued onwards into the 21st century and the 
contemporary era of Arctic politics hence the relatively long duration of the first wave literature 
which according to Hønnenland (2013) spans as far as 2012. Examples of first wave writings 
from the 1990s include Pharand’s (1993) paper on ‘The case for an Arctic Regional Council 
and a Treaty Proposal’, Rothwell’s (1996) analysis on the success of The Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (AEPS) and its impact on international environmental cooperation in the 
far North. Both Nuttall (1997) and Bloom (1999) discuss the establishment of the AC and 
provide an early evaluation of the AC’s institutional workings. Finally, Koivurova (2007) 
provides an early performance review of the Arctic Council in his paper ‘the Arctic Council at 
10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects’.  
First wave Arctic literature written in the immediate post-Cold War years continued to focus 
on environmental issues and post-Cold War ‘clean-up operations. These were organized 
primarily through bi-lateral US-Russian channels or limited multilateralism such as the Arctic 
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military environmental cooperation (AMEC) in which just three Arctic states participated: the 
US, Norway and Russia (see Sawhill 2000). Broader region-building efforts in the Arctic were 
focused exclusively on environmental co-operation as the common denominator policy-area 
that all eight Arctic states would agree to cooperate on.  
 
1.4.3 The shortcomings of the First Wave    
While the first wave authors considered how to advance Arctic cooperation and engage in 
institution-building at the regional level, in this section I outline that there were significant 
shortcomings with their approach. The emergence of a post-Cold War Arctic discourse on 
indigenous issues and environmental management was an important and necessary contribution 
to the literature while also broadening debates on security. The problem was that they focused 
on prospects for Arctic cooperation without considering how the emerging circumpolar Arctic 
region could serve as a potential indicator for significant changes occurring within the broader 
international system. Although attempting to make political predictions is a very precarious 
exercise, the fact that Arctic policymakers and academics did not consider what kind of security 
future would best serve Arctic interests, resulted in them remaining off-guard when the Cold 
War came to an end. As a result, Arctic political scientists and policymakers were unable to 
anticipate major political change, nor take advantage of the opportunity to co-create a new 
post-Cold War security architecture in the emerging Arctic region. This was arguably a major 
failure of the discipline of Arctic studies and IR. There were however exceptions to the lack of 
dialogue on Arctic security – in Chapter 5, I demonstrate how Canadian indigenous northern 
groups and national Arms control movements from Canada wrangled with questions of de-
securitizing the Arctic and creating an Arctic arms control regime. For example, Mary Simon, 
who was at the time president of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) - engaged with security 
issues in her writings from an Inuit perspective, discussing such topics as militarization and 
northern indigenous peoples (1992) and ‘Towards an Arctic Zone of Peace’ (1989). In the latter 
she advocated that “in addressing Arctic peace and security matters, it is a vital starting point 
to recognise that vast regions in northern Canada, Alaska, Greenland and eastern Siberia 
constitute first and foremost the Inuit homeland’ (p.27). The ICC was represented in this cause 
by two successive presidents: Mary Simon and Rosemarie Kuptana, each of whom prioritized 
indigenous rights, and disarmament in the Arctic at the end of the Cold War. Their appeals 
were taken seriously by the Canadian government, although the Canadian administration under 
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Brian Mulroney decided to pursue a broad, indirect approach to security. It was hoped that the 
growth of regional society in the Arctic, including environmental and other non-military 
collaborations, would help strengthen trust and cooperation between the superpowers, resulting 
in new arms control agreements (Axeworthy and Dean 2012:24). Yet sadly there was a lack of 
circumpolar engagement on military security issues amongst the eight Arctic states. Instead, 
these major decisions were to remain solely in the hands of the United States as the ‘lone 
superpower’ (see Chapter 5).  The result was the retention of Cold War military structures 
alongside the transformation towards new inter-governmental political processes in the Arctic. 
I argue in later chapters that the retention of the old Cold-War security system would manifest 
new tensions in the twenty-first century. Far from dismissing the pivotal role that 
environmental security and the politicization of indigenous groups had in the creation of the 
Arctic region: this chapter argues that the ‘hidden history’ of Arctic security discourse needs 
to be returned to its rightful place. To do so, it must be recognized how the ahistorical nature 
and narrow focus of Arctic political literature failed to situate regional developments within 
the broader movements occurring in global politics.  
Even in the aftermath of the Cold War, Arctic literature was sorely lacking in reflexivity on 
what had occurred. For instance, there was no attempt made by Arctic scholars to engage with 
the lively IR theoretical debates of the early 1990s that sought to review why no one predicted 
an end to the Cold War and the bipolar international system. This resulted in the Arctic being 
excluded in post-Cold War IR debates with respect to military security, nor was it integrated 
into discussions concerning the post-Cold War European security architecture, now an issue of 
ongoing significance in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Because the post-Cold 
war Arctic cooperation was primarily based upon the development of an environmental regime 
it was not seen as comparable to regionalization trends occurring elsewhere. This became the 
basis for the ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ argument, where the Arctic region has, up until the second 
decade of the twenty-first century, been excluded from IR and regionalism studies.  
The fact that there was little to no detailed inquiries made into the military security environment 
of the post-Cold War Arctic is also very concerning. By neglecting to face the significant 
questions surrounding the post-Cold War Arctic security order it would only be a matter of 
time before political tensions were bound to re-emerge. Some contemporary authors of social 
science Arctic literature engaging in historical approaches have entirely omitted the term ‘Cold 
War’ from their writings (Suopajävari 2003, Tennenburg 2003). While this can be understood 
as a retrospective protest on the all-consuming Cold-War ‘label’ that consumed 40 years of 
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human history in the Arctic – it is also a grave mistake to summarily ‘obliviate’ the effects of 
the superpower conflict on Northern political development. This is especially relevant when 
considering how the 1970s and 80s Cold War détente efforts towards arms control and 
environmental safety served as the original basis for developing cooperative mechanisms in 
the Arctic: these were not just the ideas of a desperate Soviet leader but were enthusiastically 
endorsed by Northern indigenous groups. However, as mentioned above, this did not produce 
the desired outcomes of a new security architecture, but the continuation of Cold War structures 
based on the US-led NATO alliance.   
Chaturvedi (1996:263) comes the closest of the first wave scholars to acknowledging that the 
post-Cold War Arctic was in the midst of profound changes and that these changes would result 
in elements of the old Cold War system being retained alongside ‘new’ features of the emerging 
Arctic region. Although he considers the post-Cold War changes to be overall positive 
Chaturvedi (1996:263-264) demonstrates a far greater awareness than any other first wave 
Arctic scholar of the security challenges facing the new region: 
This positive change, however, is being undermined by certain continuities from the past: the continuing 
militarization of the Arctic, especially the Kola Peninsula: the persistence of the Cold War discourse among 
the old power structures, with its dividing ‘East -West’ logic’: the reluctance of the Arctic-rim states to 
accept any limitations on their sovereignty, which is also reflected in their failure to resolve long-standing 
disputes: and last but not least, the uncertainty created by political and economic instability in Russia. It is 
probably unrealistic to expect far-reaching changes in the Arctic to occur overnight. In the foreseeable 
future, then, the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ might have to coexist, rather awkwardly, in the Arctic. Nevertheless, 
there is mounting evidence of the recognition, since the end of the Cold War, of a distinction between 
military and civil security in the Arctic: both state and non-state actors in the Arctic seem to be willing to 
act while the window of opportunity is wide open.  
Chaturvedi was correct that Arctic security has expanded in the post-Cold War era to include 
non-strategic issues, but in the process, security also remained divided between military and 
non-military issues. As a result of this division, the old Cold War system has been sustained so 
far as military security is concerned. While state and non-state actors have readily sought to 
engage with the ‘new’ security issues, there was a lack of engagement and debate in the 
immediate post-Cold War years as to why this division of security should be retained and if it 
is in the best interests of all states involved. The fear and secrecy that enshrined Cold War 
policymaking was sadly retained in the Arctic in the post-Cold War era, where the sanctity of 
military issues and was at once both taken as a predetermined fact, accepted as an ‘out of sight-
out of mind’ issue that was not to be discussed academically. This coincides with the post-Cold 
War trend in IR where the realist theoretical tradition emphasizing power and security 
considerably declined in favour of liberalism, as the challenging discourse and theoretical 
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framework that sought to explain global politics through institutional cooperation. The fact that 
Arctic experts failed to discuss what the paradigm shift from realism to liberalism would 
signify for the future direction of Arctic political literature again demonstrates that a deeper 
inquiry into the discourses surrounding how political analyses of the post-Cold War Arctic was 
viewed by scholars was decidedly missing from the early literature.   
In his later writings, Oran Young recognized this deficit by acknowledging that since policy 
questions are usually framed by theoretical discourse this could steer the direction of outcomes. 
For this reason, he states that it is crucial to identify the underlying frameworks which shape 
current research on Arctic politics and policy (2009:431). Young identifies two significant 
narratives, the realist/geopolitics narrative and the eco-system-based management. The latter 
loosely corresponds to regime theory and neo-liberalist theories of IR that engages with the 
process of institutionalization from the basis of environmental cooperation. Barry Buzan 
(2004:162) explains that regime theory has mainly studied sub-global phenomena of specific 
regimes which “usually embody a subset of states negotiating rules about some specific issue 
(fishing, pollution, shipping, arms control, trade etc.)”.  The problem however is that regime 
theory is generally more focused on contemporary events and fails to acknowledge the 
historical evolution of the region in broad political terms.    
Another shortcoming of the first wave Arctic literature, particularly in the period of the early 
post-Cold War, was the fact that many authors took for granted the continuation of the NATO-
based security structures operating in the region after the dissolution of the USSR. Without the 
academic community drawing attention to pertinent security questions such as ‘is it possible 
that a Russian military threat still exists in the Arctic in the aftermath of the Cold War?’ and 
‘what are the implications that a continued US-led NATO presence would have on the future 
of Arctic regional cooperation?’: these salient issues went unanswered and instead were 
completely swept under the carpet. It wasn’t until the publication of Helga Haffedorn’s (2011) 
article ‘NATO and the Arctic: is the Atlantic alliance a cold war relic in a peaceful region now 
faced with non-military challenges?’, that NATO and Arctic security gained traction once 
more. However, Haffedorn’s article did not just suddenly appear to fill the vacuum of Arctic 
security literature. Its presence can instead be better explained (along with the subsequent 
literature on Arctic military security), through the context of the second wave of Arctic 




1.5 Regional literature from the contemporary Arctic order (1997 – present) 
1.5.1. The Second Wave of Arctic Literature: the realist/geo-politics discourse and the 
‘race for the Arctic’ 
After Russia planted a titanium flag on the Arctic Ocean floor in 2007, a shift in discourse 
emerged with Arctic literature becoming more geo-political in nature. Although the Russian 
flag-planting incident was largely symbolic, it caught the attention of politicians, policymakers 
and the global media, creating a renewed strategic interest in the Arctic region for the United 
States and the West. Hønnenland (2013) therefore considers 2007 as being the point when the 
Second Wave of Arctic literature emerged. Second wave literature is primarily focused on 
alerting audiences to an impending race for the Arctic. Such arguments imply that Arctic states 
are now anticipating a new era of ‘high politics’ marked by “the assertion of jurisdictional 
claims, a growing competition for control over the Arctic’s natural resources, the 
remilitarization of the region, and more or less frequent clashes among leading states active in 
the Arctic” (Young 2009:432). Scott G. Borgerson, a former lieutenant Commander in the US 
Coast Guard, famously captured the imaginations of the public and academic community alike 
in a number of articles which appeared in Foreign Affairs in 2008 titled ‘Arctic Meltdown: The 
Arctic Ocean is melting and it is melting fast’. Other second wave publications include such 
titles as Barry Scott Zelen’s (2009) Arctic Boom, Arctic Doom, Rodger Howard’s (2009) Arctic 
Gold Rush: The New Race for tomorrow’s Natural Resources, and Richard Sale and Eugene 
Potapov’s (2010) Scramble for the Arctic.   
Russian Arctic literature also picked up on the second wave theme of conflict and competition. 
For example, Fenenko’s (2012) paper ‘Russia and the Competition for the Redivision of Polar 
Spaces’, adheres to the ‘second wave’ literature, but is distinguishable on the basis that he 
considers the current race for the Arctic as being historically determined. Fenenko argues that 
we are now experiencing the ‘second Arctic race’ while the origins of inter-state Arctic 
competition and the first race for the Arctic can be traced as far back as the 1870’s when great 
powers such as Germany, Austro-Hungary and the US all sought to acquire territory in the 
High North (Fenenko does not dwell on the fact that the Russian empire sold the territory of 
Alaska to the Americans in 1867 enabling the US to become an Arctic power). Through these 
historical references, Fenenko demonstrates the continuity of great power politics in the region. 
He also considers that the outcome of the first Arctic race was beneficial for the Soviet Union 
enabling it to claim a Russian Arctic ‘sector’ and declare that the White, Kara, Laptev and East 
Siberian Seas were all internal waterways granting Russia the right to restrict international 
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access. The second Arctic race began, according to Fenenko, after US President G.W. Bush 
issued a new Arctic strategy in 2008.10 Fenenko believes that this second race like the first, will 
have significant advantages for Russia, some of which have already manifested. One positive 
outcome for Russia was the 2009 Illulissat negotiations where the five coastal Arctic states 
agreed to cooperatively manage the Arctic ocean between them, thus preserving sovereignty 
and state interests and avoiding the creation of a new international Arctic Treaty (see Chapter 
6). Finally, Fenenko (2012:30) considers that attempts to strengthen [security] cooperation 
through international organizations like the AC have proven unsuccessful, and as such the 
potential for conflict amongst Arctic states is likely to increase. 
Although conflict-laden scenarios for the Arctic in the near-future need to be considered and 
addressed, not least for how to avoid them: the problem is that there have been too few attempts 
to critically and conceptually analyse these papers. Furthermore, they should be assessed 
utilizing realist theories of IR which many of the arguments are implicitly based on yet often 
defy the inherent logic which such theories are based on. What also seems to be forgotten is 
that there are various forms of realism and understandings of important concepts such as the 
balance of power within the realist tradition, yet these differences are rarely engaged with 
individually in the literature. Barry Scott Zellen’s (2009) On Thin Ice is one exception to the 
lack of Arctic texts written through an explicit realist theory of International Relations. Zellen 
utilizes Kenneth Waltz’s three levels of analysis (the individual, the state, and the international 
system) with the addition of a new "Fourth Image" to describe a tribal level.  Zellen’s (2009) 
study reveals that instead of the Arctic being perceived as a passive receptor of external changes 
at the international level (third image), he demonstrates how, during the crucial post-Cold War 
transition of the 1990s, “national policies increasingly reflected the aspirations of the peoples 
of the North". Zellen’s adaptation of Waltz’s neo-realist level of analysis theory is useful for 
simultaneously examining top-down and bottom-up processes of a single event occurring at a 
given time, but not fit for purpose for this research task which is to examine the outcomes of 
changes occurring in the Arctic political and security order over a timespan of seventy years.  
What can be discerned from the second wave literature is that there is a tendency for authors 
to examine state behaviour from a short-term perspective of achieving relative gains, without 
considering domestic factors and especially conflating interests between political 
 
10 By referring to the US Arctic Strategy as the critical turning point in circumpolar Arctic relations, Fenenko challenges the 
general Western consensus that the 2007 Russian ‘Arktika’ flag-planting expedition was the event that triggered a return of 
Arctic geopolitics and competition in the region. 
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representatives, commercial interests and local indigenous groups. Yet, the underlying question 
that should have been asked by the second wave literature but was not, is ‘if we are now looking 
at trying to prevent an escalation of state competition and military activities in the Arctic, why 
was Arctic military security cooperation curtailed from the very inception of region-building 
initiatives in the Arctic during the 1990s? Also, it must be asked ‘As the sole remaining global 
superpower at the end of the Cold War, why was the United States not at the forefront of 
designing an inclusive and transformative post-Cold War Arctic regional security order? These 
two questions have been entirely absent from current Arctic literature and although they appear 
as separate issues, the two questions are in fact strongly interlinked. To be answered in detail, 
however, the Arctic political literature would have had to engage and examine the negotiation 
and bargaining processes leading up to the creation of the AC, a task only completed by 
Thomas Axeworthy (2012) in his paper ‘Changing the Arctic Paradigm from Cold War to 
Cooperation’. As a former Canadian government official, Axeworthy offers a birds-eye insider 
view on proceedings leading up to the creation of the AC. However, Axeworthy does not 
explain how US Arctic institutional preferences (to keep security off the regional agenda) 
served to ensure that the US retained its predominant position as security provider in the North 
Atlantic and Europe. While this may be obvious, the point here is that it must be highlighted 
that US actions in the Arctic are fundamental for achieving its overall post-Cold War American 
grand strategy and to retain a US-led world order. If the US considered that by keeping security 
outside of the AC would ensure the continuation of the US-NATO security order, then equally, 
there is reason to suggest that by putting security on the AC agenda, the Arctic regional order 
would be transformed, while this may also have a knock-on effect for further security changes 
to occur in the wider Euro-Atlantic area.  As Layne (1998:10) reveals “underlying the strategy 
[of US hegemony] is fear of what might happen in a world no longer shaped by predominant 
US power.” Thus, continued American hegemony is seen as paramount not only for US 
interests but also because it is considered as be the prerequisite for stability and sustaining the 
deep structure of the international system both political and economic: “Instability is dangerous 
because it threatens the link that connects US security to the strategic interests furthered by 
economic interdependence” (ibid).  
While an analysis of the positive and negative aspects of a US-led global order would be too 
lengthy a discussion to engage in here, what is of relevance with respect to the Arctic is that 
the current literature has also failed to consider how US preferences for the exclusion of 
security and military cooperation at the Arctic regional level has restrained the current potential 
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of the AC (Whitehall papers 2010), while putting the Arctic on a path-dependency of retaining 
Cold War security structures. While Klaus J. Dodds (2012) provides an excellent starting point 
for discussing how to conceptualise the future or ‘Arctic futures,’ further research needs to be 
conducted on specifically outlining security futures for the Arctic region, not just from the 
narrow standpoint of the second wave, ‘race for the Arctic’ literature, but through looking at 
possibilities and outcomes of security cooperation in the Arctic.  
For this purpose, I propose that in addition to the two waves of Arctic literature outlined by 
Geir Hønnenland (2013), there is now an emerging ‘third wave’ of literature that has moved 
beyond the former paradigm of the eco-system- based management/ environmental regime 
literature on the one hand and geopolitics/realist literature on the other. In contrast, the third 
wave considers how systemic factors and external political events occurring internationally can 
impact Arctic political and security relations at the regional level. In this way, I will argue that 
the third wave of literature is distinct from the ‘second wave, race for the Arctic’ literature, for 
although security features as a topic within both waves, the difference is that the second wave 
focused mainly on preventing inter-regional competition in isolation of the broader 
international system.  
In the next section I will argue that the ‘third wave’ of Arctic literature encompasses a new set 
of research questions that have been raised in the aftermath of Ukraine. Such questions seek to 
engage with the issue of the Arctic’s relationship to the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and 
the broader international system while also engaging with the possibility of developing regional 
security cooperation within the region. 
1.5.2. The ‘Third Wave’ Arctic Literature - Reconnecting the Arctic to IR  
The conflict in Ukraine suggests a new era of competition between the West and Russia.  For 
Monaghan (2015:1) events in Ukraine “… have (again) revealed both fundamental differences 
in how European security is understood” while also demonstrating that an increasing friction 
in values exist between Russia and the West. For these reasons, Ukraine has also served as a 
pivotal turning point in Arctic politics and literature, generating what I construe as a ‘third 
wave’ of Arctic literature, as politicians and experts alike begun to grapple with the issue of 
how to prevent a ‘spill-over’ effect from both the Ukrainian conflict and potential future 
external events impacting the Arctic region (for examples see Scopelliti, and Conde Pérez 
2016, Østhagen, 2014, Oskarsson 2014, Myers 2016). Of significance to this research is how 
74 
 
Ukraine also awakened the debate on whether the Arctic should develop regional mechanisms 
for enhancing military security cooperation. 
In this way, Ukraine served as the critical event that for some, represented the end of the 
‘unipolar moment’ that existed in the 1990s and early 2000s and the return to great power 
competition. The US National intelligence ‘Global Trends’ report for 2017 acknowledged that 
with US great power decline, the post-Cold War era is coming to an end: “For better and worse, 
the emerging global landscape is drawing to a close an era of American dominance following 
the Cold War”. For other authors such as Averre and Wolckzyk (2016) Ukraine served as the 
defining moment when the post-post-Cold War era emerged. However, others such as Andrew 
Monaghan (2015) argues against utilizing any term that refers to either the ‘Cold War’ or its 
recent prefixes to describe the political changes we are now experiencing. Instead Monaghan 
focuses on how the war in Ukraine has revealed fundamental differences in the way that Euro-
Atlantic security is understood in the West and in Russia, particularly in relation to the post-
Cold War Euro-Atlantic security architecture: 
Moscow argues that European security is divided between institutions that offer both political and legal 
security guarantees, such as NATO and the EU, and those that offer only political guarantees, such as the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and that the protections afforded by the 
latter can change quickly and are unreliable. Furthermore, there is disagreement between the West and 
Moscow over Russia’s representation in European security and Moscow’s desire for a greater voice. This 
deceptively deep division in how European security – and the roles of Russia and NATO in it – is 
understood by both sides lies at the heart of most current and likely future problems in the relationship 
(Monaghan 2015:5). 
The problem outlined by Monaghan above relates to the Arctic third wave literature with 
respect to how to approach the issue of Arctic regional security cooperation, limit ‘spill-over’ 
effects from Ukraine and develop mechanisms for conflict prevention, may all be understood 
from a broader historical context of the deep divisions in Europe that were entrenched in the 
immediate post-Cold War years. Events in Ukraine have forced Western policymakers and IR 
specialists to look at this as a systemic rupture “as Moscow seeks to adjust and challenge the 
European political and security architecture through military, diplomatic and political means” 
(Monaghan 2015:6).  After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, there was a surge of 
articles voicing concern that tensions between Russia and the West would escalate in the Arctic 
as a result of a spill-over from the Ukrainian conflict, especially given that the United States 
was chairing the AC at the time (see Käpylä and Mikkola 2015, Huebert 2016, Myers 2016, 
Østhagen 2014). Due to the imposed sanctions by the US and the EU on Russia, there was the 
expectation that the US would utilise the AC to expressing disapproval towards Russia for its 
actions in Ukraine. This led to fears that the Ministerial meetings and Arctic multilateral forums 
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would be disrupted. However, it was not the US but Canada who broke the precedent of not 
discussing military security in the AC by openly criticised Russia for its actions in the Ukraine 
while also boycotting a subsequent meeting in Moscow (Østhagen 2014).  Even though 
military and economic cooperation was suspended with Russia as a result of the crisis, 
cooperation in the AC forums continued unabated, with spill-over minimalised, even in the 
aftermath of Canada’s outspoken condemnation of Russia. For this reason, the Arctic should 
be able to serve as a comparative regional case for regionalism studies in IR, rather than 
continually being excluded on the basis of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’. The term Arctic 
exceptionalism implies that due to distinctive geographical, climatic and political features, the 
Arctic is an incomparable case of regional cooperation that nonetheless lacks similar political 
features inherent in other world regions.  
Overcoming these biases will require a theoretical framework capable of bridging the gap 
between the two former IR approaches (liberal institutionalism and realism/geopolitics) which 
formerly dominated discourses in Arctic regional politics. This is especially relevant as 
according to Michael Byers, (2017:11) the Arctic “now seems to be located partway along the 
spectrum between the complex inter-dependence and realist ideal types” theories of regional 
systems. If so, then one task that third wave literature must assign itself to involves re-
establishing the Arctic as a ‘normal’ region in the international system with recognisable 
features akin to other global regions, in addition to considering what the ‘new normal’ of a 
post-Covid Arctic will look like. While the pandemic has served to heighten economic and 
security tensions between the US, Russia and China, with small Arctic states potentially being 
caught in the middle, at the time of writing (July 2020), it is too soon to say if the aftermath of 
the pandemic will lead to major political changes in the Arctic regional order. It is likely 
however that the post-Covid Arctic literature will need to contend with questions such as how 
to effectively manage the increasing competition between the US, Russia and China in the 
region, and to consider new institutional mechanisms to ensure that the threat of conflict 
remains low. For this to happen, I advocate that there would need to be a new security 
architecture in place in the region. In order to be successful, such a system would also have to 
create an impetus for an Arctic arms control regime and confidence building and security 
measures (CBSM). The latter would involve developing mechanisms for increased 
transparency, information sharing, and security cooperation, and would need to be inclusive of 
all relevant actors from both within and outside the regional order. For this reason, I will argue 
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throughout the course of this thesis that a NATO-based regional security order is no longer 
sustainable in the rapidly changing 21st century Arctic.   
 
1.6 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was threefold: first I aimed to introduce the reader to the research 
topic by providing an overview of the chapter content and structure of the thesis. Secondly, I 
conducted an in-depth literature review of the Arctic literature throughout the three stages of 
Arctic regional development that I outlined; 1) the Cold War Arctic, 2) the Transition stage 
and 3) the post-Cold War Arctic regional order. It was shown how national discourses 
dominated the Arctic social and political science literature for most of the Cold War. However, 
this changed during the late 1980s when reduced tensions between the superpowers led to new 
opportunities for Arctic regional cooperation. This led to a surge of new literature on Arctic 
environmental cooperation and regime-building. Thirdly, I identified the shortcomings of the 
first and second ‘waves’ of Arctic regional literature and proposed that a new third wave is 
now occurring. Not only does this third wave literature seek to reconcile the potentially 
disruptive impact that the Ukrainian conflict could have had on Arctic regional cooperation, 
but it also considers previously undiscussed questions such as how effective Arctic institutional 
mechanisms are at coping with external shocks and how can we prevent the re-securitization 
of the Arctic. Also, because Ukraine led to increased US/NATO-Russian tensions in the region, 
it also raised the question amongst Arctic scholars of whether the Arctic should develop new 
confidence building and security mechanisms.  
Since the AC has demonstrated its ability to sustain cooperation in the midst of two - albeit 
very different - external crises (Ukraine and Covid-19) - it would suggest that regional 
cooperation within AC structures has been largely successful. It can also be deducted that the 
Arctic states recognise they have more to gain through cooperating within the AC than in 
subverting it – a strong indication that all eight states are inherently satisfied with the AC 
institutional system. The question then is, if the AC has proven to be a stable institutional 
foundation upon which political cooperation has been established and sustained, is it possible 
to broaden the AC agenda to include security issues including military defence? To answer this 
question, I will need to identify how security is understood theoretically in IR and identify how 
the concept of security has changed over time from the Cold War when traditional or ‘hard’ 
military security took predominance in policymaking, to the present day where security is more 
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broadly understood and includes non-strategic issues.  This analysis will be undertaken in 
Chapter 2 where I outline the English School theoretical framework as a means of identifying 
how the Arctic security order has changed over time. The intent is to accurately depict the 
historical political and security changes in the Arctic region in order to consider the impact this 
has on the future direction of Arctic regional development. Furthermore, this will assist in my 
examination of which security issues are most prevalent in the Arctic today and which have 




CHAPTER TWO - THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
2.0 Introduction  
One of the central methodological concerns of this thesis is how to accurately depict macro-
change in the Arctic through the three different transformative stages identified in Chapter 1. 
In this chapter, the primary task is to select a suitable IR theory for explaining historical 
changes in the Arctic regional order up until the present day. As such, I propose that the region 
should be examined through the method of historical inquiry that serves to integrate theory 
with empirical investigation (Tilly 2002:573). An analysis of political change in the Arctic 
should also accommodate for different levels of interaction within the international system 
including: the state level, the regional level and the international (systemic) level. In section 
2.1 I therefore turn my attention to English School Approaches (ES) to engage with the three 
respective Arctic regional orders. Since the ES utilises realism as its starting point, it is 
theoretically compatible with Cold War approaches of foreign policy and international 
relations, while at the same time, it is flexible enough to accommodate and explain historical 
change over an approximately sixty-year period. Furthermore, adopting an ES regional 
approach fills in the gaps left by realism, including realisms’ inability to explain the rise of 
regionalism in the post-Cold War era.  
Two important ES approaches will be examined. The first concept is international society 
which advocates that the socialisation of states occurs through shared experiences and 
interactions structured as ‘institutions’ of international society. In section 2.2. I investigate the 
second ES approach that I adapt, namely, Buzan and Waever’s (2003) regional security 
complex theory (RSCT), which advocates that states within a regional complex will experience 
higher levels of cooperation, since security threats are more likely to travel over short distances 
than long ones and demand collective solutions. The RSCT, thus provides the theoretical 
foundational for understanding how security impacts regional inter-state cooperation. 
In section 2.3. it will be demonstrated how these two ES concepts interact and contribute 
towards explaining the nature of post-Cold War changes in the Arctic regional order. Here, I 
combine Buzan’s (2004) categorization of regional international society with Bailes and 
Cotty’s (2006) typology of security cooperation to demonstrate that there is a causal 
relationship between security and regional society that together determines the structure of the 
regional order.  
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Each of the four types of RSC are outlined in turn in the following sections: alliances (2.3.1), 
collective security (2.2.2.), security regime, (2.2.3.), and security community (2.2.4.), before 
summarising the RSC in section 2.2.5. The Buzan/Bailes and Cotty typology however falls 
slightly short in its ability to explain why the Arctic could exhibit more than one type of 
regional security system. The explanatory solution comes by way of an ES concept developed 
by Adler and Greave (2009) referred to as ‘regional security overlap’ which suggests that two 
regional orders can exist simultaneously within a geo-political space. This serves to 
demonstrate how dualistic understandings of regional society and military security cooperation 
have evolved at a different pace within the Arctic regional order. 
The evolution of the Arctic regional order, cannot, however, be understood fully without a 
fuller explanation of state behaviour. Why, and in what instances, do regional powers take up 
leadership roles within a region to initiate structural change? Why do they also choose not to 
become regional leaders and prevent change from occurring? Therefore, in section 2.4, I turn 
my attention towards outlining Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier’s (2012) Regional Powers and 
Security Framework (RPSF) which I have chosen for its ability to discern how regional power 
leadership serves as a key factor in determining the presence or absence of security structures 
within a region. The RPSF examines how the emergence of regional institutional structures 
will reflect regional power interests therefore combining realist and ES elements. This is 
significant for the Arctic given that there are two systemic powers present in the region (the 
United States and Russia) and as such political and security cooperation is undoubtedly linked 
to events arising at the international level. Finally, section 2.5, will provide a brief conclusion 
of the chapter, summarising the main arguments and key theoretical contributions towards 
answering the research question.  
2.1. How English School theory can explain change in the Arctic regional 
order 
Within realism, the oldest theoretical school of IR, macro-systemic change has been 
historically understood through three sub-theories: (the Balance of Power (BOP), Hegemonic 
Stability Theory (HST) and Power Transition Theory (PTT). Yet these realist theories are all 
curiously silent on the question of peaceful change. This is due to realism’s tardiness in 
acknowledging that there now exists a regional level of the international system that lies in 
between the state level and the international (systemic level). Since the rise of regionalism 
greatly contributed to the post-Cold War transformation in the Arctic, a theoretical approach is 
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required that exhibits a more fully developed understanding of regional order. I will therefore 
turn my focus towards the English School and demonstrate how contributions from this 
relatively new IR theoretical school can serve to fill the gaps left by realism and provide an 
overarching theoretical framework for this thesis. In this section I will briefly explain the key 
advantages of adopting an ES approach, before going on to explain the concept of international 
society perspective. For this task, I will draw upon the work of Hedley Bull (1977) before 
turning to the work of contemporary ES proponent Barry Buzan and his work on regional 
societies. I will also explain how these ES approaches can contribute to my research question 
on understanding change in the Arctic regional order.   
One of the main advantages of adapting English School theory is that it provides a pluralistic 
approach to answering the research question. The English school (ES) represents a key 
theoretical development of IR and is so named owing to the number of scholars working in 
British universities in the mid-twentieth century (Caney 2001:265).11 The ES is characterized 
by a commitment to preserving the sovereignty of states (hence its realist foundations), while 
advocating the existence of an international society of states. Barry Buzan (2012:36) defines 
international society as “the institutionalization of shared interests and identity amongst states 
and the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules, and institutions among them”. A 
second advantage of applying ES theory to the research question is that the ES endorses a 
historical approach to understanding IR. The main proponents of a historical approach to IR, 
came from British universities and became known as classicists or traditionalists. This was to 
distinguish themselves from those (mainly American) researchers who preferred to adopt a 
behavioralist approach emphasizing the importance of rigor, causality, falsifiable hypotheses 
and other scientific methods12. While behavioralists believed that IR could only advance itself 
by applying the methods of natural science, traditionalists emphasized the complexity of world 
politics, the role of contingency and leadership in diplomacy, and the unique nature of each 
historical juncture (Lake 2013:569). As such, the battle lines were drawn between Morton 
 
11 The key figures of the ES school include founding members Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull and Martin Wight, with 
contemporary proponents including Barry Buzan and Richard Little. 
 
12 David Lake explains that the attempt to define International Relations as a science began not with the behavioural revolution 
in the 1950s, (as standard accounts of the second great debate would suggest) but in the Chicago School of the 1920s and 
1930s. In turn, the behaviorists were promoting a particular kind of science focused on systems theory, a still deeply contested 




Kaplan on the behaviouralist side and ES founder Hedley Bull on the traditionalist side.13 
Claiming that no scientific theory could ever capture the interplay of so many factors nor 
explain choice by human beings who could learn by experience, traditionalists focused on 
critical moments in history in which world politics could have gone one way or the other (Bull, 
1969 cited in Lake 2012:569). When these arguments reached a zenith in the late 1960s, it 
culminated in the Second Great Debate of IR. Yet in spite of how behaviouralists claim to have 
won, the second Great Debate remains alive and is still discussed within the field of IR to this 
day (Lake 2013:570). Having established some of the main reasons why ES theory is a highly 
compatible theoretical approach through which to engage with the issue of Arctic regional 
order, I will now examine two of the most important concepts from the ES that will be applied 
to my research, the first being international society.  
When writing ‘The Anarchical Society’, Hedley Bull sought to investigate the way in which 
order is changed or maintained in international relations. To do this, Bull devised three ‘pillars’ 
1) the international system, 2) international society and 3) world society: as a way of explaining 
how order and the international system can be understood in different ways. For my inquiry 
into change in the Arctic regional order I will be mainly focusing on the first and second pillar 
of English School theory. Within the first pillar of the international system: order is understood 
from a traditional perspective, as derived from realist notions of anarchy, power politics and 
the BOP. Since realism serves as the foundation for the first pillar upon which international 
society is based on, this makes ES approaches appropriate to engage in the task of identifying 
key features of the Cold War Arctic order as well as examining the more recent post-War Arctic 
order, and the contemporary twenty-first century Arctic, through the second pillar of 
international and regional society. The second pillar, international society, perceives order as 
a pattern or regularity of social life - one that is necessary for promoting rules, norms and values 
(Reggner 2000:75). If taken as a fact of international relations, the existence of international 
society is seen to confer legitimacy on some actions, and illegitimacy on others, while also 
creating obligations on the part of the members of the society (p.75). This implies that states 
are socialised through their interactions with other states and that there are rules of behaviour 
that are accepted and observed by member states. In contrast, the third pillar, world society 
takes individuals, non-state organizations and ultimately the entire global population as its 
focus. World society, in accordance with Kantian philosophy, is mainly concerned with 
 
13 Although there were other recognisable figures on both sides, such as Edward Carr and Thomas Schelling, Bull and Kaplans 
arguments get to the heart of the matter Bennyworth (2011). 
82 
 
transnationalism and/or universalist cosmopolitanism but nowadays is usually taken to mean 
liberalism (Buzan 2012:196).14  However, Caney (2001:266) explains that members of the 
English School tend to favour the second pillar of international society15 pillar, because it finds 
a middle ground between the other two.  
Hedley Bull (2002:294) and other ES scholars also acknowledged the existence of a regional 
level of the international system. For Bull, the importance of recognizing the existence of 
regional society resided in its ability to the reform the state system, exclaiming that “by seeking 
a wider role for regional organizations which occupy a middle ground between states on the 
one hand, and global organizations on the other”. The distinction, however, between liberalism 
and the English School is what is meant by the term ‘institution’. While liberalism, (and 
especially liberal institutional approaches) would advocate that international organizations 
have a significant role in ameliorating the effects of anarchy in the international system and 
contribute towards lasting peace, the English School typology of international society, 
emphasizes the presence of conceptual institutions. Hedley Bull originally suggested there 
were six such institutions, including: war, balance of power, diplomacy, great power 
management and international law. The rationale behind such institutions (and the acceptance 
of them by states) is said to arise in response to the cost and difficulties of conflict and the 
strong desire within the modern (Westphalian) system for the preservation of independent 
states and international order (Buzan 2004:36).  
The question of how international society can explain peaceful change in the Arctic regional 
order can only be answered by understanding how these institutions have adapted and changed 
over time. Here, I utilize the work of contemporary ES scholar Barry Buzan (2012a)16 to 
demonstrate how the eight ‘master’ institutions of contemporary international society are 
expected to function (see Table 2.1). From these eight primary institutions Buzan also outlines 
 
14 The world society pillar is the most difficult of the three ES pillars to explain as this position has some parallels to 
transnationalism but neither does it rest entirely on individualism. Buzan (2012:196) considers that there are different 
approaches to tackling the issue of world society, it can also be understood better as historically operating from non-
Westphalian images of the international system as a whole than it is about capturing the non-state aspects of the system. Bull 
reflects that international politics “…. expresses neither complete conflict of interest between states nor complete identity of 
interest: it resembles a game that is partly distributive but also partly productive” (1985:31). In this way Bull recognises that 
each pillar has a role to play in the international system and each have manifested historically at different times (Bull 1985:33).  
 
15 However, Caney (2001:267) also notes that Bull’s essays distinguish two different visions of international society: pluralist 
and solidarist. According to the former, the international order is highly diverse and calls for states to simply respect one 
another’s sovereignty. According to the latter, there is room for states to work together to promote common goals. Bull’s 
earliest work is mainly pluralist but towards the end of his life he had moved towards the solidarist position. 
16 Buzan (2012, 2010) and Holsti (1998) appear to be the exceptions 
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the secondary institutions and derivatives processes stemming from each. Buzan explains that 
his model of international society can also be adopted at the regional level. However, if a 
regional society is to exist, Buzan outlines that some necessary conditions must be met. These 
included the presence of independent states, geographical scale and diversity, and the existence 
of a global-level social structure strong enough to justify the presence of regional subsystems: 
all of which criteria the Arctic fulfils. From this point on, when discussing international society 
in the Arctic I will therefore refer to the idea of Arctic regional society to engage with region-
specific institutions and processes. Later, in Chapter 6 when I discuss the current Arctic 
regional order, I will apply Buzan’s typology of international society to the Arctic by 
identifying and mapping out in more detail the derivative processes and institutions of Arctic 




Table 2.0 Contemporary Institutions of International Society Source: Buzan (2012a:187) 
Primary Institutions  Secondary Institutions 




UN General Assembly  








Some Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs)  
Bilateral Treaties also used to settle land 






Most IGOs, regimes  
Great power 
management  
Balance of Power 
Alliances 
War and Conflict 
Management 
Legitimacy 
 UN Security Council 
Plurilateral and multilateral regimes 





Markets Trade liberalization 
Financial liberalization 
Hegemonic stability 
GATT/WTO, MFN agreements, IBRD, 












CITES, UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, IPCC, 




2.2 Buzan and Waever’s (2003) Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) 
Having discussed the concept of international and regional society, I will turn to explaining the 
second meta-theoretical concept that I will utilize from the English School: Buzan and 
Waever’s (2003) regional security complex theory (RSCT). The rationale behind employing 
the RSCT is its ability to demonstrate why regional cooperation increased at the end of the 
Cold War.  Firstly however, I will briefly examine how understandings of security have 
undergone a radical reinterpretation and expansion in the post-Cold War era, with security 
policy no longer being confined to just military defense (Pilyasov et al 2015:14). While many 
theorists consider security to be an ‘essentially contested concept’ there is nonetheless a basic 
definition of security which can be understood as ‘freedom from threat’. The problem however, 
is that what counts as a threat is more complex in the post-Cold War world. For instance, 
Stadtmüller (2005:105) explains that the present time may be more accurately described by the 
term ‘reflexive security’ because we are unsure about where dangers can come from, how to 
interpret their roots, and how to react to them. As such, the security policy of each state, as well 
security at the regional and global levels of the international system, is a subject for reflection 
and discussion, not simple acceptance (ibid).  
Acknowledging the fundamentally changed nature of security in the post-Cold War era, Buzan 
and Waever (2003:4) developed an ES sub-theory focused on the question of regional security 
that links together the role of regional society with security cooperation. Buzan and Waever 
outline how the central idea behind the RSCT is that since most threats travel more easily over 
short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into 
regionally based clusters called security complexes. The authors also consider how there will 
be greater levels of state interaction and socialization (i.e. regional society) within security 
complexes as a result of their collective interests in alleviating security threats. However, 
Buzan and Waever acknowledge that where great powers are embedded in regions, the regional 
and global level security dynamics will be linked together (2003:458). Thus, a secondary 
research question arises as to why the Arctic regional order is mainly peaceful and cooperative 
even when great power relations between the US and Russia remain contentious at the 
international level. The answer lies in assessing what kind of regional society exists within the 
Arctic during the three historical periods identified in Chapter 1, while also analyzing the 
nature of security cooperation in the Arctic region. As a part of this investigation it is also 
necessary to acknowledge influences and political developments that originate from the 
international level of the system, but which also determine outcomes of Arctic regional 
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security. To do this requires outlining the types of regional society and security cooperation 
that can exist within an RSC which I will approach in the next section with the aid of Buzan’s 
(2012) categorization of four types of regional society and Bailes and Cotty’s (2006) 
categorization of four types of regional security cooperation. I then combine both typologies 
to provide an effective method of identifying the Arctic regional order both past and present. 
 
2.3 Demonstrating the Relationship between regional society and security 
cooperation – how regional orders change through time    
In section 2.1, it was shown how Buzan’s contemporary institutions of international society 
can contribute to understanding how regional society can change over time. In addition to this, 
I will also need a way to organize different historical types of regional society and to identify 
the distinguishing features of each. The solution is provided by adopting Buzan’s (2012b) 
typology of regional societies which allows me to review four key historical types that overall 
demonstrate the development and expansion of regional society through time. These different 
types of regional society are ordered based on the degree of socialization experienced by states 
within that region, – in other words, the extent that a regional society can contribute to wide-
ranging forms of political cooperation within a regional order. By utilizing Buzan’s typology, 
I am seeking to find out whether inter-state relations in the Arctic have become more 
cooperative and peaceful since the end of the Cold War thus suggesting that the region is 
progressing along a positive scale from enmity to amity, or, alternatively, if, the prevailing 
‘cold peace’ between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War has resulted in 
unresolved security issues that could reappear later. Buzan’s (2012b) typology therefore has 
the explanatory potential to outline what is driving change within regional societies and enables 
an examination of how the presence or absence of regional society can contribute to higher or 
lower levels of political cooperation amongst states. Here, I will briefly explain each type of 
international society outlined by Buzan, provide historical and contemporary examples for 
each, and, where appropriate demonstrate which of the four types are applicable to the Arctic 
regional order.  
Although there are four types of societies outlined in Buzan’s typology, the first type of 
international society - power-political – is no longer relevant to contemporary world politics 
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since it is a system where institutions are either minimal or non-existent17. The second type of 
international society – Coexistence, is described by Buzan as a pluralist, Westphalian system 
in which the core six institutions identified historically by Hedley Bull are operational. Buzan 
states that pre-1945 Europe resembled a coexistent system, as does the present-day South Asia 
and post-Soviet space. In Chapter 3 and 4, I identify the Cold War Arctic as being a coexistent 
type of regional society.  
The third variant – a Cooperative international society requires developments that go 
significantly beyond coexistence by engaging with cooperative interstate projects that might 
include the creation of a shared market economy, the pursuit of human rights, joint pursuit of 
big science, collective environmental management, and suchlike. The western/global core is in 
this category, and probably also South America. In Chapter 5 I will demonstrate that the Arctic 
emerged as a cooperative international regional society in the late 1980s with the development 
of East-West Arctic environmental management and scientific collaboration alongside the 
development of regional institutions. This also led to increased cooperation on strategic issues 
such as nuclear disarmament and arms control.  
The fourth and final form of international society is that of Convergence: this implies the 
existence of a society that has developed a substantial range of shared values amongst the states 
within the region to make them adopt similar political, legal, and economic forms. The main 
empirical case is the EU. The range of shared values has to be wide enough and substantial 
enough to generate similar forms of government (liberal democracies, Islamic theocracies, 
communist totalitarianisms etc.), and legal systems based on similar values in respect to basic 
issues such as property rights, human rights, and the relationship between government and 
citizens. Buzan’s typology of regional society can serve as a benchmark against which Arctic 
regional orders both past and present can be compared. For instance, while the typology is 
suggestive of a linear historical progression of regional society along the scale from enmity to 
amity, there may also be the possibility however small, that a regional society could revert to 
a more conflict-based system – if states within a regional order begin to reject the shared rules 
and norms of regional society and pursue unilateral security and defense policies.  
 
17 While there are historical examples of such a system, today there are no contemporary cases – although Buzan suggests that 




The relationship between international rules and norms on the one hand, and the practices of 
security in world politics on the other, clearly encourages an investigation of the ways in which 
the relationship between international society and security might be conceived (Bellamy and 
Mc Donald, 2004:308). To gain a clearer understanding of how regional society interacts with 
security, I will also outline a compatible ES approach to regional security cooperation since 
the two are recognized to go hand in hand. Although Buzan refers to three types of RSCs 
including conflict formations, security regimes and security communities, I adopt Bailes and 
Cottey’s (2006:199) four typology approach to regional security cooperation (alliances, 
collective security, security regime, security community) as I feel that it provides a more 
detailed, and therefore a more accurate categorization, with which to explain regional security 
cooperation. This is especially relevant with respect to the inclusion of ‘alliances’ as a form of 
regional security cooperation since NATO has long been considered the cornerstone 
institutional structure through which Arctic security was pursued during the Cold War and in 
the post-Cold War era. Yet the two typologies are otherwise more or less similar given that 
they share two of the same types of RSC’s: security regimes and security communities. In the 
following sub-sections, each of the four RSC configurations will be described in turn, before 
analysing which configuration(s) can be applied to the successive Arctic regional orders over 
the timespan of historical inquiry. 
2.3.1. Alliances (collective defence)  
Alliances are described by Bailes and Cottey (2006:199) as one of the oldest forms of 
international cooperation, designed for both defence and attack (typically by military means) 
against a common external, or even internal, threat or opponent. John Mearsheimer (2001:156) 
explains how threatened states will work to create a defensive alliance to help them contain 
their dangerous opponent because the costs of doing so are shared in an alliance, while at the 
same time the likelihood of successfully deterring the aggressor is increased due to the larger 
amount of military firepower available. NATO is a modern example of a political and military 
alliance which was created in 1949 in order to provide for the collective defence of Europe18 
against the threat posed by the Soviet Union (Robinson 2008:141).  
 
18 Regarding collective defence, Article Five of NATO’s founding charter stipulates than an attack on any member of the 
NATO alliance shall be considered an attack on all. This article was invoked for the first time following the terrorist attacks 
on the United States on 11 September 2001 (Robinson 2008, p.141) 
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Positive attributes of alliances include reducing the likelihood of war between its members, by 
promoting confidence, encouraging conflict prevention and resolution, and the possibility of 
developing cooperation in other non-security areas (Bailes and Cottey 2006:199-200). 
However, by their nature, alliances also incorporate negative characteristics that can impact 
international security: a purely defensive alliance may heighten its members’ threat 
consciousness more than it eases it, increasing competitive arms acquisition which in turn may 
exacerbate tensions and entrench dividing lines (ibid).  Furthermore, the underlying logic 
behind alliances is that they serve as mechanisms for regulating the disequilibrium of power 
amongst the great powers in the Westphalian state system. Yet Sperling (2009) considers that 
alliances are not particularly relevant to understanding the security dilemmas facing states in 
the twenty-first century. This is because many states are now operating within post-
Westphalian structures, such as the EU, that encourage states to favour highly institutionalised 
and normatively constituted forms of security19.  
2.3.2 Collective security 
Collective security can be understood as a universal concept that rests on the assumption that 
security is indivisible and should not be confused with collective defence which has a much 
more limited scope (Robinson 2008:40). Bailes and Cottey (2006:200) outline how the concept 
emerged in the early 20th century in response to the ambivalent effects of older-style balance-
of-power politics and alliances. They suggest that collective security was first attempted in the 
framework of the League of Nations and again in the United Nations (UN), both of which are 
described as a collective security system that aims to prevent or contain war by assuring a 
response to any act of aggression or threat to peace among its members. However, to be 
effective, the institutional system must be inclusive and have the means to direct attention 
inwardly and influence state behaviour. Yet, because of the problem of arriving at unanimous 
agreement, which is especially difficult when there is a large membership base, no such system 
has ever been made to work perfectly (ibid). Another issue is the problem of enforcement, since 
the institutional structure must have decision-making powers and authority, not to mention the 
political will, to act against offenders. Therefore, Bailes and Cottey (2006:200) conclude that 
 
19 Security governance is a concept associated with post-Westphalian systems and defined as “the coordinated management 
and regulation of issues by multiple and sperate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors…. formal and 
informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed towards particular outcomes” 




historical experience has shown that collective security works well when there is a consensus 
among the major powers but fails when faced with the largest dangers, including when the 
major powers come into conflict. Stadtmüller (2005:109) takes a similar view, suggesting that 
the search for international security by means of regional solutions arises from the recognition 
that universal organizations are as yet unable to create a system that would be really effective 
in ending current conflicts, and, at the same time, acceptable to the whole global community. 
She proposes that regions could serve as an intermediate stage between interests at the state 
and global level. The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) could fall 
into the category of a collective regional security organization. While the OSCE is inclusive in 
a pan-European sense and the largest regional organization in the world, its effectiveness in 
preventing and ending conflicts has raised considerable doubts as to the efficiency of collective 
security. As such, Bailes and Cottey (2006:200) consider that the lessons learnt from 
international collective security organizations may also apply at the regional level, stating that 
these lessons “…may indicate some limiting factors for the security aspirations of regional 
groups as well”.   
2.3.3 Security Regime 
A third type of regional security cooperation is called a security regime. Proposed by Robert 
Jervis (1982:357), a security regime can be defined as “those principles, rules, and norms that 
permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate”. 
Jervis further explains that this concept implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate 
cooperation, but a form of cooperation that substantially more than a short-term pursuit of self- 
interest. The general aim of a security regime is for states to manage their disputes peacefully 
and avoid war. However, Bailes and Cottey (2006:200) outline how regimes also encourage 
state cooperation in non-security dimensions of international relations. For example, regimes 
are often established on the basis of economic interests such as trade and transport.  To this 
effect, Bailes and Cottey consider how regimes tend to define norms—of a cooperative and 
generally positive nature—for states’ behaviour and often provide ways to implement, support 
and verify these norms (ibid). In the post-Cold War Arctic, environmental issues have largely 
shaped political dialogue and multilateral cooperation. Yet, Sheehan (2005:114) highlights 
how a distinguishing feature of environmental security is that it has resisted attempts to be 
linked to broader security agendas. This is because environmentalists may not favour linking 
the environment with the concept of security and may resist the emergence of a security-related 
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regime in the Arctic. This would explain the reluctance of the ‘first wave’ Arctic literature to 
engage with the military-political dimension of Arctic security in the immediate post-Cold War 
era. 
However, a security-related regime could, according to Bailes and Cottey, “cover broad 
prescripts for behaviour such as the non-use of force and respect for existing international 
borders, or more concretely regulate certain types and uses of weapons or activities like military 
movements and transparency”.  They go on to list several regional constructs, notably the 
OSCE which may be understood as security regimes through their ability to establish arms 
control measures such as the OSCE’s 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 
Treaty. However, Bailes and Cottey conclude that “the value of all such constructs depend on 
how well their norms are respected and there is much debate on what features—in terms of 
internal power patterns, institutionalization, incentives and penalties—are needed to ensure 
observance”. 
2.3.4 Security community 
The fourth and final form of regional security cooperation is the concept of a security 
community, (SC) defined as a group of states that have become so integrated in terms of 
institutions, practices, and a sense of communal identity, as to have created an expectation 
among them that problems and disagreements will be solved by peaceful means (Robinson 
2008 p.190). The concept of a security community was pioneered by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s 
to reflect the far-reaching goals of European integration after World War II. The concept was 
then revived and modified by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett 40 years later. A key 
contribution made by Adler and Barnett in advancing the concept was their suggestion that 
because identities and interests are largely shaped by their transactional environment, socio-
political practices hold the key to expansion of membership of the security community – an 
aspect deemed crucial if the definition of security is to move beyond state-centric conceptions 
(Sheehan 2005:31). As such, SCs imply that there are more intense interactions between states 
and non-state actors, usually coordinated through comprehensive institutional structures that in 
turn re-shape the identity of states towards prioritising participation in the community (Bailes 
and Cottey 2009:201, Sheehan 2005:31). Proponents therefore believe that the development of 
SCs across the world may represent the most promising route towards peaceful, stable security 
(Sheehan 2005:32). Furthermore, James Sperling (2009:11) considers that SCs as a type of 
RSC, can be sub-categorised into Westphalian security communities and post-Westphalian 
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security communities. While a Westphalian security community would encompass states that 
adhere to modern (historical) understandings of security through realist tenets such as the BOP, 
alliances and hegemony, a post-Westphalian security community strives to create new forms 
of political organization that emphasises interdependence, cooperation and collective security 
through a system of overlapping sovereignties and jurisdictions, enshrined within regional and 
international institutions. As early as 1979, Hedley Bull recognised there was a real possibility 
of Europe transforming through political integration yet, Sperling (2009:2,13) argues within 
the European post-Westphalian system, the United States, a key security actor in Europe, has 
persisted in promoting its own modern form of Westphalian sovereignty in European security 
relations and the institutional architecture. This, Sperling argues has formed a significant 
barrier to European security cooperation, owing to a “…transatlantic divergence in the targets 
and instruments of security governance policies” between the United States and the EU 
member states (ibid). This may be similar to the Arctic, which if taken as a sub-region of the 
broader Euro-Atlantic security order may also exhibit both Westphalian and post-Westphalian 
security architecture. In the next section I will address this issue adopting the concept of 
regional security overlap following a summary of the regional society/ RSC spectrum.      
2.3.5. Summary of RSC  
Table 2.2 summarises how Buzan’s three typologies of contemporary regional society can be 
combined with Bailes and Cottey’s (2006) types of regional security cooperation. The 
correlation between security and society demonstrate political variance within regional orders 
on a spectrum of enmity to amity.  
By pairing Buzan’s three types of regional society with Bailes and Cotty’s types of regional 
cooperation, a classification emerges that details specific types of regional orders and the form 
of security cooperation which takes place within it (including the absence thereof): all of which 
can serve to demonstrate the level of enmity or amity present within a regional society.  Where 
there are higher levels of state interaction and regional cooperation, it is suggested that conflict 
will be minimum and resolved in non-violent ways, whereas in regions that exhibit low levels 




Table 2.1 Buzan’s four types of regional society combined with Bailes and Cotty’s 
typology of security cooperation 
 Buzan’s (2012b) Regional 
Society types 
Bailes and Cotty’s (2006) regional security 
cooperation types 
 
Coexistence Alliances, collective defence Collective security 
(UN, OSCE) 
 
Cooperative  Security regime  




Post-Westphalian security community 
 
However, an immediate problem presents itself when applying the Arctic regional order to the 
combined regional society/RSC security cooperation typology outlined above. Facing the 
possibility that there is more than one RSC operational in the Arctic (the continuation of the 
Cold War NATO alliance in addition to newer forms of security cooperation such as security 
regime or community), requires an explanation as to why two historically distinct security 
systems continue to exist within the same geo-political space. Here, I adopt the concept of 
security overlap devised by Adler and Greave (2009) who explain how two security systems 
can simultaneously exist within a region  
… the notion of overlap of security systems, and of their related mechanisms and practices, highlights that 
actors’ dispositions and expectations may respond simultaneously to two distinct systems of rule, two 
different ways of conceiving power, two sets of practices – which may be distinguished, not only 
analytically, but also normatively – and to two different ways of imagining space (Alder and Greave 
2009:62-63).  
The two sets of security orders referred to above are essentially the ‘balance of power’ (akin to 
Buzan’s ‘coexistence’/BOP type20 of international society) and the post Westphalian security 
community. Adler and Greave (2009) suggest that two such distinct systems coexisting in the 
same space can produce a mixture of political and security practices. This is because the two 
 
20 Adler and Greave (2009) follow the English School approach, taking the balance of power as an institution of regional 
society. By doing so, they conceptually view the regional BOP as being reflective of “a minimal yet socially and reflexively 
base security governance system” consisting of sovereign state entities that are situated in a particular relationship to one 
another. In contrast, mechanisms of security governance – akin to the ES regional society: can be clearly delineated as a set of 
rules, norms, practices and institutions that coordinate security relations between state and non-state actors and which is 
constantly being re-enacted (Alder and Greave 2009:.65). 
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systems “rest on different notions of power, different ideas on the role of war in creating order, 
and different views on alliances/alignments” (Adler and Greave, 2009:65).  
2.4 The Regional Powers and Security Framework (RPSF)  
In this section I will outline Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier’s (2012) Regional Powers and 
Security Framework (RPSF). The authors take as their starting point ES approaches, 
particularly Buzan and Waever’s (2003) work on regional security complexes (RSC’s). 
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier explain how it is both material and ideational factors that shape 
state behaviour, defining regional powers as states “who possess sufficient capabilities to 
project power throughout and who disproportionately influence the security dynamics within 
their RSC” (2012, p7) They specify that the purpose of the RPSF is to enable scholars to 
systematically identify the regional powers within an RSC and to understand the functions that 
regional powers play in developing and maintaining regional security orders (Stewart-Ingersoll 
and Frazier, 2012, p1). According to the authors, there are three essential factors for 
determining how regional powers influence their region’s security: these are 1) regional 
structure, 2) regional power roles (leadership) and 3) regional power orientations, each of 
which will be explained in the following sections. 
2.4.1. Regional Structure 
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) argue that for us to be able explain the way in which 
regional powers behave, it is first essential to understand the regional structure in which they 
operate. To do this, the authors adapt an outline from Buzan and Waever (2003:53) which 
embodies four variables to explain regional structure:  
1. Boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours 
2. Anarchic structure, which means that the RSC must be composed of two or more 
autonomous units: 
3. Polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the units 
4. Social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the units. 
The first concept implies that there is a geographical space in which the RSC exists. For the 
study of regions and its powers to take place, the region needs to have distinctive boundaries 
which allow us to clearly demarcate what goes on within the region from that which happens 
externally to it. This clear internal/external divide is important for evaluating different types of 
influences and for analysing how the region political space can transform through time. 
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The second concept relates to the anarchic structure of the region. Stewart-Ingersoll and 
Frazier (2012: 46) acknowledge that within the region there is a designated membership of 
states: “this multi-state membership and the lack of a sovereign regional government makes 
the RSC anarchic by definition” (p43). More specifically the authors declare that a state must 
be geographically connected to the RSC in order for it to be a member. Therefore, even if there 
is extensive involvement by a systemic actor not geographically present within the region, this 
actor remains external to the RSC.  
In Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier’s (2012) RPSF, they outline that to determine the polarity of 
a region, the number of poles (powerful states) must first be identified within the regional 
complex. They do this by determining the level of material capabilities that each state 
possesses. This relates to neorealist understandings of relative or material power. To qualify as 
a regional power, a state has to pass a certain threshold of proportional power within the RSC 
(p.738). However just because a state may qualify as a regional power on the basis of material 
capabilities, this does not guarantee that it will be competent in carrying out regional power 
roles across a range of security issues on a consistent basis (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 
2010:738). Therefore, the fourth and final concept towards understanding regional structure 
includes the social construction of the region. The authors consider how power may be utilized 
through other contexts such as political and social relationships or through cooperative 
processes on non-traditional security concerns (p.739). The advantage of observing such 
processes means that we can describe the way in which regional members actually interact and 
it allows particular attention to be paid to the roles that regional powers adapt (ibid).  
2.4.2. Regional Power Roles 
Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2010) explain that to qualify as a regional power, a state has to 
pass a certain threshold of proportional power within the RSC (p.738). In other words, a state 
must have a determined level of military and economic resources at its disposal which would 
enable it to fulfil the expected roles of a regional power. This relates to neorealist 
understandings of relative or material power.  
To assess a regional power’s ability to effectively provide leadership, we must understand the 
different ways in which a regional power can behave. Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2010) 
consider that actions taken by a state in an effort to lead can be viewed as important in 
understanding regional security (p.741). Regional leadership is defined by the authors as the 
act of eliciting cooperation toward or acceptance of shared objectives and as a means through 
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which to achieve them amongst members of a group (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012:69). 
Therefore, the second concept of outlining the regional structure involves regional power roles. 
Taking into consideration the influence of both the material and behavioural/social elements, 
we can ascertain that regional powers become leaders based on two capacities: 
1. The state must be viewed in terms of recognition based on overwhelming material capability 
and the willingness to use that capability to influence member states  
2. Mutual recognition of leadership based on amicable interactions/ friendly relations that 
reduce the effect of the security dilemma and provides legitimacy for their leadership  
In the RPSF, Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll identify that a regional power may choose to take 
on different types of leadership roles including leadership, custodianship and protection roles. 
All three types of roles require that the state fulfil the threshold requirement to qualify as a 
regional power: it must have certain capabilities, in particular military and economic strength 
(p.738). However, the authors are clear that the possession of material capabilities are not 
enough to determine if a state will behave as a regional power, nor is the state that does so 
necessarily the one with the largest capabilities (ibid). They consider how power may be 
utilized through other contexts such as political and social relationships or through cooperative 
processes on non-traditional security concerns (p.739). The advantage of observing such 
processes means that we can describe the way in which Arctic regional members interact pay 
particular attention to be paid to the roles which regional powers adapt (Frazier and Stewart-
Ingersoll, 2010:739). This will be pivotal in determining if the United States as the potential 
regional hegemon of the Arctic does in fact behave in a way that is characteristic of such a role 
or, alternatively if the mantle of leadership is taken on by other states.  
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier have identified different configurations of regional order that may 
exist within a region. The difference however is with respect to the fact that the RPSF considers 
how the nature of the regional security order will be affected by the provision of regional 
leadership. In Table 2.3, the five types of regional security order proposed by Stewart-Ingersoll 
and Frazier 2012 are outlined. Each of the configurations are designated according to regional 
structure and their leadership combinations. The first configuration advanced by the authors is 
an unordered region. Strictly speaking this does not count as a regional security order for the 
reason that there is no possibility of regional leadership developing since it is fragmented and 
lacks the ‘poles’ or powerful states capable of providing leadership. Yet the inclusion of an 
unordered system in the RPSF demonstrates how both structure and leadership are fundamental 
to the creation of a security order. 
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Table 2.2 Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier’s ‘Anticipated regional security orders by 
structure and leadership combinations’ 
 
Regional Security Order Regional structure Regional leadership 
provision 
Unordered Lacking in polarity (no core 
powers) 
Lacking as no one can 
provide it 
Strength-based Unipolar. Bipolar, or 
multipolar 
May be present, but it is less 
than extensive or effective 
Hegemony-based Unipolar Extensive and effective by 
the dominant state 
Concert-based Bipolar or multipolar Extensive effective and 
coordinating among core 
powers (for general system 
threats) 
Integration-based Unipolar, bipolar, or 
multipolar 
Extensive, effective, 
cooperative and inclusive 
 
Source: Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier, 2012:79 
 
In a strength-based order, regional leadership may or may not occur. The authors explain that 
“in such systems, security and/or stability are pursued primarily through the use of material 
power-based strategies” (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, p79). There are two types of 
strength-based systems, depending upon the polarity within the region: in the first type, a 
unipolar regional order is likely where in such an order, it is only necessary that the strongest 
state has a qualitatively unique concentration of material capabilities. Leadership on the part of 
the dominant power then could be completely lacking (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012:79).  
The second type of strength-based order occurs in regions that are bipolar or multipolar, which 
by default would be based on a balance-of-power system with the most important states being 
those that qualify as regional poles (p.80). Again, the classic example of such a system would 
be during the Cold War era, and as such I advocate that in Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier’s 




In contrast to a unipolar strength-based system, the second security order advocated by the 
RPSF outlines a hegemonic regional security order. In addition to the dominant regional power 
having a high concentration of material capabilities, the same state must also engage in 
extensive and effective leadership in order to claim the title of regional hegemon. Thus, a 
hegemonic order is likely to be “a unipolar region in which the regional pole consistently 
provides leader-ship across a range of securitized issues and achieves a high rate of success in 
generating the acquiescence of regional members” (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012:80).  
For a region to be a concert-based order there must be a high degree of cooperation on security 
issues amongst the most powerful states within the region. A concert order is most likely to 
occur in a bipolar or multipolar region, “in which each of the most powerful states engages in 
extensive, effective and coordinated leadership (at least with respect to specific, agreed upon 
security issues)” (p80). Individual regional poles may also undertake leadership attributes in 
distinctive ways on specific issues and concerns that may fall outside of the scope of the concert 
arrangements, and particularly as they relate to the interrelationships between the most powerful 
states. However, another feature of the concert-based order is that the powerful states in the 
region will maintain a competitive posture toward one another (p.80).  
Finally, the authors consider an integration-based order to imply that all members of the system 
are willing to address security problems interdependently and in accordance with certain norms 
and rules which may be enshrined through political institutions. An example is given of how in 
an integration-based order states may agree to refrain from the use of force against other 
members and be willing to defend other members should this rule be violated (Kupchan and 
Kupchan 1995 cited in Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012:81). Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 
highlight that leadership plays a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of an integration-
based security order:  
...Leadership will be at its highest point in the creation and implementation of the institutional mechanisms 
that will develop these interdependences. It is possible that such an order could emerge in any sort of 
polarity. It is essential though that leadership is performed in an extensive and effective degree and in a 
manner that demonstrates a high degree of restraint, cooperation and commitment to the system 
membership as a whole. Thus, the regions in which the most powerful states perform consistent and 
expansive leadership in a manner that is highly cooperative and non-aggressive are the ones most likely to 
develop integration-based orders (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012:81). 
2.4.3. Foreign Policy Orientation  
Having seen how the two factors of structure and leadership contribute towards determining 
the type of regional order, Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier add a third important element: defining 
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a state’s foreign policy orientation. The authors define orientation as “the inclination, 
disposition (satisfaction or dissatisfaction) or preferences of a state with respect to the 
development and maintenance of the security order” (p.152). To put it another way, the 
orientation of regional powers is an indicator for what roles they are likely to play in a region 
as they attempt to achieve their preferences for a particular type of security order (Frazier and 
Stewart-Ingersoll 2010:744). Within the RPSF, regional power orientations can be expressed 
along three axes: 
1. A regional power’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the RSC’s status quo order. 
Regional powers may be protective or revisionist regarding the status quo.  
2. The tendency for regional powers towards unilateralism or multilateralism.  
3. The impetus for regional powers to play their roles in a proactive or reactive manner. 
 
The first element of foreign policy orientation is concerned with a state’s satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the status quo. Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) define ‘status quo’ as 
the way in which states benefit from the rules of the system. These rules decide how security 
and the provision of goods are distributed: “Thus, status quo orientation is defined with the 
RPSF as the preference of a state for the maintenance of the governing arrangements among 
the units of the regional system, including the rules, principles and institutions” (p.156).  
The second aspect of foreign policy orientation refers to the tendency for regional powers to 
select from a unilateral or multilateral orientation. A unilateralist orientation is selected by 
regional actors who demonstrate an individualist sense of security through their actions. Such 
actions involve “concerns with relative gains, proclivity toward issue- and state specific 
bilateral agreements, and cooperation only when it is in the short–term national interest” 
(Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 2010:745). In contrast, a multilateral orientation implies that the 
regional power views security issues of RSC members as interconnected – developing rules 
and patterns of interaction towards expectations of long-term cooperation (ibid). The third and 
final aspect of foreign policy orientation considers the prospects for regional powers to play 
their roles in a proactive or reactive manner. This follows on from a regional power’s decision 
towards unilateral or multilateralism on the basis that  
Some actions that fit within the functions of the regional power will be directed at changes in the security 
context of an RSC that are diffuse and long-term oriented. Others will be responses to specific and 
immediate actions or events. A tendency toward the former would imply a proactive regional power, while 
a tendency toward the latter would imply a reactive one (p.746) 
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This final point will be crucial in discerning if the post-Cold War regional transformation in 
the Arctic was conscientiously designed as a result of proactive leadership in the Arctic, or 
alternatively, if the current regional order has emerged from reactive foreign policy decisions 
of the regional great powers. I will specifically address the importance of the two Arctic 
regional powers’ foreign policy orientation in more detail in Chapter 3 within the Cold War 
Arctic and within Chapter 5 and 6 respectively when looking at the post-Cold War transition 
period and the contemporary Arctic regional order.  
2.5. Conclusion  
The focus of this chapter was to outline the overarching theoretical components that will be 
utilised to engage with the research question of how to identify the Arctic regional order both 
past and presently. I began this chapter with an explanation of the failure of traditional realist 
approaches to account for the global rise of regions in the aftermath of the Cold War. I justified 
my adoption of the English School as my meta-theory on the grounds that this approach 
provides a more comprehensive and inclusive account of the forces of change that have 
influenced Arctic regional development from the Cold War to the twenty-first century. In 
section 2.1 and 2.2., I engaged with two key concepts within the ES, regional society and 
regional security complex theory, both of which provide an overarching structure upon which 
I can develop my political analysis of Arctic regional development. While the concept of 
regional society embraces the idea of a society of states – or a community of shared norms and 
values, the second approach of regional security complexes illustrates how security threats are 
more likely to travel across shorter distances, indicating that regional responses may be required 
for collective threats leading to greater levels of regional security cooperation over time. Then, 
in section 2.3., I showed how these two approaches relate to one another and how, when 
combined, they can provide a detailed explanation of the evolution of historical structures 
within the Arctic, while at the same time demonstrating the international sources of systemic 
change.  To achieve this, I merged two different typologies together: Buzan’s (2012) typology 
of regional society and Bailes and Cotty’s (2006) typology of regional security cooperation. By 
doing so, I created a more effective method through which to identify and explain the structural 
features of the three different historical Arctic orders identified in Chapter 1.  
However, the typology cannot explain why regional orders transform from one type to another. 
This requires an understanding of the conditions that encourage regional powers to revise the 
regional order through peaceful means such as occurred in the Arctic at the end of the Cold 
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War. To understand why regional orders transform over time therefore requires proficient 
methods to identify the causes and conditions of regional change and the political outcomes. 
While individual studies in the development of regional institutional cooperation have been 
already undertaken in the Arctic (through the ES and the more commonly utilised liberal-
institutionalist approach), an analysis of institutional structures alone cannot provide a complete 
picture of the material and ideational impetus that drives powerful states to attempt to change 
regional structures. However, an analysis of the behaviour and their foreign policies of the 
Arctic states over the historical period of inquiry may provide a new approach towards 
understanding change. More specifically, I am concerned with the Arctic regional powers’ 
tendency to behave as status quo or revisionist powers, their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the regional order and their ability and willingness to take on a regional leadership role that 
could serve as the driving force behind long-term regional political change.  
For this reason, I have adopted Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier’s Regional Powers and Security 
Framework (RPSF), since not only is it based on ES understandings of regional order, it also 
provides an explanatory framework for regional change in the Arctic, by specifically focusing 
on the role of regional leadership in contributing to such changes. Specifically, the RPSF is 
concerned with whether an individual state, identified as a regional power, will choose to take 
on the responsibilities associated with a great power and engage in collective security 
arrangements with other states within the region. To identify the type of regional leadership that 
exists within a region, Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier advocate an approach which marries both 
material and ideational understandings of power, as understood through the institutions of 
regional society. They also outline how their framework utilises Buzan and Waever’s (2003) 
RSCT as its foundation for their assessment of regional structure. At the same time, the RPSF 
goes beyond the RSCT by outlining specific configurations of leadership and foreign policy 
orientations which in turn influence the type of regional order that will emerge.  
In conjunction with the ES approaches of regional society and regional security complex theory, 
the RPSF will assists in demonstrating how the regional leadership tendencies of the United 
States and the Soviet Union has influenced change in the Arctic throughout the three historic 
stages of Arctic regional development that spans an approximate sixty-year period of inquiry 
from 1946 to 2018. In future chapters, I will examine these three stages of Arctic regional order 
in more detail - the Cold War Arctic regional order (Chapters 3 and 4), the post-Cold War 
transformation of the 1990s (Chapter 5) and the current Arctic regional order (Chapter 6). In 
each of the following chapters I will utilise the RPSF to assess the role of the regional powers 
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in the Arctic region with respect to leadership capabilities and foreign policy orientations. As a 
part of this process, I will also consider the role of small and medium Arctic states and how 




CHAPTER THREE - THE COLD WAR ARCTIC PART I                                                                                  
GREAT POWER RIVALRY AND THE MILITARIZATION 
OF THE HIGH NORTH DURING THE ERA OF 
BIPOLARITY 
 
3.0 Introduction  
The global balance of power shifted after the Second World War from a formerly multipolar 
balance operating between the European powers of Britain, France and Russia - to a new post-
war bipolar balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Owing to the 
irreconcilable social, political, economic and ideological aims of the two great states, each 
sought to achieve total supremacy over the global political order. At the root of Cold War 
superpower competition resided the battle of ideas: American liberalism vs. Soviet 
Communism. Both these ideas were universalistic and supported by deeper considerations such 
a security needs, historical legacy and geographical position. Fred Halliday (1993:23-24) 
explains that what made the bipolar Cold War system so unique is that not one, but two distinct 
social and political systems existed concurrently - the Soviet Union created an alternative 
system that existed side by side with the Western system. Halliday explains how "the Cold War 
could not end with compromise or convergence, but only with the prevailing of one of these 
systems over another (Halliday 1993:24). This zero-sum approach resulted in both powers 
pursuing a revisionist foreign policy throughout the Cold War, as each sought to revise and 
remake the international system in their own image. The RPSF foreign policy orientations 
outlined in Chapter 2 will be utilised to identify the foreign policy orientation of the two 
superpowers. How the superpowers’ foreign policies impacted developments in the Cold War 
Arctic will be evaluated later in the chapter in addition to their relations with the small and 
medium Arctic states.   
At the beginning of the Cold War, the Arctic became a contested, bipolar geopolitical space 
that to a broad degree mirrored the artificial East-West pan-European divide. A review of the 
major post-war foreign policy trends of the two great Arctic powers will demonstrate how 
political ideology and military security created a narrow policy agenda focused entirely on 
Arctic defence. To understand how gradual change occurred within the seemingly fixed 
structures of bipolarity within the Arctic, In this chapter and the next, I will depict how the 
balance of power slowly and inevitably altered through three different stages that correspond 
to developments in US-Soviet relations: the tight bipolar system 1949-1953, (Section 3.1.) the 
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loose bipolar system 1953-1970 (Section 3.4.) and incipient multi-polarity (1970-1991) 
(Chapter 4).  
In section 3.1.1. under the tight bipolar system, it will be demonstrated how the US mobilized 
political support for militarization against the Soviet Union through the formulation of the 
Kennan and Nitze foreign policy doctrines. These policies significantly impacted the 
development of the North American Arctic. In section 3.1.2, it will be shown how Soviet policy 
under Stalin and his successors steered the Soviet Arctic on a development strategy based on 
the production of heavy industry, militarization and the creation of labour camps to exploit the 
natural resources present in the Soviet far north. Looking to the small and medium Arctic states, 
the second focus of this chapter will be to assess the small-state /superpower relations. In 
Section 3.2.3, Canada’s post-war foreign policy will be analysed alongside its growing bi-
lateral security relationship with the US. As the sole medium power in the Arctic, Canada will 
be engaged with on an individual basis, distinct from the small European Arctic states. In 
Section 3.2.4, the defence agreements made between the US and the western-aligned Arctic 
states of Greenland, Iceland and Norway in the tight bipolar era will be analysed. These three 
states will be discussed together as means of comparing the individual bi-lateral defence 
policies that each had with the US. In Section 3.3.3., the two neutral Arctic states: Sweden and 
Finland will be reviewed with respect to their decisions to pursue neutral foreign policies in 
the early Cold War years. It will be shown how these two neutral states were pivotal to 
maintaining the Northern Balance and preventing the outbreak of military conflict in the Cold 
War Arctic.  
A series of conflict events beginning with the Korean War in 1953 and culminating in the 
Cuban Missile crisis of 1963 led to a loss of confidence in the superpower’s leadership. It will 
be shown how Arctic military development continued in the loose bipolar era through the 
American’s Polar Strategy (section 3.2.1) and the Soviet historical waters doctrine (section 
3.2.2). The fracturing of the US and Soviet global alliance systems heralded the emergence of 
the loose bipolar era. In the Arctic, increased concern amongst the small and medium Arctic 
states over the excessive militarization of the superpowers led to a revision of US bilateral 
agreements. This is best observed with respect to nuclear policy. In section 3.5.1. Canada’s 
uncertainty surrounding accepting American nuclear weapons on Canadian soil will be 
investigated. Similarly, section 3.6.2. will reveal how the NATO Arctic states of Greenland, 
Iceland and Norway each struggled to achieve a balance between obtaining American military 
defence guarantees while trying not to overtly antagonise the Soviet Union. There were fears 
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that by accommodating US nuclear weapons on their soil that directly targeted the USSR would 
in turn make these allies a target of Soviet aggression. Meanwhile, it will be shown how 
Sweden and Finland’s anxiety about the occurrence of nuclear accidents and the possibility of 
nuclear warfare led these states to pursue an anti-nuclear policy in the loose bipolar era (section 
3.6.3.). In section 3.4, the key findings of the chapter are summarised with a conclusive analysis 
of the foreign policy orientations of the two superpowers through the RPSF. This involves 
ascertaining the leadership capabilities of the Arctic powers and the degree of willingness or 
reluctance exhibited by the small and medium Arctic states to accept the alliance structures of 
tight bipolarity.  
3.1 The Tight Bipolar System (1946-1953) 
The tight bipolar system serves as the transition period from the immediate post-war years 
beginning in 1946-49 up until 1953 when the new Cold War system fully emerged. Orthodox 
accounts of the Cold War indicate that heightened tensions between the two superpowers 
between 1940 and 1953 were caused by the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin. Stalin allegedly 
threatened war in Europe in an attempt to achieve his expansionist goals (Young and Kent 
2004:132). Yet revisionists such as Levering (1994) suggest the converse explanation: that US 
President Harry Truman (in office from 1945-1953) may have overreacted to limited Soviet 
actions in Eastern Europe and was himself largely to blame for the downturn in relations. In 
this manner, Levering (1994:15) considers that one way to look at US – Soviet relations during 
the early Cold War is to observe the tremendous influence and authority that Joseph Stalin and 
Harry Truman had over their respective nation’s foreign policies at this time. Under the Truman 
Presidency, growing American fears over the spread of Soviet influence resulted in the creation 
of the policy of containment.  
While some proponents of containment inadvertently supported a global US-led crusade 
against communism, in practice containment distinguished between vital and peripheral 
interests. For example, in Europe the Marshall Plan was enacted to protect America’s vital 
interests in Europe and accelerate the post-war reconstruction of Europe. By investing 
American dollars to stimulate the European economy, the US sought to guarantee European 
markets as an outlet for US goods, while also preventing the spread of communism westward.  
1949 represented a crucial year for the emergence of a bipolar international system as the world 
witnessed the emergence of the Soviet Union nuclear program, the establishment of NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact, the Berlin Blockade and the accession to power in China by Mao Zedong 
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(Jones 1991:276-277). The complexity of the hierarchical international system combined with 
bipolarity created a situation where both superpowers were required to act in a wide variety of 
areas simultaneously. Jones (1991:278) explains how the operating characteristics of the tight 
bipolar system was based on military conflict and retaliation, with the power objective being 
"to anticipate the defeat of the other coalition should it breach the frontiers of one’s own 
members”. However, Jones notes that within this tight bipolar balance, the US-oriented bloc 
commanded more influence when all power sources are considered: these include a superior 
number of allies, a larger supply of resources and the global character of American alliances 
that contrasted with the regional reach of the Soviet Union (p.277).  
This meant that the bipolar system was asymmetric and favoured the US. Early in the Cold 
War, the Arctic began to reflect this broader asymmetrical balance exhibited in the international 
system. This was due to the territorial presence of the superpowers in the High North, in 
addition to the strategic value the region came to hold as the shortest route through which to 
launch a nuclear attack on the other’s homeland. As such, the Arctic became a natural extension 
of the European security theatre. 
This imperfect balance existed between the two superpowers throughout the Cold War. This is 
evident in the Arctic when, during the tight bipolar era, the US demonstrated to a greater degree 
of political influence than the Soviet Union, through reshaping the post-war political and 
security order in the Arctic the establishment of NATO in 1949. The US perceived that only 
through institutionalising the new security order could it be assured of sustaining the alliance 
and ensuring that an optimal level of cohesion existed within the alliance. While the 
overarching military objective behind this institutional arrangement was to deter a Soviet 
military attack and prevent Europe from ‘falling to communism’, Jones’ (1991:281) observes 
that that when alliances are institutionalized, the dominant states may use the alliance structure 
to prolong the perception of threat by playing to the self-aggrandizing behaviour of pertinent 
elites, such as national military commands. I will also demonstrate how the inequalities 
between the US and Soviet influences in the Arctic highlight the differences in foreign policy 
behaviour and in state capabilities (Jönsson 1984:76). 
With respect to the small Arctic states, a key question is whether the US chose to deal for the 
most part on a bilateral basis with Arctic states on defence issues, or multilaterally through 
NATO. Therefore, what must be considered is whether the bilateral agreements between the 
US and the Western Arctic states enhanced the conditions of tight bipolarity - i.e. customised 
agreements to suit individual state's foreign and domestic policy requirements - or weakened 
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the small states ability to bargain multilaterally through NATO. Lastly, Sweden and Finland’s 
relationship with the superpowers will be compared to identify the different political conditions 
that encouraged the development of their respective foreign policies of Cold War neutrality.  
3.2 The Arctic Powers and Tight Bipolar System 
3.2.1. The application of the Kennan Doctrine in the North American Arctic –Perimeter 
Strategy 
In the late forties, during Truman’s presidency, the Kennan Doctrine dominated American 
foreign policy. It was named after George Kennan, a prominent US diplomat who was head of 
Policy Planning Staff in the State Department from 1947-1949. Within this doctrine, economic, 
political and strategic goals were oriented towards dealing with the new Soviet threat.  
America’s interest in the Arctic was as a result of this urgent requirement of national security 
to address the growing Soviet threat emerging from the northern Polar Regions. The Arctic 
represented the shortest route between east and west through which Soviet strategic bombers 
could launch conventional of nuclear attacks. However, the Arctic was also difficult to defend 
due to it being a vast, remote, frozen periphery. Because the Arctic was tied to both European 
and American homeland defence, military planners considered the Arctic as a region of 
extrinsic value that could be utilised for both offensive and defensive strikes against the Soviet 
Union. 
The state of Alaska took on a new prominence in US national security strategy and experienced 
rapid development through militarization in the 1950s. American strategic planners realised 
early on that it would take time before technology and range would permit intercontinental 
operations, which was one of the key reasons why forward bases were developed in Alaska 
and northern Canada (Tamnes 1991:30-31). Alaska’s proximity to Cold War targets in Russia 
and Asia served to justify the US military investment in an area previously overlooked by 
federal government. Airpower and strategic bombing capabilities therefore took on a latent 
primacy in US post-war strategy. This strategy of deploying bomber aircraft from forward 
bases located in Alaska and the Canadian North, became the basis of US military strategy in 
the Arctic and was referred to as ‘the Perimeter Strategy’. However, naval strategy and ground 
forces were also included in the overall defence of the nation. From 1945 onwards, the US 
possessed not only icebreakers of the Northwind class but also conducted submarine operations 
in the Arctic, the first occurring in 1947 when the diesel submarine USS Boarfish (SS-327), 
succeeded in completing the first under-ice transit of an ice floe in the Chukchi Sea.  
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However, the United States did not retain its military advantage for long. Soviet technological 
advancements in nuclear weapons and aircraft design hastened the United States’ need to 
stockpile enough nuclear weapons to be able to strike at the heart of the Soviet Union. 
American military planners were therefore required to formulate new defence strategies not 
only to anticipate a land-based attack on continental Europe but for offensive strikes through 
air or sea assaults.  To implement these new defense policies in the American Arctic, the US 
Congress authorized funding for construction of the Aircraft Control and Warning (ACW) 
System of radar sites constructed along the coast and within the Alaskan interior and were 
designed to detect Soviet bombers and dispatch US Air Force fighters to intercept them. From 
1951-58, eighteen ACW stations were constructed across Alaska (US National Park Service 
2014:5). As Air Force leaders developed plans and proposed warning system programs, they 
became convinced of the logical need to extend these plans into the neighbouring Canadian 
Arctic to provide a comprehensive early warning system for the entirety of the North American 
continent (North American Aerospace Command 2016). As a result, the US-Canadian defence 
relationship was strengthened in the early Cold War era as defence cooperation between the 
two nations increased in addition to closer ties through the establishment of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) after it was established in 1949 - of which five of the eight Arctic 
states become members: including the US, Canada, Iceland, Denmark [Greenland] and 
Norway. 
In a classical balance of power system, advocated by realist proponents, alliances were 
considered temporary by all participants. In contrast, NATO became a permanent fixture in the 
Arctic and the greater-Euro-Atlantic area. Hence, it can be argued that by creating new 
institutional structures such as NATO in the tight bipolar stage of the Cold War, the US 
displayed revisionist tendencies. The Arctic and the greater European area were transformed 
through a US-led security institution that locked actors into a permanent alliance structure.  
Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea, tensions between the two superpowers 
rose in the 1950s and they each reviewed their homeland defences to provide a measure of 
military security for their populations. US military planners recognized as early as 1952 that 
the ACW system in Alaska did not provide enough advance warning of an attack. Therefore, 
defence agreements between Canada and the United States in the early 1950s centred on the 
construction of radar networks across the territory of Canada—the Mid- Canada Line (also 
known as the McGill Fence), the Pinetree Line, and later the famous Dew Line which began 
construction in 1954.The construction of these early warning systems not only demonstrates 
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the serious efforts of the Pentagon to implement a strategy of perimeter defence in the Arctic 
but also to acquire a greater level of cooperation from Canada enabling the US to effectively 
tie the defence of the two states together.   
3.2.2. Stalin and the development of the Soviet Arctic Strategy during the early Cold War 
From a Soviet perspective, the establishment of NATO in 1949 was the first stage of an 
aggressive American policy towards consolidating a European military bloc (Ulam 1968 
p.499). However, Soviet concerns about impending American hegemony appeared as early as 
1947 as expressed through a pamphlet written by I. I. Ermashev in 1947 with the title 
‘Polyarnayastrategiya i polyarnayaekspansiya’ (Polar Strategy and polar expansion). 
Ermashev believed that America would attempt to infringe upon Soviet Arctic sovereignty as 
the first step towards American global hegemony. The only state that could challenge this 
aspiration was the Soviet Union (Ermashev cited in Horensma 1991:75).  
The development of the Soviet Arctic had occurred prior to WWII, in accordance to a decree 
by Stalin in 1932 that "The Arctic and our northern regions contain colossal wealth, we must 
create a Soviet organization which can, in the shortest period possible, include this wealth in 
the general resources of our socialist economic structure" (Mc Cannon, 1998:33). Arctic 
urbanization was the primary goal of Soviet planners because the aim was to not only 
industrialise and tame the Soviet north, but to indoctrinate the Northerners into the Marxist-
Leninist ideology and to expand the role of the working class (Josephson 2014:239). Soviet 
resource extraction in the north can be understood as a form of colonialism that excluded 
Northerners (Armstrong 1966 cited in Bartels and Bartels 2006:269). The collectivization of 
traditional occupations during the 1930s led to mass re-settlements of Russian Northerners, 
with government policies ruthlessly suppressing traditional culture and languages. While there 
were many members of northern peoples (men and women) filling positions in the local 
administration and sitting as representatives in local soviets, there was no real political 
autonomy of Northerners (ibid). Meanwhile, Soviet authorities also sought to bring the 
proletariat to colonize the Arctic and to provide the necessary labour for planned projects. In 
addition to importing (forced) prisoners of labour to the Arctic regions to work in the mines, 
the Soviets also created incentives to attract free Soviet workers and skilled personnel to settle 
in areas they would otherwise never chosen to go to. Stalin’s demands were actualised through 
the establishment of the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route, a new bureaucratic 
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organisation designed for the purpose of exploring and developing the Arctic, known by its 
more common name as Glavsevermorput and abbreviated to GUSMP. 
In the early Cold War years, a special department of GUSMP, called SPETSSTROY, was 
created for the purpose of developing the ‘Sever programme’ which included the construction 
of a number of small air fields to develop Arctic flying, while there was also an increasing 
number of landings on ice flows and the placement of radio beacons (Horensma 1991:71). 
From a Soviet perspective, these defence measures were in response to American Arctic 
ambitions in the North American and European Arctic which were viewed as aggressive in 
nature.  After the first successful nuclear testing in Kazakhstan in August 1949, the Soviet 
military developed a long-range heavy bomber aircraft, the ‘Tupolev Tu-4’ which could carry 
nuclear weapons to designated targets in America and Europe. As an accompaniment to the 
advance in Soviet aircraft technology, forward bases were built by the Soviets on the Chukotski 
Peninsula adjacent to Alaska. From these bases it was expected that the Tu-4 could deliver a 
nuclear bomb to targets in Alaska on round-trip flights and to West Coast targets on one-way 
flights (Cloe 2015).The Tupolev was allegedly constructed by reverse engineering three 
Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers that had landed in Vladivostok during the American 
strategic campaign against Japan in WWII (ibid). 
The Soviet Arctic also became the testing site for nuclear weapons that were being designed to 
deter the Americans and advance Soviet nuclear aspirations. Harrison and Hughes (2013, p19) 
emphasise that from 1955 to 1962, six nuclear bomb tests were conducted in waters off Novaya 
Zemlya, a peninsula in the North-western Soviet Arctic. Of these, three were underwater, 
including the first test, one on the ocean surface and two above the water. By 1957, the focus 
shifted to testing on land and to atmospheric testing with some of the Soviet's biggest bombs 
being exploded in the air and resulting in severe environmental damage and increased rates of 
cancer amongst residents of nearby Archangelsk.  
In addition to the deployment of nuclear weapons to Soviet air-bases in the Arctic, the Soviet 
Union responded to the American threat by attempting to strengthen its claims over the Arctic 
through the development of a naval strategy that increased Soviet authority over Arctic seas 
(Horensma, 1991, p79). At a conference in January 1949, titled ‘The undivided and 
unrestrained sovereignty of the Soviet Union over the Polar Sea’, held jointly by the Academy 
of Science’s legal institute and the Arctic Institute, (GUSUMP’s research organization): the 
Soviet’s outlined the division between the legal situation in the North and South poles and 
sought to reassess the legal status of the Soviet Arctic (p78). One possibility was to utilise the 
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theory of the ‘historic seas’ doctrine. This was a nineteenth century concept closely connected 
to that of ‘internal waters’ where state sovereignty can be applied unrestrictedly. The concept 
was elaborated on in 1952 by proclaiming that the Siberian seas were ‘internal waters’ which 
belonged to Russia through historic exploration and with reference to the development of the 
Northern Sea route in the 1930’s. An important advantage of applying the historic waters 
doctrine to the Northern Sea was the fact that it allowed for the closure of huge areas of the 
Soviet Arctic. This enabled the Soviets to extend the same buffer zones it had in central Europe 
to the Arctic to protect itself against submarine attack by the US or its Western allies (Synhorst 
1973 cited in Horensma 1991, p82).  
3.3. The small and medium Arctic states during tight bipolarity 
3.3.1 Canadian Post-war Foreign Policy: The Rise of Internationalism  
For Canada, the guiding principles of Canadian Cold War foreign policy were outlined by the 
Canadian minister of external affairs, Louis St. Laurent in the ‘Grey lecture’ in Toronto in 1947 
(Bothwell, 1998, p20). In his speech St Laurent placed Canada firmly in the western camp in 
the emerging conflict between the Soviet Union, thus publicly defining Canada’s role in the 
Cold War for the first time. He argued that Canada must be willing to assume external 
responsibilities and had a duty to act, yet he placed Canada into the role of a ‘secondary power’: 
“it would cooperate in ‘constructive international action’ but would not waste its breath or try 
others’ patience by preaching a higher form of duty or responsibility that only larger countries 
could bear (ibid). With this statement, St Laurent firmly placed Canada in the role of a middle 
power. When St. Laurent became prime minster a year later, he was succeeded by Lester 
Pearson as foreign minister and together these two men would steer Canadian foreign policy 
for the next nine years (James et al. 1997, p35). Both were convinced that internationalism best 
served Canada’s interests as this foreign policy approach aimed to avoid conflict and instability 
in the international system by engaging with other actors through political, social and economic 
means (p321). However, in as much as Canada’s internationalist outlook sought dialogue with 
the major actors in global politics, it clearly recognised that it needed to cooperate closely with 
the United States. Clarkeson and Fitzgerald (2009:7) explain how Canada’s contribution to the 
United States early Cold War efforts against the USSR was made strategically and materially 
through NATO: strategically Ottawa played a leading role in convincing the war-torn European 
powers of the necessity of establishing a peacetime collective defence organisation, while 
materially, Canada contributed army and air force troops in Europe and provided naval assets 
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for NATO’s maritime forces. Bothwell (1998:32) argues that politically, the establishment of 
NATO relieved Canada of the threat of an unavoidably close bilateral relationship that could 
have submerged Canadian sovereignty into a ‘Fortress North America’ had events in Europe 
taken a different turn and Europe fallen to communism. However, the successful launching of 
the Marshall Plan, coupled with the establishment of NATO made America content to focus its 
efforts in containing the Soviet threat militarily in strategic regions such as Europe and by 
proximity the Arctic.  
Harriet Critchley (1987:769) outlines that the Arctic initially became an area of strategic 
interest for Canada during the Second World War with levels of Canadian interest waxing and 
waning over the subsequent forty years. Canadian Cold War interest in the Arctic was 
expressed mainly through foreign and defence policy and related government activity, shaped 
largely as a result of events and factors exogenous to Canada. This will be a major theme for 
analyzing Canadian foreign policy and Arctic strategy throughout the stages of the Cold War. 
Canada’s recognition of the north as a strategic region was first acknowledged in Foreign 
Affairs (1945) by Lester Pearson who would later become Prime Minister. Pearson wrote that  
Not long ago this vast Canadian Arctic territory was considered to be little more than a frozen desert, 
without any great economic value or any political strategic importance…. We know better now. Canada, 
like Russia, is looking to the North as a land of the future (Pearson 1945:638) 
While technology served as the impetus for this change in significance, Canada’s choice of 
policy response in the Arctic was limited by economic concerns as was its ability to defend its 
vast northern expanses. Rather than stationing regular troops throughout Canada’s immense 
isolated territories, the military looked to the Canadian Rangers – a sub-component of the 
Canadian Army Reserve to provide scouting forces in the North. At the same time, Elliot-
Meisel (1999:411) explains that while the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) moved to assert a 
northern presence, they too were limited by lack of resources: “Most notably, the Canadians 
had neither an icebreaker capable of High Arctic operations nor sufficient personnel to perform 
the annual missions unilaterally” (ibid). Thus, the operations were initially carried out by the 
US Navy and USAF with Canadian observers aboard.   
Canada also did not have the economic resources to supply the Royal Canadian Air Force 
(RCAF) with the necessary amount of aircraft to intercept Soviet bombers over its vast northern 
regions. From 1945 onwards, Canada also faced the issue of whether it should have nuclear 
weapons but was inconsistent in foreign policy decision making. During the late 1940's the 
Canadian government had decided that it would not develop atomic weapons. Unlike Great 
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Britain, Canada had no desire to be a great power and was instead content to support the 
American atomic weapons program through exports of nuclear materials such as uranium 
(Trudgen 2009:47). When Canada joined NATO in 1949, this sealed its fate as an American 
ally for although this guaranteed Canada protection under the American nuclear umbrella, it 
came at tremendous cost: for if a Soviet bomber armed with a nuclear warhead was intercepted 
this was likely to occur over Canadian territory (Clarkson and Fitzgerald 2009:9). As Pearson 
(1945:647) wrote “there is no isolation – even in the Arctic ice”. The Canadian Army illustrated 
this awareness by writing “that either by accident or design, Canadian air defences contribute 
to the perimeter defence of the USA while using Canada as the killing area” (Jockel 2007, cited 
in Clarkson and Fitzgerald 2009:9). However, the trade-off for defending its southern 
neighbour was the military support America provided Canada towards national defence of its 
northern Arctic territories (Clarkson and Fitzgerald 2009:9). 
3.3.2 Greenland, Iceland and Norway – American bilateral defence agreements in the 
early Cold War 
There are considerable similarities between Greenland and Iceland’s experience of great power 
relations with the US during the early Cold War period. Greenland and Iceland’s experience of 
Cold War relations with the US is largely based on the renegotiations of American defence 
agreements first signed in 1941 during the Second World War, which were then renewed 
considering the new Soviet threat. During WWII, Norway was more directly impacted by Nazi 
occupation and therefore felt even more acutely the need for military defence and American 
aid against the Soviets during the Cold War. 
Early in the Cold War, Greenland and Iceland became central to US overseas defence 
initiatives. Greenland was located along the shortest route for strategic bomber aircraft (and 
later ICBM missiles), to travel from the Soviet Union to the United States. However, for 
Iceland, the US military envisaged a four-fold role: 1) as a base for protecting North Atlantic 
shipping lanes, 2) as a buffer against aerial and naval attacks on northern Europe, 3) an outpost 
for long-range bombers, and 4) a stage for aircraft flying across the Atlantic (Bjorgulfsdottir 
1989:76). Yet in the immediate aftermath of the war, both Danish and Icelandic government 
preferences were for the cessation rather than the renewal of the American military presence.  
Danish politicians wanted to terminate the base agreement that was made in Greenland during 
the war under U.S occupation. Peteresen (2011, p95) explains that the Danish parliament (the 
Folketing), considered the agreement as a barrier to full Danish sovereignty over Greenland, 
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and could be taken as an excuse for the Soviets to remain in the Danish Baltic island of 
Bornholm which they had liberated from the Germans in 1945 (Sorensᴓn p93). Throughout 
1946, internal pressure grew in Denmark to terminate the base agreement. Peterson (2011:95) 
explains that in the end, the US position in Greenland remained intact. The United States stuck 
to the notorious Article X of the agreement, which said that the US presence should continue 
‘until it is agreed that the present dangers to the peace and security of the American Continent 
have passed’.   
The advent of the Cold War presented the United States with the opportunity to reinterpret 
Article X as a means of extending and renewing the Greenlandic military base agreements with 
Denmark. Increasing tensions in Europe in the spring of 1948, with the Czech coup, made the 
Danes revise their early stance. Although the Danish authorities were aware that they were 
unable to provide for the defence of Greenland alone, they were unwilling to enter into a new 
bi-lateral agreement with the United States and sought alternatives to their security dilemma. 
One such option was the idea of a Scandinavian Defence Union (SDU) with Sweden and 
Norway. When this proved unattainable, the Danish government cautiously signed the North 
Atlantic Treaty (Peterson 2011:95-96). Among the incentives for Denmark to sign was the 
expectation that a multilateral alliance would replace the existing bilateral arrangement (p.96). 
However, Petersen outlines that during the initial allied defence planning for Greenland which 
took place between 1949 and 1951, the NATO Council encouraged Denmark and the United 
States to conclude a bilateral agreement and as a result, Denmark failed to gain multilateral 
arrangements for Greenlandic defence (Petersen 2011:96).  The US Danish Agreement on the 
defence of Greenland was ratified on 27th April 1951 and according to Nielson (2013), 
essentially reflected American interests, although it was completed under the coordinated 
defence planning of NATO (p.130). The US insisted that for the defence of Greenland, US and 
Canadian reinforcements should be flown in to the most favourable site, which they identified 
as the site at Thule in the north of Greenland. The construction of Thule air base in 1951 
resulted in the northern section of the island being placed partly under US dominance. This had 
significant and far reaching effects for the local indigenous peoples who were ‘cleared’ from 
the area when Denmark granted US permission to expand the American defence area at Thule 
to cover the whole of the Dundas peninsula in 1953 (Nielson 2013:137-138)21. Thule became 
 
21 The eviction of the indigenous inhabitants from Thule demonstrates how US strategic policy was prioritised over Danish 
state and local interests. Danish authorities presented the relocation of Thule inhabitants as an attempt to counteract the 
environmental and human ‘spill-over’ from the AFB. They led the public to believe it was an arrangement that had been made 
in more or less complete agreement with the hunters and local representatives (Nielson 2013, p138). The Inghuit’s however 
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a major NATO base, being categorised as the permanent US Strategic Air Command 
installation in the North.  The agreement secured U.S rights to build additional bases by 
“designating three US operated ‘defence areas’ in Greenland – at Thule, Sondrestrom, and 
Narssarsuaq – within which the United States was given near-total freedom of action” (Petersen 
2011:97).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
During the Cold War, the Norwegian Arctic comprises of four distinct regions; 1) mainland 
Norway – which included the counties of Finmark, Troms and parts of Norland that reside 
above the Arctic Circle, 2) Jan Mayen Island situated 440km west off the coast of Greenland; 
3) Bear Island – situated 400kms north of the mainland; and 4) Svalbard archipelago (also 
known as Spitsbergen) located some 640kms north. Of the four, the mainland and Svalbard 
held the most strategic importance.  
In the immediate years after WWII, Norway, like Denmark also faced a predicament about 
what kind of bilateral security relations it should have with the US. In the late 1940s, Norway 
sought an independent Scandinavian pact known as the Scandinavian Defence Union (SDU) 
that would ensure the defence of Scandinavia while also having ties to a larger Euro-Atlantic 
defence community. However, Norwegian delegates to the US concluded that there was 
insufficient sympathy on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom to support the 
idea of an independent northern defence agreement (Bjorgulfsdottir 1989:80). Given that 
Norway was the front-line defence because it bordered the Soviet Union in the north, it was 
anxious to establish a defence guarantee that provided it with military support to counter the 
Soviet threat. Since this could not be achieved through a Scandinavian defence alliance, 








deny that this is the case and in 1960 the Hunter’s Council made a claim to the Danish Ministry for Greenland seeking 
compensation. The Ministry did not respond (ibid). 
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Image 3.0 – Map of Norway and its Island territories above the Arctic Circle (modified 




Simon Duke (1989:215) outlines how two concepts underlined Norway’s foreign policy with 
NATO and the Soviet Union – ‘deterrence and reassurance’. Together these made up the 
cornerstone of Norwegian ‘dualism’ which can be understood as political and military 
alignment with the West while at the same time seeking not to overtly antagonize the Soviet 
Union. The deterrence element involved Norway’s active role within the alliance which was 
visibly expressed by a) permitting the US military to deposit stockpiles of weaponry on 
Norwegian soil (and nuclear stockpiles up until 1961), b) Norway’s duties of guarding the 
Northern Flank and monitoring sea lanes leading from the Barents Sea to the North Atlantic 
(p215, 219) and c) hosting annual NATO exercises, however these were not permitted in the 
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northernmost county of Finmark or effectively within 800km of the Norwegian-Soviet border 
(p215, 218). The second policy concept ‘reassurance’ was aimed towards appeasing the Soviet 
Union by prohibiting any foreign bases in Norway during peacetime. This was designed to 
reassure Moscow that Oslo harbored no aggressive intent. For instance, in the 1949 Norwegian 
base declaration it is stipulated that Norway does not permit the permanent peacetime 
deployment of foreign combat forces on Norwegian soil (Duke 1989:218). However, the 
declaration does not exclude temporary deployment training or infrastructure facilities nor 
deployment during times of crisis or NATO alert. To this effect, In October 1952 Norway made 
an agreement with the United States for emergency use of two Norwegian airfields at Sola and 
Gardermoen by Strategic Air Command (SAC) forces - with the intent of being used for staging 
posts or as post-attack recovery bases. It was thought by Norwegian officials that with the 
development of long-range bombers that the necessity of having these forward contingency 
bases would become unnecessary. Duke also highlights that the timing of the SAC agreement 
coincided with significant changes in US military thinking, with the American NSC-68 
document that endorsed the notion of perimeter defence (1989:217).22  
For Icelanders the concept of a SDU was troubling since they knew they would not be invited 
to join since they could not contribute militarily. There was some relief on Iceland’s behalf 
when Denmark and Norway turned to NATO for security arrangements as it made it much 
easier for Iceland to follow the same course (Bjorgulfsdottir 1989:81). The issue surrounding 
the US base agreement was of central political concern, as was Iceland's political preference 
towards neutrality. Icelandic leaders felt it necessary to obtain more detailed information 
regarding the purpose, obligations and organization of the proposed NATO alliance (p.82). The 
US made known to Iceland that it would request certain facilities to be ready in case of an 
emergency, specifically Keflavik airport, but the Americans were also interested in maintaining 
a fuel storage depot at Hvalfjörður (p.84). With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, 
Icelanders became increasingly anxious that war with the Soviet Union was likely and begin 
to seek assurances for a Western defence for Iceland. It came as no surprise then to the public 
when on May 7th 1951 the Icelandic Foreign Office issued a press release announcing that a 
new defence agreement had been signed in Rekjavik two days earlier by representatives of the 
 
22 The US provided military and economic assistance to build up Norwegian coastal defences, and in return Norway's NATO 
membership responsibilities involved guarding the Northern Flank (the northern border it shares with the Soviet Union), the 
prepositioning of US military stockpiles and monitoring the sea lanes leading from the Barents Sea to the northern Atlantic 
(Duke 1989, p.215). Norway also engaged in intelligence sharing with the US and hosted joint-military exercises conducted 
through NATO.     
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US and Icelandic governments (Neucheterlein, 1961:99). On the same day as the press release, 
the first contingents of a United States military force arrived at Keflavik to take up their duties. 
Thus, the Icelanders reluctantly went along with the militarization of the Arctic in the early 
Cold War.  
3.3.3 Sweden and Finland – perceived or actual Cold War neutrality? 
Sweden’s neutral policy, which dates to the early 19th century, was the basis upon which it 
managed to stay out of both WWI and WWII and was not forced to take sides with either of 
the superpowers during the Cold War. In contrast to Iceland23, Sweden adopted a policy of 
armed neutrality advocating military preparedness to defend its sovereign territory against 
attack. However, according to Dalsjö (2014:194), Swedish neutrality primarily served 
peacetime purposes and would not have lasted if war had broken out. This is because Sweden 
would have either been attacked by the USSR since it was a Western country on the path 
towards Western Europe, or it would have been drawn into the allied side because of Sweden’s 
cooperation with the West, including tolerating overflights by NATO allied bombers. 
Cooperation with the West may have been considered as a preventative course of action to 
reduce the possibility of nuclear war occurring. However, Arter (1999:271) suggests that the 
Swedes were also reluctant to antagonise Moscow. It is likely that for the Soviets, a non-
aligned Sweden with close Western contacts was preferable to Swedish NATO membership 
(Petersson 2006:607). Yet the rationale underlying Swedish neutrality was based on the 
concept that if Sweden was drawn into a war sooner or later, it mattered a great deal that it 
should be later. This, Dalsjö explains, is based on the realisation that should war have broken 
out it was expected to start with a violent but short nuclear exchange, which would expend 
almost all weapons, It therefore made sense for Sweden to put off its entry into a war until the 
nuclear exchange was over (p.194). As a result, "Sweden's leaders in the 1950s understood 
that neutrality would probably fail in wartime, but that they aimed to stay out of the violent 
initial nuclear exchange" (Dalsjö 2014:175). 
 
Thus, at the beginning of the Cold War, Sweden reformulated its security policy with the new 
line being 'freedom from alliances in peacetime aiming at neutrality in war' (Arter 1999:274). 
 
23 Icelandic neutrality is categorised as unarmed neutrality since Iceland, having no army on its own could not wage wars 
abroad nor defend against war should it be fought on its shores 
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With the prospects for a SDU having collapsed, Sweden was left to pursue its traditional course 
of neutrality, which was viewed with great suspicion by the Soviets (Arter, 1999:271). Yet 
Sweden clearly favoured the West and cooperated with NATO in both military campaigns and 
intelligence-sharing. The US accepted Swedish armed neutrality as it served to reduce 
superpower tension in an area adjacent to the Soviet Union (Moores 2002:29). Furthermore, 
Washington recognised that since Sweden sought to defend against the Soviet threat, it was 
therefore in the US' best interest to ensure that Sweden was as militarily strong as possible so 
that it could then engage in 'under the table' military cooperation with the West (ibid). 
Finland’s position was in many respects similar to its neighbour Sweden’s during the Cold 
War. Both states are without a border to the Arctic Ocean in the north, while their northernmost 
regions are primarily inhabited by the indigenous Sami peoples. However, in contrast to 
Sweden, Finland’s geographical proximity to the Soviet Union has been the core of what has 
come to be known as the ‘Finnish Dilemma’, - the impossibility of totally escaping involvement 
in great power politics on the one hand, while on the other seeking to withdraw and maintain 
neutrality. Therefore, unlike Sweden with its policy of 'semi-neutrality', Finland had to consign 
itself to a new foreign policy alignment in the Cold War era. This involved seeking to appease 
Moscow while at the same time retain Finnish sovereignty and democratic traditions in the face 
of Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe. Finland can be considered as a de facto frontier state 
in the Cold War Arctic, for not only was it a borderland in the physical sense, sharing a common 
border with the Soviet Union: but ideologically, Finland also served as a frontier between 
capitalism and communism (Arter 1999:263).  
Having experienced two defeats by the Soviet Union during the Second World War: The 
Winter War of 1939-40, and the Continuation War of 1941-44, Finland learned that aligning 
against the Soviet Union was detrimental to national security and state survival. One of the 
main reasons why Finland attacked the Soviet Union with Germany during Operation 
Barbarossa in 1941 was that Finland wanted back the areas that it lost to Russia during the 
Winter War. The Finnish Arctic indigenous – the Sami – were especially committed to this 
endeavour because an area that Finland was trying to reclaim included part of the Sami 
homeland (Sampi) (Johnson n.d.). In addition to the physical damage incurred to its northern 
forestry and settlements from Soviet invading forces, Finland was also required through the 
armistice treaty signed in Paris in 1947, to cede 12 per cent of its northern border territory to 
the USSR in addition to paying war reparations. In reparation for fighting against the Soviets 
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in WWII, Finland had to accede to Soviet territorial demands, yielding the militarily strategic 
areas of Karelia and Petsamo (the Finnish passage to the Barents Sea), thus losing its maritime 
access to the Arctic and North Atlantic (ibid). Furthermore, within six years, Finland was 
expected to pay the equivalent of $300 million in goods to the Soviets to make amends (Weibull 
and Henriksson 2020). In addition to this, a military base at Porkkala near Helsinki, was to be 
leased to the Soviet Union for 50 years as a naval base but was returned to the Finns in 1956.    
Arter (1999:275) explains that military defeat also led to a radical change in Finnish foreign 
policy towards Moscow. To secure peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and Finland, 
the Finns were also required to signing the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
(FCMA) Treaty with Russia in 1948. So long as the Soviet Union believed that Finnish territory 
would not be used for an attack against it, and that Finland would seek to prevent such an 
attack, it saw no need to take possession of Finnish territory (Tornudd 2005:45). Although the 
Finns would have preferred not to sign the treaty, it provided significant benefits to Finland - 
the most important of these assuring Finland remained outside the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
bloc (Maude, 1976:12). Finland represented an uncommon example of detente in the midst of 
heated East-West tensions, as it "emerged as the most conflict-free area of the world at a time 
when the Soviet-American confrontation was reaching global proportions" (ibid). Finland was 
viewed by the West as a successful case of containment: yet there was still the fear that Finland 
could fall prey to Soviet aggression (Hanikmaki, 1994:354). However, for Finland, 
'containment' meant protecting the status quo of amicable Finno-Soviet relations and avoiding 
a worse alternative - the complete Soviet domination of Finland and the extension of the Iron 
Curtain north of the Baltic Sea (p354-355). 
3.4 Loose Bipolarity (1953-1969) 
In the mid-1950s, fundamental changes occurred to the superpower alliance as the bipolar 
system began to loosen and fragment. Jones (1991:278) explains that alliances between the 
superpowers and their small states dependants began to disintegrate as a result of internal 
conflicts that begun to appear within each of the two blocs. States began to also lose confidence 
in the superpowers as a result of what was perceived as reckless militarisation and/or 
dissatisfaction towards the superpowers. The source of this can be traced to political 
developments from the mid-1950s onwards and the rise of ballistic missile defence. In 
particular, the launch of the Sputnik in October 1957 indicated a more serious threat from Soviet 
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ICBMs (Petersen (2011:111) and led to growing concern amongst leaders in the United States’. 
This led to a renewed arms race and culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963. 
The loose bipolar system also differs from the tight bipolar balance with respect to changes in 
the competition between the two superpowers. Instead of deterrence and defence of the 
superpower allies, the competition became based on convincing non-aligned states to align or 
prevent them from going over to the other side. The newly established, non-aligned post-
colonial states in the third world became the new arena for the Cold War competition. However, 
Europe also presented problems for the US as European states began to doubt the credibility of 
the American nuclear umbrella and feared that NATO would embroil Europe in war with the 
Soviet Union (ibid).  
Although the militarization of the Arctic continued, the pace of military development in the 
Arctic was not as frantic as during the tight-bipolar era. As a result, this era provided new 
opportunities for change in domestic Arctic policies of the two superpowers. However, marked 
differences can be seen in this era between the Arctic policies of the US and the Soviet Union. 
While the beginning of environmental conservation and the politicisation of Alaskan natives 
can be observed in the North American Arctic alongside the development of the oil industry, 
the Soviets primarily focused their efforts on destalinization policies, developing industrial 
shipping and heavy industry, while also taking advantage of new technology to achieve naval 
military superiority in the Arctic.  
With the overhanging nuclear threat continuing, the small and medium Arctic states resigned 
themselves in the loose bipolar era to creating tacit agreements not to provoke war between the 
dominant power of the opposing bloc. Yet, they also began to also lose confidence in the 
superpowers as a result of what was perceived as reckless militarisation. A key example of this 
can be seen with respect to the decision not to pursue national nuclear programs and for NATO-
aligned Arctic states to re-think the storage of American nuclear weapons on base facilities. 
Norway is an interesting exception as it did not succumb to American pressure to accept either 
foreign troops or nuclear weapons (with naval exceptions) on Norwegian soil throughout the 
Cold War. For neutral Sweden the pursuit of developing a Swedish atomic bomb was also a 
critical juncture that ultimately could have reshaped the neutral buffer zone between east and 
west had Sweden not opted for the path of non-proliferation. Thus, awareness of the tentative 
northern balance among the small Arctic states was vital to maintaining peace in the High 
North.  Heightened tensions in the mid-1950s worked favourably to strengthen defence 
alliances just when Arctic states had begun to rethink the necessity for an American presence. 
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Yet it will be shown that NATO Arctic states also took advantage the threat perception to obtain 
concessions from the US that furthered national interests, and which were granted in order to 
sustain the alliance. 
3.5 The Arctic Powers and Loose Bipolarity 
3.5.1. The United States and the Early Stage of Loose Bipolarity: From the Nitze Foreign 
Policy Doctrine to the emergence of a Polar Strategy in the Arctic 
The beginning of the loose bipolar stage coincides with a critical shift in US foreign policy that 
occurred when Paul Nitze succeeded George Kennan as head of Policy Planning Staff in 
January 1950.  Nitze went on to serve the Eisenhower Administration when Dwight D. 
Eisenhower attained office in 1953. He is credited as the author of the fundamental US Cold 
War document, NSC 68, which, in contrast to the previous Kennan doctrine, called for stronger 
and more varied responses to the Soviet threat including a significant and costly defensive 
encompassing not only nuclear deterrence but also war-making (Tamnes 1991:21). The Nitze 
concept is considered to have formed the basis of American policy for three periods: early in 
the fifties in the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War: under Kennedy and his successors 
with their détente strategy of flexible response: and in the early eighties under the Reagan 
Administration (Tamnes 1991:21).  
The Nitze doctrine of containment can be correlated to the transition of American Arctic 
strategy from perimeter defence to polar strategy. What this meant in practice was a more 
aggressive foreign policy. The Arctic was now seen as a northern front through which to launch 
offensive strikes on the Soviet Union. With the introduction of the B-52 and the attainment of 
a truly transpolar capability, the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC) started to worry 
about the vulnerability of the bomber force and sought to strengthen its early warning systems 
and increasing the readiness of the Air Force (Petersen 2011:111). To do this the United States 
devised the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line (The DEW line) which was built 
between 1954 and 1959 (US National Park Service n.d. p5)24. Nikolaj Petersen (2011:113) 
outlines how the polar strategy was promoted by Secretary of the Air Force Finletter and 
Colonel Balchen, the United States Air Force’s (USAF) foremost specialist on Arctic aviation. 
 
24 The Alaskan portion of DEW line consisted of a total of twenty-four DEW line stations stretching across northern Alaska 
and along the Aleutian Chain, forming part of a wider DEW line stretching across the Canadian Arctic as far east as Greenland. 
The system was tied together by a communications system of tropospheric scatter radio and microwave radio relay sites, 
commonly referred to as White Alice (Cloe 2015). 
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These two men were instrumental in the decision to develop major Arctic bases, and with the 
opening of Thule Airbase in Greenland, the polar strategy gradually became dominant from 
1953 onwards. New technological developments that produced heavy bombers such as the B-
52 Stratofortress (which had inter-continental range) reduced the dependence on perimeter 
bases in Alaska and the Canadian North. Therefore, although air operations were still staged 
from bases in the United States, less were required since Thule AB was used as a major 
intermediate base on missions against the Soviet Union and for air refuelling until the late 
1950s (Petersen 2011:102).  
Before leaving office, Eisenhower also witnessed the accession of Alaska to Union on the 3rd 
of January 1959 when Alaskans finally won the long battle for statehood (Vaughan 
1994:184)25.Alaskans felt it was unacceptable that they were not granted the same civil and 
political rights as any of the lower 48 states, yet they were expected to contribute militarily as 
the first line of defence outlined by national security strategy, should the Soviets military attack 
from the north26. After taking up office in 1961, President John F. Kennedy revised nuclear 
strategy through a concept known as flexible response that replaced Eisenhower’s policy of 
massive retaliation with its excessive reliance on nuclear weapons, to a policy that emphasised 
greater reliance on conventional forces. This had important implications for NATO strategy in 
the 1960s as it allowed NATO to respond to a Soviet provocation without having to resort to a 
nuclear attack.  
Within the North American Arctic, Alaskan natives became more politically active after a 
series of proposed Federal projects threatened their access to land and resources, inciting the 
creation of indigenous interest groups. Ervin (1976) recounts how the earliest crisis revolved 
around a proposal by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1959 (known as Project Chariot) to 
create an artificial harbour at Ogotoruk Creek on the Chukchi Sea. To accomplish this an 
underground nuclear blast equivalent to 2,400,000 tons of TNT was planned. The project was 
eventually shelved because of the protests of scientists, conservation groups, and the local 
Eskimo themselves. However, the native Alaskan peoples felt increasingly vulnerable and in 
 
25 Without its own state government or political representation at a federal level, Alaska had not previously been granted the 
same civil and political rights as any of the lower 48 states. Hawaii was at this time, also a US protectorate and did not gain 
statehood until after Alaska. 
26 During the 1955 Constitutional Convention, held on the grounds of the University of Alaska-Fairbanks, Senator Ernest 
Gruening delivered his ‘Let Us End American Colonialism’ address.  He argued that if any evidence was needed to justify the 




response created the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) in 1967 to pursue the land claims 
question through a pan-Alaskan native organization. The AFN successfully utilised existing 
American political institutions to influence government policy. These efforts culminated in the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act passed in both houses of the US Congress on December 
18, 1971.  
3.5.2. Russia: From Destalinization and ‘Peaceful’ Coexistence to the Brezhnev era of 
economic and environmental decline in the Arctic 
In Russia, the loose bipolar period heralded the beginning of the ‘thaw’ in Soviet relations with 
the west associated with Stalin’s successor Nikita Khrushchev who became General Secretary 
in 1958. Khrushchev had the tendency to steer the Soviet Union’s foreign policy in two 
different contradictory directions: on the one hand he proposed a forward policy in Europe, the 
Middle East, Africa and Latin America, while at the same time he sought to improve relations 
with the US (Ascher 2009:210). These changes in foreign policy were preceded by significant 
domestic policy changes occurring within the USSR at this time including the process of 
'destalinization' that began once Khrushchev came to power. Destalinization had far-reaching 
effects throughout a wide range of policy areas, however the most significant for the Soviet 
Arctic was the effect de-Stalinization had in revising labour policies and the Gulag system. 
Major risings in the labour camps occurred in Norilsk, in May 1952, and soon after in Vorkuta 
(Hoskings 1992:328-9). The uprisings of 1952 occurred as prisoners fought back against basic 
violations of human dignity which they previously had felt compelled to tolerate for years 
under the Stalinist regime (Hoskings 1992:329). Conditions gradually improved for the 
‘zeks’(prisoners), with many of those who had been imprisoned as political dissidents under 
Stalin returning home. Horensma (1991:120) states that from 1953 onwards, the Stalinist 
polices of forced labour and self-sufficiency had begun to be revised, for with the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons, the ‘first communist state’ was no longer seen as an embattled fortress and 
instead developed a more outgoing policy which allowed the Soviet Union to play a more active 
role in international politics.  
By the end of the 1950s, the USSR achieved high rates of growth through a form of intensive 
development that drew constantly on more labour and resources. However, inertia within the 
command economic system, and the military demands of the superpower conflict, prevented a 
transition to a more rational economic development path. This led to severe environmental 
damage being done during the Khrushchev years. As a result, a Soviet environmental 
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movement emerged from the scientific community. Soviet climatology also made 
extraordinary advances through the work of figures such as Y.K. Fyodorov27, famous for his 
research on the melting Arctic sea ice, and Mikhail Ivanovich Budyko, who was the first to 
recognise the impact of polar ice-melt as an effect of global warming (Foster 2015). However, 
by framing these issues as global ecological problems, Soviet thinkers often skirted the 
ecological problems within the USSR to avoid censorship (ibid). As a result, ecological 
findings seemed to have little impact on Soviet Arctic policy during this time. Instead, heavy 
industry and technological progress continued to be forefront in the Politburo. In 1956 at the 
Twentieth Party Congress, it was decided to make the expansion of the NSR a government 
policy so that the route was to become ‘a route for mass transportation’ (Guzhenko 1984 cited 
in Horensma 1991:121). The expansion of the NSR in turn called for the expansion of the 
Arctic fleet. This was achieved through technological breakthroughs in shipbuilding and 
nuclear power.  Soviet interest in submarine operations greatly increased after the USS Nautilus 
completed an under-ice passage to the North Pole in 1957. The first Soviet submarines known 
as the November class appeared around 1958. From this time onwards, the Arctic Ocean was 
perceived by the superpowers as having become an actual or potential deployment area for 
strategic ballistic-missile firing submarines (SSBN’s). The Americans began increasingly to 
enter into Soviet waters for both scientific observation and military reconnaissance. Although 
the Soviet’s had previously applied the historic seas doctrine to the Arctic, Horensma 
(1991:112) acknowledges that the Soviet’s did not (or could not) stop the American ships but 
instead took measures to confirm its sovereignty over these areas. The Party decided that a 
nuclear icebreaker should be constructed, as it served not only as an ideal commercial project 
to demonstrate the superiority of Marxist planning, but because nuclear power provided the 
near perfect solution to the problem of fuelling icebreakers on the vast stretches of the NSR 
(p.121). The creation of the world’s first nuclear powered icebreaker the Lenin earned wide 
coverage in the Soviet press in May 1960 (Crump, 2013:98). The project also potentially served 
as a means in which to test nuclear propulsion before being applied to submarines (Morris 1979 
cited in Horensma 1991:122). 
Ruperez (2014) highlights that while the Soviet Union was not shy in boasting and proclaiming 
the “inevitable” triumph of Marxism Leninism over the West’s “decadent” capitalism during 
 
27 Fedorov became a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and headed the Institute of Applied 
Geophysics of the State Committee of the USSR on Hydrometeorology and Control of the Natural Environment. 
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the fifties: the sixties by comparison showed a mellowing of its belligerent rhetoric as new 
realities on the ground forced a change of tactics, if not strategy. The Soviet Union recognised 
that Western Europe, together with the USA and Canada, were there to stay and that prudence 
often dictated that more favourable outcomes could be achieved if the Soviets sought to 
accommodate and compromise with the West than seek out confrontation (ibid). In this way, 
“Détente” became Moscow’s new diplomatic catchword while the search for a revised 
“European Security Architecture” became the mantra guiding Soviet foreign policy. The reason 
for this was simple - further territorial gains were no longer feasible while political gains by 
the communist parties in Western Europe had been thwarted by the electorate. Thus, "The 
revolutionary USSR became the strongest conservative spokesman for the post war European 
'status quo'” (Ruperez 2014). Although having avoided outright conflict with the US during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963, the incident was politically disastrous for Khrushchev. Two years 
later in 1964, the Central Committee unanimously stripped Khrushchev of his powers and he 
was succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev (Ascher 2009:211). 
3.6 The small and medium Arctic states and loose bipolarity 
3.6.1 - Canada's uncertain commitments to NORAD, NATO and Nuclear Weapons in the 
loose bipolar era   
Canadian defence of the Arctic North was dominated by the three ‘N’s’ of NORAD, NATO 
and nuclear weapons during the early stage of the loose bipolar era (Eyre 1987:296). Although 
Canada still required US military and economic assistance to defend the north against the 
Soviet threat, Eyre explains that this period of military interest in the North was short-lived. It 
peaked in the late 1950s and diminished rapidly thereafter with the advent of the ballistic 
missile era, making the earlier network of Canadian Arctic bases obsolete.     
In the mid- 1950s the Canadian government began to rethink its position as this was the period 
when NATO adopted nuclear weapons and Canada recognised that its role in European defence 
would have to change in order to maintain its effectiveness (Trudgen 2009:47). The close ties 
between USAF and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) also had an influence on nuclear 
policy, as talks between these two military command structures led to the possibility of creating 
a unified, continental air defence system to help protect North America (Trudgen 2009:48). 
However, Gladman and Archambault (2012: 11) observe that much of the Canadian literature 
surrounding the formation of NORAD implies that the Diefenbaker government had been 
duped by senior military leaders into a decision that compromised Canadian sovereignty. This 
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suggests that Canadian political leaders had no clear understanding of defence matters and that 
they did not share the same threat perception with their own military advisors or Washington 
(ibid). With the creation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) Agreement 
on the 12th of May 1958 (See Figure 3.1), the North American air space was divided into three 
regions: Continental American Region West and East (CONR), Alaskan Northern Region 
(ANR) and the Canadian Region (CANR). Canada was expected to acquire nuclear surface to 
air missiles (SAMs) in order to fulfil its defence role in NORAD and provide an effective air 
defence cover against a Soviet attack from the North.  
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker (1957-1963) was caught in the middle of the nuclear debate 
(Trudgen 2009:50). In the late 1950s, Diefenbaker was in favour of Canada being armed with 
nuclear weapons to be able to fulfil its commitments it had made to NATO. However, his 
position began to shift over time, and Diefenbaker increasingly embodied anti-American 
feelings that had risen up in Canada during the 1960s. As Diefenbaker struggled to make up 
his mind his indecision began to frustrate the Kennedy Administration (p.51). Because of 
American pressure urging Canada to accept the weapons, Diefenbaker decided to reconsider 
his options, since the issue of who would control the weapons based in Canada troubled him. 
He was convinced of the need to ensure that the Americans would not fire the weapons without 
the consent of the Canadian government in order to prevent rash decisions with respect to their 
deployment. This was reinforced by the Kennedy administration’s lack of consultation with 
Canada during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (Trudgen 2009:50). 
The contentious issue of Canadian nuclear weapons demonstrates how the United States saw 
the NATO/NORAD arrangement primarily as serving US defence interests with Canada acting 
as a secondary partner28. However, Diefenbaker’s refusal to place Canadian forces on alert for 
a 48-hour period during the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates that Canada was prepared to go 
against US command and express dissatisfaction with NORAD at a critical moment.    
During the late stage of the loose bipolarity in the post-Cuban missile crisis era, defence of the 
Canadian north presented some interesting complexities (Eyre 1984:295). Elliot-Meisel 
(1999:412) outlines how Canada’s move to define its position in the Arctic in the 1950s was 
occurring as the US Navy carried out submarine exercises in the arctic waters, including under-
 
28 For instance, the NORAD military command structure outlines that the NORAD commander in chief would always be a US 




ice transits of the NWP by nuclear-powered submarines in 1960 and 1962. Yet interestingly, 
there were no negative comments recorded in Parliament after the transits despite the RCN 
seeking to reassert Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic (ibid).   
Although American-sponsored activities during the war and immediate post-war years had led 
to the construction of a series of airfields throughout the Canadian north, military leaders such 
as Field Marshall Alexander observed to former Prime Minster Mackenzie King (1935-1948) 
that these military sites also had the potential to become ‘bases from which the enemy himself 
may operate but would not operate were they not there’ (Pickersgill 1970 cited in Eyre 
1984:195). The 1964 Canadian White Paper on Defence does not contain a single reference to 
the Canadian North, perhaps to emphasise this point and not draw attention to the area (ibid).  
When Lester Pearson came to power (1963-1968) he held similar views for while he accepted 
that eventually commercial and military needs would dictate the development of the Arctic, he 
favoured delaying such developments as long as possible (p.295). Lester Pearson’s liberal 
administration completed the process of military withdrawal from the Arctic airbases. Only the 
DEW line stations remained in operation by 1965 (Eyre, 1987:296). However, Pearson decided 
to accept US nuclear weapons being placed on Canadian soil since he was focused on repairing 
Canada's relations with the US (Trudgen 2009:51). Pearson’s strategy had, according to Eyre, 
an economic basis also. The cost in both dollars and labour to provide fixed defences in all the 
base facilities would have been staggering and beyond Canada’s ‘middle power’ capabilities 
for given the immensity of the area. Instead, Canada elected to develop forces with the 
capability of recapturing a Soviet-occupied airfield in the North which was in stark contrast to 















3.6.2 Fragmenting alliances in Greenland, Iceland and Norway, and the deployment of 
US nuclear weapons  
When the United States sought to strengthen its early warning systems and increase the 
readiness of the Air Force in the summer of 1957, it offered to deploy nuclear weapons within 
the territories of its NATO European allies (Mastny et al, 2013:198). At a North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) meeting in December 1957 in Lisbon, both Norway and Denmark declared that 
they would not host nuclear weapons. 
However, the construction of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) in 1960 
proved important in the Danish case. An advancement on the earlier DEW line, the BMEWS 
had been extended to Thule in 1958 to protect southern Greenland against bomber attacks and 
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consisted of three radar stations – based in Alaska, Britain and Thule29. From 1958, an Airborne 
alert was also in operation. Known as ‘Operation Chrome Dome’, the northern route was flown 
across the Canadian North and Greenland by B-52 bombers carrying a nuclear payload 
(Petersen 2011:172). 
Kristensen (2004: 7) outlines how Denmark effectively led two policies regarding nuclear 
weapons: publicly Denmark declared that there were no such weapons on Danish territory, 
including Greenland, while tacitly allowing the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in 
Thule without the knowledge or consent of either the Danish Parliament or the Greenlanders. 
However, this double policy became public when an American B-52 bomber carrying nuclear 
weapons crashed into the frozen North Star Bay, approximately ten miles from Thule on 21 
January 1968. It was then revealed that US nuclear weapons had been stored at Thule Air Base 
from 1959 until 1968. A secret clean-up to retrieve the nuclear weapons was labelled Operation 
Crested Ice’ by the US Air Force.30 The incident also created a crisis in the Danish-American 
relationship. A humiliated Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement to the US 
Department of State in May 1968 demanding that Danish atomic policy be upheld in Greenland 
and declared that US nuclear arms may not be stocked in Greenland or flown over Greenlandic 
air territory.   
Iceland fared better and proved capable of challenging the US when, prior to the 1956 general 
elections, the coalition group called for the cancelation of the 1951 Defence Agreement and 
the withdrawal of US troops in Iceland during peacetime. While confirming Iceland’s sustained 
commitment to NATO membership, they declared that Icelanders would take over the 
maintenance and operation of defence installations (Ingimundarson 1976:70, Neucherterlein 
1961:171).  The left-wing government that formed after the election committed to this 
resolution. On June 11th1956, Iceland officially notified the US that it wished to begin 
negotiations for the withdrawal of US troops by invoking Article VII on the cancellation of the 
1951 Defence Agreement (Neucherterlein 1961:152). However, the international environment 
changed dramatically in the winter of 1956. When Soviet troops brutally supressed the 
Hungarian Revolution, it deeply shocked the Icelandic republic and dispelled any illusions of 
 
29 The BWEMS was designed to give a fifteen-minute warning of a missile attack but to achieve this, the Air Force was 
required to have one-third of its forces on ‘Ground Alert’ ready at the runway to take off and armed with nuclear weapons. 
This was supplemented by an Airborne Alert in 1958 which called for aircraft to fly three to six daily sorties (Petersen 2011)   




Soviet peaceful intentions (p.179). Thus, Iceland felt that its hopes for American military 
withdrawal were dashed. By December 1956, most Icelanders were convinced that the troops 
would remain in Iceland indefinitely, and the question therefore focused on what price the 
United States should pay for being able to keep operating from the Keflavlik base 
(Neucherterlein p.187). The new Icelandic Defence Agreement, signed on December the 6th 
1956, was considered a major political victory because of the considerable financial aid given 
to Iceland by the United States as the price paid for the use of Keflavlik airport.   
Soon after, Iceland faced challenges from the Soviet Union in late 1957 and early 1958 when 
Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin submitted two letters to Icelandic Prime Minster Hermann 
Jonasson. In the first letter Bulganin stated his willingness to guarantee Icelandic neutrality on 
the condition that all foreign troops were removed from the country, while the second letter 
intimated that Iceland was in grave danger because the US had the capability of stationing 
atomic weapons in Iceland (Ingimundarson 2011:81). In response, Prime Minster Jonasson 
stated that the US military base was for defence purposes only and that there were no plans to 
store nuclear weapons in Iceland. This response was “welcomed by the Americans and showed 
how far the Icelandic government had moved away from its initial stance on the US military 
presence in 1956” (ibid). Yet a partly declassified Pentagon 1977 study on the stationing of 
nuclear weapons abroad by the Atomic Bulletin of Scientists (ABS) revealed that complete 
nuclear bombs were stored at Icelandic bases from September 1956 until the end of 1959 
(Inginmundarson, 2011:85-86). In 1960 after the U2 affair, the US Ambassador to Iceland was 
instructed by the State Department to avoid, if possible, having to assure the Icelandic 
government either that no atomic weapons were stored in Iceland or to give assurances that 
consultations would proceed before nuclear weapons could be stored. In the memorandum 
outlining these instructions it was stated that "in our view it is not desirable to give assurances 
to the Icelandic government that we would seek its prior agreement to storage or transit of 
nuclear weapons", while in the margins it was written that the US government was already 
constructing nuclear facilities at Keflavik (Ingimundarson 2011:86-87). Thus, the Americans 
chose to interpret the Defence Agreement in such a way that they did not need to consult the 
Icelandic government prior to storing nuclear weapons on Icelandic soil.  
Norway poses a contrast to the general trend of US nuclear policy in NATO Arctic states during 
the loose -bipolar era. As Njølstad (2004:306) explains, the two main features that set Norway 
apart were its self-imposed restraints on allied military presence and activities on Norwegian 
soil, and its anti-nuclear stance in its various permutations. Both those sets of policies were 
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explained as rational and sensible measures to avoid fomenting Soviet feelings of insecurity in 
a sensitive border region. They were also important as elements in what was sometimes referred 
to as ‘the Nordic balance’: a term suggesting a linkage between Norway’s self-imposed 
restraints and restraints on Soviet policy toward Finland. 
It is assumed that the United States upheld the Norwegian defence agreements for the reasons 
stated above - not to antagonise the Soviets, particularly in the sensitive Norwegian-Soviet 
border zone. Nevertheless, there was also strong agreement amongst the Norwegian parties that 
created the political will to preserve Norway's anti-nuclear stance, even in the face of pressure 
from the US to revise this decision.  However, Rolf Tamnes (1991:162) indicates that Norway's 
restrictive stance on nuclear weapons was challenged in two ways by the Alliance in the period 
from 1955-1960. First, the Alliance clearly expected Norway's policy would change, and 
secondly both infrastructural funds and the Mutual Defence Assistance Program were 
increasingly geared towards nuclear-related projects. There was concern on the Norwegian side 
that if it were to reject the peacetime incorporation of nuclear weapons then material support 
would also diminish (Tamnes 1991:162-163)31.Yet naval defence activity presents a major 
exception to Norway's non-nuclear stance. The Norwegian Defence Agreement did not exclude 
visits by foreign naval ships or submarines during peacetime - even those armed with nuclear 
weapons. Therefore, one of Norway's most crucial peacetime roles was that of providing 
support for NATO's Anti-Submarine-Warfare (ASW) operations and naval navigation in the 
Barents-Kola region (Duke 1989:219,226).  
Norway also signed 'The Neptune Journey' Agreement with the United States Navy in 1955, 
permitting American aircraft to land in bases in the north of Norway, which was key to 
reconnaissance operations in the north (Tamnes and Hotlsmark 2014:28).  Yet the memorable 
incident in 1960 of US pilot Gary Powers being shot down in a U-2 reconnaissance spy plane 
over the Barents Sea near the Kola Peninsula revealed just how sensitive Norway's foreign 
policy position was (Duke 1989:220). In the aftermath of the incident, the Soviet Union 
charged the Norwegian government with collusion and aiding the US spying operation by 
provisioning the Bø communications facility in northern Norway for American technicians to 
use during the U2 operation. As a result,  
 
31 Norway did accept the allocation of infrastructure funds between December 1958 and March 1959 for the construction of 
special Ammunition storage sites, which could be used in the event of war to store nuclear weapons but in spite of American 
optimism that Norway would change its policy, these were only used for conventional weapons, and Norway continually 
reinforced its anti-nuclear policy. (Tamnes 1991, p.162) 
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the Norwegian Ministry of Defence promptly required that three US technicians at Bø be out of Norway 
within four days, so that the Minister of Defence, would in the event of questions in the Storting, be able to 
deny collusion and say that there were definitely no US personnel connected with any communications 
facility in Norway (Duke 1960:220).  
Similar to the case of the Bulganin letters to the Icelandic Prime Minister, the U2 incident 
shows Norway's response was to deny rather than confirm its role in the Western NATO 
alliance in the face of Soviet scrutiny.  
3.6.3 Sweden and Finland - decisive approaches to nuclear policy    
While the Swedish leadership was initially cautious of Soviet motives during the early Cold 
War, they began to show signs after the 1955 Geneva summit of growing confidence in detente 
(Petersson 2006). However, the Suez and the Hungary crisis in 1956 brought a sharp drop in 
Swedish optimism and the government reacted strongly to these events (p.627). In Finland, the 
Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising provoked bitter responses in public opinion and 
proved what happened to countries that were a part of the Soviet system (Maude 1976:16).  
Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén (1945-62) was of the opinion that the Soviets did not 
desire heightened tensions in the world yet they had achieved this through their actions in 
Hungary. He did however consider the possibility that the Soviets would seek to resume the 
previous detente policies "if they are not rejected too brusquely by the other side" (Petersson 
2006:627). This statement demonstrates the Swedish government's understanding that Western 
reluctance to engage in negotiations with the Soviet Union could critically undermine the future 
of the detente process. In contrast, the Swedish military leaders saw detente as merely a tactical 
ploy and remained mistrustful of Soviet intentions. Fortunately, military intelligence estimates 
did not have much of a direct impact on Swedish security policy-making during the first twenty 
years of the Cold War (p.628) as the Swedish tradition of weak connections between the 
political and military leadership ensured that military preferences remained subordinate to the 
political will (Petersson 2006:607). 
A good example of this is the nuclear question - Lars Van Dassen (1998: III, 5) outlines how 
Sweden's nuclear research programme, established immediately after the war, had in fact never 
been approved by a clear political decision to develop the bomb. The Swedish Air Force saw 
the development of the Swedish bomb as imperative to defence efforts and pushed for a 
Swedish nuclear arsenal. However, in addition to the unclear political stance, the program faced 
immediate problems including how to manage the different priorities and estimates of costs 
between the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those that wanted to develop 
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the bomb. An additional problem included how to manage the Americans, who were against 
the Swedish nuclear program. Jonter (2010: 66) explains that the US policy towards Sweden 
during the period 1945–1952 was restrictive and characterized by two objectives. First, the US 
sought to discourage the Swedes from exploiting their uranium, especially for military aims.32 
Secondly, they wanted to prevent Sweden from acquiring highly enriched uranium, technical 
expertise, and advanced equipment that could be used in the production of nuclear weapons.  
Van Dassen reveals that Prime Minister Erlander had his doubts while Foreign Minister Undén 
was outright against it. Undén's position argued that a nuclear bomb was of little or no strategic 
value to Sweden – while it might even prompt an aggressor to a first strike. He also believed 
that the possession of nuclear bombs was immoral due to the damage they could inflict on 
innocent victims and the exorbitant costs of developing and producing the bomb (Van Dassen 
2006:11). 
Public and political debates surrounding the research program intensified during the 1950s. In 
November 1959 a Nuclear Weapons committee submitted a report recommending that Sweden 
refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons in solidarity with the ongoing international 
negotiations on non-proliferation and disarmament. The Swedes also revised their nuclear 
energy program to run on enriched uranium imported from the US This was significant as it 
meant that Sweden had abandoned its earlier ambitions to create a complete nuclear fuel cycle 
including uranium mining, reprocessing and bomb manufacture (p.17). The final nail in the 
coffin for Sweden's nuclear program came in 1968, when it signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) following NATO's 1967 decision to shift its nuclear strategy to one of 'flexible response' 
"by which it was thought that Sweden could avoid becoming involved in a nuclear war" (Van 
Dassen 1998:17-18). To summarise, Sweden had a double-track policy where both the nuclear 
weapons option and the non-proliferation possibility were pursued and investigated until 1968, 
when the policy of non-proliferation gained supremacy (p.20).  
During the time that Sweden was led by Social Democrat Sven Olaf Joachim Palme from 1969 
to his assassination in 1986: the nation was to engage in a policy of outspoken criticism against 
superpower conflict and ideological issues, in contrast with the former policy of ideological 
neutrality (Arter 1999:283). Palme saw Sweden's small-state role as being that of the 'world's 
conscience' strongly condemning US involvement in Vietnam, and the Hanoi bombings: 
 
32 Jonter (2010:.5) elaborates that US diplomats and military experts were concerned that Swedish uranium assets would fall 
into the hands of the Soviets and would be used in future Soviet nuclear weapons programmes. 
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resulting in Washington freezing diplomatic relations with Sweden between January 1973 and 
spring of 1974. Palme believed that small states were not obliged simply to play a reactive role 
on the world stage but could work pro-actively to influence developments in the direction of 
peace and detente (ibid). Yet Sweden was also under pressure to reverse its foreign policy of 
reducing military spending when it was faced with political developments that emerged from 
three significantly different sources (Arter 1999:283-284).  The first involved a series of Soviet 
submarine incidents in the 1980s which presented Sweden with a renewed sense of 
vulnerability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, yet Sweden did not waiver on its path of nuclear non-
proliferation. Indeed, from 1984-1986, Sweden hosted the Stockholm Conference on 
Disarmament and Confidence Building Measures demonstrating that Sweden took a leadership 
role in the global nuclear disarmament movement.  
In contrast to Sweden, Finland’s policy towards nuclear weapons and nuclear energy is clear 
cut. Finland was the first country to form an agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency concerning the peaceful use of nuclear power (ibid). In 1963 Finland signed the 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting nuclear testing underwater, above ground, and in outer 
space: and in 1968 it approved the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
alongside Sweden. An essential element of Finland's active neutrality policy was the concept 
of a Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (Nordic NWFZ), first introduced by Kekkonen in 
May 1963 against the background of a Europe increasingly armed with nuclear weapons. 
However, this idea was not realized at the time since a major impediment was Denmark and 
Norway’s NATO pledge to consider the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories in 
a time of crisis. (US library of Congress n.d).    
Meanwhile, the Soviets were keenly aware of the threat of the growing military strength of 
West Germany and the extension of German military activity in Norway and Denmark. On the 
30th of October 1961, Soviet foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko handed the Finnish ambassador 
in Moscow a note which ushered in the crisis of Finnish-Soviet relations known as 'the note 
crisis'. The Russian's proposed that military consultations be held immediately between Finland 
and the Soviet Union to discuss defence measures to be taken to protect the frontiers of both 
countries in accordance with Article 2 of the 1948 Treaty (Maude 1976:20). By going to 
Novosibirsk to meet Khrushchev, Kekkonen succeeded in persuading the Soviet Union to agree 
to postpone the consultations, preserving Finnish neutrality (p.22).  The Soviets came around 
to the Finnish position: that the less the treaty had to be implemented the better - not just for 
the two countries involved but also for the greater Northern European region. President 
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Kekkonen gained enormous prestige on the handling of the note crisis and his foreign policy - 
known as the Kekkonen line - based on maintaining the trust of the Soviet authorities, 
succeeded beyond all expectations.  
In contrast to the Swedes whom America covertly assisted, American Cold War documents 
specifically excluded military support to Finland nor was it considered part of the 'grey zone' 
of NATO defence that Sweden belonged to (Tornudd 2005:47). In 1968 US security policy 
expert Herman Kahn stated that 'we have written off Finland', giving credibility to the idea that 
by the end of the loose bipolar era, Finland had consolidated its policy of neutrality that was 
implicitly recognised by both superpowers. 
3.7 Conclusion  
An in-depth analysis of the US and Soviet foreign policies reveal that for the duration of the 
tight and loose bipolar stages of Cold War, Arctic development was influenced to a greater 
degree by the demands of the superpower rivalry. The Arctic security order therefore remained 
subsumed within the broader parameters of Euro-Atlantic defence and systemic bipolarity. I 
advocate that through the RPSF, the Cold War Arctic is best represented as a strength-based 
system, since it lacked inclusive, institutionalised regional security mechanisms. Strength-
based systems are considered by Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) as being less than 
effective for deterring threats to the regional security complex. Regional leadership is also 
likely to be less than optimal and produce negligible results. This is because regional powers 
are oriented towards forming alliances in pursuit of limited aims.  
It can be concluded that both the US and the USSR were dissatisfied powers, as the political 
and ideological differences between the two superpowers meant each posed a threat to the 
continued existence of the other. Conflict between the two powers increased during times of 
heightened tension and decreased during periods of détente. It can also be observed how US 
and Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War was strongly influenced by the distinct political 
cultures of the two superpowers. While the US exhibited more frequent leadership change, 
Soviet foreign policy demonstrated a slower rate of change due to less frequent political 
turnover and the more resistant nature of the Soviet institutions. Despite the military build-up 
between the US and the Soviet Union, the Arctic never witnessed 'hot' conflict. The 
militarisation of the Arctic therefore served primarily as a defensive capacity that reinforced 
the nuclear 'balance of terror' between the two powers and prevented military invasions of the 
other bloc. Empirical evidence suggests that for the majority of the Cold War, each of the Arctic 
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powers prioritised national security and state survival rather than long-term development 
policies in the Arctic. This resulted in the two superpowers pursuing mainly protectionist and 
reactive foreign policies. 
However, an exception is when the US pursued a proactive revisionist Arctic policy in the early 
stage of tight bipolarity through the creation of new institutional structures of NATO and 
NORAD. This resulted in the consolidation of the Western Arctic bloc as an extension of the 
Euro-Atlantic alliance. It was shown that by creating new institutional structures such as 
NATO, the US displayed regional leadership tendencies in the Arctic and in the broader Euro-
Atlantic area. The US purposely sought to create institutional alliances beyond what was 
strictly necessary for national defence in order to lock actors in and to maintain optimal 
conditions of tightness amongst the Western alliance bloc. The Soviet Union then tried to 
emulate this feat through the establishment of the eastern-bloc and the Warsaw Pact 
institutional structure. However, given that the Arctic states consisted of predominantly 
democratic nations, the Soviet Union was unable to extend the Warsaw Pact into the Arctic in 
the same way that the US was able to with NATO. The Soviet insistence on having a security 
arrangement with Finland demonstrates that it saw the necessity of having at least one Arctic 
ally, for fear that a Western-led invasion would emerge through the High North. Although the 
Finns did not willingly enter into the Friendship and Mutual Assurance Pact with the Soviet 
Union, the treaty enabled Finland to keep Soviet relations agreeable, thus enabling it to remain 
outside of the Warsaw Pact and pursue a foreign policy of neutrality independent of Soviet 
influence.  
A key finding of this chapter is that the nature of relations between the small Arctic states and 
the superpowers were predominately bi-lateral. This is evident during the formation of basing 
agreements amongst NATO Arctic states and the US in the tight bipolar era as well as being in 
evident in Finnish-Soviet relations through the Friendship and Mutual Assurance Treaty that 
Finland was required to uphold with the Soviet Union. While conventional accounts of Cold 
War history tend to present NATO history as an uncomplicated and unanimous alliance 
solidified under US leadership, in this chapter I have attempted to show the concerns and 
apprehension of the small Arctic states throughout the Cold War. This was observed through 
the behaviour of states such as Canada, Denmark and Iceland who joined NATO with the 
express purpose of engaging with the United States on a multilateral basis to avoid 
subservience and to legitimise their security alliance with the great power. For instance, 
Norway and Denmark only reluctantly agreed to NATO membership when all other options 
138 
 
were exhausted, including the idea of a Scandinavian defence agreement which the US refused 
to support. A revisionist account of Cold War Arctic history therefore needs to draw attention 
to the fact that even during the height of the superpower tensions, the security and political 
interests of the small and medium Arctic states were often ignored or not satisfactorily met by 
NATO.  
A secondary observation is the vital role that Finnish and Swedish neutrality played in 
preserving an essential buffer zone between East and West. This served to provide a conflict-
free zone in the Northern Europe and the Arctic between the Western-NATO bloc and the 
Soviet Union in the Arctic: a necessary precaution to prevent tensions escalating into open 
conflict along border zones. Thus, underlying the Cold War Arctic security system was the 
concept of a Northern Balance.  
Overall, there is a visible trend of decreasing levels of trust and political support occurring 
amongst the small states during the shifting political climate of loose bipolarity. The small and 
medium states gradually became increasingly dissatisfied with the overall nature of the alliance 
and their role in the Northern Balance. Shrewd US interpretation of the Icelandic and 
Greenlandic defence agreements enabled the US to deploy nuclear weapons on territories 
formally declared to be nuclear free. This understandably led to resentment and reluctance to 
concede to NATO nuclear defence demands.  The excessive and dangerous militarization (both 
conventional and nuclear) embarked upon by the superpowers increasingly alarmed the small 
European states when it became all too apparent how easily a crisis could escalate out of control 
and lead to war as witnessed during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Fears over the deployment of 
nuclear weapons, the possibility of nuclear warfare in addition to nuclear accidents remained 
at the forefront of political life and were particularly contentious issues during national 
elections.  
Although the aftermath of Cuban Missile Crisis brought a period of détente and a time of 
greater stability and predictability in US-Soviet relations, there was a reluctance by both 
powers to put an end to the Cold War. US and Soviet leaders remained dissatisfied with the 
global system and continued to pursue protectionist foreign policies after this time. It would 
not be until the period of incipient multipolarity in the 1980s that the Arctic would begin to 





CHAPTER FOUR                                                                             
EMERGING ARCTIC REGIONAL COOPERATION 
DURING THE STAGE OF INCIPIENT MULTIPOLARITY 
(1970-1984) AND THE TRANSISTION ERA (1985-1996) 
4.0 Introduction  
Distinguishing the era of Incipient multipolarity and the transition stage from the two previous 
stages serves the purpose of explaining the intense structural changes that occurred within the 
international system. Beginning in 1970 this chapter covers a twenty-year period leading up to 
the end of the Cold War, in 1991. Although I argue that the transition era continued after this 
time up until 1996, I engage with the events of the early 1990s in Chapter 5. It will be shown 
in this chapter how the rise of new trans-national forces and a new era of East-West détente 
transformed political and security cooperation and heralded the rise of Arctic regionalisation.  
In section 4.1., I start by providing an overview of the main features of incipient multipolarity 
as advocated by Jones (1991). Following from this, in section 4.2 and 4.3., I delve into the 
political events that occurred during this time period in the US (section 4.2.1), the Soviet Union 
(4.2.2.) and the small and medium Arctic states respectively (section 4.3). In section 4.4. I then 
provide a similar overview to the transition stage before again turning to addressing 
developments occurring within the individual Arctic states. Emerging indigenous rights groups 
and environmental conservation movements all sought to turn the tide in Arctic great power 
relations in the era of incipient multipolarity. This is particularly evident in Canada (Section 
4.3.1) where the pan-indigenous movement began to grow in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
while the backlash against the US military bases reached a crescendo in Greenland and Iceland 
during this era (section 4.3.2). At the same time, Sweden faced new challenges from Soviet 
submarine intrusions in its national waters, resulting in a worsening of Swedish-Soviet 
relations, whereas Finland began developing its competencies in environmental politics and as 
a peace broker between east and west. It achieved several successes in this time including 
organising and hosting the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe CSCE in 1975 
(section 4.3.3.)  
The transition stage of Arctic regional development will reveal some critical turning points in 
US-Soviet relations in the latter years of the Cold War that eventually saw the turbulent years 
of the 1970s in the US and the stagnation of the Soviet system give way to a new era of détente 
and the eventual culmination of bipolarity. This crucial political transformation centred around 
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the personalities and foreign policies of President Ronald Reagan in the US (section 4.5.1) and 
the General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union (4.5.2). Mikhail Gorbachev 
played a fundamental role in initiating the regionalisation of the Arctic, however I advocate 
that he did not do this for the primarily for the benefit of the north but rather he sought to revise 
Soviet foreign policy and utilise the Arctic as a means to develop East-West cooperation and 
arms-reduction. By outlining Gorbachev’s proposals, it will become evident that region-
building in the Arctic had already begun prior to the end of the Cold War and as such, created 
a foundation for regional-security relations in the Arctic in the post-Cold War era. 
In section 4.6.2. I outline how the three NATO Arctic states still faced challenges from US 
basing issue that culminated in the mid-1980s. For Greenland, a key issue centred around the 
question of hosting a controversial new radar at Thule, while public approval towards the US 
forces based at Keflavik declined once more. During the Reagan-Gorbachev détente of the late 
1980s, Iceland also became increasingly focused on arms control and disarmament issues and 
began developing new environmental policies. Norway, as the staunchest of Arctic NATO 
states, took an unprecedented stance against the Regan’s military programs in this era, causing 
a minor crisis in bi-lateral relations. Meanwhile, Sweden and Finland (section 4.3.3) continued 
to act as mediators in the superpower conflict whilst steering their foreign policy in a direction 
that increasingly favoured nuclear disarmament, strengthening trade with the European 
Community and bringing an end to the Cold War. During the transition era, Finland was quick 
to take Gorbachev up on his offer to create an international Arctic region. It decided the best 
way to do this was to establish an institution to promote environmental cooperation in the 
Arctic. As a result, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was created in 1991 
which would later become the forerunner of the Arctic Council. 
4.1. An Overview of Incipient multipolarity 
The emergence of incipient multipolarity requires an explanation of the growing political 
influence and power of other state and non-state actors during this period. The fundamental 
idea behind incipient multipolarity is that "the global power distribution is in a transitional 
stage between bipolarity, clearly a thing of the past, and true multipolarity, in which a group of 
states have the capabilities of influencing the outcomes of major international events” (Jones 
1991:281-2). Significant factors contributing to this transition from bipolarity to incipient 
multipolarity were events such as the US withdrawal from the Bretton Woods monetary system 
in 1971 and the oil shocks of 1973. As Stefano Guzzini (1997:129) explains, “not only did this 
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unilateral decision change the way that the international monetary system was run, but the USA 
was perceived to have officially declared its power position as challenged”.  In the early 1970s 
the world power distribution was seen to be evolving into a ‘penta-polar’ model, one in which 
five major powers (the US, Russia, China, Japan and Western Europe) would dominate 
international politics (p.289). 33 European economic recovery and the establishment of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) proclaimed that new ‘non-state actors’ were now a 
significant feature of the international system and began to steer the economic policies of the 
small European Arctic states in a new direction. The creation of OPEC and the oil embargo of 
1973-74 demonstrated that the resource rich Third World also held the ability to force a 
transformation of the international economic system, demanding that they be taken seriously 
as an independent part of the global power structure (Jones 1991:281, 290). After the 1973 
crisis, the accrued influence of economic weapons moved economic issues to the level of ‘high 
politics’, while US academics began for the first time to analyse the impacts of declining 
American power on the international system (Guzzini 1997:129). 
Although Jones does not consider this model of world politics to have lasted longer than the 
1980s, in the Arctic, the era of incipient multipolarity arguably continued up until the mid-
1990’s.  
This era presented an opportune time for the emergence of a growing environmental movement 
that would contribute to the beginning of circumpolar Arctic cooperation. For example, in 
1971, Canadian Professor Maxwell Cohen was the first to propose institutionalizing 
cooperation in the Arctic in the form of an Arctic Basin treaty – 10 years after the Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS) came into effect – however, Cohen’s vision failed to find support among 
the Cold War obsessed policy makers. (Chaturvedi 1996:178). The environmental movement 
however, achieved an exceptional success during this era, with the ratification of the 
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears in 1973. Signatories from the five Arctic states 
with the largest polar bear populations (Canada, Denmark [Greenland], Norway [Svalbard], 
the US and the USSR) signed the treaty and as such, it is often considered as early proof of 
Arctic cooperation at a time when the superpowers responded either negatively or at best- half-
 
33 The basis for this model was similar to that of bipolarity: the relative power capabilities of the five states were not equal, 
but it was expected that they would have developed their international capabilities to the degree that they could intervene in a 




heartedly to Arctic environmental and scientific initiatives (Arctic Portal 2019, Chaturvedi 
1996:98-99).    
Evidence from the Arctic of emerging non-state actors can also be witnessed by indigenous 
groups who began to organise internationally during the late 1960s and 1970s in response to 
growing environmental concerns of native tribes in Alaska and Northern Canada. One of the 
first political organizations to emerge was the 'Indian and Eskimo Association', created at the 
end of the 1960s in Canada. The first international indigenous group - the World Council for 
Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) - was established in 1972 by George Emmanuel and held its first 
meeting in 1975 (Shadian 2006:141). Once the WCIP gained UN recognition, the international 
indigenous movement became a formal entity, acquiring international legal standing and being 
recognised and supported by a number of states (p.142). Other indigenous groups were formed 
following the success of WCIP including the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) which was 
founded by Eben Hopson, a former mayor of the North Slope Borough in Alaska, in 1977. 
Hopsen felt it was imperative to establish an international pan-Arctic Inuit organisation which 
could voice Inuit concerns on Arctic oil and gas development, nationally and internationally 
(Stenbaek, 1985:5). The connection between the indigenous movement and environmental 
movement highlights how the two policy areas grew to dominate national and international 
political agendas during the era of incipient multipolarity. Shadian (2006:250) explains that the 
politics of natural resource development contributed to a merging relationship between Alaskan 
and Canadian Inuit efforts to gain control over the ways in which Arctic resource development 
was to be carried out.  These groups also provided a counter-narrative to the Cold War narrative 
of the superpowers and the collective security arrangement of NATO, which had until the 
1970s been the de-facto non-state actor in the Western Arctic.  
4.2. The Arctic Powers and Incipient Multipolarity: 1970-1984 
4.2.1 American Foreign policy in the 1970s to mid-1980s: an era of rapid change for the 
American Arctic  
The monumental shifts occurring in state and international relations during this emerging 
period requires investigating how the two superpowers responded to these changes. During this 
period it will be shown how there were times of increased tension as well as greater efforts to 
engage in nuclear arm reduction and inter-state cooperation. 
Levering (1994) explains that American-Soviet relations between 1969 and 1972 were 
extremely complicated for although there was a continual improvement in relations since the 
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Cuban Missile Crisis, there was also a determination on each side that the other would have to 
pay an adequate price for specific gains in bilateral relations. These prevailing attitudes 
continued to shape US foreign policy through ‘linkage’: the idea that progress in one area 
depended on progress in others. However, the US had the upper hand in relations, since Moscow 
was more anxious than Washington to improve relations and reduce their defence spending. As 
a result, US leaders stuck more consistently – though often unsuccessfully to their policy 
(Levering 1994:124).  
From 1969 until 1974, US foreign policy was directed by two bold, controversial leaders, 
President Richard Nixon and his chief national security adviser Henry Kissinger (Levering 
1994:118). It was recognised that US power was more limited than in the post-war years. 
Vietnam had proven to be a costly enterprise with no military victory in sight. These factors 
influenced the beginning of the Strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) which were established 
for the first time in 1972 by Nixon and Brezhnev at a summit in Moscow, followed by a treaty 
to prevent the development of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs). SALT effectively froze the 
nuclear arsenals of both superpowers while ensuring that each side still had more than enough 
nuclear weapons to destroy the other if war broke out (Downing 2018:13). Nonetheless, SALT 
set a five-year numerical limit on ICBM’s and signified a major shift towards nuclear détente 
(Levering 1994:127).   
With official nuclear arms limitations treaties in effect, this enabled long-suppressed 
environmental issues to emerge within the Arctic. This can be seen in the NSDM-144 
memorandum which President Nixon approved of in 1971. Considered as America’s first 
Arctic policy document, a mere seven lines of text framed US Arctic policy which advocated 
for the “sound and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of minimizing 
any adverse effects to the environment: promoting mutually beneficial international 
cooperation in the Arctic” (CSIS 2013:3). At the same time, the memorandum advised that the 
United States should provide for the protection of essential security interests in the Arctic 
which included the preservation of the principle of the freedom of the seas and adjacent 
airspace (ibid). These two objectives outlined in the NSDM-144 would serve as the 
foundational document for successive US Arctic Strategies.  
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However, with the revelation of the Watergate scandal34 in 1974, the US was faced with an 
internal political crisis with Nixon resigning and being replaced by President Gerald Ford. 
Ford’s term in office was far from uneventful as it included two assassination attempts: the fall 
of Vietnam: Cambodian seizure of a US freighter, and constant fights with Congress. When 
President Ford delivered his first State of the Union address in January 1975, three months 
before the end of the US presence in Vietnam, he said “The state of the Union is not good.”  
However, amongst his successes were Ford’s continued efforts to maintain the Cold War 
détente begun under his predecessor. There is no clearer evidence of this than through Ford’s 
approval of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (Zississ 2007). 
The process that eventually culminated in the creation of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) can be traced back to Soviet diplomatic talks that began back 
in 1953-4. However, in order to see these efforts materialise Soviet leaders had been required 
to concede US participation as a full member of the process (Smith, 2006:8). Twenty years 
later, the first CSCE meeting in Helsinki in 1975. The outcome of the conference was the 
Helsinki Final Act, a document which expressed that the states in attendance recognised the 
inviolability of borders and agreed that European security should be comprehensive, indivisible 
and cooperative. What Helsinki demonstrates is that European states were being granted greater 
rights and freedoms as the bipolar system loosened under détente in the era of incipient 
multipolarity. The Helsinki Accords are considered as a milestone in Cold War history because 
not only did it herald the beginnings of cooperative security in Europe, but also contributing to 
the peaceful end of the Cold War.35 (CSCE 1975:2). 
When Jimmy Carter became the 39th President of the United States from 1977 to 1981, he 
demonstrated support for continuing détente, however he rejected the Nixon-Kissinger concept 
of “linkage,” believing that he could speak out against human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, 
while negotiating arms reductions with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. Although 
Carter intended to maintain the spirit of Helsinki in US foreign policy, by early 1979, following 
international events such as the Somalian-Ethiopian war, Sino-American normalization, the 
Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it had become apparent that the 
 
34 On August 9th 1974, Ford became ‘the accidental president’ after both Nixon and his vice president Spiro Agnew resigned 
to avoid impeachment as a result of the Watergate scandal. The scandal involved the politically motivated burglary of 
Democratic Party offices in the Watergate complex in Washington    
35 The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which opened at Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and continued at Geneva 
from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, was attended by over thirty-five states High Representatives (CSCE 1975, p.2) 
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SALT process was the only real evidence that superpower détente remained alive (Young and 
Kent 2004:745)36.   
Without doubt, realist perceptions of the Cold War still guided strategic thinking in the White 
House. However, domestic crises also impacted Carter’s presidency as he faced a mounting 
series of domestic economic problems, including increases in gasoline prices, rising inflation, 
and rising unemployment (The US Office of the Historian 2016). However, as an individual 
policy actor, President Carter made his own contribution to the emergence of a pluralistic 
approach to Arctic security when in 1980, he enacted the Alaskan Lands Act. The act made 
104 million acres of Alaskan land into national parks, forests, and wildlife preserves. During a 
visit to the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), President Carter - awestruck by the 
wildlife spectacle, was said to have announced “The closest thing to this I’ve seen is Africa’s 
Serengeti Plain. Oil development can never be allowed here” (Miller 2011: xxii). Carter’s 
statement was timely as in 1967, the discovery of North America's largest oil field at Prudhoe 
Bay, on the Arctic Coast heralded in a new era for Alaska, with oil companies threatening 
conservation areas with prospects of buying or leasing land for drilling. Huge amounts of 
money began to flow into the state with the construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline in 
1974, and the beginning of production in the field in 1977 (Alaska Humanities Forum 2015).  
Ultimately, however, it was Carter’s failures in foreign policy that led to his downfall as public 
disillusionment with his policies grew. His inability to secure the release of the Americans taken 
hostage in Iran, in 1979, followed by his harder stance on the Middle East, led to his defeat in 
the November 1980 presidential elections. His replacement was the Republican presidential 
candidate Ronald Reagan and his vice-presidential running mate George H.W. Bush who would 
later go on to become president (US Office of the Historian 2016).  
4.2.2 Russia in the 1970s and early 80’s: Leonid Brezhnev, Foreign Policy Stagnation, 
Andropov and Chernenko 
Like the US, the Soviet Union also experienced a higher than usual turnover in leadership 
during the 1970s and 80’s yet this did not translate into changes in foreign policy or Soviet 
Arctic policy. While acknowledging how new global political developments such as détente, 
the rise of non-state actors and the movement of non-aligned states all constituted fundamental 
developments towards multipolarity. Arbatov (2007:8) argue the Soviet leadership failed to 
 
36 SALT II was eventually signed at the only Carter –Brezhnev summit in 1979. However, after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan Carter withdrew from the treaty and it never actually went into effect.  
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understand these changes and held fast to their bipolar vision of the world. The Soviet 
leadership interpreted the partial scaling back of US military presence overseas following its 
defeat in Vietnam as a change in the balance of power in favour of socialism. In addition, the 
growing independence of Western Europe and the increase in the number of post-colonial 
conflicts in the world was interpreted by the Soviet’s as a sign of “increasing contradictions 
within the imperialist camp” and that these new post-colonial states were attracted by “non-
capitalist development” (2007, p.8). Arbatov considers how this led the Kremlin to respond by 
launching an unprecedented geopolitical and military-strategic expansion in the late 70s-early 
80s in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This explains the contrast between Khrushchev’s policy 
of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ and Leonid Brezhnev's more conservative ‘hard-liner’ stance in 
foreign policy as he embarked on what became known as ‘The Brezhnev Doctrine’ that did not 
hesitate to use force to defend what Brezhnev considered to be the vital interests of the Soviet 
Union. This included the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 197937.  
Yet while Brezhnev steered a turbulent course for foreign policy, domestically, the state 
experienced a period of relative calm if not gradual decline. Newly discovered oil and gas 
reserves in the late 1960s and early 70’s served to bolster the ailing economy and Arctic 
research received new long-term funding for cutting edge scientific programs. As a result, this 
era became known as ‘The Golden Age’ of Soviet Arctic research (Josephson 2014:168-169). 
However, Crump (2013) paints a different picture through demonstrating how Arctic shipping 
in the late Brezhnev era exposed the inherent contradictions within the Soviet economy that 
already indicated economic decline and stagnation. Although Soviet icebreakers were making 
shipping possible year-round from Murmansk to Vladivostok, their full economic potential was 
far from being realised. The Soviet Union could ill-afford to embark on new shipbuilding 
projects in a time of economic decline, demonstrating how Brezhnev and the party were out of 
touch with reality. For even though the sea lanes were being kept open by the icebreakers, there 
were too few giant nuclear freighters to exploit them. Both icebreakers and freighters also had 
to share inadequate and poorly maintained facilities with the Soviet Northern Fleet. Meanwhile 
the nuclear-powered fleet - civil and military – produced a long-term environmental disaster, 
since facilities were inadequately protected against nuclear contamination (Crump 2013:99). 
 
37 Although Afghanistan was not a part of the Soviet bloc, there were fears that the socialist regime might fall to Muslim 




Spent nuclear fuel was dumped in the Arctic sea which represented a long-term hazard and 
hastening the environmental degradation of the Arctic (ibid). At a time of emerging 
environmental awareness in the Western Arctic, Brezhnev’s leadership demonstrates a blatant 
ignorance of the growing socio-economic and environmental consequences of Soviet military 
policies that had exploited the North for decades, while his shipping policies did little to 
contribute to the Soviet economy or save it from stagnation (Crump 2013:99). 
For Northern peoples of the Soviet Arctic, the 1960s and early 1970s was a devastating time 
as the closure of so-called "futureless" indigenous villages resulted in forced relocation into 
larger, often multi-ethnic settlements where the leadership was often non-native (Poelzer and 
Fondahl 1997).  This period also saw an increase in the removal of children from their families 
for residential school-based education, and heightened state interference in traditional 
economic activities (reindeer husbandry, hunting, fishing) with an eye toward "rationalization." 
Such policies led to acute social problems, including chronic alcoholism and a reduced 
indigenous life expectancy.  Among the 26 northern aboriginal peoples officially recognized 
by the Soviet state, seven groups decreased in absolute numbers between 1970 and 1989 (ibid).  
Brezhnev’s successors, Yuri Andropov, followed by Konstantin Chernenko, were in effect both 
conservative Soviet leaders whose domestic and foreign polices did not alter considerably from 
those of Brezhnev in the early stage of incipient multipolarity. When Ronald Reagan 
denounced the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” that had committed “a crime against 
humanity”, Andropov responded with the comment that the Reagan Administration had 
“finally dispelled all illusions” that it could be negotiated with (RT Russiapedia 2011). US-
Soviet relations became especially strained after Soviet pilots shot down a Korean airliner in 
September 1983. The United States responded by issuing extensive sanctions against the Soviet 
airline and a meeting in Madrid between Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko turned into a shouting match (Matlock 2008, p61). Later that year, Andropov 
withdrew Soviet negotiators from all discussions concerning reductions in Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) while the United States 
began deploying Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe (ibid).  
Andropov had more personal experience in the Arctic than most Soviet leaders, as a result of 
his experiences as a Soviet liaison officer in the Arctic during the war years, however this did 
not translate into policy reform. Instead, the importance of Arctic shipping increased in the 
seventies because of the discovery of natural gas on the Yamal peninsula (Horensma 
1991:118). Soviet defense policy was based on the idea of Bastion theory: according to which 
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the Soviet navy sought to deny an enemy access to the Arctic, siting its missile launchers where 
they can be protected from retaliation and safe from American submarines. This period of 
strained tensions markedly resulted in greater defense of the Arctic seas especially after the 
introduction of the first ballistic missile submarines in the early 1970s which were able to reach 
targets well outside the Arctic. 
Andropov remained in office for only sixteen months as he suffered from renal failure and died 
in February 1984. He was replaced by the seventy-two-year-old Konstantin Chernenko who 
was already in ill-health when he became Secretary General. During his brief tenure in office, 
Chernenko generally chose to continue Brezhnev policies. However, in foreign policy he 
negotiated a trade pact with the People’s Republic of China and several times in his speeches 
or interviews, he stated a desire to meet US President Ronald Reagan. Although he called for 
renewed détente, little progress was made towards closing the rift in East-West relations during 
Chernenko’s rule. While the War in Afghanistan also intensified, late in autumn of 1984, the 
US and the Soviet Union did agree to resume arms control talks in early 1985 (ibid). However, 
Chernenko died in March 10th, 1985. As such he was the third general secretary to die in less 
than three years, in what was to memorably be dubbed ‘a hearse race’ (Foreman-Peck 2018). 
After him, the party elders all felt that a younger, more dynamic leader was needed to 
rejuvenate the Soviet system and ensure its survival (ibid). 
 
 
4.3 The small and medium Arctic States during the era of incipient 
multipolarity 
4.3.1. Canadian nationalism, Arctic sovereignty and environmentalism in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
The decade of the 1960s witnessed a tremendous increase in Canadian concerns about its 
vulnerability – actual or perceived – to the United States. Although the United States was at 
the height of its power, the Vietnam war resulted in Canadian confidence in US leadership 
being at an all-time low (Gotlieb 2013). This precipitated the emergence of a new-found 
Canadian nationalism which brought an increased focus and public awareness to ‘the national 
interest’ and protection of Canadian sovereignty. Deep conflicts arose over the Arctic that 
included pollution and other environmental issues, sovereignty over territorial and international 
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waters, fishing resources and the movement of US icebreakers through the NWP (Gotlieb 
2013). In 1973 and again in 1975, Canada claimed that the NWP and all archipelagic water to 
be historical internal waters. However, there was no treaty or legislation to substantiate this 
claim (Elliot-Meisel 1999, p414). Canada worried that the NWP would become a potential US 
shipping route for oil tankers across the north of Canada and as such, Canada would lose control 
over this waterway. Yet, Canadian leadership also feared the environmental repercussions 
should an oil spill occur in this remote northern region. Growing environmental concern over 
Arctic shipping therefore served to legitimize Canadian sovereignty claims over its northern 
waters, particularly after the United States sent a Coast Guard vessel to escort the converted oil 
tanker SS. Manhattan through the NWP in 1969. Although Canada had been informed about 
the ship, the lack of express permission was considered as a challenge to Canadian sovereignty, 
producing public outcry and a minor crisis in Canadian-US relations. As Elliot-Meisel (p.413) 
explains,  
The Canadian response was both reactive and concurrently innovative. Canada increased its territorial sea 
from three miles to twelve miles, making the two entrances of the Northwest Passage – Barrow Strait and 
Prince of Wales Strait – Canadian territorial waters. In addition, the novel and controversial Arctic Water 
Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) created a 100-mile zone around the arctic islands in which the 
Canadians claimed the right to regulate shipping…Never before had a nation based its authority over the 
water on environmental concerns.  
The US immediately rejected AWPPA arguing that no state had the right to extend jurisdiction 
over the high seas (ibid). However, as international negotiations on establishing exclusive 
maritime economic zones (EEZs) were finalized from 1973-1982 at the UN’s third law of the 
Sea Conference (UNCLOS III), the US and the Soviet Union conceded the twelve-mile 
territorial sea proclaimed by nations around the world and accepted the 200-mile economic 
zones (Elliot-Meisel 1999:413).  
Meanwhile, the Canadian government was revising its commitments to the United States and 
Cold War militarization. Liberal internationalism experienced a relative decline in the era of 
incipient multipolarity during the administration of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968-
1972). Instead a new foreign policy of 'limited internationalism' was endorsed that included a 
scaling back of Canadian military spending to NATO along with other overseas commitments. 
The declining Soviet threat during the Khrushchev thaw served to shift priorities away from 
military security: a trend that continued into the 1980s (Nossal 2003). Even more significantly, 
Trudeau contributed to the demilitarisation of the Arctic owing to his strong anti-nuclear 
stance. Trudgen (2009:52) explains that not only had Trudeau opposed Canada's acquisition of 
nuclear weapons in 1963, he believed that Canada's entire foreign policy needed to be re-
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examined.  On this basis Trudeau ordered full reviews of both defence policy and foreign policy 
including Canada's possession of nuclear weapons. The result of these reviews was published 
in the 1970 White Paper, in which the government reiterated the main internationalist priorities 
but acknowledged a limited Canadian capability to serve and promote them and recommended 
readjusting its efforts on the international scene. Along with a unilateral reduction of its 
conventional forces in Europe, Canada would now have a non-nuclear role in the alliance 
(Trudgen 2009:53). This undoubtedly created tensions between the Canadian and American 
leadership:   
 ……relations between President Reagan and Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau had increasingly 
soured, not least because of Trudeau’s concerns about what he termed the ‘parlous’ [risky] relationship 
between the superpowers. Trudeau’s vision of world politics differed dramatically from Reagan’s, and 
Trudeau was not hesitant to press those differences” (Nossal 2003).  
Canada's nuclear arsenal begun to be decommissioned from 1972, including its SAM's and air 
-to air missile interceptor systems, which were scrapped owing to doubts over effectiveness 
and as an effort to reduce defence costs (p.54). However, Canada kept its other nuclear system 
'The Genie' until 1984, in accordance with the 1971 Defence White Paper, which outlined that 
there was no other means at the time to destroy attacking Soviet bombers but to equip Canadian 
fighter planes with nuclear weapons (Trudgen 2009). Finally, in 1984 when Canada upgraded 
its fighter planes it returned the last of its nuclear warheads to the United States, completing its 
transition to a non-nuclear role in the NATO alliance.   
4.3.2 The 1970s and 1980s - fragmenting alliances in Greenland, Iceland and Norway, 
the rise of nuclear non-proliferation, trade disputes and the question of EEC 
membership.  
The era of incipient multipolarity witnessed US endeavours to upgrade and construct new radar 
facilities in Greenland and Iceland as part of a broader plan to modernize NATO and NORAD 
defence systems. These upgrades, which came during the height of President Reagan’s 
campaign for implementing his SDI – represented the US’ relentless determination to maintain 
a technological and strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. However the responses by the 
NATO Arctic states to these projects reflect changing political attitudes and the continued 
fragmenting of the alliance amidst growing awareness that broader security concerns were 
emerging on national and international agendas. 
In Greenland, defence issues with the US re-emerged, as the Ballistic Missile Early Warning 
System (BMEWS) located 16km from Thule AB, became the focus of American plans in the 
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late 1970s to upgrade its strategic defence systems (Duke, 1989:46). American military plans 
for 'improvements' to the BMEWS aimed at increasing the scanning rate of the Soviet landmass 
up to 85 per cent in order to detect where ballistic missile attack could be launched. During the 
heightened Cold War tensions in the 1980s, The BMEWS site at Thule became a centre of 
contention between the superpowers, particularly over charges proclaiming that the upgraded 
BMEWS site was not a modification but a new system that violated the 1972 ABM Treaty.   
However, as Kristensen (2004:7) highlights, a continued concern was whether Greenland's role 
as an early warning site would make it a likely target in any superpower conflict, jeopardizing 
the safety of the Greenlandic population with neither their implicit nor explicit consent. 
Iceland's relations with the West and NATO were deeply affected by two fishing disputes with 
Britain in 1975 and 1976 which became known as the 'Cod wars' (Ingimundarson 2011). This 
conflict saw repeated boat ramming incidents and collisions: and while no deaths occurred, it 
ruptured diplomatic relations between the two countries. The US and NATO were also 
concerned that the disagreement between Iceland and Britain would impact the cohesion of the 
NATO alliance. Ingimundarson explains that Icelanders did not want NATO to mediate, only 
to get the British out of the self-declared 50 mile zone, yet the dispute also demonstrated that 
"When economic interests were at stake, international institutional loyalty meant far less than 
perceived national interest" (p. 186) The fishery issue was fuelled both from an economic basis 
and a domestic political stance: to preserve Icelandic waters from the British fishing industry 
and from the need to settle scores between the national/conservative position and the pro-
Western opposition. The disputes ended in full victory for Iceland with recognition of a 200-
mile fishery limit (Ingimundarson, 2011:186).   
The Reagan military build-up in the early 1980’s witnessed an increase in the number of fighter 
jets stationed at Keflavík. Ingimundarson (2005:68) outlines that the number of jets increased 
from twelve to eighteen due to a major increase in the number of Soviet bombers entering 
Icelandic airspace. Yet when the Soviets drastically curtailed their military activities around 
Iceland in the mid-1980s, domestic pressure to remove the jets became stronger. In 1982, the 
US DoD submitted its North American Air Defense (NAAD) plan to Congress. The plan was 
primarily aimed to protect against the threat by Soviet long-range bombers and was intended 
to improve the DEW line and to modernize the North-Atlantic Defence System (NADS). At 
the time, there were radar installations in Iceland which served both systems (Duke 
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1989:189)38. Through an agreement signed with the Icelandic government in 1985, the US 
sought to upgrade the radar system. Duke outlines how relations between the Icelandic 
Government and the US were generally good during the 1980s with the exception of a low 
point in mid-1986 when a serious dispute arose over freight services. Since 1904, US 
legislation had required freight for US forces, wherever possible to be carried out by US 
vessels. As such, the freight carried to the US forces in Iceland was mainly handled by US 
companies. The Icelandic business community felt that the situation was unfair, and a meeting 
was convened between US and Icelandic officials in London in September 1986. The outcome 
of the meeting resulted in an agreement that was ratified by the Althing and the US Congress. 
Under the new agreement which came into effect on the 1st of March 1987, both states are 
‘guaranteed equal rights to compete for the freight business’ (Duke 1989:186). This dispute 
highlights the broadening security agenda in Iceland and the growing awareness that a US 
military presence was not going to guarantee Iceland’s economic security. At the time, the 
Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs Matthiás A. Mathiesen wrote that the dispute highlighted 
the necessity of clearly distinguishing between the nation’s defence interests and its economic 
interests (Duke 1989:191).  
The nuclear issue came back to dominate Norwegian political debates with a vengeance at the 
end of the 1970s. Njølstad (2004:304) explains that elements of the Norwegian Labour Party 
decided to reopen discussion about NATO's nuclear strategy. In 1979 a well organised 
campaign began under the slogan 'No to Nuclear Weapons', acquired one hundred thousand 
members in a short time. A petition calling for the creation of a Nordic Nuclear weapons free 
zone (NNWFZ) was signed with over half a million signatures, equalling one eight of the total 
population of Norway (ibid). The campaign highlighted the strong stance that some 
Norwegians held regarding the storage of nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil – although 
prohibited during peacetime, Norwegians sought to revise the policy that allowed them during 
war. The nuclear debate contributed to Labour's fall from power in the autumn of 1981, and 
when the Conservative government took over they put the question of a nuclear-free zone on 
ice as they sought to restore Norway's position as a dependable ally "in part because the 
 
38 Duke explains that in the DoD’s plan a military base in the north of Iceland (Hofn) was planned to host an acoustic listening 




Americans had uttered slightly veiled threats to suspend plans for reinforcement forces for 
Norway if such a zone was established" (Njølstad (2004:304).  
Trade and economic power increasingly began to shape and dictate change in the international 
system from the 1970s onwards, and for all three countries, the question of European Economic 
Community (EEC) membership emerged. For Greenland - EEC accession came on the back of 
Danish membership as Greenland remained a Danish colony and subject to Danish laws and 
policies. The lack of a political voice on the EEC issue highlighted the Greenlander's need for 
legislative powers and Home rule. In 1973, a Commission was set up to examine this possibility 
followed by a bill that was rapidly passed and became law in November 1978. In a referendum 
held in January 1979, Home Rule was approved in Greenland with a 70.1 per cent ‘Yes’ vote 
against a 25.8 ‘No’ vote on a 63.3 per cent turnout (Fitzmaurice 1981:85). The referendum 
campaign of 1972 on EEC membership served as the litmus test for Greenland to enact the 
powers it received from Home Rule and had a considerable politicising and radicalising effect 
in Greenland. As Kristensen (2004:6) indicates "One of the few major policy areas where 
authority continued to be entirely located in Copenhagen was that of foreign policy". Yet it was 
understood that even in this area the Greenlandic community had a legitimate claim to 
participate in the formulation of foreign policy issues that Greenlanders deemed important. 
Despite its own massive ‘No’ to the EEC, Greenland was forced to became part of the 
Community alongside Denmark. This started the debate about the island’s constitutional status. 
In 1982 a referendum was held in Greenland on 23rd of February on whether to stay or leave 
the EEC. Nearly three out of four voters participated. 52.2% voted for leaving while 46.0% 
preferred to stay (Sorenson p.167). This resulted in Greenland exiting the EEC on the 1st of 
February 1985. Analysing Greenland’s EEC withdrawal, Sorenson states that  
Departure from the European Union was not intended to isolate Greenland from the world. The intention 
was rather to maximise control over its own affairs. It is a matter of political judgement whether the 
Greenlandic interests are best taken care of inside or outside the union….   the matter might be different if 
Greenland could join the union as a full member, not as part of Denmark (p.167). 
Norway also held a referendum that same year on EEC membership. The referendum result 
was a marginal victory for the no campaign owing to the conservative rural voters putting 
forward a strong opposition to the Oslo government and voters from urban centres who were 
in favour. Norway's justification not to enter the European market in 1973 ranged from 
preserving Norwegian sovereignty to economic concerns such as maintaining control over 
154 
 
fishing rights and the newly discovered offshore oil deposits in the North Sea39. Another reason 
for abstaining from EU membership, was, according to Bjørklund (1997:149) to ensure that 
Norway's security policy continued to be oriented towards its bi-lateral relationships with the 
United States and Great Britain rather than continental Europe.  
In Iceland, preparations towards free trade and EEC association had been formulated by the 
highly stable governing coalition of the Social Democrats and Independence Party (Arter 
1999:327). This coalition, which was formed in 1959, became the first government to pursue 
free trade as a basic principle of Icelandic foreign economic policy. The European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) was established in 1960 as an intergovernmental organisation to promote 
free trade and economic integration to the benefit of its European member states. Iceland joined 
the EFTA in 1970 on the grounds that the treaty contained an explicit statement outlining that 
trade liberalization provisions would not apply to agriculture and fisheries (USDA Economic 
Research Service, n.d.). While the Icelandic coalition government favoured an association with 
the Common Market, full EC membership was ruled out as too risky for a small economy - in 
other words, the government was concerned that Iceland would be unable to compete in a fully 
liberalised EU market.  
4.3.3. Sweden and Finland 
With the intensified Soviet submarine activity in the 1980s, Swedish defence planners feared 
the possibility of Soviet maritime dominance in the Baltic and loss of access. The Baltic Sea 
was critical for Swedish neutrality. As a result, the prospect of Soviet maritime dominance in 
the Baltic was seen as potentially crippling for Sweden’s political, military and economic 
abilities including maritime access to its northern territories. As Hattendorf (p25) explains, one 
of Sweden’s key strategic areas lies in the far north of Sweden. Economically, Swedish Lapland 
is significant as it contains rich iron ore, low-grade uranium and other mineral deposits. The 
Kiruna iron mines - the largest underground iron ore mine in the world is situated in this area. 
However, tourism in Swedish Lapland also grew into an important economic activity with the 
number of overnight stays in hotels and log cabins doubling between 1971 and 1989 (Bäck 
 
39 In the late 1960s Norwegian oil explorations discovered vast reserves of oil and gas in North Sea. This led to a decision by 
the Norwegian parliament in June 1972 to establish the state-owned company 'Statoil' (Ryggvik 2015:9). Statoil (now Equinor) 
was established on the principle that the Norwegian state was to have 50 per cent ownership interest in every production license 
(norwegianpetroleum.no 2019). As such, Statoil has been one of the most important players in the Norwegian oil industry and 




1993:72). This also benefited the Swedish Sami who began to recognise the economic 
opportunties of tourism including the short-leasing of log cabins and selling handicraft to 
visitors. The port city of Luleå on the Gulf of Bothnia, which lies close to the Swedish-Finnish 
border, became an important gateway to the north as the eastern terminus of a railway that 
serves the mines and extends across the Scandinavian peninsula to the Norwegian port of 
Narvik. Military planners faced the challenge of how to secure the area of northern Sweden 
they considered that should a conflict occur with the Soviet Union in the north, then the area 
of Swedish Lapland was likely to be overrun by Soviet forces pushing westward or 
alternatively, by NATO forces on the eastern front.  
However, according to Oldberg (1985:54) nothing has influenced Soviet-Swedish relations in 
the 1980s as much as the Soviet submarine incidents in Swedish waters. He explains that during 
this time, the Soviets increased their surveillance of Swedish military operations in Baltic and 
Swedish waters utilising submarines. This resulted in a number of incidents40 involving 
submarines breaching Swedish waters, the most controversial being the Karlskrona incident - 
the stranding of an old ‘Whiskey-class’ Soviet U-137 submarine in in October 1981. The 
submarine was discovered inside a military area near Karlskrona, a major naval base in the 
south-western corner of the country. Swedish authorities detected radioactive emissions 
coming from its hull indicating that it was carrying nuclear weapons. Jonson (1990:2) outlines 
how the Swedish government issued formal protests to Moscow in 1981, again in 1983 after 
the completion of an official report investigating submarine incidents, and in 1984 after the 
Soviet airplane intrusion in the summer of 1984. Taken together these incidents served to sour 
Swedish-Soviet relations and increased Swedish-NATO covert collaborations on surveillance 
and military intelligence.  
The non-aligned Arctic states also faced challenges with respect to European integration. For 
Sweden the debate revolved around the extent that Sweden would engage in new economic 
markets and trade agreements with the EEC that could impact Swedish neutrality. When 
Sweden became a founding member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1960, this 
resulted in Sweden’s trade relations becoming more heavily weighted towards the west, with 
over 80% of Sweden's trade being conducted with the capitalist world of Western Europe and 
North America (Arter 1999:283). Throughout the 1970s, Finland sought to overcome Soviet 
 
40 A second incident, (The Harsfjärden event) occurred on 1st October 1983, a year after the episode at Karlskrona. 
This involved a Soviet submarine being spotted near the top-secret naval base at Muskö (Sadurska 1988) 
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pressure to renounce neutrality in favour of an alignment with the 'peace policy' of the Soviet 
bloc (Arter 1999:309). Yet because Finland continued to be hindered by the FCMA pact made 
with the Soviet Union, this essentially ruled out full Finnish membership of the EEC and the 
EFTA (Arter, p.326). Nonetheless, Finland had sought to increase its trade deals with Western 
countries. It signed the Finland-EFTA (FINEFTA) customs agreement in March 1961 after 
President Kekkonen's aide made secret concessions and convinced Khrushchev of the potential 
for obtaining Western technology through Finland (Arter 1999:327). As a result, Finland 
eventually became an associated member of the EFTA in January 1974, meaning that it 
obtained the economic benefits of being in the EFTA but without having a political voice. The 
Finish defended its decision to the Soviets on becoming an associate member of the EFTA on 
the basis that it was an economic necessity that would not impose on Finish neutrality and 
assured the Soviets that "there was to be no Finnish participation in the expansionist aims of a 
political-economic West European bloc" (Maude 1976:99-100). However, after 1975, Soviet 
pressure on Finland subsided when the Finnish proposal for the European Security Conference 
initiative (the Helsinki Process), was approved and ratified. This is because one of the 
significant outcomes of the Helsinki process resulted in the stabilization of superpower 
relations in Europe.  
In 1984, the Luxemburg Declaration was signed to enable broader cooperation between the 
EEC and the EFTA, smoothing the way towards economic and political integration of 
European states.  However, it was not until 1986 when Gorbachev's policy of glasnost was at 
its zenith that Finland was able to become a full member of the EFTA, demonstrating that 
Finland at all times during the late era of the Cold War had to remain wary of aggravating its 
Soviet neighbour through its foreign or economic policies, especially when dealing with the 
West.  
During the era of incipient multipolarity, Sweden and Finland sought to promote environmental 
politics particularly in the area of marine pollution in the Baltic Sea as a means of east-west 
cooperation. As Räsänen and Laakkonen (2007:230-231) highlight, Sweden took the first 
initiative and advocated an agreement between the states around the Baltic Sea to protect it 
from oil discharges from ships. However, meetings held in 1969 and 1970 in Visby, Sweden 
resulted only in a declaration that stressed the importance of joint efforts in matters relating to 
the environmental protection of the Baltic Sea. Although it was hoped that this would serve as 
the basis for a possible future agreement, the fact was that no international agreement was 
signed because the NATO countries in the region did not accept the government of the Eastern 
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Germany (the GDR) as a contracting party. In 1972, Sweden hosted the first UN Conference 
on the Human Environment however it failed partly for the same reason – the Soviet Union 
and the other Easter bloc countries boycotted the conference (p234). Räsänen and Laakkonen 
Sweden’s position on the GDR differed from Finland – Sweden had recognised West Germany 
(FRG) but not the Socialist East Germany (GDR). Finland in contrast had not recognised either 
state, which ironically enabled the Finnish government to be in a position to promote 
cooperation on environmental protection (p231). Räsänen and Laakkonen further clarify that 
Finland believed the Soviet Union would be inclined to look more favourably on initiatives 
taken by Finland since it was prepared to enter into “…any multilateral agreement, if [other] 
countries are also capable of entering into it”.  Fortunately, an agreement was made between 
the two Germanys on the 21st of December 1972 when the FRG finally recognised the GDR 
as an independent state. This effectively removed the biggest obstacle towards Baltic Sea 
environmental cooperation. It was much easier for Finland to then organise an expert meeting 
to be held in Helsinki between the 28th of May and the 2nd of June 1973 (p233). A second 
conference was held a year later in March 1974 that concluded the process leading to the 
establishment of the Baltic Marine Environmental Protection Commission (HELCOM). 
However, Räsänen and Laakkonen conclude that the monitoring stations used by HELCOM in 
the Baltic Sea were situated only in the central and western parts of the Gulf of Finland. Thus, 
the area for environmental studies was strictly limited by the Cold War and did not include 
north-eastern and sub-Arctic areas that had strategic importance during the Cold War. 
Nonetheless, the example of Baltic Sea cooperation demonstrates that during the 1970s Finland 
was developing a leadership role in the realm of environmental cooperation that would then be 
applied to the Arctic a decade later through its initiative The Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy (AEPS). Just as with Finland’s efforts to initiate the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were also political 
benefits to be gained through acting as a broker in environmental politics. For example, it 
allowed Finland to strengthen its policy of neutrality and its role as an international player. 
Furthermore, Finland hoped that environmental cooperation would later have a positive impact 
on the organisation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 
(Räsänen and Laakkonen 2007:231). As Fischer explains, “Offering Helsinki as a host to the 
talks and thereby making neutrality an indispensable condition for convening the security 
conference became the crown jewel in Finland’s strategy towards the Soviet Union in the years 
1969 to 1972” (2009:177).  
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During the era of incipient multipolarity, there were also significant political developments for 
the Saami indigenous peoples of Sweden and Finland. In 1977, the Swedish Parliament 
recognized the Indigenous status of the Sami41. According to the history of the Sámediggi (the 
Saami Parliament), in 1982, an official investigation called the Samerättsutredningen (the Sami 
Rights Investigation). was established. One of the suggestions to emerge from the Investigation 
was a call to establish a popularly elected Sami body in Sweden. Finland had already had a 
Sami institution since 1973, and Norway inaugurated their Sami Parliament in 1989 
(Sámetinget.se 2020). In 1993, The Sami Parliament in Sweden was inaugurated, consisting of 
31 members who are appointed through general elections every fourth year (ibid). In Finland, 
the status of the Sami was written into the constitution in 1995 and a year later they obtained 
self-government in the Sami homeland, in the spheres of language and culture that is managed 
by the Sami Parliament (Samediggi.fi 2020). 
4.4. An Overview to the Transition Stage 
The era of incipient multipolarity faded in the early 1980s as ideas for a new multipolar model 
of global politics waned in the face of political realities. A number of events suggested this 
shift was underway, including the shooting down of the Korean airliner in 1983 by the Soviets, 
US deployment of Pershing missiles to Europe, the election of President Ronald Reagan to the 
US presidency in 1981 and his Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), followed by ongoing 
disagreements surrounding the ratification of new arms reduction treaties (START); all of 
which led to increased tensions between the superpowers. At the same time, elements of the 
lose bipolar system remain with respect to NATO and the Arctic member states. At the 
beginning of the 1980s the US began to once more pay attention to the High North as NATO’s 
‘Northern Flank’ in response to greater Soviet submarine activity in the Barents and North 
Atlantic. This required the Scandinavian countries to ‘manage’ their relationship with the 
superpowers while maintaining the Northern Balance amidst heightened militarisation during 
the early to mid-1980s.  
It will be suggested here that the beginning of the transition stage of Arctic regional 
development began in 1985 when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was promoted to the role 
of Secretary General. While most scholars officially recognise Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech 
 





of 1987 as the beginning of efforts towards Arctic regionalisation, in this section I consider 
how two environmental catastrophes also impacted the creation of an Arctic environmental 
regime; namely the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986 - which although thousands of 
kilometres away, led to an sharp increase of radioactive pollution in the Arctic and hastened 
the development of Arctic environmental monitoring, and the 1989 Exxon-Valdez oil spill in 
Alaska which also created the impetus for strengthening inter-state cooperation on Arctic 
environmental issues.  
The transition years spanned from the final years of the Cold War to the collapse of the USSR 
in 1991 and beyond to the immediate post-Cold War years of the 1990s. I advocate that the 
transition stage of Arctic regional development culminated in 1996 with the establishment of 
the Arctic Council. Finland lead the way with the creation of the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991 and later this call was taken up by Canada leading to the 
establishment of the Arctic Council. Essentially, the transitional stage serves as a critical 
juncture not only for Arctic politics but for the global international system – a time where 
political events move increasingly quickly, and major change is underway. I explain this further 
in Chapter 5. However, in this chapter I will focus on the early transition era from 1985 up to 
1991. An important point to emphasise here is that during the early transition stage, the Arctic 
served as a focal point for changes that would impact the entire international order. This 
demonstrates that the Arctic has always been connected to the international system and yet can 
also serve as a litmus test for global political change.    
4.5 The Arctic Powers and during the early Transition Stage: 1985-1991 
4.5.1. Ronald Reagan: ‘The Regan Vision’ and Star Wars (SDI)   
The period of relative détente had already begun to wane as Ronald Reagan took office in 1981. 
During Reagan’s campaign for the presidency, he had accused Carter of weakness in allowing 
American defences to deteriorate and for failing to respond adequately to Soviet aggression. 
Reagan intended to rectify this situation by expanding American armaments programs as a part 
of his overall economic policy of 'Reaganomics' that called for widespread tax cuts, decreased 
social spending, increased military spending, and the deregulation of domestic markets. While 
advocating nuclear disarmament, the creation of a missile defence shield was arguably one of 
Reagan’s most cherished foreign policy goals. This project, known as the Strategic Defence 
Initiative (SDI) was proposed by Reagan in March of 1983, and was to serve as a defence 
system that would intercept any Soviets missiles that were launched at the United States –
160 
 
effectively cancelling out the Soviet Union’s painfully achieved strategic parity (Bothwell 
1998:96-97). The SDI was planned to operate in the European and NORAD air space over the 
Arctic and was labelled ‘Star Wars’ by opponents because of its science fiction-like 
assumptions that it would serve as a space-based nuclear shield (ibid). With access to new 
declassified documents, Downing (2018) has revealed that the Soviet leadership was alarmed 
at Regan’s defence programs and saw this as evidence of America’s aggressive intentions. US 
intelligence later revealed that during Abel Archer 83 - a NATO annual exercise held at Allied 
Command Europe in November 1983, the Soviets panicked and had put their entire nuclear 
arsenal consisting of 11,000 warheads on maximum combat alert. When Reagan was presented 
with evidence of the Soviet war-scare he was astonished and described the events as ‘really 
scary’. He found it both astonishing and inexplicable that anyone (including the Soviets) could 
believe that America would launch a first strike (Downing 2018:263).  However, this revelation 
did have a big influence on Reagan’s thinking on Russia and arguably convinced Regan that a 
nuclear Armageddon could only be prevented with total nuclear disarmament. This became 
Reagan’s new policy goal outlined through the so-called ‘Reagan Vision’ that advocated three 
key points that taken together would end the Cold War: 1) the global elimination of nuclear 
weapons through verifiable treaties, 2) A missile defence shield and 3) the sharing of this 
missile defence technology with Russia to prevent an imbalance of nuclear forces (The Reagan 
Vision 2016). 
It is uncertain if Regan ever intended to share nuclear missile shield technology with Russia, 
but the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of Soviet General Secretary in 1985 
and his subsequent policies of appeasement towards the US – this presented Reagan with the 
opportunity to pursue his vision of nuclear disarmament. History shows however, that when 
this extraordinary opportunity came to pass at Reykjavik in October 1986, Reagan - instead of 
signing an agreement there and then –favoured the continuation of his SDI program over the 
possibility of a nuclear-free world. Blanton and Savranskaya (2011:46) relate how after 
Reykjavik, Reagan presented two very different views of what happened at the summit. 
Depending on the audience, he either emphasised that he had refused to ‘back down’ on the 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), as he told himself in his diary and conservative crowds on 
the campaign trail, or alternatively, he sought to avoid blame for the failure by claiming that 
‘the significance of that meeting at Reykjavik is not that we didn’t sign agreements in the end: 
the significance is that we got as close as we did’.  
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The Reagan presidency did however witness the signing of an agreement for the exploration 
and drilling of oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska. In 1987, the 
Interior Department recommended that Congress allow drilling in the coastal plain of the Arctic 
refuge. The Department produced a report that stated the area represented the nation’s best 
chance to boost domestic oil production while at the same time cautioning that drilling could 
harm wildlife (Shogren, 2005). In March 1989, a Senate committee approved leasing in the 
coastal plain. However, less than 10 days later, an Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran aground and 
spilled more than 10 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound Alaska, devastating 
seals, birds and other wildlife and having a major impact on the local economy. The Exon 
Valdez disaster served as one of the greatest environmental disasters to have occurred in the 
United States, while on an international level it highlighted the need for stronger environmental 
policies and political oversight of oil corporations, in addition to developing international 
environmental cooperation amongst Arctic states. Roger Herrera, a former geologist with 
British Petroleum and the person who first discovered the oil reserves in ANWR in the 1960s, 
saw the event as "… a worst-case scenario which had come to fruition”. The Exxon Valdez oil 
spill was a pivotal moment in the effort to allow drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 
a battle that continues still (Shogren 2005). 
4.5.2 Mikhail Gorbachev, from Reykjavik to the Murmansk Initiative 
Immediately after Chernenko’s death in March 1985, the members of the Politburo 
unanimously voted for Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the party and the nation’s 
leader (Ascher 2008, p220). Gorbachev quickly won both international and domestic popularity 
and steered Soviet foreign policy in a new direction in the closing years of the Cold War era. 
One year into his leadership, Gorbachev was faced with a crisis of monumental proportions 
that would challenge his ‘new thinking’ on openness and party reform. This crisis was the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine, which occurred on the 26th of April 1986 when a reactor 
at the nuclear power plant exploded, releasing radioactive material twelve hundred meters into 
the atmosphere and spreading north-west across Europe - as far as the Arctic regions of 
Fennoscandia (see section 4.6.3 of this chapter). Although Soviet officials blamed the accident 
on a series of human errors made by the station operators, Josephson et al consider that the 
accident also revealed “the inadequacy of the entire safety philosophy of the Soviet nuclear 
industry”, given that the reactor design was also inherently unsafe (2013:259).  
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The Chernobyl Disaster may be the most famous anthropogenic environmental event in history, 
and one of the crucial factors that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Josephson et al 
2013:257-8).  As a Washington Post article published in 1987 reported, Chernobyl was a test 
case for Gorbachev’s policy of openness and party reform (glastnost) (Bohlen 1987). Yet when 
Chernobyl occurred, Gorbachev’s glastnost policy was still in its infancy and was not able to 
meet the initial challenge of overcoming decades of Soviet censorship in order to pursue an 
effective public relations campaign – one that disclosed details to the public but at the same 
time which sought to reassure civilians that the state was working to contain the disaster 
(Daniloff 2004:122). Even though word of Chernobyl had reached political, military and 
scientific officials in Moscow within a few hours, both Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze were kept in the dark regarding the seriousness of the crisis. In an article written 
for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists titled ‘Chernobyl 25 years later, lessons learnt’, Gorbachev 
wrote that “only on the following day, April 27th did we learn that an explosion had taken place 
at the nuclear power station” (Gorbachev 2011:77). 
However, it would take until the 14th of May before Gorbachev would break his eighteen-day 
silence and address the nation to discuss Chernobyl in a televised speech that lasted twenty-
five minutes. While Gorbachev defended Soviet reactions by stating that  “as soon as we 
received reliable initial information it was made available to Soviet people and sent through 
diplomatic channels to governments of foreign countries” (Walker 1986:1), at the same time 
he did not downplay the damage resulting from the accident and disclosed that nine people had 
died (seven from radiation) as of that time (Daniloff 2004:128). In the same statement, 
Gorbachev tried to regain some lost credibility by announced a further extension of the Soviet 
unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. Gorbachev proposed this to last until the 6th 
August of 1986 – the anniversary of the US bombing of Hiroshima. He then repeated his call 
for an instant summit between himself and US President Ronald Reagan to discuss an 
international test ban treaty (Walker 1986:1).  
When Gorbachev proposed the meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986 it was at short notice and 
the expectations for the summit were low (The Regan Vision 2016). However, the talks between 
Reagan and Gorbachev proceeded quickly with Gorbachev agreeing that human rights issues 
were a legitimate topic of discussion - something which no other Soviet leader had ever 
admitted. As mentioned previously, what was even more significant about the conference at 
Reykjavik was that the leaders discussed - for the first time in history - the real possibility of 
eliminating nuclear weapons forever (ibid). However, from Gorbachev’s perspective, this 
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opportunity was scuttled by Reagan, who, by prioritising the SDI, Reagan had reneged on a 
series of broad arms control agreements previously reached by the two leaders. Gorbachev told 
Reagan that they “were missing a historic chance” to implement Moscow’s radical and 
concessionary proposal towards nuclear arms reduction (Taubman 1986). As a part of this 
proposal, Gorbachev had said Moscow’s expectation was that he and Reagan could issue 
binding instructions to their negotiators to prepare agreements to reduce strategic nuclear 
weapons by 50per cent, to eliminate intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and to deal with 
defensive systems by extending the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty for 10 years (ibid). Regan’s 
stubborn refusal to end the SDI program meant that the Reykjavik talks ended in stalemate and 
failure.   
Fortunately, Reykjavik did not deter Gorbachev in his efforts to improve US-Soviet relations 
and reduce the nuclear threat. In October 1987, during a visit to the Kola Peninsula, Mikhail 
Gorbachev launched a series of policy initiatives which ultimately came to mark the beginning 
of the end of the Cold War and served as a major turning point in Soviet Arctic policies (Åtland 
2008:289-290).In what became known as the ‘Murmansk Speech’, Gorbachev discussed five 
proposals: a nuclear free zone in northern Europe, a reduction of naval activities in northern 
waters, cooperation in the fields of Arctic exploration, scientific exploration and environmental 
protection (Horensma 1991:175). These wide arrays of policies were framed as an integral part 
of perestroika – Gorbachev’s policy of restructuring and Soviet reform and launched as an 
invitation for disarmament in the Arctic (Åtland 2008, p289). Gorbachev proposed to do this 
by inviting Arctic states to engage in dialogue to come up with solutions towards demilitarizing 
the north: 
Therefore, while in Murmansk, and standing on the threshold of the Arctic and the North Atlantic, I would 
like to invite, first of all, the countries of the region to a discussion on the burning security issues … that 
have accumulated in the area… The Soviet Union is in favour of a radical lowering of the level of military 
confrontation in the region. Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North 
Pole be a pole of peace. We suggest that all interested states start talks on the limitation and scaling down 
of military activity in the North as a whole, in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. What, 
specifically, do we mean? Firstly, a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. If such a decision were adopted, 
the Soviet Union, as has already been declared, would be prepared to act as a guarantor. It would depend 
on the participating countries how to formalize this guarantee: by multilateral or bilateral agreements, 
governmental statements or in some other way (Gorbachev 1987).  
During this era of incipient multipolarity, we can witness a rare occasion when the USSR 
demonstrates a regional leadership capacity, under a proactive, revisionist foreign policy. 
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012:219) explain that “a proactive orientation is one in which 
the functions of the regional power will be directed at changes that are diffuse and long-term 
164 
 
oriented. This means that a proactive state will take a broad and coherent approach to resolving 
issues or threats and are driven towards change and creating new institutional and political 
structures. This implies a perspective on security that moves beyond responding to specific 
threats in an immediate or short-sighted fashion.  
In his Murmansk speech, Gorbachev specifically called for multilateral discussions on 
disarmament in the North. But the initial Western response to the speech (except for the Fins 
who responded positively the next day) was at best cautious, with the strongest critic being the 
United States, particularly on military security issues (Axeworthy and Dean 2013:15-16).  For 
instance, a Washington spokesperson for the State Department said that the security agenda 
was “already extraordinary broad” and that there was little value in discussing specific Arctic 
applications of détente principles” (ibid). Yet disarmament represented only one of five 
proposals that Gorbachev outlined in his Murmansk speech and the non-strategic aspects of 
security cooperation received a more positive response. Was Gorbachev compelled to propose 
demilitarization in the Arctic out of concern for Arctic communities or as a strategic move to 
achieve broader security and foreign policy objectives? A convincing argument is made by 
William Wohlforth (2000:328) who argues that changes in Soviet foreign policy were preceded 
by a decline in the Soviet economy. For the first three decades of the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union to have been materially competitive with the US: “capable of fielding a first-class 
military force, sustaining a complex alliance system, and keeping the Western alliance mainly 
on the defensive” (p.327). However, a decline in relative economic power forced the Soviet 
leadership to change their ideas. In the 1980s after a decade of stagnation and reform failures, 
the Soviet Union was much worse off than the West realised. As the Soviets began to steadily 
lose their technological, military and systemic competitiveness, “more and more members of 
the Soviet ruling echelons began seriously to question the veracity and usefulness of their 
traditional ideas” (Wohlforth, 2000:329). Given prolonged relative decline: 
Moscow faced three grand-strategic choices: ‘lash out’ to reverse decline by preventative war, conquest or 
intimidation: ‘hold fast’ to maintain the status quo: or ‘appease and retrench’, to allow for the revitalization 
of domestic institutions necessary to reverse decline. Standard realist theories state that the odds will favour 
appeasement and retrenchment. Hegemonic theory predicts that the decline of a clearly weaker challenger 
will remove the problem of hegemonic struggle from world politics unless and until it reverses decline or 
a new challenger appears. Preventative war by a rational challenger that knows it is substantially weaker is 
not an option – especially in a world with nuclear weapons (Wohlforth, 2000:328). 
The Soviet Union’s chosen foreign policy was that of appeasement and retrenchment. 
Gorbachev therefore sought to convince the US and its allies through assurances that the Soviet 
Union desired to peacefully co-exist with the West. This was to be achieved through increasing 
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diplomatic connections and inter-governmental cooperation in specific areas, one of which 
included environmental cooperation within the Arctic region. Another method in which the 
Soviet Union appeased its foreign competitors was through the signing of strategic and nuclear 
arms reduction treaties. This signified the Soviet Union’s willingness to prevent another arms 
race and alleviate some of the economic strain it was experiencing from the lengthy Cold War 
militarization and competition with the United States. By appeasing the United States and the 
Western allies, the Soviet Union sought to turn its attention towards rebuilding and reforming 
the Soviet command economy. Gorbachev’s pragmatic policy response of reducing defence 
spending was based on economic necessity - as Gorbachev became aware of the dire economic 
and political crisis his country was facing, it was vital to reduce military spending which could 
only be done safely by ensuring greater levels of trust and a more benign international 
environment. However, appeasement and retrenchment can also be seen as a long-term pro-
active regional strategy in the Arctic. At Murmansk, Gorbachev created the opportunity for 
greater international cooperation on Arctic environmental issues and the emergence of a 
regional security agenda. This was enthusiastically taken up by the small Arctic states which 
would seek to further develop Arctic regionalism in the post-Cold War era.  
However, domestic policy reform and retrenchment proved to be far more difficult. By the 
early 1980s, Soviet officials had launched a hushed program of research into the origin of the 
crises facing Russian indigenous peoples. In 1988, a silence-shattering article called "The Big 
Problems of the Small Peoples" published in the official journal of the CPSU raised public 
awareness. Meanwhile, indigenous leaders began to mobilize politically and engage in debates 
on what must be done. The Russian Association of the Peoples of the North (RAIPON)42 was 
created for this purpose and in March 1990, the first congress of native northern peoples 
convened at the Kremlin. Four challenges that dominated discussions amongst political leaders 
of Northern peoples and academics in the final years of the Soviet Union  included 1) revival 
of the Leninist policies of the Committee of the North which was to involve significant 
devolution of political power by the Soviet state to Northern dominated local governments in 
native regions 2) adoption of Western institutions such as Indian reservations and nature 
preserves in which traditional Northern occupations were expected to thrive 3) moral and legal 
appeals for redress for past and ongoing suppression of Northern cultures and despoliation of 
 
42 RAIPON is the Russian umbrella organization which organizes 35 regional and ethnic organizations of indigenous peoples 
and represents 41 groups of Indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East. The total number of people is more than 
270 thousand and they live in 60 % of the whole territory of the Russian Federation from Murmansk to Kamchatka. 
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traditional lands and resources by more powerful non-Northern groups and states and 4) the 
adoption of Western-style free markets (Bartels and Bartels 2006:273). Sadly, the Northerners 
political objectives were subverted by the overwhelming political and economic problems the 
Soviet Union was facing in the 1980s. This crisis culminated in Gorbachev resigning as 
President in December 1991, signifying the end of the Soviet Union.  
4.6 The Small and Medium Arctic States  
4.6.1 Canada in the late 1980s and 1990s – Environmentalism, protecting Canadian 
sovereignty in the NWP, and the decision to divide the Northwest Territories 
By the time that Brian Mulroney became Prime Minister (1984-1993) of the new conservative 
government, a re-escalation of Cold War tensions had occurred perpetuated by a series of 
incidents including; the shooting down of the Korean Airlines plane by the Soviet Air Force in 
September 1983, the American support for the Mujahideen which turned the tide of Soviet 
occupation in Afghanistan; and President Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ project, which threatened to 
undermine the foundation of the 'balance of terror' between the two superpowers (Nossal 2003).  
In 1987, the Mulroney government released a new White paper on Defence, titled Challenge 
and Commitment. As Lackenbaur and Lajeunesse (2014:15) explain, the 1987 white paper 
outlined how the deteriorating superpower relations of the mid-1980s ultimately led to Canada 
reassessing its security and defence policy. As such, the paper prioritized Canada’s defence 
objectives as 1) strategic deterrence, 2) conventional defence, 3) sovereignty, 4) peacekeeping 
and 5) arms control. To meet these new objectives, the paper called for major military 
procurement and an expansion of the Canadian forces. The Arctic became the focus of this 
shift with the Canadian Arctic Archipelago being identified as a potential transit route for 
Soviet submarines. At the same time, it was also recognised that Canada lacked the capability 
to monitor the subsurface Arctic (ibid). As a result, a key issue in this new defence policy was 
the decision to invest in nuclear propelled submarines (SNNs). Undoubtedly Canada’s decision 
was both strategic and political as diesel-electric powered submarines were unable to surface 
through frozen, icy northern waters. Since Canada remained concerned about access through 
the North-west passage, the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines was considered to be a 
way to protect Canadian Arctic sovereignty and hedge against the uncertainty surrounding the 
future of the Canadian Arctic.  
Another policy proposal raised in the White paper was the replacement of the aging DEW line 
with a series of minimally manned long-range radar stations and automated short-range radar 
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posts to fill in radar coverage gaps along the 70th parallel (Lackenbaur and Lajeunesse 
2014:17). Although referred to as the North American Air Defence Modernization Program 
(NAADMP), this was essentially a NORAD program.  
Canada contributed 40 per cent of the construction and maintenance costs. Like other 
government initiatives of the era, even this co-operative endeavour was cast in terms that 
emphasized “the importance of fully exercising sovereignty in our north”. Minister of National 
Defence Erik Nielsen explained to the House of Commons that  
the DEW Line has served Canada well, but Canadians do not control it…… The North 
Warning System will be a Canadian-controlled system-operated, maintained and manned 
by Canadians. Sovereignty in our north will be strengthened and assured for the future. 
 
In August 1985, the westerly crossing of the Northwest Passage by the U.S. Coast Guard 
icebreaker Polar Sea led to the re-emergence of the dispute over the legal status of the 
waters of Canada’s Arctic Archipelago (Pharand 2007:4). Canada informed the United 
States that it considered the waters of the Archipelago, including those of the Northwest 
Passage, as historic internal waters and that prior request for authorization was necessary. 
However, the United States contended that the Northwest Passage was an international 
strait and refused to make such a request. In the end, the two countries agreed that the 
crossing would take place without prejudice to their respective legal positions (ibid). 
Nonetheless, the Polar Sea crossing prompted a diplomatic push towards a new bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Canada on the Arctic. In 1988, Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney and US President Ronald Reagan signed the Arctic Co-operation Agreement. In the 
agreement it is stated that “The Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by 
U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the 
consent of the Government of Canada” (Government of Canada 2014). While the agreement 
allows the US Coast Guard to use the passage after notifying Ottawa, at the same time Canada 
cannot deny the Americans access (Mandel-Campbell 2004). Another point of interest here is 
that President Ronald Regan allegedly refused to include the US Navy in any agreement 
regulating Arctic waters (ibid). 
However, after Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the international security environment 
altered, creating new opportunities for Canada in its role as an intermediary between the 
superpowers. Canada took this chance to develop new mechanisms for inter-state cooperation 
in the Arctic. During a speech in Leningrad in 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney took the 
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initiative to suggest that the “time had come to create a multilateral body that would bring 
together the Arctic states to improve cooperation between former enemies” (Griffiths et al, 
2011). However, the two superpowers were unwilling to support the creation of an Arctic 
intergovernmental council at that time, so Canada instead joined forces with Finland to create 
the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). Essentially, the AEPS was an agreement 
to examine the emerging circumpolar environmental problems discovered by scientists. 
Although it was less ambitious than the plans for the council, Canadian officials viewed it as 
offering the best means for improving cooperation at that time (Griffiths et al, 2011). 
By 1987, the Canadian federal government was also engaged in the largest land claim 
agreement with the Inuit people in an unprecedented new chapter in the history of Canadian 
indigenous land claims settlements. From 1982 to 1993,43 the Inuit peoples of eastern Canada 
had lobbied and engaged in lengthy negotiation processes with the Canadian government on 
dividing the Northwest Territories in order to create a new political territory in the north-eastern 
Canadian Arctic governed by the Inuit people. The Tungavik Federation of Nunavut 
represented the Inuit people in the negotiations with the Canadian government. The process 
culminated in the signing of the 1987 Iqaluit Agreement which outlined the location for the 
territorial boundary, constitutional goals and a method for implementing the territorial division 
(Bonesteel 2006:107). The boundary line identified in the Iqaluit Agreement was amended in 
1991, and then accepted by the majority of northerners through a 1992 referendum. The 
Territory of Nunavut and the Government of Nunavut were established in 1999 (ibid). 
 
4.6.2. Greenland, Iceland and Norway from the late 1980’ to early 1990s – Radar 
modernization at Thule, concerns over violation of the ABM Treaty 
In the transition era, the BMEWS site at Thule continued to be a core issue of contention 
between the superpowers, particularly over charges proclaiming that the upgraded BMEWS 
site was not a modification but a new system that violated the 1972 ABM Treaty. Early in 1987, 
a US proposal to develop a new Large Phased-Array Radar (LPAR) at Thule, Greenland 
became a major issue in Danish security policy debate (Fischer 1993:7). 
 
43 Bonesteel (2006:107) explains that in 1982, the Constitutional Alliance group was created to develop a process for dividing 
the Northwest Territories. The Alliance was mandated to select the location of the boundary between the eastern and western 
Arctic territories, and to negotiate this boundary with the federal government. Through the Alliance, the Nunavut Constitutional 
Forum and the Western Constitutional Forum were created to manage issues affected by territorial division, including 
developing proposals for structures of government on each side of the boundary. 
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The modernization of Thule radar emerged from a controversial US-Soviet arms control 
disputes during the 1980s as to whether the construction of new or modernizing existing radars 
violated the ABM treaty. Zimmerman (1987:9) explains that the AMB Treaty placed 
constraints on early warning radars to prevent their use as a part of an AMB system. As such 
the Treaty required both sides to locate new early warning radars along the periphery of its 
national territory and for radars to be pointed outward.  
In the late 1980s the US sought to modernize two radar stations overseas: Thule, Greenland 
and Flyingsdales, UK. While the US defied the wording of the treaty since these radar stations 
were not situated on the US homeland, the Soviet Union arguably violated the Treaty even 
more so owing to its intention of constructing a new radar site at Krasnoyarsk, located hundreds 
of kilometres south of the southern border of the Soviet Union with a radar facing inwards and 
northward towards Siberia and the Arctic Ocean (Zimmerman 1987:9).  The political debate in 
Denmark over the Thule radar station resulted in a resolution adopted by a broad majority in 
the Danish Parliament, stressing that the radar was not be used in a future SDI or ABM system 
(Fischer 1993:7). Although that US officials justified the modernization of the Thule radar on 
the basis that it didn’t violate the spirit of the 1972 ABM Treaty, Fischer outlines nonetheless 
argues that “several factors lead to the conclusion that the new radar did constitute a violation 
of the letter of the ABM Treaty” (p18). Zimmerman (1987: 10) however, argues more strongly 
that the new radars at Thule and Flyingsdales were not a mere ‘modernizations’ of the old 
radars but instead incorporated entirely new technologies (LPARs) and wholly different 
operating principles, a fact he proclaims was “not missed by the AMB Treaty which clearly 
treats them differently from other types of radars”. 
While the US was focused on upgrading the Thule radar in the late 1980s, the defence situation 
in Iceland was somewhat different as Icelandic radars had already taken place by the mid-1980s 
as previously discussed in section 4.3.2. This was perhaps fortunate for the US, as Icelandic 
support for the US presence at Keflavík AB declined in the late 1980s. Gunnarsson 1990:147) 
sheds light as to why this was the case by referring to an opinion poll published in 1987 
following the Icelandic general election. The poll stated that 55 percent of the population 
supported the US occupation of Keflavík air base while 45 percent were opposed to it 
(Gunnarsson 1990:147). This contrasts with an earlier 1983 poll where there were higher levels 
of support for the base (64 percent in support and 36 percent opposed). Gunnarsson considers 
that the change in opinion might have been due to friction in US-Icelandic relations during the 
late 1980s over transatlantic transport for the base and attempts by the US government to ban 
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whaling. However, there was also less internal political disagreement and debate over the 
basing issue despite leftist parties calling for the abrogation of the Defence Agreement on the 
basis that the international security situation had changed. Gunnarsson nonetheless concludes 
that the arguments of the traditional opponents to the base were not met with much public 
interest which signals that the Keflavík base became less controversial in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  
At the same time, Ingimundarson (2007:11) explains that the Icelandic government did not 
want to do anything to weaken the defence relationship with the United States and NATO, 
despite the changing international security situation and Iceland’s growing connection to 
Europe. Iceland became more focused on arms control and disarmament issues in the late 1980s 
during the Regan-Gorbachev era of détente. In an address given to the Althing in March 1990, 
the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Minister Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson stated that arms control 
at sea was more important than any other area of arms control owing to Iceland’s geostrategic 
location.   
The core of our interests in the sphere of disarmament is clearly to promote military stability and lower 
levels of armaments in northern waters and to reduce the danger of nuclear accidents and the damaging 
consequences they can have for marine biology (Gunnarsson 1990:147).  
Iceland was also forging new European linkages through Iceland’s associate membership in 
the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992 that also included a security dimension.  
Meanwhile, the United States decided to scale down its military presence, without notifying 
the Icelandic government, by reducing the numbers of fighter jets stationed at Keflavík from 
eighteen to twelve (Ingimundarson 2005:68). Although the United States did not express any 
intent of withdrawal from Keflavík following the end of the Cold War, in 1993-1994, the US 
government wanted to remove the rest of the F-15 fighter jets from Keflavík. Ingimundarson 
(2007:11) explains how in order  
To reduce operating costs, it sought to remove the F-15 fighter jets and associated search-and-rescue, radar, 
and support units. Faced with stiff Icelandic opposition and an implicit threat to abrogate the Defense 
Agreement, the two sides agreed, in 1994 and again in 1996, on the retention of at least four fighters. This 
was meant to prevent the demilitarization of Iceland, which has only a small number of police special 
forces. Nonetheless, the considerable reduction in U.S. military activity was bound to affect the bilateral 
‘security community’.  
In 1996, a compromise between the US Clinton Administration and the Icelandic government 
was reached by means of an understanding known as the ‘Agreed Minute’. The agreement, 
which was to last for five years, allowed for a minimal force to remain at Keflavík with a 
maximum of six aircraft serving on a rotational basis (Jóhannesson 2004:128).  Ingimundarson 
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(2007:11) observes that the scaling down of Keflavík base in the 1990s also had an impact on 
the Icelandic economy. For example, trade with the United States steadily decreased in volume 
from about 25 percent of Iceland’s total trade in the mid-1980s to about 9 percent in 2005. 
Another theme that is evident in Greenlandic political and economic development during the 
transition era is the discoveries of new mineral deposits and issues surrounding natural resource 
exploitation. As Høyem (1988:12) explains, one of Greenland's few possibilities of becoming 
economically independent from Denmark is the exploitation of raw materials found on the 
island. However, it is also one of Denmark's few possibilities of economic reimbursement for 
supporting Greenland for decades. Thus, Greenland’s natural resources and the exploitation of 
them raise further issues on Greenlandic sovereignty, ownership over the resources in addition 
to control over foreign investment and industrial development. For example, in early November 
1990 Danish newspapers carried reports of the discovery of what was described as 'the world's 
largest gold deposit near Kap Edvard Holm in the Kangerdlugssuaq Fjord area, East Greenland 
(Sinding and Poole 1991:139). The estimated value of the new deposit was reported as being 
in the order of DK700 billion (US$130 billion) (ibid). 
With regards to indigenous peoples and environmental developments in Greenland, the 
creation of AEPS in 1991 led to a new joint initiative by the Greenland Home Rule Government 
and Denmark to create an Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS). By strengthening their 
participation within the organizational setting of AEPS, indigenous northern peoples 
established their right to become permanent participants within international Arctic fora. 
Denmark was prepared to provide the support for the establishment of a small secretariat in 
Copenhagen with the aim of increasing the participation and contribution of indigenous peoples 
in the conservation and protection of the Arctic (Tennberg 2000, Rothwell 1996:97). During a 
seminar held in Iceland in 1994, two key issues were discussed; first that Arctic indigenous 
peoples groups would become permanent observers to AEPS in addition to considering ways 
that indigenous knowledge could be applied within the AEPS working groups Rothwell 
1996:97).  
During the transition years, Iceland strengthened its economic ties to the EC especially after 
the EFTA countries reached an agreement on free trade in fish products in 1989. As a member 
of the EFTA since 1970, a key priority for Iceland was to be able to obtain free trade in fish 
products within the European Economic Area (EEA) without having to grant the EC access to 
its fishing grounds (Gunnarsson 1990:150). It achieved this goal in 1992 when together with 
Lichtenstein and Norway, Iceland signed an agreement to enter the European Single 
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Market/EEA thus becoming institutionally linked to the EU following the Maastricht Treaty. 
The agreement came into effect two years later in 1994. Iceland also benefited from its linkages 
with the EU with respect to environmental policy. Although environmental policy has 
historically not been a high priority on Iceland’s political agenda, this began to change when 
in 1990, the Ministry for Environment and Natural Resources was established (Siftung 2019). 
Iceland’s national environmental strategy titled Towards Sustainable Development was 
published in 1993, followed by the National Sustainable Development Action Plan in 1997 
(ibid). This also benefitted the development of Arctic environmental policies as outlined in the 
2001 OECD Environmental-Performance Review of Iceland44,  
Iceland developed its environmental policy at a fairly late stage but made significant progress in the 1990s, 
in particular by transposing many EU directives into its legal system and giving legal status to its 
international commitments. It has ratified and implemented many international agreements and it hosts the 
secretariats of two working groups under the Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (OECD 2001:2). 
The Secretariats for the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) 45 and the Protection 
of the Marine Environment in the Arctic (PAME)46 working groups – established respectively 
in 1992 and 1993 under the AEPS - are both located in Akuryeri, Iceland. The CAFF working 
group serves as a forum in which scientists, indigenous peoples and conservation activists can 
exchange data and information relating to shared flora and fauna species and habitats (Hasanat 
2011:135), while PAME was tasked during a 1996 ministerial meeting in Inuvik with 
developing a regional program of action for the protection of the Arctic marine environment 
from land-based activities and guidelines for offshore petroleum activities (p.133).  
While public opinion in Norway remained consistent in its upport of NATO and Norway’s 
membership of the alliance, as Riste (2004:303) points out there were also signs of Cold War 
weariness. When President Ronald Reagan's 'Star Wars' SDI project came to dominate the 
agenda during the mid-1980s, Norway muted its public crticism of the program in order not to 
disturb the US-Norwegian security relationship (p305). However, with the return of the 
Norwegian Labour Party to power in 1986, Norway significantly revised its stance towards 
 
44 The Environmental Performance Review (EPR) programme was launched in 1992 after being approved at the OECD 
Ministerial meeting in June 1991and the London-G7 economic summit in July 1991. The programme serves as a mechanism 
to ensure that OECD governments uphold their environmental promises (OECD.org 2019). The first OECD review of 
Iceland was published in 1993. The second OECD review, published in 2001 is referenced here 
45 Although CAFF was established as a working group in 1992 it was formally recognised by the Nuuk Declaration on 
Environment and Development in the Arctic in 1993 
46 PAME was established in 1993 during an AEPS ministerial meeting in Nuuk. In 1998, PAME was mandated by the 
ministerial meeting in Iqaluit to review shipping activities in the Arctic with the aim of working on an international code of 
safety for ships operating in polar waters (Polar Code) under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).   
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accomodating US' military policies. At a NATO defence meeting, Norway joined Denmark in 
refusing to sign a communique expressing general support for US postures regarding defence 
and space weapons. It was the first time Norway had ever done so, yet the Americans reacted 
sharply. They withdrew from the joint US-Norwegian study group on security and defence 
affairs that had served for over a decade to heighten American awareness of the problems in 
the Northern Flank. The US also withdrew an offer of financing for an upgrade of Norways 
anti-aircraft defence. The crisis blew over, but relations remained cool after the Labour 
government came to power in 1986 as the new government decided to sharpen the ban against 
visiting allied ships carrying nuclear weapons (Njølstad 2004:305). Part of the reason for this 
stance by Labour was concerning the US naval strategy. As Børresen (2011:105) explains, in 
the 1970s and 1980s the US had ‘rediscovered’ NATO’s northern flank due to increasing 
Soviet submarine activity in the Norwegian and Barents Seas as part of its maritime strategy 
that sought to deny the West access to the Norwegian and Barents Seas (the so-called ‘Bastion 
defence’ strategy). NATO percieved that to counter the Soviets required offensive strategies to 
secure the maritime defensive zone but could also have potentially involved a ground invasion 
of northern Norway.  As such, this presented a new danger for Norway.  
As Børresen (2011:107) outlines, the considerable allied military presence in Norway in the 
1980s averaged around ten thousand personnel in training and over fifteen thousand involved 
in exercises per year, in addition to a large number of ships and aircraft. When the United States 
sought Norway to revise its no-base policy and construct new forward bases to accommodate 
NATO troops, Norway stuck to its former position and this was once more underlined by then 
deputy Minister of Defence Johan Holst in 1983 
As the no-base policy became part of the foreign policy doctrine of Norway, it could be chaged only at the 
cost of major domestic controversy and internatioanl repercussions even if the forces involved were to be 
primarily ground troops. Instead Norway chose to rely on the transfer of allied military power in the event 
of an emergency. The credibility of the alllied commitment to Norway was not associated with the presence 
of a given level of allied troops. Hence, reassuurance inheres in the capacity of allies to reinforce Norway 
during a crisis rather than in the actuality of a presence of force during peacetime. It should be noted, 
however that Norwegian security draws on the presence of American troops in Germany and Iceland (Holst 
1983 cited in Duke 1989:219).  
When Johan Holst was appointed defence minister in 1986, he feared that the US naval strategy 
could result in Soviet pressure on Norway and lead to an inadvertent escalation to nuclear war 
(p99,105). Holst decided to reinstate the 1975 ‘Bratelli doctrine’ that had been orignally 
proposed by former prime minister Trygve Bratteli. The doctrine declared an extension of 
Norway’s nuclear policy to cover naval vessels on short-term visits to Norwegian ports 
(Knudsen 1992:58). It essentially stated that the Norwegians would expect foreign warships to 
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not carry nuclear weapons on board, taking into account that under international law, warships 
cannot be inspected by foreign states. However as Børresen summarises, “The American 
reaction was immediate and strong, and Holst had to back down and accept a compromise 
whereby reference to the doctrine was only indirect” (Børresen 2011:103). 
 
A shipping incident in 1987 also served to highlight Norway’s revised stance in its relations 
with the US. Riste (2004:305) outlines how the dispute emerged over exports to the Soviet 
ship-building industry by the Norwegian firm Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk and the Japanese 
Toshiba Company. The equipment being exported had a potential military use – specifically 
the equipment was designed to have a dampening effect on propeller noise emerging from 
submarines. Riste continues by explaining that since the beginning of the Cold War, the 
Americans had been pushing for strict export controls of strategic material. While Norway and 
other European states generally followed the American lead on the issue - albeit with 
reluctance, the Reagan conservative administration was determined to draw a hardline, 
demanding concessions from Norway for the incident. Norway's emboldened response 
involved warning the US against giving the public the impression that the superpower was 
resorting to bullying tactics towards a small ally instead of seeking accommodation based on 
common interests (ibid). 
In the years following the Chernobyl accident, Norway significantly increased the number of 
stations monitoring radioactivity. The stations generate readings every three hours indicating 
the type and quality of the radiation. The first two were estabished in 1988 in the northernmost 
provinces of Tromsø and Finnmark. A further nine stations were opened in January 1992 in the 
same area to bring the number of stations to a total of 19 across mainland Norway, plus one at 
Ny Aalesund on Svalbard (newscientist.com 1992). Norwegian fears of an ‘Arctic Chernobyl’ 
stemmed mostly from the possibility of a marine disaster. Anxieties increased after 
unconfirmed reports emerged of a leaking nuclear reactor from the Soviet submarine 
Komsomolets, which caught fire and sank on the 7th of April 1989 off Bear Island, which lies 
between Svalbard and the mainland (ibid)47. It is perhaps no surprise that taken together these 
incidents made Norway increasingly aware of monitoring pollution levels from both 
 
47 The Komsomolets submarine caught fire on 7 April 1989 due to a short circuit in the ship’s engine room. Only four people 
were initially killed from fire and smoke inhalation, as the vessel was able to surface for around five hours. However. A total 




radioactive and other sources. From 1989-1991, Norway hosted consultations to outline 
possible content and structure of an Arctic monitoring programme. This would eventually 
become the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) - one of the founding 
working groups established as part of the AEPS in 1991 and later incorporated into the AC 
(Stone 2016). An important meeting took place in Oslo in November 1990, chaired by Lars 
Otto Reiersen, to determine the mandate of the future monitoring programme. Early 
environmental reports were also prepared during this formative time that prioritised monitoring 
of the following components; Acidification, Heavy Metals, Underwater Noise, Oil, 
Organochlorines, and radioactivity (ibid). The permanent secretariat of AMAP is based in Oslo, 
Norway.  
  
4.6.3. Sweden and Finland 
With respect to defence, Sweden pursued the general Western trend of decreased military 
expenditures in the 1980s and 1990s. As Tornburg (1994:60) outlines, in the 1980s, the 
Swedish defence doctrine started to change to a more flexible response capable of meeting 
different forms of aggression ranging from low-level threats and surprise attacks to a large-
scale invasion. Although pressure from the Swedish right opposed this trend, Swedish defence 
spending saw a decline of 4% between 1980 and 1988. During this time, the Swedish Navy 
adapted to having a reduced number of ships but utilising its technological advantage in order 
to perform as conditions demanded in the Baltic (Tornburg p54-55).  
As mentioned previously in section 4.3.3., Swedish-Soviet relations had reached a low point 
in the early 1980s owing to Soviet submarine incidents in Swedish waters. When Mikhail 
Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he sought to improve relations with Sweden through a 
process of normalization. As Jonson (1990:5) outlines, there were two key dimensions to this 
approach. The first issue concerned the direction and implementation of Swedish neutrality 
policy. While the Soviets were more inclined under Gorbachev to appreciate Swedish neutrality 
there also appeared some criticism of the strong Swedish defence force and its defence 
cooperation with the west. A key objective for the Soviets in its relations with Sweden was that 
they wanted Sweden to pursue a more ‘active’ foreign policy that emphasised global 
disarmament. The Soviets also encouraged Sweden to endorse Palme’s proposal for a Nordic 
nuclear weapons free zone which he suggested during a conference held in Copenhagen in 
1985. In 1988, Soviet parliamentarians were sent to Sweden hoping to discuss developments 
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in Northern Europe and Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech, however the Swedes avoided the issue 
by insisting that such discussions were the domain of the Swedish government (p.9).   
The second area of concern for the Soviets regarded trade issues; Sweden was becoming 
increasingly under pressure by the US to ban Western hi-tech exports to the USSR.  The 
tougher restrictions on Western imports to the USSR had been implemented in the early 1980s 
by the Reagan Administration. By 1985, several Swedish companies had been given an 
ultimatum by the US to tighten control over the export of products with US components. Those 
who failed to do so were blacklisted and barred from importing products from the US (p7). 
Trade with Sweden was especially important for the Soviet Union as it was the Soviet’s only 
real ‘window to the West’. At the time, the Soviets issued cautionary messages expecting 
Sweden to continue trade relations regardless of the Western embargo. However, it had the 
opposite effect; in the end Sweden conformed to the tougher US controls on high technology 
exports to the USSR and trade lessened (ibid).  
Finnish-Soviet relations also reflected the changing economic and geopolitical environment of 
the late 1980s. Although Sutela (1992) outlines how Finland was given a high priority in the 
USSR’s foreign trade with the West, the Soviet share of Finnish exports declined rapidly in the 
latter years of the 1980s. Traditionally, trade with the USSR represented about 15 percent of 
Finland’s total exports. This percentage expanded with the rise in energy prices in the 1970s 
and peaked at about 26 per cent in 1982. Yet by 1990 it had halved to about 10 percent as a 
result of the decreased demand and the deteriorating Soviet economy. With respect to defence 
and foreign policy, Möttolä (1982:306) explains how the Finnish debate in the 1970s and early 
1980s “in essence concerned how much Finnish-Soviet military co-operation, on the basis of 
the FCMA treaty, to include in the defence doctrine to make it politically acceptable”. This 
required debates that brought up “old and difficult issues connected with Finland's position in 
severe international crises; in effect, the issue of the reflection of the Finnish defence 
arrangement on her foreign policy”.  The outcome was a shift in foreign policy during President 
Mauno Koivisto’s (1982–1994) term in office (Koskinen 2019:22). Koivistowas from the 
social democrat party, which was known to have opposed Moscow in the past (Lukacs 
1992:61). Although still committed to neutrality, Koivisto shifted from the traditional 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen line (see Chapter 3) towards strengthen ties with the West. Koivisto 
outlined that “Finland emphasises the importance of maintaining good relations with 
neighbouring countries, but also with all other countries in the world” (Kallenautio 2005 cited 
in Koskinen 2019:22). When Mikhail Gorbachev visited Helsinki in 1989, he was the first 
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Soviet leader to recognise Finland’s neutrality openly. After declaring that “Finland is a neutral 
Nordic country”, the distinguished Finnish audience interrupted Gorbachev with a standing 
ovation; In the opinion of the Finns, Gorbachev’s statement was the final victory in Finland’s 
40-year long struggle to remain neutral (Suominen (1994:12). However, as Luckacs (1992:61) 
explains, it was not until January 1992 when the new Treaty of Friendship was signed between 
Finland and the newly established Russian Federation that the 1948 treaty was terminated. With 
this, “the last remnant of restrictions on an independent Finnish foreign policy were formally 
removed”.    
However, Korsmo (1988: 534) argues that throughout the Cold War, the security of the state 
has often taken precedence over human rights protection of Saami peoples. This has meant that 
as a result, the interests of the state have often collided with those of the Saami people. For the 
duration of the Cold War, the northern areas of Fennoscandia were viewed strategically in 
Western and NATO scenarios. Such views considered northern Fennoscandia as a base, transit 
area, occupation zone and target of the Soviet Union – scenarios which met with considerable 
controversy by those who lived in these territories. The Chernobyl accident of April 1986 
brought these conflicting views of security into an even starker perspective, as Saami and non-
Saami people alike were affected by the radioactive fallout from the Ukrainian power plant 
thousands of kilometres away. As mentioned previously in section 4.5.2., winds blowing from 
a south-easterly direction in the days following the accident brought rain containing radioactive 
elements including cesium-137 to northern and central Scandinavia. The weather conditions 
were such that Norway and Sweden were the two countries worst hit outside the Soviet Union. 
In Sweden, the areas around Uppsala, Gävle and Västerbotten were hardest hit, while in 
Norway the area between Trondheim and Bodø along with mountainous areas further south 
suffered, mainly because of rainfall (Nikel 2019). Stephens (1987) explains how   
Lichen, the main reindeer grazing food, is a biologically remarkable "radioactive sponge." With no 
underground root system, it must take all its nutrients from the air and thus incorporates airborne 
contamination to a much greater degree than other vegetation. The absorption of the major Chernobyl 
pollutant, cesium 137 (with a half-life of 30 years), by the slow-growing northern lichen has meant serious 
long-term contamination of many northern Scandinavian pasturelands and of the deer grazing them. In 
some areas, deer are many times more radioactive than is considered safe for domestic consumption or is 
legally allowable for market sale.   
 
The fallout of Chernobyl resulted in Saami and non-Saami inhabitants having to cope with 
higher levels of radionuclide pollution in addition to inconsistencies and modifications of 
national policies and scientific regulations (Anderson 1987:127). Swedish authorities 
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conducted a nationwide radiation survey in May 1986 and although the authorities settled on 
testing individual reindeer carcasses rather than mass slaughtering, meat from between 25,000 
and 40,000 tame reindeer in Sweden had to be discarded after the autumn slaughter. In Norway 
the number was slightly lower at 15,000 (The Guardian 1986). Not only reindeer were affected 
by the fallout but also sheep, lambs, freshwater fish, wild game, berries and mushrooms were 
all found to have unacceptably high radiation levels and could not be eaten (Utsi 1987:726). 
Concerning the edibility of local sessile plant life such as berries and mushrooms, individuals 
often had to make judgements based on earlier assessments conducted in the area as to whether 
or not they were safe to eat (Anderson 1987:127). As Utsi (1987) observed, the level of 
radiation considered to be safe varied from country to country as certain Saami regions were 
spared from the fallout. However, according to Anderson (1987), this also had the effect of 
intensifying the distinctions among and between the various occupational and regional 
lifestyles characterising the Saami populations.  However, as a 1997 Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Program (AMAP) Report clarifies,  
Many people think of Chernobyl as the worst-ever large-scale release of radionuclides. It was not. 
Atmospheric tests of nuclear bombs, which went on until 1980, spread much more radioactive material and 
over a wider area than Chernobyl. But Chernobyl added to the radionuclides in the northern polar area, 
especially in Fennoscandia, and the question remains: What are the long-term con-sequences of this for 
people living off the land? (AMAP 1997:111) 
 
One long term consequence of the radioactive pollution from Chernobyl is that even more than 
a decade after the accident some Saami villagers were still giving their reindeer special fodder 
to get rid of radioactive cesium that the animals accumulate from eating contaminated lichen 
(ibid). Over 30 years later, reindeer in northern Fennoscandia are still affected by radioactivity. 
Deemed as unsafe for human consumption by authorities thousands of reindeer have been 
released back into the wild rather than being slaughtered. 
Chernobyl served as a watershed for Arctic environmental policy and the making of an Arctic 
environmental regime with Finland at the forefront in this process. Emboldened by the success 
of the Helsinki process, the opportunity came for Finland to propose new mechanisms for 
Arctic cooperation after Gorbachev’s Murmansk proposal in 1987.  As mentioned earlier in 
section 4.5.2, Finland was the only state to enthusiastically respond to Gorbachev’s proposal. 
However, this was likely due to Finland’s awareness that international Arctic cooperation 
would serve national Finnish interests on multiple policy areas. For instance, Gorbachev’s 
vision of a nuclear free and demilitarised Arctic decreased Finnish security concerns that a 
military strike would occur on or adjacent to Finnish territory, while inter-state environmental 
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collaboration could help alleviate pollution in northern forests and in the Barents Sea. 
Politically, Arctic cooperation represented the opportunity through which Finland could be free 
from the binding Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) 48 that it 
was forced to make with the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Cold War. As Cold War 
tensions decreased so too did the significance of the treaty, thus releasing Finland from this 
bind on its neutrality. Finland decided that an environmental focus would be an effective policy 
strategy through which to establish a new institutional mechanism for Arctic cooperation. In 
September 1989, representatives from eight Arctic states met in Rovaneimi, Finland for the 
preparatory session (Axeworthy and Dean 2013:20). The Fins then persuaded an initially 
sceptical Norway to come on board in the winter and spring of 1989. Thus, with “a united 
Nordic front, combined with enthusiastic support from the Soviet Union and Canada, even the 
laggard US was brought around to support the initiative” (ibid).  
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), was formally signed into existence at 
Rovaniemi, Finland, in June 1991, with the operationalization period from 1991 to 1996 
producing a series of innovations which would eventually be adopted by the Arctic Council. 
One of these innovations include the development of working groups. Another significant 
development occurred with respect to the inclusion of northern indigenous groups. At the 
formal signing of AEPS in 1991, the ICC, the Nordic Sami Council and the USSR Association 
of Small Peoples of the North were included as observers. As AEPS developed, the indigenous 
role grew (Axeworthy and Dean 2013:20-21). However, the AEPS institution served as a 
political-but not legal - commitment towards greater cooperation among the Arctic (Bloom 
1999:713). While the superpowers were not entirely ready to yet forfeit the Cold War order or 
allow for military and security issues to be discussed in a regional organisation, the 
establishment of the AEPS was significant as it represented the beginning of international 
Arctic political cooperation. If viewed through a neo-functionalist approach to regionalization 
- that is cooperation in one particular area (environmental and Arctic scientific research) 
eventually paving the way towards greater levels of multilateral Arctic cooperation, then AEPS 
can, be seen as the first step towards an Arctic inter-governmental institution. As Axeworthy 
and Dean (2013:20) observe: 
 
48 The 1948 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance outlined in advance how Finland would be expected to 
act in defence of the Soviet Union’s north-western border. The treaty indicated that should Finland be attacked, as a neutral 
state it was entitled to defend itself and seek aid where possible. The treaty indicated that the source of assistance would be 
the Soviet Union (Tornudd 2005, p.44-45) see also Chapter 3 
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The Finnish initiative on AEPS and the Canadian initiative on the Arctic Council…both show the value of 
small or middle powers willing to take a chance. Large powers – and even more so superpowers – are 
consumed with worry about credibility and prestige. Finland had less to lose, and thus took up the risk to 
publicly announce an initiative when it was not guaranteed a success.  
4.7 Conclusion: From a strength-based bipolar regional order to coexistence 
- The Cold War Arctic through the RPSF   
It has been demonstrated that for most of the Cold War era, the two superpowers were locked 
into a highly competitive and militarized conflict that left little room for cooperation on security 
issues, in the Arctic or elsewhere. For this reason, in Table 1.1. (see Chapter 1), I advocate that 
the Cold War Arctic is most accurately depicted through the RPSF as a strength-based system, 
wherein alliances and power politics serve as a key feature of the bipolar global political order. 
The Cold War clearly shows that military alliances, by their nature, are divisive and 
exclusionary towards other states that are perceived as a threat while also limiting possibilities 
for regional cooperation.  By utilising Jones three-stage model of the Cold War (tight bipolar 
system, loose bipolar system and incipient multipolarity), it was demonstrated how the Cold 
War Arctic shifted from being a passive recipient of great power foreign policy and security 
dictates, to becoming politicised on a local and regional level.  
This observation can also be demonstrated with respect to the combined ES model of Bailes 
and Cotty’s (2006) regional security mechanisms and Buzan’s (2012b) categorisation of 
regional societies. Recall from Chapter 2 that this model supposes that in regions which exhibit 
low levels of regional cooperation, there is a higher likelihood of military tension and conflict. 
Alternatively, where there are higher levels of interactions amongst states and regional 
cooperation, it is suggested that conflict will be minimum and resolved in non-violent ways.  
During the three stages of the Cold War, the Arctic demonstrated a coexistent form of regional 
society, where transnational cooperation was extremely limited due to the restrictions of the 
bipolar system and alliances structures. This is akin to Hedley Bull’s original depiction of 
international society which was limited to core institutions such as: the balance of power, war, 
diplomacy, great power management and international law. However, during the transition era 
the Arctic began to transition from a coexistent to a cooperative form of regional society. This 
transformation began in the era of incipient multipolarity. 
During the 1970s, the Arctic experienced a period of growth and transformation, with evidence 
of a more cooperative regional society emerging. This saw developments that went beyond the 
basic institutions of international society mentioned above towards new interstate projects 
including; the pursuit of human rights, joint pursuit of big science, and the beginnings of 
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collective environmental management. The accession of European Arctic states to European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) membership in the 1970s also exhibits the rise of regionalism 
as a global project and greatly influenced trade relations for Arctic states. Furthermore, the 
politicisation of indigenous groups, the anti-nuclear campaign, the expanding membership and 
integration agenda of the EU and growing environmental and political cooperation; all 
contributed to the rise of international organisations and other non-state actors. While these 
developments undoubtedly led to the growth of Arctic regional society, it also had the effect 
of tempering the superpower rivalry and military hostilities, de-securitizing the region whilst 
laying the foundation for the post-Cold War transformation of the Arctic regional order.  
I proposed that the transition stage of Arctic regional development began with the appointment 
of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of Secretary General of the Soviet Union. However, this 
also coincides with US President Ronald Reagan’s growing awareness of the need to end the 
arms race after learning how close the world had come to nuclear annihilation as a result of the 
Soviet’s panic during the NATO exercise Abel Archer in 1983. When Gorbachev proposed his 
policies of glastnost and perestroika during his 1987 Murmansk initiative, this provided Reagan 
with the means to achieve greater levels of trust and cooperation with the Soviet Union. At 
Murmansk, Gorbachev also advocated for the creation of an Arctic zone of peace. In this way, 
the Arctic held a special role in Gorbachev’s policies as an area of mutual interest which could 
foster greater East-West cooperation. Thus, the idea for an international Arctic region emerged.  
This was a pivotal moment in Arctic regional history and signified that the Arctic had 
transitioned from a strength-based system to a concert-based system. Stewart-Ingersoll and 
Frazier (2012:80) advocate that for a region to be a concert-based order there must be a high 
degree of cooperation on security issues amongst the most powerful states within the region. 
Although it is possible for a concert-based order to occur within a bipolar regional order, the 
authors explain that each of the most powerful states with this type of system are expected to 
engage in extensive, effective and coordinated leadership (at least with respect to specific, 
agreed upon security issues)” (p80). For the Soviet Union, this involved building trust with the 
West on non-strategic issues in order to begin the process of revising nuclear and defence 
policies. 
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012:161) advance the notion that status quo and revisionist 
orientations at the regional level generally mimic what we observe at the global level. Utilising 
the RPSF, an analysis of the Cold War Arctic as a strength-based regional order demonstrates 
that the Arctic mirrored the polarity of the international system up until the time of incipient 
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multipolarity. It can be concluded that both the US and the USSR were dissatisfied powers for 
the entire duration of the Cold War given that the existence of the other threatened their own 
ideological, political and military security. While each pursued protectionist foreign policies 
for the majority of the Cold War (see Table 4.1), it has been shown that at specific times during 
the three distinct eras of bipolarity, the two superpowers pursued revisionist and proactive 
foreign policies. For instance, the US can be seen to pursue a proactive revisionist Arctic policy 
in the early stage of tight-bipolarity through the creation of new institutional structures of 
NATO and NORAD, which resulted in the consolidation of the Western Arctic bloc as an 
extension of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. NATO redefined the post-war international order by 
advocating that international organisations (specifically US led ones) could participate in 
international politics alongside states. The US again demonstrated a proactive foreign policy 
during the Reagan Presidency in the period of incipient multipolarity. Reagan believed that his 
Star Wars program could end the threat of nuclear conflict and change the systemic balance of 
power in America’s favour.  
Yet, the Soviet Union also pursued a revisionist proactive policy during this time that proved 
to be far more successful in creating far-reaching changes, many of them unanticipated. As 
mentioned previously, after Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk speech, the 
Arctic became the focal point for cooperation as he was especially concerned about creating a 
de-militarized zone in the region to ensure that the Soviet Union could safely reduce its military 
spending without fearing an unanticipated attack from the Barents or Baltic Seas. This appeal 
would eventually lead to the creation of an Arctic region, while also paving the road towards 
the peaceful end of the Cold War. From 1987 onwards, the Arctic demonstrated characteristics 
of a concert-based system when the Arctic states took up Gorbachev’s proposal for east-west 
Arctic cooperation on specific, non-strategic issues. Thus, it can be summarized that while 
cooperation emerged on political and non-strategic issues – multilateral security cooperation 
was excluded – arms reduction talks were strictly bilateral, while the predominant form of 
collective security remained alliance structures. This trend remained a constant throughout the 
Cold War and the transition period in the Arctic.  
Following from this, during the transition stage preceding Murmansk, new forms of 
institutional cooperation emerged as mechanisms to better serve Arctic interests. There was the 
growing awareness amongst Arctic actors of the increasing power that institutions could exert 
in reshaping the political landscape and the international system.  Arctic indigenous and 
environmental movements were established during the late 1970s and early 1980s to critique 
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Cold War militarization and to broaden the security agenda beyond that of the nuclear conflict. 
These movements consolidated their power during the transition stage by becoming 
circumpolar (international) political organisations that would more effectively promote the idea 
of an Arctic region and representation of northern peoples. The emergence of détente and the 
improved US-Soviet bilateral relationship under the Reagan-Gorbachev administrations in the 
transition stage opened up new opportunities for the small and medium Arctic states and new 
non-state actors, to reshape the Arctic security order. Thus, when the era of incipient 
multipolarity yielded to the transition stage, the Arctic was finally able to break free from Cold 
War constraints and become one of the central sites for fundamental political change. However, 
the crucial idea of Arctic regional cooperation was slow to emerge – partially because of 
superpower reluctance to establish an inter-governmental institution for the Arctic. Yet the 
persistence of Finland paid off and as a compromise the AEPS was created as a legal, but not 
political entity, yet which would eventually pave the way towards the creation of the Arctic 
Council almost a decade later.  
 
Table 4.0 Great Power Foreign Policy Orientations throughout the Cold War  
 Tight Bipolar era 
(1946-1953) 



















































CHAPTER FIVE:                                                                                              
ARCTIC REGIONAL TRANSFORMATION DURING A 
CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN WORLD POLITICS 
5.0 Introduction  
In the immediate post-Cold War years, the Arctic experienced a dramatic shift. No longer a 
strategic military theatre of operations, it was transforming into an international region where 
new initiatives for circumpolar cooperation were being developed or expanded upon. A 
resurgence of northern political concerns strived to rebalance Arctic policy agendas away from 
deterrence. Indigenous voices called for a broader and deeper understanding of security 
including issues such as climate change, environmental conservation and post-Cold War ‘clean 
up’ efforts. However, at the same time, US reluctance to transform the Cold War military 
structures in the Arctic and broader Euro-Atlantic RSC resulted in the regional security overlap 
in the Arctic that continues to exist today.  
In section 5.1.1. it will be explained what a critical juncture is and how it applies to the post-
Cold War Arctic transition. Here it will be demonstrated how three pathways existed during 
the critical juncture for political leaders to choose from. These three choices include, 1) 
retaining the Cold War security order, 2) transforming it through the development of new 
cooperative security institutions, or 3) a compromise of Russian NATO membership. In section 
5.1.2. it will be explained how unipolarity steered America on a foreign policy course that 
revised, rather than transformed, the Cold War European security system. In section 5.1.3 
Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s Common European Home (CEH) initiative will 
be outlined. The US rationale for dismissing Gorbachev’s proposal and the prospect of Russian 
NATO membership in favour of the decision to retain, transform and enlarge NATO will be 
examined closely since this decision explains why the post-Cold War Arctic RSC remains tied 
to broader Euro-Atlantic security structures. As such, it will be argued that the current regional 
security overlap in the Arctic was not historically predetermined. Instead it can be viewed as a 
refusal by the George H.W Bush Administration to consider viable alternatives for a new, more 
inclusive post-Cold War security architecture.  
In section 5.2.1. President Clinton’s Presidential Directive NSC-26, will be analysed as a key 
document outlining America’s post-Cold War Arctic strategy. Because the US displayed a 
narrow post-Cold War foreign policy agenda in the Arctic that focused mainly on 
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decommissioning Soviet nuclear weapons and military facilities, it adopted a lesser RPSF role 
– that of regional custodianship.  
In section 5.2.2., the post-Soviet transition will be examined with respect to the Arctic. 
Domestic political turmoil and economic upheaval of the post-Soviet transformation distracted 
Russia’s attention away from being able to engage in meaningful participation in Arctic 
regional politics prior to the establishment of the Arctic Council (AC) in 1996. As such, Russia 
was unable to resume an Arctic regional leadership role during the 1990s, as it had during the 
Gorbachev era. It therefore fell upon the small and medium Arctic states to propose new 
institutional mechanisms for multilateral political cooperation, firstly through Finland’s AEPS 
initiative (see Chapter 4), and later through Canada’s development of the AC.  
The negotiations leading up to the creation of the AC in 1996 serve as the focal point of a 
discussion that satisfies three objectives, firstly, in section 5.3.1 the important role played by 
Canadian Arctic regional society groups will be highlighted to show the fundamental role they 
played in establishing the AC. As explained in Chapter 1, it is my intention that this thesis will 
provide a significant contribution to the Arctic political literature by returning military security 
to its proper place within a broad, integrated approach to Arctic security. It will be shown how 
indigenous leaders focused their efforts on achieving the twin objectives of full participation 
within the AC while also promoting the inclusion of military security and nuclear arms 
reductions talks on the AC agenda. A second objective here is to show the regional leadership 
role taken by Canada during the AC negotiations and to discern its reasons for doing so. I will 
outline through ES theory how the AC served not only to further Canadian national interests 
and foreign policy objectives but was also a means of attaining international recognition and 
solidifying Canada’s ‘middle-power’ role in the Arctic.  
In section 5.3.2, I will engage with the third key issue: how US foreign policy preferences also 
impacted the institutional design of the AC and as such shaped the post-Cold War Arctic 
regional order. The different positions of Canada and the United States during AC negotiations 
will be examined including why the US altered the AC institutional design at a critical stage of 
negotiations. Finally, Section 5.4 summarises the main issues addressed within the chapter, 
paying close attention to the intended and un-intended consequences of the US decision to 
retain the Cold War security order in the Arctic.  
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5.1 The Post-Cold War security juncture: explaining the persistence of 
NATO in the European security order and in the Arctic 
From 1987-1994, political leaders had a unique window of opportunity to implement far-
reaching changes and radically transform the international political and security orders.  If 
several options are possible during a critical juncture, then one possibility includes the 
decision to retain the previous structure as opposed to changing it. As such, the outcome 
results in the restoration of the pre-critical juncture status-quo. This is what happened in the 
immediate post-Cold War years when instead of major systemic change, the pre-existing Cold 
War Euro-Atlantic security order was sustained. This resulted in the continued exclusion of 
Russia from military security structures both in the Arctic and the broader European RSC.  At 
the same time, NATO was reformed in the aftermath of the Cold War through both its eastern 
enlargement and institutional transformation.  
An analysis of the post-Cold War critical juncture requires investigating not only the decisions 
and actions that were taken, but also those that were considered and ultimately rejected, “thus 
making explicit the close-call counterfactuals that render the critical juncture ‘critical’” 
(Cappocia and Keleman 2007:.357). Ignoring the near-misses of history deprive us of 
important insights (ibid). For instance, Paul Narvestad (2015:352) outlines how the arms-
control literature on the Arctic from the 1980s often references the CSCE as a possible but 
limited arena for security initiatives in the Arctic. This offers us a tantalising glimpse into how 
the media, policymakers and Arctic academics were aware that new, alternative security 
arrangements at the end of the Cold War could have replaced NATO.  
At the end of the Cold War, there were essentially three main options being considered for the 
Euro-Atlantic RSC by the two powers (see table 5.1).  The first option, favoured by the United 
States and enacted upon by the George H.W. Bush Administration, was to not revise the 
international order, and instead retain the Cold War NATO structures. This involved returning 
to the pre-juncture status quo and the strategy of containment against Russia. This included 
reinventing NATO and would, under the Clinton Administration eventually lead to NATO 
enlargement by offering membership to former post-Soviet states in Eastern-Europe. This is 
history as we know it.  
The alternative option during the critical juncture was Mikhail Gorbachev’s Common European Home (CEH) 
initiative and the transformation of the OSCE as the new pan-European security institution. This option was 
championed by Gorbachev in the final days of the Soviet Union, and by his successor, Boris Yeltsin. This represented 
an alternative pathway that was not taken. The third option was a middle-of-the-road position (Russian NATO 
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membership) that did not gain as much traction as the other two as it was quickly disregarded by the US when 
proposed by Gorbachev. The US dismissal illustrates an unwillingness to consider options that would ensure Russian 
inclusion, even when the latter was willing to compromise on their preferences.  Therefore, by analysing the 
outcomes that didn’t happen it will be shown why the Arctic regional security order did not transform alongside the 
political order in the post-Cold War era, resulting in the Arctic regional security overlap that exists today. 
Considering the predominant role that the US enjoyed in NATO throughout the Cold War, it may in hindsight appear 
very unlikely that the US would willingly have dismantled NATO and replaced it with a more inclusive for 
engagement on security issues with the European states and Russia. Dougherty and Pflatzgraff (1990:169) surmise 
that regimes are more easily preserved than created, and the conditions for maintaining existing regimes are less 
demanding than those required for creating them.  
Throughout this chapter, it will be demonstrated that the US security preferences for Europe and the Arctic were 
enacted not because they were necessarily the right decision for the collective but because it served US interests. 
NATO was retained by the Bush Administration since it was perceived as the US’ best guarantee for preserving 
American political and military hegemony in Europe. Therefore, only by evaluating the US’ post-Cold War grand 
strategy during the critical juncture is it possible to fully understand the changes that occurred at the international 
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5.1.1 Critical Juncture Part I: George H.W. Bush and the American post-Cold War 
strategy of containment   
You could argue that if they had been geniuses, George Bush and Jim Baker would have sat down in 1990 
and said the whole game is coming into our hands …We’ve got this opportunity, which may not recur, to 
remake the world, update everything, the UN, everything…But they weren’t that kind of person, either of 
them. George Bush had famously said he didn’t do the vision thing… (Douglas Hurd, former British foreign 
Minister, cited in Sarotte 2014b:4) 
In this section, I will briefly outline how the US’ post-Cold War grand strategy, devised by the 
George H.W. Bush Administration during the critical juncture, called for a re-commitment to 
the Cold War strategy of containment against Russia.  Ultimately, the failure of the US to 
develop a new and more benign post-Cold War grand strategy ultimately kept the Arctic region 
tied to the Cold War Euro-Atlantic security order and resulted in regional security overlap.  
When George H.W Bush came to power in 1989, he brought an attitude of deep mistrust of 
Russia to the presidency. He believed that since America had won the Cold War, they were 
under no obligation to revise the Cold War security architecture to become inclusive of Russia, 
nor provide Russia aid and assistance during its painful post-Soviet transition. In the final years 
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of the Soviet Union, the Bush administration remained undecided as to what action to take and 
were unable to formulate a decisive foreign policy in the face of Gorbachev’s bold and 
innovative proposals. Although Bush declared in 1989  that “America is moving beyond 
containment to ‘a new policy for the 1990s”, his inability to name or describe this new policy 
reveals how ultimately, the Bush administration failed to formulate a grand strategy in 
anticipation for a new international environment, beyond vague claims about democracy, 
markets, stability and American primacy (Suri 2009:613).  
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was anticipated that the world would 
revert to multipolarity. Instead, as Charles Krauthammer (1990/1:23) forthrightly stated “the 
most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity”, since there was no longer 
any state considered capable of challenging the military, political and ideological might of the 
United States. As such, Krauthammer proclaimed that “Now is the unipolar moment (ibid).” 
Others were not so optimistic. Wohlforth (1999:24), for example cautioned that the theory of 
unipolarity is contentious owing to its questionable durability as a global political system. 
Unipolarity is considered peaceful and stable only so long as the hegemon maintains a clear 
and large concentration of power (ibid). Being aware of this, US policymakers therefore sought 
to retain America’s post-Cold War power advantage at all costs, while also continuing to 
perceive Russia as a political rival and a security threat. Cold War attitudes towards Russia 
were so deeply entrenched in American foreign policy thinking that it was relatively easy to 
justify continuing this perspective on the grounds that the US must prevent a resurgence of 
Russian military power in the post-Cold War era. American foreign policy analysts incorrectly 
assumed that global security threats in the new post-Cold War international political system 
would remain the same as the old Cold War order. A review of the 1992 Defence Planning 
Guideline (DPG) - the first defence paper to be issued since the end of the Cold War –outlines 
in a veiled reference to Russia, how the US sought to prevent a re-emergence of Russian 
political influence in areas including Western Europe and the post-Soviet space: 
Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration 
underlying the new regional defence strategy and requires that we endeavour to prevent any hostile power 
from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate 
global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, 
and Southwest Asia. 
 
The 46-page classified document, known as the ‘Wolfowitz doctrine’ circulated for several 
weeks at senior levels of the Pentagon. But controversy erupted after it was leaked to The New 
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York Times and The Washington Post. Although the White House ordered then-Defence 
Secretary Dick Cheney to rewrite it (PBS 2005), the 1992 draft did not entirely disappear. 
Instead, Secretary Cheney re-drafted the DPG document which was dutifully distributed in 
January 1993 and circulated in a declassified form as the ‘Regional Defence Strategy’. The 
National Security Archive (2017) explains how this revised document retained the basic 
objectives and method of the 1992 DPG, e.g., ‘no new rival’, while it also introduced new 
language i.e. ‘strategic depth’, that would survive further re-writing. The concept of strategic 
depth can be understood with respect to post-Cold War Europe, where the US., through a 
regional defence strategy, could take advantage of its position and preserve capabilities needed 
to keep threats small such as shaping the security environment, acting alone where necessary, 
and maintaining a dominant edge in military capabilities. As David Edelstein (2017:6) explains 
“when leaders of existing powers are more focused on the long-term threat posed by another 
actor, then the prospects of cooperation in the short term diminish”. The 1992 DPG ultimately 
set to limit cooperation with Russia and demonstrates that the US was determined to prevent 
Russia from re-emerging as a great power and future challenger to US hegemony. 
The fateful US’ foreign policy decision to continue to view Russia as a potential threat, 
ultimately steered the direction of European security in the 1990s and limited the potential for 
a new post-Cold War European security order to emerge. For instance, Flynn (1990) confirms 
that the United States adopted a cautious approach towards the changing strategic situation in 
Europe. Considering how the Northern European region fit into American post-Cold War 
policies for Europe, Flynn correctly assessed that the Northern region of Europe would 
reinforce America’s cautious predisposition because “military shifts will be slower to 
materialize here than elsewhere in Europe” (p.157). He reasoned that while the Nordic 
countries would be more affected by the dramatic changes in political atmosphere between East 
and West, this would nonetheless “reinforce a general tension between European and American 
policy over constructing the new Europe, with the former concentrating more on longer-term 
possibilities and the latter concerned with nearer-term risks” (Flynn 1990:152). Although the 
Scandinavian states were optimistic of Gorbachev’s policies and proposals for circumpolar 
cooperation, the key problem remained the unresolved security dilemma vis-à-vis the United 
States and the Soviet Union, in addition to the differing perspectives amongst the Scandinavian 
states on NATO and how they fitted into the overall picture of European security.  
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5.1.2 Critical Juncture Part II –Gorbachev’s ‘Common European Home’ initiative for 
transformational change in the Euro-Atlantic RSC  
If security is the foundation of a common European home, then all-round co-operation is its bearing frame 
(Mikhail Gorbachev, 1989). 
NATO is the only plausible justification in my country for the American military presence in Europe. If 
NATO is allowed to wither because it has no meaningful political place in the new Europe, the basis for a 
long-term US military commitment can die with it (A letter from George to French President François 
Mitterrand, April 1990) 
The concept of a ‘Common European Home’ (CEH) was advanced as a key foreign policy goal 
by Mikhail Gorbachev from when he first proposed the idea in 1987, up until he left office in 
1991 (Malcom 1989:664). Rey (2004:39) explains that during his speeches in Prague (1987), 
Belgrade (1988) and Strasbourg (1989), Gorbachev provided a structural template for the CEH 
through utilising the image of a four-level building.  
The first story of the house would be built on collective security and based on the widest possible 
disarmament (nuclear, chemical and conventional), and, in the long-term, on the disappearance of military 
blocs and alliances. The second story related to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The upper two stories 
concerned a pan-European economic and trade cooperation and, finally, a real European cultural 
community, which would constitute the supreme achievement of this common home (Rey 2004:39) 
The 1975 Helsinki Final Act (see Chapter 4) would serve as the foundations for this new 
geopolitical order (Rey 2004:39), with the main institutional framework being provided by the 
existing Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), suitably enhanced and 
upgraded (Smith 2006:8). Gorbachev envisioned that the OSCE as a unique all-inclusive 
cooperative security arrangement that would have a central role in European security, 
responding to coordinating actions of all member states and security organizations, including 
NATO, the CIS, the Council of Europe and the WEU (ibid).  It was also expected that the 
CSCE would acquire a structure similar to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in which Russia 
would have a permanent seat. The CSCE had an advantage over any other European security 
institution in that it was the only security organization in existence which Russia and its 
Warsaw pact allies enjoyed an equal status with the United States and NATO members 
(Ponsard 2007:135, Smith 2006:8). Coincidentally, it is also the only security organisation in 
which all eight Arctic states are members of.  
Gorbachev described how his new collective security arrangement for Europe would possesses 
a ‘certain integrity’, although the countries involved belonged to different social systems and 
were members of opposing blocs (Malcom 1989:664). Although NATO held the suspicion that 
Soviet plans for the OSCE were aimed at promoting a divisive agenda by driving a wedge 
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between the United States and its European allies (OSCE 2017), Gorbachev recognised that to 
be successful the US and Canada would need to be fully associated with the project (Rey 
2004:39). Another important point emphasised by Rey (p.40) is that by 1988, Soviet leaders 
no longer insisted on the dissolution of the alliances: instead they proposed to progressively 
transform these alliances into political organizations that could actively contribute to 
rapprochement. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership was said to have repeatedly emphasised 
that the shape of any CEH would only be determined after exhaustive dialogue among all its 
future inhabitants, and that rival conceptions would quite naturally coexist for some time 
(Malcom 1989:665). The Soviet’s awareness that their proposal for European security was not 
the only option confirms that the period was indeed a critical juncture. 
Lebow (2010) advocates that had there been two different political leaders in power other than 
Reagan and Gorbachev, the Cold War arguably would not have come to an end. This is 
significant because with Bush’s accession to the US presidency, the likelihood of American 
support for Gorbachev’s CEH lessened dramatically. It was inconceivable for the conservative-
minded Bush Administration to imagine that Gorbachev’s CEH was a genuine paradigm shift 
away from ‘a hard-nosed realism’ to a way of thinking that appeared to be based on the idea of 
an international society held together by shared interests and values (Malcom 1989:659). 
Aware of this danger and imbued with a new sense of urgency, Gorbachev, in the spring of 
1989, embarked on a series of visits to the capitals of Western Europe, to convince European 
leaders of his goals and provide a more concrete and better attuned concept of the CEH to his 
European hosts (Malcom, 1989:667). Janes (1990:171) explains how northern Europe served 
Gorbachev particularly well as a region for “marshalling the conceptual points in the emerging 
Soviet image for Europe”. Here, it will be argued that there were two reasons for why 
Gorbachev sought to appeal to the Nordic states. First, Gorbachev recognised that he would 
find support amongst the Nordic countries for Soviet policies of disarmament and confidence-
building, which would, through the CSCE provide the ‘foundation’ and ‘first story’ of the CEH. 
For example, the proposal of a Nordic nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) as outlined by 
Gorbachev in his Murmansk speech in 1987 was met with general Nordic approval. Gorbachev 
also frequently referred to Soviet-Finnish relations as ‘the model for contemporary relations 
with Europe: ‘new thinking in practice’ (Janes p.165).  
Secondly, Gorbachev sought to emulate the Nordic model for a broader European security 
community. Recall from earlier Rey’s (2004) explanatory image of the CEH as a four-story 
house. The roof of the house was envisioned by Gorbachev as being the creation of a ‘European 
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cultural community’ of shared values. From an ES perspective, this can be understood as 
Gorbachev’s attempts to create a new European regional society (inclusive of the USSR, 
Canada and the US). Lars Schouenborg (2013) a Scandinavian proponent of the ES school, 
advocates that a regional international society of Nordic states exists - which he justifies on 
two grounds. Firstly, Schoenborg outlines that there is a ‘remarkable absence of inter-state and 
intra-state war in Scandinavia over the past 200 years’, which marks the region out from the 
rest of Europe. Second, the Scandinavian states have also demonstrated ‘progressive 
internationalism or solidarist foreign policies’ that in turn have produced a belief in common 
social rights for citizens throughout the region and the efficacy of multilateral and legal 
processes to resolve disputes (Schouenborg cited in Suzuki 2013:50). Recognising this, Soviet 
policy promoted the idea of a Northern Europe that would supply, in the words of Gorbachev, 
‘the roof’ to the CEH (Janes 1990:165).  
During a visit to Helsinki in 1989, Gorbachev noted the contributions of the small states of 
Northern Europe towards aiding the CSCE processes, especially the neutral, non-aligned states 
(i.e. Sweden and Finland). Yuri Deryabin, a Soviet analyst, commented at the time how 
Gorbachev “set out in bold relief the role of the so-called small countries of Europe in 
strengthening fresh approaches to security and cooperation” (Deryabin 1990, cited in Janes, 
1990:172). Gorbachev’s speech essentially served as a rallying call for tying the Nordic states 
to the CEH. Yet Janes (1990: 172) argues that in effect, this amounted “to building the roof of 
the house first, since it seems easiest – and in, the process trying to work out the blue-print for 
the rest of the edifice”. However, there was also another significant problem that impeded 
Gorbachev’s efforts to build a CEH based on shared Nordic values - the differing perceptions 
that the Nordic states had on security- an issue that could not be resolved overnight. Tiilikainen 
(1998:51) perceives that the Cold War had a deeply divisive impact upon the Nordic 
community, since the external border of NATO passed right through the Nordic region and 
divided those countries who joined the alliance (Denmark, Norway and Iceland) from those 
who remained neutral (see Chapters 3 and 4). However, Nordic cooperation nonetheless took 
place throughout the Cold War through two key Nordic organisations– the Nordic Council 
(1952) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (1953). Yet political cooperation did not extend to 
foreign and security policy as a result of the differing security policies of the Arctic states 
(ibid). During the post-Cold War critical juncture, Norway, Denmark and Iceland continued to 
base their security upon NATO membership, while Sweden and Finland were far more 
interested in participating in a new system revolving around the EU (Tiilikainen (1998:52). 
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Similarly, Haftendorn (1990) highlights how differences existed amongst the NATO states. For 
instance, both Denmark and Norway had alternative views on the post-Cold War European 
security order. Haftendorn remarks that while Denmark was in favour of transforming NATO 
into an instrument of political consultation, it nonetheless supported all efforts to strengthen 
the CSCE processes. Petersen (1990:92) sheds further light on Danish defence perspectives in 
the early 1990s. He refers to a 1988 report issued by the Danish Defence Commission that 
sketched two scenarios for European security in the 1990s; a best case and worst-case scenario. 
The best-case scenario anticipated the continuation of the Warsaw Pact despite internal changes 
as a stabilizer not only for East-West relations but also East-East relations. Interestingly, the 
worst-case scenario predicted the breakup of the Eastern bloc, fundamentally changing the 
context of the disarmament process and giving rise to new conflict patterns in Europe. Thus, 
Petersen (1990:92) summarises that destabilization in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
was “the dominant Danish risk perception on the threshold of the 1990s rather than premediated 
aggression or accidental superpower war”. 
Yet, Norway by contrast, favoured the retention of NATO as a collective defence organisation 
and was adamantly opposed to loosening its ties to the United States. Nonetheless, Norway did 
support greater European defence cooperation (Haftendorn 1990:186). Understandably, the 
Soviet perspective saw the continual US involvement in the region as being detrimental to the 
stability of the Northern European region (Janes 1990:165).  
By 1991, time was running out for Gorbachev to convince both the Nordic and European states 
of his plans for the CSCE as there were clear signs indicating the US’ preference for the 
continuation of NATO. This began as early as 1990 when the United States launched its first 
proposal for change at NATO’s London Summit. A review of NATO’s military strategy was 
carried out from July 1990 by an Ad Hoc Group otherwise known as the ‘Legge Group’ after 
its chairman Michael Legge49 (Cornish 1996:759). Publicly, the United States affirmed 
NATO's post-Cold War agenda as one in which the West would willingly engage in political 
cooperation with the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw pact allies, declaring that they were 
no longer enemies. Yet, in private, Bush wasted no time to denounce Gorbachev’s efforts to 
promote the CEH and set a course that steered Europe on a path of NATO dependence in the 
post-Cold War era. Bush was adamant that NATO would remain in Europe and therefore 
 
49 The review of NATO’s military strategy took 16 months although much of the substantive work was completed 
in the first two or three months (Cornish 1996:759) 
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sought to legitimise NATO’s post-Cold War doctrine to include a broad array of new security 
objectives (Hendrickson 1999:55). 
Flynn (1990:156) explains that the overall emphasis on continuing the NATO alliance stemmed 
from a basic concern about how long it would take for the new order in Europe would be built, 
arguing that “under the best of circumstances, it will take time to dismantle the military vestiges 
of the Cold War, and it is still totally unclear what role military forces will play in the new 
Europe”. Flynn goes on to express the common view of US defence experts and policy planners 
during the time of the post-Cold War critical juncture;  
the most likely outcome was that the Soviet Union would remain the preponderant 
power on the European continent and the other states in Europe would therefore want 
a guarantee against that power, even if all of this transpires at lower levels of military 
force. American presence will continue to be necessary to offset even this form of 
Soviet power, and NATO is believed to be the only viable basis for a link of this kind 
between Europe and the United States. 
 
Writing to the French President François Mitterrand in April 1990, during the ongoing 
discussions for the reunification of Germany, President Bush declared “I hope that you agree 
that the North Atlantic Alliance is an essential component of Europe’s future.” Moreover, “I 
do not foresee that the CSCE can replace NATO as the guarantor of Western security and 
stability” (Sarotte 2014:95). This statement is telling in that neither Bush nor his European 
counterparts attempted to seriously review how the CSCE could plausibly replace NATO. Bush 
it seemed, had already made up his mind and was aware that NATO had already set into motion 
its plans to launch a New Strategic Concept in November 1991 at the Rome summit. Yet it was 
inexcusable of European leaders to not have the foresight to conduct their own review on 
alternative European security architectures in consideration of Gorbachev’s CSCE/CEH 
initiative. Nor did Western European states demand that Russia be included within the post-
Cold War European security order. Unfortunately, Gorbachev and his Soviet executive also 
failed to come up with a concrete proposal for how this could be done. As a result, it is 
somewhat understandable why Bush’s unyielding statements convinced European leaders that 
there was no viable alternative to a US/NATO led European security order. Although Bush 
would not be persuaded to co-create a new European security order, Gorbachev demonstrated 
that he was willing to compromise by suggesting the possibility of NATO membership for the 
Soviet Union to US Secretary of State James Baker: “You say that NATO is not directed against 
us, that it is simply a security structure that is adapting to new realities, therefore we propose 
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to join NATO”. Baker however, refused to consider such a notion replying dismissively that 
‘Pan European security is a dream’ (Sarotte 2014a:95). 
At this point, Gorbachev recognized that the US had dismissed a middle of the road solution 
of Soviet NATO membership. Gorbachev nonetheless remained confident that he could 
convince the European leaders to support the CEH at the CSCE Summit meeting held in Paris 
in November 1990.  Officially marking the end of the Cold War, the Paris Summit set the 
CSCE on a new course, by institutionalizing the organization in a process outlined in the 
‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’. As such the CSCE acquired permanent institutions and 
operational capabilities to manage the historic change taking place in Europe and respond to 
the new challenges of the post-Cold War period (OSCE 2017). This was a pivotal moment for 
the CSCE during the critical juncture as up until 1990, it functioned mainly as a series of 
meetings and conferences that built on, and extended, the participating States' commitments 
(OSCE 2017). For Gorbachev, this was the next step towards developing the CEH (Ponsard 
2007). At the CSCE summit Gorbachev exclaimed  
Now the ideas proclaimed in Helsinki [at the CSCE’s founding conference in 1975] are gaining a real 
foothold. We can talk about a legally defined European space in the spheres of security, human rights, the 
economy, ecology and information as something completely attainable. The similar ideas of a ‘European 
home’, a ‘European confederation’, and a ‘peaceful European order’, are being incorporated in a kind of 
political project. All of us will have to work on its implementation in the 1990s (Gorbachev 1990, cited in 
Smith 2006:9).  
While Gorbachev was acutely aware that this process would not succeed without the input of 
all parties involved, he mistakenly believed he had more time to convince European leaders of 
the merits of the CEH and engage in negotiations to further clarify the details of his plan. 
However, in the aftermath of the Paris Summit, political events took a different direction than 
Gorbachev had envisioned. While Gorbachev had intended to hold a follow-up CSCE 
conference on human rights in Moscow during 1991, this didn’t happen because the other 
CSCE member states refused to convene after a Soviet military crackdown in the Baltic States 
of Lithuania and Latvia in January of that year (Smith 2006, p9). An attempt was made to 
censure the USSR through the CSCE. The Soviet Union responded by blocking the censure 
process and followed up by limiting attempts to bolster the CSCE’s ability to call member 
states to account for alleged human rights abuses at a meeting in Berlin in June 1991 (ibid). 
The outcome of this was the deterioration in Soviet relations with the CSCE just a few months 
after Gorbachev’s bold proclamation at the Paris summit. Gorbachev also came under 
increasing pressure from domestic problems at this time, including the deepening economic 
crisis and the fracturing of the CPSU. This led to his resignation as president of the Soviet 
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Union in December 1991. Without Gorbachev’s leadership it was expected that from the CEH 
initiative would fade into oblivion. However, there were genuine efforts on behalf of the 
Yeltsin Administration to continue to pursue Gorbachev’s vision of a new security architecture 
in Europe until the critical juncture period closed in 1994. 
During the first months of the Russian Federation’s (RF) existence, its policy towards the 
CSCE seemed to most commentators and observers to be positive, however, the honeymoon 
period of Russian-Western relations did not last long (Smith 2006 p.10). In June 1994, Russia 
put forward the idea of institutionalising the Conference into an all-inclusive European security 
organisation (Ponsard 2007:135). Although the Conference transformed into an organization 
after the Budapest Summit, held in December 1994, the idea of vesting the new OSCE with a 
superior character than NATO was once again rejected by the West (Ponsard 2007:135). In 
fact, little emerged from the summit except that a decision was taken by the Heads of State to 
change the name of the CSCE to the OSCE (The Organization of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe) (OSCE 2017). This could be viewed as quite a symbolic move as the organisation 
having rejected Russian proposals, solidified into a structure that was far removed from 
Gorbachev’s original vision for the CSCE.  The prevailing Russian sentiment was, according 
to Smith (2009:17) best expressed at the time by analyst Sergei Rogov in Moskovskiye Novosti 
in November 1999: 
The OSCE has not become the central structure for European security, as was planned during the Gorbachev 
era. Instead, the OSCE has turned into a discussion club, a vegetative organization with good intentions. 
The real force on the European continent is NATO (in the military sphere) and the European Union (in the 
economic sphere). It turns out that the common European home that Gorbachev spoke of has been built, 
but so far there’s no place in it for us. This is a very unpleasant result, not only for us but for Europe as 
well. 
 
5.2 The Arctic Regional Powers during the post-Cold War transition 
5.2.1 American Arctic Strategy during the Clinton Presidency: regional custodianship, 
continued US deterrence, clean-up efforts and post-Soviet decommissioning  
When President Bill Clinton took up office in 1993, his first secretary of state Warren 
Christopher called upon the new administration to develop a coherent and compelling grand 
strategy, something which the Bush Administration had failed to do (Suri 2009). The 
administration declared that it would transform its grand strategy “from containment to 
enlargement”. However, in practice, this meant expanding NATO into the former post-Soviet 
area of Eastern Europe, under the rhetoric of spreading democracy to these newly independent 
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states. As Posen (2019) explains, NATOs new goal became the eradication of all security 
competition from Europe and its periphery. Yet Clinton’s wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, both of 
which depended on significant American and NATO military capabilities, did not produce 
functioning liberal democracies in these countries (ibid). It was nonetheless argued by the US 
that Russia’s domestic instability and incomplete post-Soviet transition to democracy meant 
that it did not fulfil the necessary criteria for NATO membership.  
For the US, retaining the Cold War status quo security order therefore continued to take 
precedence both in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the Arctic region. To demonstrate this, I will 
turn to investigating Clinton’s 1994 Arctic and Antarctic strategy, titled ‘United States Policy 
on the Arctic and the Antarctic Regions’ issued as a Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD/NSC) No.26. Within this document it can be clearly seen how security objectives 
continued to take precedence before all other policy-issue areas in the Arctic. The PDD/NSC-
26 directive is a relatively short and concise document that outlined six US objectives in the 
post-Cold War Arctic in just under three pages.  
The United States has six principal objectives in the Arctic region:  
(1) meeting post-Cold War national security and defence needs, 
(2) protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources,  
(3) assuring that natural resource management and economic development in the region are 
environmentally sustainable,  
(4) strengthening institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations, 
(5) involving the Arctic's indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them, and  
(6) enhancing scientific monitoring and research into local, regional and global environmental 
issues (The White House 1994:2). 
In contrast to the ordering of the Clinton environmental review, the first objective of the 
PDD/NSC-26 is “meeting national security and defence needs” while “protecting the Arctic 
environment and conserving it’s biological resources” takes second and third place in the 
PDD/NSC-26. The primacy of security objectives in the Arctic is further explained in the 
following paragraph from the PDD/NSC-26: 
Although Cold War tensions have dramatically decreased, the United States continues to have basic 
national security and defence interests in the Arctic region. We have a strong interest in maintaining peace 
and stability throughout the region. We must maintain the ability to protect against attack across the Arctic, 
to move ships and aircraft freely under the principles of customary law reflected in the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention, to control our borders and areas under our jurisdiction and to carry out military operations 
in the region (The White House 1994:2) 
In reality the US pursued a regional strategy towards the Arctic that amounted to benign neglect 
for almost two decades– within the NSC-26 it is nonetheless evident that the US sought to 
preserve its post-Cold War military hegemony in the Arctic RSC. From the statement declaring 
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that ‘we must maintain the ability to protect against attack across the Arctic’ it can be discerned 
that the US sought to maintain strategic overseas military bases in the Arctic that it had obtained 
through WWII and Cold War leasing agreements. These included Thule AFB, Greenland, and 
Keflavik AFB, Iceland. However, at the time, the US State Department was also seeking to 
reduce its forces in Europe. For example, US forces stationed in Iceland were cut by a third, to 
around 2,000 military personnel in 1993, and by 1994 only four to six fighter jets remained to 
provide ‘a credible defence of Iceland’50 (Jóhannesson 2004:128). Essentially, the United 
States sought to maintain the benefits of the advanced warning radar stations and observation 
posts that Thule and Keflavik provided yet sought to do so as cheaply as possible.  
The PDD/NSC-26 objective of ‘strengthening institutions for cooperation’ and ‘involving the 
Arctic’s indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them’ are listed in fourth and fifth place 
respectively. Later, in Part Three, when I describe the process of the inter-state negotiations 
between the US and Canada that took place prior to the creation of the AC, I will show that the 
US did not fulfil the fourth and fifth policy objectives from the PDD/NSC-26 and in fact, 
through its actions, essentially undermined these objectives.  
From the five other objectives of the PDD/NSC-26, Palosaari and Möller (2003:272) consider 
that non-proliferation was the most prominent US interest in the Arctic north since it was 
framed as having considerable importance to US national security. A further reason for 
focusing on non-proliferation in the Arctic is that it served as the overarching basis of bilateral 
relations with Russia, but this was expanded into other areas of technological and scientific 
cooperation.  
The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission is referred to in the NSC/PDD-26 as a key institutional 
structure to organise non-proliferation efforts51. Within the Commission, there were three US-
led projects aimed at non-proliferation and decommissioning of Soviet nuclear weapons and 
submarines in the Arctic. These included the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) (1991), the 
 
50 Jóhannesson (2004:128) explains that in 1994, the 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was relieved of its mission 
in Iceland and replaced on a rotational basis by aircraft from units in the United States. The Icelandic government 
were concerned that the United States would remove all aircraft and sought to prevent doing so because a) the 
defence of Iceland was not viewed as credible without some aerial element and b) aircraft such as the rescue 
helicopters had often proved vital during non-military search and rescue missions  
 
51 Established in Vancouver in 1993 the commission was named after its two chairmen: US Vice President Al Gore, and 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission met twice a year for five years, until 




Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) (1996) and the Northern Europe Initiative 
(NEI) (1997).  However, Palosaari and Möller (2003:272) explain that the focus of the US-led 
projects was too narrow in its agenda to support a comprehensive environmental program in 
the Arctic: “Rather than being mutually supportive, synergistic and constructive division of 
labour between the projects: with CTR dealing with strategic issues, AMEC dealing with 
military environmental issues other than strategic ones, and the NEI dealing with civilian 
environmental issues, in practice, strategic issues were prioritized at the expense of all other 
issues”. This undermined the NSC-26 Directive which recognised that cooperation on non-
strategic issues would “…help reduce the risk of a resurgence of traditional threats” (The White 
House 1994:2). 
From this it can be concluded that while on paper, non-strategic objectives were outlined in the 
PDD/NSC-26 as being a fundamental part of America’s post-Cold War Arctic policy, in reality, 
the document served a short-sighted, national-security agenda that was mainly concerned with 
preventing Russia from re-militarizing and re-emerging as a regional power in the Arctic. 
Environmental clean-up operations were therefore only a means to this end. As such, America’s 
post-Cold War Arctic leadership role can most accurately be described through the RPSF as 
regional custodianship. This is defined by Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) as a state which 
aims to protect the region from specific threats that originate from inside the region, in this 
instance, the securing and disposing of aging Soviet nuclear components to prevent third-party 
theft and/or Russian remilitarization under the auspices of preventing further Arctic 
environmental degradation. At the same time, the US left its own Cold War security structures 
intact, maintaining rather than dismantling overseas NATO Arctic air bases in states in 
Greenland and Iceland. This demonstrates that the US was satisfied with the pre-critical 
juncture status quo, as it served the Clinton’s post-Cold War grand strategy of maintaining US 
military hegemony in Europe and globally.  
To conclude, in the post-Cold War years, the US did not seek to transform the Arctic political 
or security orders and as such did not take on a regional leadership role. Instead, it behaved as 
a regional custodian intent on maintaining the status quo security order, by taking as a ‘night-
watchman’ approach – ready, if necessary, to defend the order from old or new security threats, 
(i.e. Russia, and the challenge of post-Cold War nuclear clean-up efforts) but otherwise 
remained politically detached from the region. As such, America became known in policy 
circles as ‘the reluctant Arctic power’ a title first suggested by Canadian scholar Rob Huebert 
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in 2009 to illustrate how the United States remained both disinterested and disinclined to act 
as a regional leader in the Arctic throughout the decade of the 1990s and for most of the 2000s.   
5.2.2 The Post-Soviet Arctic and the ‘Smuta’ of the 1990s – a Time of Troubles   
Historians have documented that Russia has cyclically experienced times throughout its history 
where the nation has undergone reoccurring ‘time of troubles’ (smuta). Yet the post-Soviet 
transition period is considered by some as the most recent episode of smuta encountered by the 
Russian state (Petersson 2013:311). Having examined how the Arctic and the broader Euro-
Atlantic RSC experienced a post-Cold War critical juncture from 1987 to 1994, during this 
time, Russia, experienced its own series of critical junctures as it attempted its tenuous post-
communist transition towards democracy. Ostrow et al (2007:10) explain that this can be traced 
to decisions made over 1) how to demolish the communist political system, 2) when and how 
to adopt a new constitution, 3) how to respond to political competition, new actors and interests 
and 4) how to handle leadership change. The authors argue that at each critical juncture, 
Russia’s post-communist leaders made antidemocratic choices that would pave the way to the 
consolidation of dictatorship under Putin when he succeeded Yeltsin as president in 1999.  
In this section, it will be argued that due to the deep systemic crisis that Russia experienced in 
in the immediate post-Cold War years, it was unable to take up the role of regional leadership 
in the Arctic as it had previously done during the Gorbachev era. As President Boris Yeltsin 
(1991-1999) admitted more than two years after the Soviet collapse, the Russian state had yet 
to assume ‘a worthy place in the world community’ (Lo, 2002 p.13). Yeltsin was aware that in 
order to play a meaningful part in global affairs Russia would need to develop a clear sense of 
what it stood for, a system of core values and priorities, and foreign policies capable of 
promoting them (p.13-14). As Andrew Hurrell (2007:28) explains, the liberal constitutional 
state, as an institution, should serve as a container for pluralism and a framework for the 
protection of diversity: “what animates this claim is the idea that peoples, nations, and 
communities have an identity and justifiably seek the protective and expressive power of the 
state to further that identity”.  
Yet a more immanent problem that Russia first had to face was how to prevent the further 
erosion of domestic order. A considerable difficulty was how to dislodge “diffidence, fear and 
suspicion from social settings characterized by great inequalities of power, weak institutions 
and deep societal differences” (Hurrell 2007:29). Because civil society was severely 
underdeveloped and underfinanced owing to the long years of Soviet oppression, any Russian 
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initiatives for circumpolar Arctic cooperation would likely have had to emerge from within the 
state itself and be considered by the executive as a priority issue of foreign policy. However, 
Yeltsin’s political weakness and ineffectual rule meant that neither the president or his 
administration were able to formulate a clear vision for Russia’s foreign or domestic policy, 
least of all with respect to Arctic cooperation, even though this would lead to an absence of 
Russian involvement during a crucial time of Arctic regional transformation.  
Another aspect to be considered is the difficulty Russia faced with identifying itself as a great 
power in world politics. Although no longer a superpower, the 1993 Foreign policy concept of 
the Russian Federation, outlined that Russia was still a great power in world politics. However, 
if, as Petersson (2013) suggests, that order is a precondition for reaching and upholding great 
power status, then it is evident that Russia’s internal crisis during the post-Soviet transition led 
to a significant decline of external status. Writing in Foreign Policy Georgei Arbatov (1994), 
reflected that since Russia was unable to take up a leadership role in US-Russian relations in 
the immediate post-Soviet years, it therefore fell upon the United States to take the initiative: 
…one has to understand the Russian situation: The present political elite is just not enlightened, 
experienced, or powerful enough to take the lead. If America is willing to play the role of a country 
proposing initiatives, it will offer in a sense to repay a debt: When perestroika started, one could not expect 
too much from those who ruled America at the time. So Russia took the initiative. Now it is America's turn. 
Arbatov’s observation about the Yeltsin administration is significant since it corresponds to 
both the ES and RPSF understandings of power and leadership. Essentially, both material 
power capabilities and ideational forms of power (including having a clear vision for 
cooperation and shared ideas/identity) are a necessary requisite that must be present within the 
political leadership of a state in order it to take up a regional leadership role. It has been 
established that the United States was unwilling to take long-term, decisive steps to strengthen 
the US-Russian relationship in the post-Cold War era. Nor did it take up a regional leadership 
role in the post-Cold War Arctic. At the same time, the continuation of American Cold War 
security mandates, which resulted in regional security overlap, made it extremely difficult to 
alter Russian perceptions away from a militarized Arctic and propose new initiatives.  
Yeltsin’s political failures in the Russian Arctic can be summarized as the inability to develop 
prudent regional development strategies to help steer Russian northerners successfully through 
the political and economic transition. The new ‘hyper-liberal’ economic policies implemented 
by the Yeltsin Administration and endorsed by the US proponents of economic ‘shock therapy’ 
led to many changes in the Russian North, including the privatization of agriculture, farm 
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holdings and natural resources. However, mismanagement, corruption and embezzlement of 
funds at the local and regional level severely impeded economic development.  The lack of 
political and legal oversight by Moscow demonstrates the relative weakness of the Yeltsin 
administration and its inability to develop a new, cohesive vision for ‘the Russian north’. 
Historically, the Russian Arctic has never been perceived by the state as a unified region, 
instead being roughly divided geographically between the north-western Russian Arctic 
(Murmansk, Karelia and Arkhangelsk) and the Siberian Russian Arctic in the Far east. 
However, during the Yeltsin era, regional differences threatened the very cohesion of the state. 
Political fragmentation amongst the remaining post-Soviet regions and republics was a 
constant concern for Yeltsin who had during his election campaign promised the regional 
governors that they could take as much sovereignty as they wanted. In 1993, when the new 
Constitution for the Russian Federation was ratified, Article 69 served to guarantee the political 
rights of indigenous peoples in line with international law and grant them the ability to govern 
their own territories. In reality, the Arctic regions obtained a semi-autonomous status at best.  
Since the Russian Arctic was no longer considered the vital strategic military region that it had 
been during the Cold War, nor a region consigned an importance through the creation of 
national identity and myth-making as it had during the early Soviet era - it therefore faded into 
policy negligence. Military and commercial shipping declined and the Northern Sea Route 
(NRS) and the supporting infrastructure fell into disuse. The decline in Northern policymaking 
was also to a large extent the result of bureaucratic disorganisation within the State Committee 
on Northern Issues, Goskomsever, which negatively affected efforts to formulate policies that 
responded to the needs of Russian citizens in the post-Soviet Arctic (Foxhall 2014:98). 
Goskomsever, the Committee and political unit responsible for formulating Russia’s Arctic 
policy during the 1990s, was disbanded and re-established no less than six times between 1992 
and 2000, a trend that reflected the chaotic state of Russian politics during the post-Soviet 
transition (ibid). With respect to post-Soviet military activities and defence, the Yeltsin era also 
led to a significant reduction of the Russian defence budget and thus a reduced military 
presence in the Arctic.   
Although Yeltsin never created an Arctic Strategy, there were specific maritime incidents that 
occurred in the Russian Arctic that drew his attention toward unresolved security and foreign 
policy issues that directly impacted Russian-Western relations. A good example of this is a 
collision that occurred between an American and Russian submarine which occurred on the 
20th of March 1993. The March collision occurred when an American nuclear-powered 
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submarine, the USS. Grayling, collided with a Russian Delta-class submarine it was shadowing 
on a routine patrol in the Kola Peninsula. Had the US submarine been five seconds slower, it 
would have struck the Russian submarine right on its missile bay, sinking the submarine and 
scattering nuclear warheads over the ocean floor. While the START I treaty limited the number 
of missiles that submarines were allowed to carry, this treaty had not yet gone into effect. It 
was therefore assumed that the Russian submarine was carrying up to sixteen nuclear-tipped 
missiles (Bowermaster 1993).  
The March collision represented “one of the few irritants standing in the way of smoother US-
Russian relations”, as it demonstrated how US had not yet revised its naval policy in the Arctic 
or reduced its forces in the region at the end of the Cold War, despite political rhetoric 
proclaiming that Russia was no longer a threat to American security (ibid). As Kristian Åtland 
(2007:522) explains, Russia’s relative naval weakness, in combination with what was 
perceived as an increasingly offensive US naval doctrine, gave rise to a sense of vulnerability. 
In 1995, Northern fleet commander Oleg Yerfeyev wrote that the ‘constant presence’ of US, 
British and French nuclear submarines in the North Atlantic attested to the need to strengthen 
Russia’s military presence (Åtland 2007:522). This served to justify Russia’s retention of a 
Soviet outlook to planning in the Arctic up until the end of the Yeltsin presidency.  
Nonetheless, throughout the turbulent years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, Russia remained a 
strong supporter of both the AEPS and the Arctic Council initiative (Axeworthy and Dean 
2013:17). However, the political and financial difficulties experienced by Russia in the post-
Soviet era severely limited the newly established Russian Federation’s capacity to contribute 
to Arctic regional development initiatives. These included the working group projects of the 
Finnish initiative - the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) from 1991 to 1996, 
and later the Arctic Council during its formative years. For example, Elana Wilson Rowe 
(2009b:145) observes that because of domestic problems, Russia was almost entirely absent 
from the official record for the first three years that the AC was operational (1996-1999)52.  
Prior to the creation of the AC, in February 1992, Yeltsin visited Ottawa Canada and met with 
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Together they issued a declaration affirming that 
both countries supported the creation of an Arctic Council. The Toronto Star newspaper 
 
52 Rowe also notes that Russia was a net recipient of subsidies from other Arctic states when it would have otherwise been 
financially unfeasible for Russian official representatives and non-government experts to attend AC fora and Summit meetings. 
Unfortunately, this practice persists today, for Arctic experts and Russian indigenous groups, although less frequently for 
representatives of the Russian administration.     
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reported this event by declaring that ‘Canada and Russia have joined forces in a sweeping 
program to protect the Arctic’ (Axeworthy and Dean 2013:17). In a state visit to Canada a few 
months later in June 1992, President Yeltsin addressed Parliament, stating that “only together 
can we solve the problems involving the Arctic”. In reality, Yeltsin left it to the Canadians and 
the Fins to develop new forms of circumpolar political cooperation in the Arctic since he simply 
did not have the material capacity at his disposal to fund new regional Arctic initiatives, nor 
did he share Gorbachev’s ideational vision for the Arctic to serve as the foundation for a new 
Euro-Atlantic security order.  A post-Cold War increase in US naval activity in the Arctic 
created a greater sense of Russian vulnerability with respect to its relative military weakness. 
This served to limit the potential of developing greater Arctic military cooperation between the 
US and Russia. Meanwhile, Russia’s political and economic incapacity prevented Russian 
delegates from actively participating in AC structures during its formative years. Under such 
conditions it is inconceivable for Russia to have taken up a post-Cold War Arctic regional 
leadership role.   
5.3 The negotiation process leading up to the establishment of the Arctic 
Council in 1996 
In the following sections, I will focus on the process and inter-state negotiations prior to the 
establishment of the AC. This will serve two purposes: firstly, to understand the process of 
negotiations leading to the creation of the AC and secondly to investigate the way in which the 
decision to exclude security issues from the AC was rationalised by the United States and why 
this was conceded by Canada, the leading state behind the creation of the AC. By doing so, I 
intend to demonstrate that two key institutional features of the AC, its non-legal identity, and 
the exclusion of security issues from discussion forums: were not agreed upon by the majority 
of Arctic states but were instead implemented on American insistence. My point here is to show 
that America’s institutional preferences for the AC correlated to its uni-multipolar post-Cold 
War foreign policy of maintaining American military hegemony in the Arctic and the broader 
Euro-Atlantic RSC, while conceding to limited change in the region through the creation of 
mechanisms for institutional cooperation. Since the US was politically disinterested in taking 
up a regional leadership role in the Arctic, Canada, the Arctic’s sole middle power, instead took 
it upon itself to create a new institutional architecture that expanded upon Finland’s AEPS and 
responded to indigenous northerners request for political representation at the regional level. 
Some Arctic experts such as Wegge (2011) would argue that Canada’s role in developing the 
AC multilateral political forums would strongly indicate that the post-Cold War Arctic regional 
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order is undeniably multipolar. I disagree, since the United States has demonstrated its ability 
to instigate an ‘Arctic veto’ at critical times during AC negotiations. As such, the US’ ability 
to shape the post-Cold War Artic order according to its security preferences would suggest that 
the post-Cold War Arctic can more accurately be described as ‘uni-multipolar’. This signifies 
that while the US was not inclined to take up regional leadership or hegemony itself, it 
nonetheless critically influenced political and security outcomes in the Arctic during the 
development of the AC, thus demonstrating a latent ability to act as a regional power and 
override the political will of other Arctic states. However, the concept of uni-multipolarity also 
suggests that this period of Arctic history is transitional and brief, with the prospect that the 
Arctic and the international system is transforming to that of true multipolarity, within which 
decision-making power is diffuse, diversified and not confined to states alone.   
5.3.1 The role of regional society in creating the AC initiative: a partnership between the 
Canadian government, civil society and indigenous groups in pursuit of an integrated 
Arctic security agenda 
One of the key objectives of this section is to show how the current division in Arctic political 
literature between environmental cooperation and indigenous politics on the one hand, and 
military security on the other, is a false dichotomy. To do this, I will focus specifically on the 
role that Canadian civil society played in contributing to the creation of the AC and outline 
how their objectives for creating a circumpolar Arctic institution were two-fold: to achieve full 
participation of indigenous leaders while developing a broad, integrated security agenda 
inclusive of Arctic demilitarization and arms control issues. From an indigenous perspective, 
political and security cooperation in the Arctic is understood as inter-connected and not 
mutually exclusive. However, to prevent a revision of the Cold War international security order 
and to maintain its power advantage in the region, the United States sought to prevent full 
participation of indigenous leaders and exclude military issues from the AC.  
In Chapter 4, it was shown that in the era of incipient multipolarity, during the final years of 
the Cold War, state and non-state Actors in the Arctic began to engage in greater levels of 
trans-national circumpolar political cooperation. This led to the transformation of Arctic 
regional society from a coexistent to a cooperative society with the outcome being a broadening 
and deepening of Arctic networks. In this way, it can be surmised that the emergence of a 




In 1988, when Finland had decided that the best way to respond to Gorbachev’s Murmansk 
speech by pursuing an environmental approach to Arctic regional cooperation (see Chapter 4), 
elements of Canadian civil society were more intrigued by the northern arms control 
possibilities (Axeworthy and Dean, 2013:22). For instance, the Walter Duncan Gordon 
Foundation, a Toronto-based charitable organization dedicated to innovative public policy, had 
identified both arms control and the North as a major priority in the late 1980s. The foundation 
established a multi-year ‘Arctic Security Project’ which ran from 1988 to the creation of the 
Arctic Council whose objectives were defined by the chair of the Foundation, Kyra Montagu, 
as “To encourage the development of Canadian security and demilitarization of the Arctic 
which is successfully integrated with related social, scientific, environmental, developmental, 
legal, and other Canadian Arctic policy goals, and which complements and supports 
international circumpolar cooperation” (p.23). The Foundation subsequently funded projects 
for other organisations which also agreed with this approach, including the ICC, Scientists for 
Peace, and the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (CCAD). Of these, the 
ICC would play an especially important role since ICC leaders Mary Simon and Rosemarie 
Kuptana53 were at the forefront in AC negotiations. Simon (1992:57) expressed that  
The ICC firmly believes that extensive circumpolar cooperation (for example international trade, polar 
research, environmental protection, cultural exchange) is a key factor in promoting Arctic and global peace. 
However, such co-operation would best flourish if it included meaningful and comprehensive arms control 
initiatives. For both defence and environmental purposes, state governments must look beyond 
geographical and political borders. They must begin to perceive the Arctic as a single entity, as Inuit do  
A pivotal moment in support of the AC initiative occurred in November 1989, when Brian 
Mulroney, then Prime Minister of Canada, proposed the creation of an Arctic Council in a 
speech during a visit to Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) in the Soviet Union. The Prime 
Minister asked “And why not a council of Arctic countries eventually coming into existence 
to coordinate and promote cooperation among them?54 The Canadian government’s crucial 
role in forwarding the AC initiative can be viewed through English School perspectives as the 
challenge of small and medium states to fill the political vacuum left by the receding 
 
53 Mary Simon was president of the ICC from 1986-1992. In 1993 she took up the role as Canadian Ambassador for 
circumpolar affairs and played a key role in US-Canadian AC negotiations. Rosemarie Kuptana was president of the ICC 
during the critical years of 1995-1996, when the Arctic Council declaration was negotiated 
 
54 It was Mulroney’s speech writer, John Hagen, who had been urged by John Lamb, president of the CCACD, to include the 




superpowers and reshape the post-Cold War Arctic into a peaceful multipolar order. Canada’s 
proposal for developing Arctic multilateral cooperation can also be further rationalised 
through analysing its motivations for doing so from both a domestic and foreign policy 
perspective. Keskitalo (2004:4) effectively summarises the Canadian position below:   
For Canada… Arctic “northerness” had long been a factor whereby the state had defined itself, especially 
in sovereignty conflicts with the US but also domestically, and the Arctic was an area where Canada 
possessed a well-developed discourse and organization. 
Quick to exploit the opening provided by Mulroney, civil society groups including the CCAD, 
the ICC arranged briefings with government officials in Ottawa to ensure that the government 
follow up on Mulroney’s sporadic proposal. In November 1990, a year after Mulroney’s 
speech, Inuit leader and president of the ICC, Rosemarie Kuptana co-chaired the Arctic Council 
Panel with Franklyn Griffiths of the Gordon Foundation to flesh out the details of an Arctic 
Council. The panel undertook an extensive consultation with Northern groups between April 
and September 1990 (Axeworthy and Dean 2013:26).  
As a part of this process, a report was prepared for the Arctic Council Panel in August 1990 
that reviewed five organizational structure that were examined in terms of their origins, 
structure, procedures/decision-making processes, legality and impact. The CSCE was included 
as one of these five organisations55. Written during the critical juncture, the fact that the report 
included a review of the CSCE demonstrates that the panel was serious about their intent to 
include arms control and military security issues as a part of the AC agenda while at the same 
time, they recognised the potential of the CSCE to be transformed in the post-Cold War era 
into a powerful security actor. The report concludes its assessment of the CSCE by asking “is 
it time for a new Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to agree upon the creation 
of a new institution with effective powers?” (Hannigan, 1990:29).  
Even more noteworthy is the fact that in a separate report published in September 1990 To 
Establish a Council on Arctic Security and Cooperation, the panel declared that “we will 
hereafter refer to the proposed new body as the Council on Arctic Security and Cooperation 
(CASC)” (Griffiths and Kuptana 1990:4). Additionally, the panel organised the CASC agenda 
by categorising issues into ‘baskets’ (see table 5.2) – a method that has striking similarities to 
the CSCE’s Helsinki Accords of 1975 (Chapter 4). Similar to Buzan and Waever’s (2003) 
 
55 The other four organisations included in the report were the Antarctic Treaty System: the Canadian Polar Commission: the 




RSCT, the panel identifies the difference between security threats that emerge from within the 
Arctic and from outside of it arguing that:  “[this]…difference is of particular significance here 
in that it allows us to build preconditions for effective action into the structure of choice among 
possible Arctic agenda items” (Griffiths and Kuptana 1990:54). However, the panel proposed 
a flexible approach towards the allocation of issues into baskets, recognising that each were 
interconnected. As such they were also against ‘an iron curtain’ division between civil and 
military issues arguing that “Arctic-specific cooperation on civil matters may serve as a form 
of confidence-building” (ibid).  
However, the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) was not in favour of a direct 
approach to Arctic arms control. One senior official stated that it doesn’t make sense to treat 
the Arctic as a special region and that arms control should be discussed in an international 
setting such as in Geneva or Vienna (Axeworthy and Dean 2013). This can be understood due 
to the fact the Cold War had not yet ended. The DEA was operating in accordance to its 
December 1986 Foreign Policy paper titled Canada’s International Relations: Government 
Response to Independence and Internationalism. Within this document, the government 
emphasised that Arctic policy, as a component of Canada’s foreign policy, were two 
interrelated themes that would be dealt with together, providing “the basis for an integrated and 
comprehensive northern foreign policy” (Dean et al 2014:13). As such, a separate Arctic 
strategy and arms control agenda was not going to emerge. The Arctic arms control movement 
therefore began to pursue an ‘indirect approach’ to security issues by engaging with a broader 
Arctic security agenda (Axeworthy and Dean 2013). As a result, CASC was shelved in favour 




Table 5.1- Proposed structure for CASC’s primary agenda Source: Griffiths and Kuptana 
1990:54 
 
At the end of the consultation period, the Arctic Council Panel published an interim report To 
Establish an International Arctic Council in November 1990. At this time, other indigenous 
leaders joined Kuptana56 on the panel which tipped the balance in favour of promoting the 
northern agenda within the AC negotiations. With northern consultations completed, External 
Affairs Minister Joe Clark announced on November 28th, 1990, that ‘Canada intends to propose 
an Arctic Council to the seven other Arctic countries”. He wrote to all the circumpolar foreign 
ministers outlining the Canadian government’s concept of an Arctic Council. In this letter, 
Clark also stated that “Canada is willing to host a small secretariat and contribute to sustaining 
 
56 These included Mary Simon, Bill Erasmus, (president, Dene Nation), John Amagoalik (president Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami) 
and Cindy Gilday (formerly with Indigenous Survival International) 
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it from the outset” (Axeworthy and Dean 2013:30), suggesting that he expected Canada to take 
a leadership role both in the creation and day-to-day running of the AC.   
For Canada, taking up this AC leadership not only ensured that the project would reach 
completion but as a way in which to further its own national interests in the north. Not only 
could Canada establish itself as an Arctic nation, but it also undoubtedly served Canada’s 
national interests since it was hoped that developing a new multilateral structure for Arctic 
cooperation would in turn reduce superpower military tensions in the region and alleviate 
national defence spending. However, Canada was also consciously aware that should it 
overstep its role as medium power, that this would not be tolerated by the United States and 
could endanger the carefully crafted ‘special relationship’ and security agreements between the 
two countries and Canada’s ongoing commitment to NATO and NORAD. Therefore, Canada’s 
actions in the Arctic were bounded by its perceived role as a middle power in international 
politics, however through its long-term foreign policy doctrine of internationalism, Canada 
could, through the creation of a new multilateral institution, seek to revise the Cold War order. 
This draws parallels with Hedley Bull’s proscription of developing a regional international 
society where Arctic nation-states would routinize their interactions through institutionalized 
rules and norms.  
On January 25th, 1991 the Arctic Council Panel took its intermittent report to Ottawa for an all-
day round table with senior officials from several departments including the Department of 
External Affairs and the Prime Minister’s office. The Toronto Star reported that by the end of 
the day, the government agreed not to rule out any discussion of security. Gordon Robertson, 
who chaired the roundtable meeting, summarised discussions by stating that “an open agenda 
achieved through consensus is preferable, so that it is possible to include without having to 
exclude” (Axeworthy and Dean p.29). Thus, the concept of an ‘open agenda’ rather than a 
specific commitment to security issues became the bottom line for Council proponents. The 
final report of the Arctic Panel:  To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework 
Report was published in May 1991 and attracted the most public attention. The executive 
summary report declared 
We urge that the mandate of an Arctic Council be an open one that allows for growth in the Council’s 
agenda with the growth of consensus. No international arctic matter should in principle be barred from 
discussion or negotiation in Council. This applies to questions of international peace and security. Though 
consensus procedures will prevail on this as on other questions, an Arctic Council must be able to address 
the full range of arctic international issues as circumstance allows (Arctic Council Panel 1991).  
212 
 
It is evident that indigenous leaders and the ACP still fought to retain security issues on the AC 
agenda. At the ICC Copenhagen summit held in June 1991, indigenous leaders specifically 
outlined two key objectives that should be addressed as a part of a new security agenda in the 
Arctic: ‘first to develop an integrated concept of security in which military requirements are 
combined with an awareness of the need to act for environmental, economic and social security 
as well’, and second ‘to place a new emphasis on non-military cooperation…which may over 
time improve the outlook for confidence building and arms reduction agreements in the 
circumpolar North’ (Østreng 1992:26). The specific use of the term ‘integrated security 
agenda’ is of special interest here since it closely corresponds to the RPSF categorisation of an 
integrated security order. However, the United States, understanding the potential that such a 
proposal could have on the long-term development of the region, sought to prevent a security 
agenda emerging within the AC by impeding the negotiation process until this issue was 
resolved in its favour (Huebert 1998:53).  
Two meetings of international experts were held in May 1992 and May 1993. When Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney proposed a “low key officials meeting of the Arctic countries in 
Canada” in May 1992, every Arctic state sent negotiators except the US, which sent officials 
from its Ottawa embassy to observe only (Axeworthy and Dean 2013:31). Then, at the May 
1993 meeting, all of the Arctic states, except the United States, agreed to the draft declaration 
and terms of reference for the AC. At this point, Canadian officials pressed the Americans for 
their support of the AC initiative (Huebert 1998.:53). However, this would come at the price 
of conceding to US demands to revise the AC declaration from the original draft to one that 
limited northerner indigenous participation, did not include a Canadian secretariat, and 
specifically excluded military issues.  
5.3.2 The unresolved difference between Canadian and American positions on the AC    
When President Bill Clinton came into power in 1993, this was considered a positive 
development for AC negotiations since in his pre-election campaign Clinton had proclaimed 
that he would pursue a more liberal, multilateral foreign policy, in contrast to his predecessor 
(Axeworthy and Dean 2013:34). As such it was hoped that the new US administration would 
be more conducive towards developing an Arctic regional institution. Changes in government 
also occurred in Canada in 1993, when the liberal party won the Canadian general election and 
Jean Chrétien became prime minister in November 1993. Fortunately, the Chrétien government 
was as enthusiastic as the previous Mulroney government about the creation of the AC and 
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made it a priority on the new government’s agenda. The party also made a specific commitment 
to create an Arctic Ambassador, an idea first raised by the Arctic Arms Control Report in 1989. 
Mary Simon, former president of the ICC, and long-time member of the Gordon Arctic Project 
Steering Committee took up this post in October of 1994. In her new role, Mary Simon would 
become a key figure in US-Canadian AC negotiations.     
The first step that Simon took to break the deadlock of US opposition to the AC was to get it 
on the President’s Agenda (Axeworthy 2012:22). Prior to an arranged meeting between 
President Clinton and Prime Minister Chretien in Ottawa during a bilateral summit in early 
1995, Canadian negotiators planned to concede enough of the US objectives to encourage 
President Clinton to accept the proposal. Mary Simon led a Canadian delegation to Washington 
on January 16th and 17th 1995 where she made the argument that a broader forum that the AEPS 
was needed. In a letter to Secretary of State André Oullet, dated January 20th 1995, Mary Simon 
emphasised that since the Clinton administration sought to bolster ties with President Yeltsin, 
“…Canadian/US cooperation with the Russian Federation could be enhanced through the 
Arctic Council” (Axeworthy 2012:22).  In this way, Simon attempted to ‘sell’ the AC initiative 
to the respective Canadian and American governments on the grounds that an Arctic regional 
institution could serve as a mechanism for socialising the RF within a predominantly western, 
democratic grouping of Arctic states. Simon also believed that “The creation of the Arctic 
Council will a be modest but real recognition that Russia has joined the democratic community 
of states” (ibid). For Canada, an added benefit of establishing a regional institution was the 
international recognition bestowed on the leading state(s) involved in undertaking such a task 
(Hurrell 1995, p50, Keskitalo, 2004, p4). For instance, Fenge and Penikett (2009:68) observe 
how the AC represents “Canada’s most significant foreign policy accomplishment in the last 
fifteen years”. 
While the Canadian civil society groups sought to promote peace and demilitarization in the 
Arctic, US negotiations, headed by R. Tucker Scully57, kept returning to the issue of the AC 
being a non-security forum. When the US presented a ‘streamlined’ declaration, their position 
paper emphasized “the Arctic Council would not be an appropriate forum for discussing 
national security and defence issues and the United States should ensure that security issues 
are not within the Council’s terms of reference” (Axeworthy and Dean, 2013:35-36). Therefore, 
 




on US insistence, the final draft of the Arctic Council Declaration explicitly prohibits the 
discussion of military security within the Council’s mandate, stating that “The Arctic Council 
should not deal with matters relating to military security”. 
The US specifically objected to the plural of “indigenous peoples” in the draft charter, believing 
that the use of ‘peoples’ implied sovereignty (p.35). The US therefore created a footnote in the 
revised draft outlining that “the use of the term ‘peoples’ in this Declaration shall not be 
construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under 
international law” (p.36-37). This indicates that the US viewed the Council as a forum of states 
rather than a partnership with the indigenous peoples, in the process disregarding the objective 
of its own 1994 Arctic Strategy NSC/PDD-26, that declared how the US would seek to increase 
‘involvement of Arctic indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them’ (section 5.2.2).  
The US stance denying full representation to Permanent Participants in addition to the 
exclusion of security from the AC agenda was wholly disheartening for groups like the ICC 
who had fought so hard for Arctic indigenous representation and the Arctic arms control 
agenda. Yet, in the end, all parties involved in the AC negotiations conceded to the US position, 
most likely out of concern that to do otherwise would jeopardise the whole process. From an 
indigenous perspective, it was hoped that as the role of the AC grew, so too would the potential 
of indigenous groups to make a difference (Axeworthy and Dean 2013:42).  
The final draft of the revised Declaration was signed in Ottawa on September 19th, 1996, 
formally establishing the AC. However, Pedersen (2012:149) remarks that the September 
signing was not attended well by high level dignitaries from Arctic states. When the United 
States announced that Secretary of State Warren Christopher would not attend the Ottawa 
signing event, this prompted Russia to replace Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov with 
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Krylov. Subsequently, Norway and Denmark58 also chose not 
send Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials to the ceremony, notwithstanding the fact that the 
event was hosted by Canada's foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy. It would take until 2011, 
fifteen years after the signing of the Ottawa Declaration, for a US Secretary of State to finally 
attend an AC Ministerial meeting for the first time (ibid). This strongly suggests that. Thus, 
having achieved its political objectives to limit the institutional power of the AC, it then was 
 
58 Norway was instead represented by the Deputy Minister of the Environment, Bernt Bull, while Denmark was represented 
by the Prime Minister of Greenland, Lars Emil Johansen (Pedersen 2012, p.149) 
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then considered only of marginal importance to the United States. As such, the US was content 
to resume its custodianship role as the ‘reluctant Arctic power’.  
The question that arises from analysing Canadian actions through the RPSF is ‘did Canada 
fulfil a leadership role in the Arctic in the immediate Post-Cold War years’? It is interesting 
that Canada’s Arctic leadership contribution, while adhering to the RPSF, also produces some 
findings that might serve useful for future adjustments to the theory. First, Canada is not a 
regional power in the sense that it is overshadowed by the two great regional powers: the United 
States and Russia. However, if these great powers were not regionally present in the Arctic, 
then Canada, at least in terms of relative power, would be the strongest circumpolar Arctic state 
with respect to geographical territory and material capacity, potentially qualifying it as a 
regional power. In support of this view, Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012:51) contend that a 
regional power may be a middle power in global politics.  
I conclude that while middle powers may propose new initiatives and strive to take up a 
regional leadership role, they can be overshadowed by the influence of great powers operating 
within the region. Canada’s asymmetrical power position vis-à-vis the US and the necessity of 
maintaining its special defence and trade relationship explains why it conceded to US demands. 
Therefore, unless the middle power is also the regional power within the RSC, then it is likely 
that any long-term regional initiatives that a middle power might propose will be revised by 
the regional power(s), especially if they are oriented towards maintaining the status quo. Since 
it is unlikely that a middle power and a great power will share the same foreign policy 
objectives, a status quo regional power will likely seek to block any long-term transformational 
changes proposed by a middle power, especially if such changes threaten their own interests. I 
have shown this to be the case in the Arctic and where the US is concerned, as Canada’s AC 
proposal was revised by the US to better suit its own short-term interests and align with its 
post-Cold War foreign policy.  
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012:264) state that “we might expect that a status quo regional 
power to be more associated with static or limited change in the security order…however, such 
a condition would seem difficult to achieve unless the regional power has acquired hegemony”.  
While the US was considered to have achieved global hegemony in the immediate post-Cold 
War years, I nonetheless argue that the US did not aspire to, or attain, Arctic regional hegemony 
at this time. Instead, the post-Cold War Arctic regional distribution held a mix of power 
orientations. While the US undoubtedly held a status quo position, allowing only limited 
change, Russia and Canada were revisionist as they sought transformative and comprehensive 
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change to the Arctic RSC. However, Russia’s reasons for revising the Arctic order differed to 
Canada’s, primarily because in the 1990s Russia was experiencing the effects of great power 
decline, and as mentioned in section 5.2.2. this increased its vulnerability relative to the US in 
terms of defence.  
In the RPSF, the authors consider how the distribution of power along with orientation will 
determine if the security order will experience continuation or change. Unfortunately, the 
authors of the RPSF do not consider the possibility of a uni-multipolar order, which I have 
previously proposed best describes the Arctic distribution of power. However, they outline that 
in a multipolar order where a mix of distributions exist amongst the regional powers (i.e. status 
quo and revisionist powers) - this is likely to lead to a strength-based order. This is an accurate 
assessment for the post-Cold War Arctic during where the outcome of the critical juncture 
during the transitional period led to the continuation of the Cold War/NATO security 
structures.   
Secondly, the AC has been shown to be a bottom-up initiative to Arctic region-building that 
first emerged from Canadian civil society and then was proposed to the state. The authors of 
the RPSF are silent on the possibility that regional leadership can emerge from a sub-state level. 
Their focus in accordance with the ES approach is entirely on the role of the state rather than 
considering regional leadership as a process of policymaking. By allowing for a greater role of 
non-state actors and regional society the authors could enhance the RPSF while remaining true 
to its ES origins. Further empirical insights could also be obtained from the Canadian case 
whereby the RPSF role of regional leadership could be expanded upon to include two types: 
leadership that emerges from within the state as seen through Gorbachev’s Soviet Arctic 
leadership or alternatively from outside of it, through a bottom-up approach to policymaking 
that emerges from regional society. From analysing the AC negotiation process, it was shown 
how, in partnership with the Canadian government, the coalition of different Canadian interest 
groups (particularly the arms control movement and northern indigenous groups) successfully 
managed to get the AC initiative on the regional agenda.      
While Canada was not entirely successful in creating an integrated security agenda within the 
AC, nor achieving full participation for indigenous northerners, AC negotiations nonetheless 
produced an institutional design that accepted Russia as a full and equal member with the 
Western Arctic states, while also ensuring that indigenous northern peoples could engage in 
meaningful political discussions within the AC forums. Together, these achievements have 
arguably made a substantial contribution to creating a peaceful and stable post-Cold War Arctic 
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regional order. I therefore conclude that Canada behaved as a regional leader in the Arctic at a 
crucial time during the critical juncture when the two regional powers were either unwilling or 
unable to do so. Canada’s role in creating the AC has also significantly impacted the long-term 
development of Arctic regional society and ultimately set the Arctic region on a pathway 
towards a stable, uni-multipolar regional order that exists today.    
5.4 Conclusion  
The post-Cold War Arctic transition occurred during a critical juncture in global politics that 
took place between from 1987 and 1994. There are three key findings from this chapter that 
relate to changes and development of the Arctic regional order. The first key finding of this 
chapter shows that the Arctic regional security overlap occurred as a result of the US decision 
to retain the Cold War status quo security order in the Euro-Atlantic RSC. Nonetheless, as 
Josephson et al (2013:255) observe that because Gorbachev’s perestroika ultimately failed to 
save the Soviet Union, it has also become a marker of an incomplete transition from 
dysfunctional Soviet socialism to a chaotic form of rule witnessed under Yeltsin in the post-
Cold War era.  
The US, while no longer perceiving Russia to be an imminent threat in the post-Cold War era, 
sought to prevent a resurgent Russia re-emerging in the long-term to challenge US hegemony. 
This led the US to restrict opportunities for US-Russian security cooperation at the end of the 
Cold War. The continuation of the status quo, NATO-based security order was not 
predetermined, instead there were three options available to political leaders. However, by 
refusing to consider a new, genuine political transformation of the Euro-Atlantic security order, 
the George H.W. Bush administration, and later, the Clinton administration, would dismiss any 
potential solution that included integrating Russia into a new European security order either 
through Russian NATO membership or, as proposed by Gorbachev through his CEH/OSCE 
pan-European security architecture. It was shown that the small European Arctic states were 
considered by Gorbachev to be particularly important towards building his CEH, since he 
viewed the Nordic states as a model for a future European regional society. However, due to 
political constraints and events turning against him, Gorbachev was unable to gain the support 
he needed from European states to back his CEH initiative before the juncture closed.   
While domestic instability and crisis prevented Russia from taking an active regional 
leadership role in Arctic during the immediate post-Cold War years, Russia was nonetheless 
supportive of AC developments. The US by contrast was politically disinterested in the region 
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or in taking up a regional leadership role. The US’ behaviour can best be explained as being a 
regional custodian since it pursued a limited set of objectives that were mainly focused around 
military and environmental clean-up efforts as a way of preventing a Russian military 
resurgence.    
This presented an opportunity for Canada to step into its ‘middle power’ regional leadership 
role through steering the development of the AC. Creating a multilateral forum for Arctic 
cooperation also served to effectively promote Canadian national interests as well as project an 
identity as being an Arctic state. It was also argued that promoting Arctic multilateral 
cooperation essentially offered Canada a way to engage on a more equal basis with the US and 
Russia rather than continuing to be a lesser partner in bilateral negotiations. However, there 
were undoubtedly collective benefits to be gained by all Arctic states from developing a 
multilateral Arctic forum, including the development of best practices on a range of policy 
areas that were not restricted to environmental protection. By outlining the role of Canadian 
civil society groups during AC negotiations, I demonstrated how the current dichotomy 
between Arctic military security on the one hand, and Arctic environmental and indigenous 
politics on the other, has been artificially created and does not accurately reflect historical 
political developments in the region. In the Arctic, the exclusion of military issues from the 
AC in addition to the continuation of NATO produced two overlapping regional security 
orders. Following US demands to revise the AC institutional structure, indigenous leaders were 
denied full participation while military security was also excluded from AC discussion forums. 
The decision to prevent indigenous peoples from having full participation in the AC may be 
partially explained by their contribution to broadening the security agenda in the post-Cold 
War Arctic. The efforts of Canadian indigenous groups undoubtedly served to strengthen and 
expand the cooperative circumpolar regional society towards an integrated security order.  
The task that emerges from the findings of this chapter is to consider the long-term 
consequences that US foreign policy decisions had on the development of the post-Cold War 
Arctic order: specifically, the decision to retain NATO in the post-Cold War security 
architecture and to prevent the inclusion of military security on the AC agenda. Both are 
interconnected since each have contributed to regional security overlap in the post-Cold War 
Arctic order. Since NATO remains the primary security institution operational in the Arctic, 
the US therefore continues to control all military cooperation in the Arctic unmistakably 
demonstrating signs of being a status quo power. Finally, I conclude that the exclusion of 
security negotiations within the AC also served to prevent a revision of the Cold War security 
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order such as could occur through the development of an alternative security architecture.  This 
topic, along with the question of whether NATO intends to pursue a stronger Arctic military 




6 CHAPTER SIX - THE PRESENT-DAY ARCTIC 
POLITICAL ORDER (1997-2020) 
6.0 Introduction  
Having traced the evolution of the Arctic regional order over a timespan of almost 50 years 
from the Cold War up until 1996 when the AC was established, I will now turn to the task of 
defining the Arctic regional order from 1997 up to the present year and time of writing in 2020. 
In Chapter 5, it was established how regional security overlap emerged in the post-Cold War 
circumpolar Arctic. This occurrence distinguishes two different sets of practices: on the one 
hand, a uni-multipolar political order based on multilateral cooperation within the AC 
institutional framework, while on the other hand – the continuation of the Cold War defence 
structures militarily organised around NATO as the overarching security actor in the Arctic. In 
this chapter I will focus specifically on the later: namely the Arctic political order – which 
excludes military issues. As per the RPSF, I analyse the role of the two Arctic powers; the 
United States (section 6.1) and Russia (section 6.2), by discerning their Arctic strategies and 
how they engage with the political processes of the AC. This requires assessing the degree to 
which the two Arctic powers are satisfied or dissatisfied with the regional order. The relative 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction of these states serves to indicate the potential direction that future 
change might take – ideally this would take the form of positive change leading to greater levels 
of political cooperation and amity. However, it is also important to discern how domestic 
politics can interpret Arctic issues in a manner that can become potentially divisive for Arctic 
regional cooperation.   
In section 6.1.1, I will discuss two factors identified by Steinburg (2014) that implicitly steer 
the direction of US policymaking in the Arctic: namely institutionalization and 
territorialisation. This will provide further insights into American political culture and 
determine why certain key features of US Arctic policy have remained consistent despite 
changes in political leadership. In section 6.1.2 I will then turn towards analysing US 
participation in the Arctic Council from 1996-2008 which includes the two-year period when 
the US first held the AC Chairmanship from 1998-2000. The success of the Arctic Council 
since its establishment in 1996 appears an undisputed fact in Arctic literature. However, in 
section 6.3, I will focus on a series of inter-state negotiations that occurred between 2009 and 
2010 involving the five Arctic coastal states that resulted in the creation of a new Arctic Five 
(A5) forum. I show how the A5 forum served to circumvent the AC framework to create a new 
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Arctic Ocean management regime, namely the Ilulissat Declaration. The effects that the 
Ilulissat processes had on the cohesion of the AC will be analysed as this serves the purpose of 
further identifying the degree to which the two Arctic powers in addition to the small and 
medium states exhibit their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the AC and the regional order. 
The Ilulissat process also serves to demonstrate the role that the US played in deciding to re-
prioritise the AC over the A5 forum. I argue that this suggests the US still possesses latent 
ability (power) to act as a regional leader in strengthening or weakening Arctic institutional 
processes.  
Following from this, In section 6.1.4. I continue the contemporary historical narrative of US 
Arctic policy during the Obama Presidency (2009-2017) to determine if the US has exhibited 
regional leadership tendencies during the second US Chairmanship of the Arctic Council from 
2015-2017, and discuss the Obama Administration’s efforts to implement bureaucratic reform 
in order to strengthen federal capacity to engage in Arctic issues and promote both a domestic 
and Arctic regional climate change agenda. However, the election of republican candidate 
Donald Trump to the American presidency in 2016 has heralded the re-emergence of ‘big 
business’ and oil interests in Alaska, creating a new era of political uncertainty and a shift in 
US foreign policy towards the Arctic. In section 6.1.5 I outline the most recent developments 
pertaining to US Arctic strategy in addition to discussing how the controversial viewpoints held 
by the Trump Administration have impacted AC processes. 
Turning the focus towards Russia, in section 6.2.1 I provide an overview of Russian political 
developments from 1996-2007. This period witnessed the transfer of power from President 
Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin who began his long reign in 2000. I discuss developments in Russian 
Arctic strategies during the first and second terms of Vladimir Putin, and Russia’s Arctic 
revival in 2007 with the flag planting expedition in the North Pole. I also analyse the impact of 
the Putin presidencies on Russia’s ability to contribute to the AC and Russia’s performance 
during its first Chairmanship of the AC from 2004-2006. Following from this, section 6.2.2., I 
outline events during the brief intermittent period from 2008-2011 when Putin stepped down 
and Dmitry Medvedev was appointed president in his stead. I show that throughout this time, 
Russian economic interests and great power status continue to be the driving force influencing 
the Kremlin’s Arctic strategy as detailed in policy documents such as Foundations of the 
Russian Federation’s Arctic Policy to 2020, issued in 2008. In section 6.2.3., I then reflect on 
political developments during Putin’s third and fourth term from 2012-2020, especially the 
release of Russia’s new Arctic strategy in March 2020. I also consider the implications that 
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Putin’s controversial decision to change the constitution and pursue a further presidential term 
to 2024 will have on Russian Arctic policies. Finally I also discuss the proposed agenda of 
Russia’s forthcoming chairmanship of the Arctic Council due to commence in 2021 in the 
context of Russia’s ability to demonstrate Arctic regional leadership.    
In section 6.4, I provide an overview of developments in the contemporary Arctic regional 
society. By utilising Buzan’s (2004) ES model of regional institutions, I will illustrate how 
political processes in the Arctic continue to evolve by identifying key areas of change in the 
current order.  Throughout this chapter I will demonstrate that specific ES institutions identified 
by Buzan (2004) in Chapter 2 including: the balance of power, great power management, 
territorialisation and sovereignty, all continue to be foreign policy and security priorities of the 
Arctic regional powers who in turn shape the political and security outcomes for the Arctic 
regional order. However, in this chapter, I will argue that because of regional security overlap, 
the Arctic RSC has not yet evolved from a cooperative to a convergent regional society. This 
is because the continuation of the Cold War security structures has prevented the emergence of 
new, institutionalized forms of security that would lead to an integrated security order. Finally, 
in section 6.4, I will conclude the main points of this chapter.  
6.1 The United States  
6.1.1 Non-strategic and normative threat perceptions informing America’s Arctic 
strategy  
Steinburg (2014:116) considers that two latent non-military threats exist for the US in the 
Arctic region: internationalisation and territorialisation. The first of these issues, 
internationalisation relates to how the US has, since the AC’s establishment, sought to confine 
its role to non-strategic issues and as a regional forum for dialogue rather than a legally binding 
international institution. To demonstrate his argument, Steinburg refers back to events 
occurring in the 1980s and describes how the finalization of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)59 was perceived as threatening to US interests:  
the United States perceived that open access was being threatened by calls for intensified management of 
the sea by a self-funding international treaty organization. This concern was evidenced by the United States 
reluctance to support global governance of the international seabed as the ‘common heritage of mankind’ 
 
59 Although the US has still not ratified UNCLOS, the 2013 US National Strategy for the Arctic Region, clarifies that “While 
the United States is not currently a party to the (Law of the Sea) Convention, we will continue to support and observe principles 




and, later when it became clear that UNCLOS was to go into force despite US objections, its insistence that 
the International Seabed Authority’s powers be reduced through the 1994 Part XI Implementation 
Agreement (United Nations 1994 cited in Steinburg 2014).   
The reason that the US Congress still refuses to accede to UNCLOS is due predominantly, (but 
not exclusively), to republican suspicion towards international institutions. This reasoning is 
based on an awareness that once laws, rules and institutions are established, they have powers 
and internal logics that even a unipolar power would find difficult to control (Finnemore 
2009:60).  
The US rejection of international law is justified from a realist perspective as a rational decision 
to ensure the hegemon is not restricted by any set of rules. This is arguably because hegemons 
cannot encompass all the unforeseen circumstances in which it may have to act (Jervis 
2006:14). Breaking international law would therefore make the hegemon a target for political 
condemnation and hypocrisy. US reluctance to ratify UNCLOS and to grant the AC legal 
powers along with the ability to enforce decisions, can therefore be understood from a realist 
perspective as an action to protect US hegemony. The US refusal to ratify UNCLOS therefore 
implies that the US considers itself above international law and as a hegemon is entitled to act 
in contradictory ways should it decide that it is necessary to do so. However, taking the ES 
approach, it can be argued that should the US act unilaterally, outside of international legal 
structures, this will ultimately undermine US legitimacy in international society. Similarly, 
with respect to the AC, it has been shown in Chapter 5, how the US altered the AC institutional 
design to prevent it from having legal powers and the ability to influence military security 
outcomes. The 2009 George Bush National Security Presidential Directive on the Arctic 
(NSPD-66) reinforces this decision: 
It is the position of the United States that the Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to 
issues within its current mandate and not be transformed into a formal international organization, 
particularly one with assessed contributions.  
In addition to US concerns over internationalisation, Steinburg (2014) also emphasises that the 
other perceived threat: territorialisation has concurrently been triggered by Arctic coastal 
states claiming ocean-space as territory through the mandate of UNCLOS. What is certain is 
that as the shipping season in the Arctic Ocean lengthens due to reduced levels of sea-ice during 
the summer months, free and open access to the Arctic Ocean is deemed an increasingly vital 
issue for commercial and defence interests of the United States. This has been increasingly 
reflected in recent US policy documents from the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United 
States to the 2019 Department of Defence’s Arctic Strategy. Although I intend to discuss US 
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policy documents chronologically throughout the remainder of section 6.1, I will briefly draw 
attention to the December 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, 
(hereafter referred to as the 2017 NSS) wherein the Arctic is referred to in a passage that 
reaffirms the importance of the freedom of the seas – a principle that remains central to US 
national security policy;  
A range of international institutions establishes the rules for how states, businesses, and individuals interact 
with each other, across land and sea, the Arctic, outer space, and the digital realm. It is vital to US prosperity 
and security that these institutions uphold the rules that help keep these common domains open and free. 
Free access to the seas remains a central principle of national security and economic prosperity, and 
exploration of sea and space provides opportunities for commercial gain and scientific breakthroughs. 
Furthermore, the NSS 2017 declares that the United States “must lead and engage in the 
multinational arrangements that shape many of the rules that affect US interests and values” to 
protect American sovereignty “from a competition for influence that exists within these 
institutions” (2017 p.40). Here again it is possible to see how prevalent US concerns are that 
international institutions will develop their own political agendas that are at odds with the 
national interests of the United States.  Keeping in mind the two normative threat perceptions 
informing US policy on the Arctic, I will now turn to recounting developments in US politics 
and Arctic strategy in addition to the US’ participation within the Arctic Council from 1996-
2020.   
6.1.2 1997- 2008: leadership change from the Clinton to the Bush presidency, a shifting 
climate change agenda, and the First chairmanship of the Arctic Council (1998-2000),  
The US held the Chairmanship of the AC from 1998 to 2000 during President Clinton’s second 
term in office. Although the Presidential Directive on Arctic and Antarctic Policy, issued in 
1994 represented a scant one-page policy document on the Arctic - the Clinton Administration 
did not update or release a new Arctic strategy in anticipation of the US taking the AC 
Chairmanship. This indicates that the Arctic was not high on Clinton’s political agenda.  
Nonetheless, there were individuals within federal government who enthusiastically 
anticipated the US’ upcoming Chairmanship and sought to devise a forward-looking and 
comprehensive program.  In 1998, Richard Norland, a Senior US Arctic official wrote that the 
first US chairmanship of the Arctic Council (1998-2000) was an “unprecedented opportunity 
to develop systems for linking our nation’s extensive scientific and environmental activities in 
the Arctic with those of the other member states, in a way that will facilitate lasting contact and 
cooperation” (Arctic Council 1998). The major theme of the first chairmanship was human 
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health, and the United States, together with the other seven Arctic States, launched the 
International Circumpolar Surveillance (ICS), a region-wide disease surveillance system led 
by the U.S. Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Arctic Council 2019).  Prior to the end 
of the first US chairmanship of the Council, at a ministerial meeting in Barrow Alaska, the 
decision was made to launch a project that would later become the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (ACIA) (Nilsson 2018:100). However, soon after the Barrow meeting, US politics 
witnessed the transfer of power with the presidency passing from Bill Clinton to George W. 
Bush in January 2001. This also brought about a policy revision and growing scepticism 
towards climate change. This created new challenges for the US-led ACIA leadership who had 
joined forces with the ICC to push for discussions in Congress and at a US Senate hearing 
(p101). Nilssen further outlines how the ACIA process revealed a tension within US Arctic 
politics between concerns about climate change and the potential environmental impacts of 
economic development on the one hand; and a wish to avoid any potential threat to the 
economic and security interests related to fossil fuel on the other, explaining how 
Despite the stark messages from ACIA, and due to strong reluctance from the US 
negotiator, the final text of the policy document was uncommitted to any action. At one 
point it was even uncertain whether there would be a policy statement and if the 
disagreement would threaten cooperation in the Arctic Council (Nilssen 2018:101) 
 
Fortunately, the ACIA was completed under Iceland’s chairmanship in 2004 as the first-ever 
comprehensive scientific assessment of the effects of climate change in the Arctic (Arctic 
Council 2019). Results from a questionnaire published by Kankaanpää and Young (2012:4), 
reveal how the US-led ACIA project is considered one of the most influential AC-conducted 
assessments in the institutions history due to the impact it has made in enhancing sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic to date. 
In 2008, the US State Department and the National Security Council conducted an in-depth 
review of the previous US Arctic policy document, the 1994 Presidential Directive on Arctic 
and Antarctic Policy (see Chapter 5) and outlined recommendations for a new separate Arctic 
policy. The outcome of the review was the adoption of a new US policy document in 2009, 
prior to G.W. Bush leaving office. As the final directive signed by President G.W. Bush, the 
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-66/ Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD)-25 (abbreviated hereafter as NSPD-66) emphasizes that the United States is 
an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in the region. The directive discusses 
several issues as they relate to the Arctic, including; international governance, the extended 
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continental shelf and boundary issues, promotion of international scientific cooperation, 
environmental protection and conservation of natural resources, maritime transportation and 
economic development including resource extraction/energy. Although the NSPD-66 outlined 
a broad policy agenda for the Arctic – the results were negligible. In short, the essence of the 
NSPD-66 Arctic strategy can be distilled down to the basic strategic concept that US – as a 
global power, has special interests and unique responsibilities in the Arctic that may require it 
to resort to unilateralism. It can therefore be summarised that security and defence – rather than 
a broadened post-Cold War Arctic security agenda - took priority for the Bush Administration.   
6.1.3 Foreign policy revisions – the US and the Arctic Five (A5) forum 
In this section I will relate how a series of events from 2008 to 2013 involving five Arctic 
states, (the US, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark/Greenland), chose to bypass the AC in 
favour of engaging in a new and exclusive ‘mini-lateral’ arrangement that became known as 
the Arctic Five (A5) forum. This served as the setting from which to negotiate an Arctic Ocean 
management treaty. 
It was neither the US nor Russia who initiated the ‘Arctic Five’ setting, but Denmark. In May 
2008, Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller proposed that a conference should be held on 
the future governance of the Arctic Ocean and received general approval from the other four 
Arctic coastal states. By first proposing the idea of an exclusive mini-lateral forum, Denmark 
sought to score major diplomatic points with the most powerful Arctic states while also 
securing its own seat at the negotiating table. The eventual outcome of A5 negotiations was the 
2008 Ilulissat Declaration, described by Christopher Rossi (2017:170) as “a soft power 
statement on Arctic Ocean management with Realpolitik implications”. The declaration was 
met with significant international criticism for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was observed 
that the decision by the five Arctic coastal states to bypass the auspices of the AC undermined 
the legitimacy of the regional institution. Overarching maritime jurisdiction and security issues 
prompted the coastal Arctic Five to initiate “a dialogue among themselves regarding issues 
deemed unsuitable for treatment within the setting of the Arctic Council” (Rossi 2017:174). 
This served as justification for the exclusion of Sweden, Finland and Iceland along with 
representatives of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ibid). Drawing on leaked US Embassy cables 
that were revealed to the Wikileaks project from 2010-2011, it can be observed how the United 
States, Russia and Denmark all expressed an eagerness to explore the Arctic Five as an 
alternative or supplementary forum to the AC: “The Arctic Council was seen as being “too 
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unwieldy” for certain political discussions whereas the Arctic Five would be a more 
“conductive” forum for particular political talks” (Pederson 2012:153). There was however 
some scepticism from some of the Arctic Five: Canada, initially pointed out the risks of 
excluding the other three Arctic states and the six AC indigenous groups from political talks 
on Arctic Ocean issues, while Norway, which chaired the AC at the time, also had misgivings 
and called for the politicization and extension of AC powers to better facilitate dialogue on 
Arctic ocean management.  
There is evidence here of how regional security overlap (Chapter 5) has also subtly influenced 
the Ilulissat process. The contrasting mechanisms of Westphalian balance of power politics 
have blended with normative ideas of ‘security community’ to create definitive policy 
outcomes that may have long-term consequences for the Arctic regional order. State 
sovereignty served as the justification for the A5 to act independently to not be bound to an 
international treaty (a notable concern for the US – i.e. internationalisation). In the Ilulissat 
Declaration the A5 proclaimed that their stewardship over the Arctic Ocean obviates any “need 
to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean”, 
arguing that the present international legal framework, crafted around UNCLOS provides 
sufficient support for the resolution of Arctic issues (Rossi, 2017:170-171). Such a treaty had 
the potential of being loosely based on the Antarctic Treaty and thus could have led to the 
greater inclusion of non-Arctic states into the region: and thus internationalisation: an outcome 
which the US and Russia were strongly opposed to. Here, it is evident that the balance of power 
security mechanism is at play, as a key aim of the A5 forum was to deter outside influences in 
the Arctic maritime area, an area which the A5 claimed to have a unique sovereign 
responsibility for protecting. However, while seeking to deter external threats, the A5 forum 
was also exclusionary to three other Arctic states (Iceland, Finland and Sweden). Nevertheless, 
at the same time, the ES concept of security community (see Chapter 2) in also in evidence, 
albeit in a limited way, since the A5 decided the best way to prevent the creation of an 
international treaty was to coordinate multilaterally (in a small exclusive setting) and pledge 
that they would peacefully cooperate with each other to ensure the management of the Arctic 
Ocean.    
From evidence provided by exposed US diplomatic cables on Wikileaks, while George W. 
Bush was still President, Heather Exner-Pirot (2015) explains that after Ilulissat, Canada 
expressed misgivings to the US about continuing with the A5 forum. Canada professed that “if 
the other three Arctic Council members had an interest, it was better to invite them. Keeping 
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the group limited to the five littoral states also risks appearing to exclude the indigenous 
permanent participants of the Arctic Council.” However, the United States responded that “the 
Arctic Five and the Arctic Council had different roles and that the Arctic Five group was a 
preferable forum in some cases”. This demonstrates that the US understood the rationale for 
utilising the A5 forum as a core group on certain issues, but not for everything (Exner-Pirot 
2015).  
However, with the changeover from the Bush to the Obama Administration in late 2009, this 
resulted in a foreign policy U-turn for the United States, as it became an overt critic of an 
alternative forum to the AC. It was at this point that Canada hosted the controversial ‘Ilulissat 
II’ forum in Chelsea, Quebec in July 2010, and had “arguably become the strongest advocate 
for the alternative Arctic Five forum” (Pederson 2012:153). Although US Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton responded positively to the Canadian invitation to Chelsea, she began the 
meeting by delivering a prepared statement asserting that “significant international discussions 
on Arctic issues should include those who have legitimate interests in the region” (Exner-Pirot 
2015). Noting the absence of indigenous permanent participants as well as the three excluded 
Arctic states, Clinton spoke about the need to cooperate, “not create new divisions” (Rossi 
2017:174). This declaration, “rhetorically indicated a US policy preference for the Arctic 
Council forum, notwithstanding indications to the contrary and its long-standing refusal to 
ratify UNCLOS” (ibid). A further statement was issued on the AC official webpage for the 
United States, reiterating that the AC is “The primary forum through which the United States 
engages in Arctic diplomacy” (Arctic Council 2017).  
As for the rest of the A5 states, Russia adopted a middle-position and argued that the five 
littoral states of the central Arctic Ocean should seize a leading role within the AC and keep it 
exclusive. Denmark however seemed increasingly uncomfortable with excluding indigenous 
peoples, possibly on account of Greenland’s 2008 referendum for Home Rule and self-
governance, along with the deteriorating effect it could have on relations with its Scandinavian 
neighbours. Therefore, Denmark, the original instigator of the A5 forum, no longer 
championed the cause, while Norway maintained its stance from the beginning that the AC 
should become more politically potent (Pederson 2012:153).     
The shifts in foreign policy made by the United States in 2008-2010 demonstrated the role that 
a unipolar state can play in the Arctic as a legitimising or de-legitimising force in regional 
institutions and multilateral processes. A constructivist understanding of power viewed from 
an ideational perspective is also useful here, as the US’ reaffirmed commitment to multilateral 
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cooperation was also a means of legitimating its own power. When it appeared that US 
preferences leaned towards the A5 forum, the other four states acquiesced even though some, 
like Norway and Canada (at the beginning) expressed misgivings. However, to simply dismiss 
and ignore international criticism would have put the US in a risky position where it could 
undermine its own power by undercutting the legitimacy it needs to create the desired policy 
outcomes (Finnemore 2008:68). From an analysis of the Ilulissat Declaration it can be 
understood how foreign policy U-turns make it problematic to generalize on international 
regime dynamics and state behaviour. Yet it can be seen how regional institutions are reliant 
on state support for their survival. In 2008 the AC faced potential marginalization amid the 
emergence of a new ‘mini-lateral’ A5 forum, however, the subsequent years following Ilulissat 
ended up strengthening the AC. 
Nonetheless, the A5 forum did not simply disappear after the signing of the Ilulissat 
Declaration. Exner-Pirot (2015) explains that in 2015, the A5 states once more gathered 
together to sign a moratorium on fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean. 
Specifically, the ban adopted measures to prevent unregulated fishing and protect the Arctic 
ecosystem. The Canadian newspaper Globe and Mail called it “remarkable”, and a rare 
example of ‘unusually mature diplomacy’, given the overriding tensions at the time between 
the Western Arctic states and Russia over its annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine. 
Exner-Pirot states that the lack of any opposition from parties who had previously expressed 
disappointment in the A5 is telling. This might suggest that opposition and political backlash 
is more likely to occur over the substance of the agreement being signed, rather than the forum 
which is hosting it.  
However, in 2013, there was another unanticipated outcome from Ilulissat that emerged from 
Iceland, one of the three small Arctic states excluded from the process. Iceland considered itself 
a “forsaken Arctic coastal state in the context of A5 negotiations” (Rossi 2017:179). This is 
owing to its claim as an Arctic coastal state vis-à-vis Grimsey Island – a small inhabited island 
(with a population of 85) which lies above the Arctic Circle, in addition to a portion of Iceland’s 
EEZ being situated north of the Arctic Circle (ibid). On April 15th, 2013, Iceland’s president, 
Ólafur Grímsson appeared before the National Press Club in Washington DC and called for the 
creation of a new transparent and roving forum called The Arctic Circle that would adapt an 
inclusive, ‘open tent’ approach to Arctic dialogue involving states, corporations, and 
organizations (p.177). Within months, one thousand two hundred delegates from forty nations 
gathered in Reykjavik, Iceland, to launch the world’s largest ever gathering on Arctic issues, 
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giving birth to the Arctic Circle Assembly (Rossi p.178). Iceland’s Arctic Circle initiative may 
be interpreted as an implicit move meant to express Iceland’s pique with the A5, although the 
Icelandic administration claimed that the Assembly was meant to complement the work of the 
AC (ibid). Icelandic actions may however indicate that there is a preference amongst some of 
the smaller Arctic states towards a global and inclusive approach to Arctic cooperation in 
contrast to the exclusivity favoured by the more powerful Arctic states.  
While the Ilulissat process initially suggests that the US may be dissatisfied with the current 
Arctic order given its concerns over internationalisation and territorialisation and its support 
for the A5, the Obama administration’s renewed commitment to the AC in 2010 indicates 
otherwise. By favouring the AC as the pre-eminent institution in the region, the US exhibited 
that for the most part it behaves as a satisfied, status quo power in the Arctic. Similarly, Russia’s 
endorsement of the A5 and the AC indicate its satisfaction at being included in exclusive 
groupings which serve to verify its status as an Arctic power.  
 
6.1.4 2009-2016: The Obama Presidency and the second US Chairmanship of the AC  
Having observed the renewed American interest in the Arctic with respect to the llulissat 
process and America’s recommitment to the AC and the status quo political order, I will now 
further investigate US Arctic strategy under the Obama Administration. This will include an 
analysis of the Obama Administration’s National Strategy for the Arctic region – ratified in 
2013 and updated in 2016 and a review of the US’ second Arctic chairmanship which took 
place from 2015-2017.  
On May 10, 2013, the Obama Administration released a document entitled National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region. The strategy outlined its interests in three key areas:  
1. Advance United States Security Interests  
2. Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship 
3. Strengthen International Cooperation  
 
The first objective of the strategy outlines that US security in the Arctic encompasses “a broad 
spectrum of activities, ranging from those supporting safe commercial and scientific operations 
to national defence” and thus pledged to improve Arctic infrastructure and capabilities 
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including ice-breaker capacity. The second issue of concern – pursuing responsible Arctic 
regional stewardship – recognised the US’ commitment to environmental protection. The 
strategy states that the US would seek to establish and institutionalize an integrated Arctic 
environmental management framework, drawing on scientific research and traditional 
knowledge to protect the Arctic environment”. Finally, the third objective of the strategy would 
be pursued through “bilateral relationships and multilateral bodies, including the Arctic 
Council”. This statement, while vague alludes to the US’ willingness to continue to pursue 
multiple channels of cooperation including the A5 forum in addition to the AC. The strategy 
also pledged that “we will pursue arrangements that advance collective interests, promote 
shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the Arctic environment, and enhance regional security, 
and we will work toward U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (Law of the Sea Convention)” (President of the United States, 2013: 2-3). 
The strategy also highlights the important role of the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) as well as the 2013 Agreement on 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (OPPRA) in 
deepening cooperation among the Arctic States (see also Chapter 9). The SAR Agreement 
represented a milestone for the AC as one of the few legally binding agreements it has passed. 
The question that must be asked however is why did the US agree to pass this agreement when 
it has actively sought to prevent the AC from being a decision-making body? As Exner-Pirot 
(2012: 195) explains the SAR agreement does not affect the domestic legislation of circumpolar 
states and permission is still required for a foreign country to enter internal waters. In other 
words, the adoption of these two agreements did not substantially infringe the basic US security 
principles of internationalisation and territorialisation. Furthermore, if the US does intend to 
open American Arctic waters for offshore oil exploration in the future, then the SAR 
agreement, together with the (2013) Oil-Response agreement and the Polar Code60 (2014), 
could serve to assist the US in the task of coordinating Arctic state resources towards 
emergency preparedness and disaster response.  
 
60 The Polar Code is an international regime adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2014. In 2009 the 
foreign ministers of the eight member states of the Arctic Council approved the Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
(AMSA) and called upon the IMO to formulate and adopt mandatory international standards for ships operating in Arctic 
waters (Earth Justice n.d.). The AMSA report and the ministers stressed that the new Polar Code must protect not only the 
ships, their crews, passengers and cargo from the unique dangers of Arctic shipping but also protect Arctic peoples and the 
environment from the risks of shipping (ibid). 
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However, independent reviews were critical of the Obama National Strategy for the Arctic 
region (NSAR) for several reasons. Some argued that it lacked clear objectives, or that the 
objectives were too vague. Other criticisms centred around the fact that the NSAR did not 
supersede the NSPD66 which resulted in this directive still being legally operational. 
Dissatisfied with the content of NSAR, Alaskan senators and congresspeople called for a 
revised version as they felt that the Obama Administration did not pay enough attention to 
upgrading US Arctic infrastructure, especially icebreakers and port facilities. Prior to President 
Obama leaving office, in December 2016, an updated version of the US Arctic Strategy was 
completed. Senator Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska), considered the 2016 strategy as a ‘…dramatic 
improvement from the 2013 version, which was more platitudes and pictures than actual 
substance’ (Maritime Executive 2017:11).  
Nonetheless the Obama Administration was proactive in the implementation of its 2013 Arctic 
Strategy and provided further details outlining how the NSAR would be implemented in a 
document issued in January 2014, titled Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region that included 36 specific initiatives to correspond with the three main objectives 
outlined in the 2013 NSAR (O’Rourke et al. 2020:11). The decision was made to also create a 
new position titled ‘US Special Representative for the Arctic’ – which would involve duties 
such as interacting with ambassadors from other Arctic states. On the 16th July 2014, Robert J. 
Papp Jr a former commander of the Coast Guard was appointed as the first U.S. Representative 
for the Arctic and served in this position until 20th January 2017 (p14).  
The administration also sought to re-organise governing structures in preparation for its 
upcoming chairmanship of the AC. President Obama’s January 2015 Executive Order 13689 
for Enhancing Coordination of Arctic efforts served as a benchmark for institutional re-
organisation. The document outlined the establishment of an Arctic Executive Steering 
Committee (AESC) to enhance coordination amongst the many US state departments and 
federal agencies involved in Arctic issues, stipulating that  
As the United States assumes the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, it is more important than ever that 
we have a coordinated national effort that takes advantage of our combined expertise and efforts in the 
Arctic region to promote our shared values and priorities (O’Rourke et al. 2020:12). 
 
 
The overarching theme of the US Arctic chairmanship (2015-2017) was One Arctic: Shared 
Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities. The theme reflected the complicated 
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geopolitical situation the Arctic states found themselves in after Ukraine. As Zhuravel (2017) 
explains, all the Arctic states had imposed sanctions against Russia, which, in turn, responded 
with its counter sanctions. However, to the credit of the United States, it did not raise the issue 
of Ukraine during AC meetings, unlike Canada, who broke with protocol to denounce Russia 
for its actions in the Crimea when it chaired the AC before the United States.In the framework 
for its second AC chairmanship, the US prioritized economic development and improvement 
of living conditions of the population of the Arctic region, sea route safety and mitigation of 
the climate change impacts on the Arctic ecosystem (Sakharov 2017:68).  
Some of the successes the US achieved during its chairmanship included the Agreement on 
Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation in the Arctic – which was signed by 
foreign ministers at the AC ministerial meeting on 11th May 2017 in Fairbanks Alaska (Arctic 
Council 2020). The US and Russia co-chaired a special task force on science cooperation under 
the auspices of the AC that led to the legally binding agreement that was aimed primarily 
towards deepening collaboration between scientists involved in research on climate processes. 
Other results were the update of the Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) 
study conducted within the AMAP working group, the Summary of Progress and 
Recommendations on black carbon and methane emissions, the Arctic Marine Biodiversity 
Report and the Arctic Resilience Action Framework (Sakharov 2017:68-69). The US 
chairmanship also contributed to deepening Coast Guard collaboration in the Arctic with the 
creation of Arctic Coast Guard Forum (CGF) launched in November 2015. Speaking in March 
2015 at the Brookings Institute in Washington D.C., Robert Papp, the US Special representative 
to the Arctic, remarked that the US’s agenda was “probably the most forward-leaning 
ambitious program that’s been proposed for the chairmanship of the Arctic Council” (Gramling 
2015:270).  
However, for the most part, the US chairmanship of the Arctic Council from 2015-2017, can 
be said to have only demonstrated that the US is capable of taking the initiative on issue-
specific policy areas, rather than long-term regional leadership on climate action that is so 
desperately needed. Compared with its first Chairmanship form 1998-2000 and the enduring 
success the US achieved with the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), the achievements 
of the second US Chairmanship were moderate.   
When the US chairmanship program was revealed to the public in October 2014, there was 
nothing to suggest that the US would initiate any long-term proposals for the further 
development of the AC. Yet, when the AC Ministers met in Fairbanks in May 2017 at the 
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conclusion of the US Chairmanship, a surprising new development occurred. The Ministers 
recognised that new opportunities and challenges in the Arctic required a review of how the 
Council functions. Perhaps in anticipation of this important development, all Member States 
were represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Fairbanks meeting represented the 
first time this occurred in the history of the AC and as such, it demonstrated the growing 
importance and attention paid to the AC, particularly in the United States (Smieszek 
2019:42)61. As Balton and Ulmer (2019:2) explain, the Fairbanks Declaration called for an 
effort to establish clear priorities and, potentially, to adjust the structure and operations of the 
Council to meet current and anticipated conditions. As such the Ministers instructed that Senior 
Arctic Officials (SAOs) should develop a strategic plan that would focus on updating the AC’s 
foundational documents (i.e. The 1996 Ottawa Declaration). It stands to reason that since this 
occurred at the end of the US Chairmanship rather than the beginning that this was not a pre-
planned initiative by the US.  
To conclude, the Obama Administration hoped that the US chairmanship (2015-2017) would 
serve to raise awareness on climate change and draw attention to America’s status as an Arctic 
nation. However, Clifford (2016a) outlines that Obama has been tentatively pro-drilling in 
Alaska and this has, at times, led to a duality in Obama’s policy within the region, with attempts 
to balance energy security pressures against environmental concerns. This was made very clear 
in 2015 when Obama approved Arctic exploration for Royal Dutch Shell. The US Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) predicted a 75% chance of one or more large spills 
occurring, yet the Obama Administration responded by citing energy security as the reason for 
allowing the exploration, which had to be pursued as a matter of national security (ibid). 
However, explorations came to a halt amid declining oil prices making Shell’s Arctic ventures 
unprofitable for the time being.  
Prior to leaving the presidential office in January 2017, President Obama sought to ensure his 
climate change legacy by seeking to ban offshore oil drilling in the North American Arctic. In 
2015, Obama halted oil exploration in coastal areas of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas. Then, in 
late 2016, he withdrew most other potential Arctic Ocean lease areas — about 98 percent of 
the Arctic outer continental shelf. The aim was to protect Arctic wildlife and fish populations 
in addition to the Alaska Native villages that depended on these natural resources for their 
 




livelihood (CNBC 2019). In support of Obama’s measures, Canada’s Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau placed a moratorium on offshore drilling for five years. However, Obama’s 
environmental legacy in the Arctic has been threatened by his successor Donald Trump and the 
American petroleum Institute; both of whom have fought to overturn Obama’s offshore drilling 
ban in the Arctic in subsequent years.  
6.1.5 2017-2020 The Trump Administration – a threat to Arctic climate change 
negotiations and a return to great power politics?  
Although 57% of Alaskan’s voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, Trump’s 
nomination has created greater levels of uncertainty in the Arctic. Since becoming president 
Trump has sought to undo the progress made by the previous Obama Administration - leaving 
the position of US Special Representative to the Arctic vacant along with the Arctic Executive 
Steering Committee (AESC). However, like many of his republican predecessors - energy 
policy serves as the exception to Trump’s Arctic indifference. Trump has not been shy about 
proclaiming his preferences for oil extraction and ‘big business’ interests. As such it would 
only be a matter of time before Alaskan oil prospects would be drawn to his attention.  
After being inaugurated on the 20th January 2017, President Trump expressed an ongoing 
determination to reversed former President Obama’s ban on offshore oil drilling in the Arctic. 
In February 2017, the American Petroleum Institute (API) wrote to the Department of the 
Interior calling for the reversal of an executive order by Barack Obama in 2014 banning oil 
drilling in large areas of the Atlantic and Arctic (Davies 2019). The same month, Trump 
reversed Obama’s executive order and in January 2018, the Trump administration unveiled 
plans to allow oil exploration in almost all US offshore territory including protected areas 
(ibid). In November 2018, these plans were put into motion when the Trump Administration 
began to open a large area of federal waters off Alaska for oil and gas drilling (Shankman 
2018). At present however, an oversupply of oil on international markets make such ventures 
unprofitable. Yet if energy prices rise in the near future this will likely result in greater levels 
of interest in offshore Arctic oil and gas in coming years. Should drilling go ahead, this would 
lead to untold risk of environmental damage from oil spills and pollution from shipping. 
History has shown through the Exon-Valdez oil spill in 1989 (see Chapter 4) that the US 
federal government is insufficiently prepared to deal with an oil spill in the Arctic and would 
require a coordinated response alongside other Arctic states.  
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The National Security Strategy (NSS) document released by the Trump Administration in 
December 2017 refers to the Arctic once, in the context of upholding international institutions 
and the rules  
A range of international institutions establishes the rules for how states, businesses, and individuals 
interact with each other, across land and sea, the Arctic, outer space, and the digital realm. It is vital to 
U.S. prosperity and security that these institutions uphold the rules that help keep these common domains 
open and free.” (2017:40) 
 
While the Trump Administration may verbally pledge to uphold international institutions such 
as the AC, in practice, efforts to strengthen the Arctic environmental regime within the AC 
institutional structures have been effectively blocked or weakened by the US. For example, 
during the Senior Ministerial meeting held at Fairbanks Alaska, on the 11th May 2017, the 
Ministers of the eight Arctic states announced they had signed the Fairbanks Declaration: a 
document that expresses support for international action on climate change. Yet, during the 
formulation of the Fairbanks Declaration, the US was said to have requested that the Council 
make six changes to the document, each of which weakened the language in the agreement 
(Shankman 2017). Also, because the declaration remains non-binding this means that it is not 
enforceable by law. Although getting Trump to sign the declaration was seen by some 
indigenous groups and Arctic states as a victory (given Trump’s many previous statements 
denying the occurrence of climate change), the non-binding Declaration could just as easily be 
considered a relatively empty show of rhetoric. Secondly, if actions rather than declarations of 
intent demonstrate a state’s true policy preferences, then the refusal to ratify the Paris 
Agreement in July 2017 – the most significant international treaty on climate change to date, 
speaks very clearly of the meaninglessness of the Fairbank’s Declaration.  
2019 represented a year in which the Trump Administration aggressively sought to reverse the 
progressive stance Obama held towards Arctic environmental issues and climate change. Yet 
Trump did not anticipate domestic opposition emerging from the judicial component of the 
state. On the 30th March 2019, a US district court overturned President Trump’s attempt to 
reverse the bans on offshore drilling in the Arctic Ocean. Judge Sharon Gleeson decreed that 
the presidential order was unlawful and outlined that “the wording of President Obama’s 2015 
and 2016 withdrawals indicates that he intended them to extend indefinitely, and therefore be 
revocable only by an act of Congress” (Associated Press 2019). However, the Trump 
administration was not deterred in its efforts to open-up protected areas of the American Arctic 
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for oil and gas drilling. In September 2019, the administration sought to finalize plans to allow 
oil and gas drilling in a portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Although 
Trump would not be the first republican president who has sought to reverse laws protecting 
ANWR to open it up for oil drilling, the occurrence of the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 
1989 (see Chapter 4) contributed to increased environmental awareness and strengthened 
opposition to drilling in the area. However, this changed when an “unrelated 2017 tax bill” was 
ratified by the US Congress, thus enabling the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to authorise 
the sale of leases on the 1.6million-acre coastal plain which is home to threatened Arctic species 
including the polar bear (Holden 2019).  
The Trump Administration further made its position known in the May 2019 AC Senior 
Ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland when US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pressured 
other Arctic Council members to remove references to climate change during negotiations on 
the draft of a new declaration. He also weakened other aspects of the declaration pertaining to 
protecting the environment and in the end the US refused to sign the Declaration. Because of 
this, Finnish Foreign Minister Soini62, had no choice but to convert what should have been a 
consensus document into a Chairman’s Statement reflecting disagreement on key matters 
(Ulmer 2019). The AC has traditionally adopted declarations at the conclusion of ministerial 
meetings that set out common priorities and commit the member states to a certain course of 
action for the next two years (Sevunts 2019). Dalee Sambo Dorough, who currently holds the 
International Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), called the U.S. actions a lack of 
leadership and a “moral failure.” She went on to state that “This is the first time the Arctic 
Council has failed to issue a declaration at the end of a two-year chairmanship, and it’s a serious 
blow to the future of what is supposed to be a consensus-based body”. Sambo Dorough further 
condemned the Trump administration by stating that “Inuit are feeling the effects of climate 
change everyday. While the US Government concerns itself with semantics, playing games 
with words, our people are witnessing the adverse impacts of climate change. What about us 
and our reality?” (Quinn 2019). 
While the Trump Administration bears much of the responsibility for blocking consensus on 
the 2019 Ministerial Declaration at Rovaniemi, Balton and Ulmer (2019:2) highlight that 
another missed opportunity also occurred -   the inability to complete work on the AC’s first 
 
62 Finland held the chairmanship of the AC from 2017-2019 
238 
 
Strategic Plan, which was referred to earlier in section 6.1.4. Initiated in 2017, the strategic 
plan was meant to be finalised at the Rovaniemi meeting. However, Balton and Ulmer (2019:2) 
summarise that  
Instead of adopting a Strategic Plan, the Rovaniemi Chairman’s Statement welcomed the ongoing strategic 
work, instructed the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) to continue strategic planning in order to provide 
guidance and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Arctic Council, and further instructed the 
SAOs to review the roles of the Ministerial meetings, the Senior Arctic Officials and the Permanent 
Participants, and to report to Ministers in 2021. 
 
Although it is fortunate that the momentum for developing the AC strategic plan did not 
disappear entirely from the agenda, the Chairman was essentially forced by the circumstances 
at Rovaniemi to water-down his statement with respect to the focus of future negotiations on 
the strategic plan. This can be concluded owing to Bolton and Ulam’s assessment that the three 
areas referred to in the Rovaniemi Chairman’s statement are not the most pressing problems in 
the AC. Although improvements could be made to these processes, they are unlikely to address 
the primary challenges facing the Council which include issues such as; institutional structure, 
funding, managing projects and the role of observer states (2019:5-7).   
Events at Rovaneimi in 2019 clearly demonstrate that America’s unwillingness to engage in 
negotiation involving the strengthening of the AC’s climate change agenda and future 
restructuring processes of the AC continually point back to domestic US political issues. A 
fragmented bureaucratic structure, topped by an un-reformed legislative and executive, and the 
unrestrained influence of powerful interest groups –particularly those of the oil industry - serve 
to negatively impact and dampen policy outcomes with respect to international agreements 
pertaining to the Arctic. The fact that the US has repeatedly failed to tackle climate change in 
its national policies puts it in a weakened position when it comes to collaborating with other 
Arctic states to develop long-term strategies for the Arctic. As a result, the US remains caught 
in a cycle of reactive policies that produce ad-hoc measures in the Arctic that only tackle 
present-day issues, as opposed to proactively developing long-term proposals to promote best 
practices and enhance international cooperation.  
While US Arctic strategy has greatly improved since the skeletal 1994 policy on the Arctic and 
the Antarctic Regions, there is an underlying constant within US Arctic strategies which 
advocates that security and strategic issues continue to take precedence over environmental 
concerns. An example of this can be seen in the latest document on the Arctic – the US 
Department of Defence (DoD) Arctic Strategy, released in June 2019.  Since this document 
239 
 
largely focuses on military security, I will discuss the strategy in further detail in Chapter 7. 
However, it is important to note here that although the document is inherently militaristic, the 
strategy nonetheless recognises that the majority of policy issues and security challenges in the 
Arctic today are non-strategic in nature. In an assessment of the Arctic security environment, 
the DoD outlines five key issues – four of which are non-military including; the changing 
physical environment, multilateral cooperation to address shared interests and challenges, the 
status of Arctic Sea Routes, and attempts to alter Arctic governance through economic 
leverage. Rodman (2019) critically assesses the new strategy by arguing that the Pentagon 
should be “showing not telling the world that it is thinking strategically about the Arctic”. 
According to Rodman, the problem with the current strategy is that it is descriptive rather than 
normative. She argues that rather than merely reciting a list of strategic considerations in the 
Arctic, - for instance outlining issues relating to the changing physical environment - the 
Defence Department should provide a strategic vision that commits action and investment in 
Arctic capability and capacity. Unfortunately, the DoD 2019 Arctic Strategy draws heavily on 
the 2018 National Defence Strategy that refers to the return of great power competition and 
explicitly identifies Russia and China as a threat to US national interests. With respect to China, 
the DoD refers explicitly to Chinese economic activities in the Arctic63 and refers to how China, 
through its “One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR)64”, has linked economic activities in the 
Arctic to its broader strategic objectives. The DoD stipulates that “despite China’s claim of 
being a ‘Near Arctic State’, as articulated in its first Arctic policy white paper issued in January 
2018, “the United States does not recognise any such status” (DoD 2019:5).  
Finally, the coronavirus pandemic has also put US global leadership at stake. As Burrows and 
Engelke (2020:6) explain the global order could be fundamentally reshaped by the virus if the 
world’s major economic powers – the United States, the European Union and China – suffer 
an extended economic depression and limit engagement beyond their borders. The impacts of 
the pandemic on the Arctic have also been felt with respect to the shutting down of international 
Arctic events and conferences, science research expeditions, while freedom of movement has 
been restricted across northern borders, impacting economic activities and the annual migration 
of indigenous peoples such as the Saami reindeer herders who travel across Scandinavian 
 
63 Elsewhere in the 2019 Arctic Strategy it is stated that “China is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may 
undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic behaviour globally may be repeated 
in the Arctic” (DoD 2019: 6). 
64 Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China seeks to create a ‘Polar Silk Road’ by obtaining access to the NSR as an 
alternative to the conventional sea route to Europe via the Suez Canal and the vulnerable Strait of Malacca  
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borders. The fact that Washington chose not to coordinate its decision to impose a US travel-
ban with European governments - signifies that the US has chosen to act unilaterally instead of 
exhibiting the leadership qualities expected of a global power during a critical moment in world 
history. However, according to Burrows and Engelke (2020:6) the real test of leadership will 
come once the US has started its recovery and others are still struggling. The question remains 
as to whether Washington will revert to its “America First’ position or decide to assist in 
international recovery.  
To conclude, the US has not distinguished itself as a regional leader in the Arctic throughout 
the 22 years of the post-Cold War era. If the US truly seeks to be a regional leader in the Arctic 
during this time of major global upheaval, it needs to urgently provide a vision for the region 
that includes long-term change and climate action. While President Obama made strides in this 
direction, first by seeking to reform institutional structures within the US political system in 
order to tackle climate change, unfortunately his efforts were piece-meal and soon challenged 
by his successor Donald Trump. Although the Trump Administration has aggressively fought 
to promote Arctic oil drilling, prevent agreements on climate change policy both domestically 
and within the Arctic region, while also stalling progress on the first strategic plan and arguably 
one of the most important developments to occur within the AC during its 20 year history –it 
may be possible for the damage to be reversed should Trump be voted out of office next year 
(2021). It is perhaps not a coincidence that the Finnish Chairmanship decided to wait until 2021 
before reconvening negotiations on the AC strategic plan.  
6.2 Russia 
6.2.1 1997-2007: From the resignation of Yeltsin to the rise of Putin – the impact of the 
first and second terms of the Putin presidency on Russian Arctic policy and a review of 
Russia’s performance during its first chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2004-2006) 
On December 31, 1999, Yeltsin unexpectedly announced his resignation and named Putin 
acting president. In the following weeks, apartment bombings across Russia killed more than 
300 people. Putin’s placed the blame squarely with the Chechen terrorists while his tough 
response included aerial bombing of parts of Chechnya and an assault to recapture the 
breakaway southern province. This led to an overnight increase in his popularity and in the 
March 2000 elections Putin won about 53% of the vote. He promised Russians that he would 
end corruption and create a strong regulated market economy and return Russia to its rightful 
place as a great power in the international system. It will be argued here that a key aspect of 
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outlining Russia’s foreign policy orientation in the Arctic is to first consider Russia’s status as 
a great power in the broader international system. There are two main dimensions determining 
the international recognition of Russia’s great power status (Neumann 2008 cited in Petersson 
2013:309). The first dimension is concerned with Russia’s international influence, which was 
most apparent from the time of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War but has since 
then been denied to it over extended periods. The second aspect focuses on the internal 
dimension of Russian politics which has been considered as the critical and frequently lacking 
dimension of Russia’s great power status in the post-Cold War international system.  
As was demonstrated in Chapter 5, the political chaos and fragmentation during the post-Soviet 
years greatly contributed to the Russian populace’s scepticism towards democracy. This made 
it relatively easy for Putin to solidify his power in office during his first term of the presidency 
through the promise of returning Russia to its former historical status as a ‘strong state’ in the 
international system, even if to do this meant a reversal of many of the democratic political 
processes that were established under Yeltsin. More specifically, Putin sought to undo the 
federalization process of the Yeltsin era that had contributed to the siphoning of power and 
resources away from the political and administrative centre in Moscow. This was achieved by 
re-centralizing power from the regions to Moscow, and within Moscow to the Presidential 
Administration (Wilson Rowe, 2009:152). When Putin came to power, he was faced with a 
number of challenges that required internal reform. From the Russian regime’s perspective, 
domestic political order remains the most important factor for the survival and preservation of 
the state. The Putin regime therefore does not consider concepts of ‘good governance’ or 
democracy to be important instruments in achieving this aim (Petersson 2013:310). Instead, it 
extols the ‘rule of law’ and a state-regulated or ‘managed’ energy-based economy, yet the 
Russian federal government has also behaved in ways that demonstrate the Presidential 
administration itself is above such laws, particularly with respect to supressing political 
competition and the freedom of the media. Aiding Putin’s endeavours were the beneficially 
high oil prices from 2000 to 2007 which led to economic growth and a more assertive foreign 
policy. Russian confidence in its ability to project a new international image of power was 
based on its role as a major global energy exporter. All these factors contributed to Putin being 
able to maintain high levels of popularity and public approval ratings for his policies.  
Yet when the Kursk submarine sank in the Barents Sea on the 12th of August 2000, Putin faced 
an immediate political crisis and challenge to his leadership (see also section 7.1.2 of Chapter 
7). The failure of the Russian military to request international assistance for search and rescue 
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efforts in addition to the secretive way in which the Russian state apparatus handled the incident 
resulted in Putin having to face severe criticism from the Russian media and the international 
community. In response, this led to a crackdown on free speech within Russia and ultimately 
led to independent media outlets being taken over by the government. Today, the Russian 
media is now predominately state-owned and heavily monitored (Rainsford 2015).   
However, the Russian Arctic has more recently been used in the media as a means of promoting 
Russian nationalism, bolstering support for the Putin regime, and to re-establish Russia as a 
world power. Seven years after the Kursk incident, the Russian media intensively covered a 
Russian expedition to the North Pole and the planting of a titanium Russian flag on the seabed 
floor. There are recognisable similarities to the way in which the Russian media presented this 
expedition that are comparable with the American moon landing and all the political 
significance that entailed. The Russian Arctic expedition, which took place on the 2nd of August 
2007, involved a dangerous 4,300-metre descent to the seabed floor under the ice by a pair of 
mini-submersible vessels known as the Mir-1 and the Mir-2 (Parfitt 2007). Inside the first of 
the mini submarines to reach the seabed were two members of Russia’s lower house of 
Parliament. One of them, Artur N. Chilingarov, aged 68 and a veteran polar explorer, led the 
expedition with the aim of seeking evidence to reinforce Russia’s claim to UNCLOS to extend 
its continental shelf. Chilingarov was also responsible for raising much of the funding for the 
expedition. Yet there was arguably a stronger political objective to the endeavour as 
demonstrated by Chilingarov who proclaimed that “our task is to remind the world that Russia 
is a great Arctic and scientific power”. President Vladimir V. Putin called the members of the 
expedition to thank them personally, which as Chivers (2007) explains, is “an unmistakable 
sign of the significance of the claim to the Kremlin”.  
Concerning the issue of Russian participation and support of the AC, the Putin regime did not 
significantly transform Russia’s relationship with the Arctic Council. In Chapter 5, I outlined 
that because Russia was beset by economic difficulties and domestic problems during the 
transitional years of the 1990s, this made it extremely difficult to engage in the AC forums 
during the first three years of operation. However, Rowe (2009b:152) implies that the reforms 
of the Putin era had inconclusive results for improving Russian participation in the AC: here 
she makes two key observations. Firstly, she explains that “…the centralization of power in the 
presidential administration at the expense of other branches of government may have reduced 
the mandate of some Arctic Council representatives”. This example also serves to highlight a 
second problem with respect to Russian AC participation – essentially that participants must 
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adhere to strict administrative preferences with little room for bottom-up initiatives from the 
regional republics. In this way, Rowe (2009b:147) highlights the fact that capacity building is 
another major stumbling block when it comes to Russian efforts to set the AC agenda. She 
draws attention to how Russian officials have rarely proposed or funded new projects 
throughout the duration of the AC. Even the 2004-2006 Russian chairmanship had mixed 
results: while meetings were well organised, there was little substance to, or progress made, on 
the agenda, even though the chairmanship had been given to Russia in hopes of strengthening 
its engagement in the AC, (a similar motivation had been behind the 1998-2000 chairmanship 
of the US) (Rowe 2009:246). While there is now more involvement overall due to an increase 
of Russian representation, Russia still proposes relatively few projects and at times struggles 
to provide the necessary data for Council assessment activities (ibid).  
A third issue impacting Russian participation in the AC from the onset of the Putin presidency 
is, according to Rowe (2009b:152) the difficulty surrounding high and low politics: she 
explains how “… issues that previously fell comfortably within the realm of ‘low politics’ such 
as environmental cooperation may now be assigned some strategic significance”. Russia views 
the Arctic as a treasure house of natural resources however Western efforts to tighten 
environmental standards in the Arctic has led to more stringent control over the extraction of 
natural resources. This in turn has created clashes of interest with Russian companies’ 
production methods (Baev 2013:267). Within the AC, problems occur when an environmental 
topic framed as an issue of ‘low’ politics is deemed otherwise by Russia (Rowe 2009b:152). 
This is because from a Russian perspective, Arctic economic development became increasingly 
linked to security and foreign policy outcomes particularly with respect to oil and gas 
extraction.  
6.2.2. 2008 – 2011: The Medvedev Presidency and the Development of Russia’s 2008 state 
policy in the Arctic up to 2020 
The Arctic began to be progressively referred to in major Russian policy documents from 2008 
onwards as a region of strategic and economic importance in addition to prioritising military 
reform and modernization of Arctic bases. Then, in September 2008, under the Medvedev 
Presidency, the Russian Security Council led by the former FSB chief Nikolai Patrushev, issued 
its first Arctic Strategy titled ‘The fundamentals of the Russian state policy in the Arctic up to 
2020 and beyond’ which was released to the public in 2009 (Pederson 2009:47). Four key 
national interests are outlined in this document: 
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1. The use of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base of the 
Russian Federation providing the solution of problems of social and economic development 
for the country 
2. Maintenance of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation 
3. Preservation of unique ecological systems in the Arctic 
4. Use of the Northern Sea Route as a national single transport communication of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic (to improve the NSR) 
While these four objectives are outlined as cooperative and peaceable Arctic objectives, the 
policy envisioned a plan for deploying a special force in the Arctic in order ‘to guarantee 
Russia’s military security in diverse military and political circumstances’, however spokesmen 
denied any intent of militarizing the Far North (Petersen 2009:47). This was followed in 
February 2013 by a Strategy for Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation that 
focuses mainly on domestic and regional policies for the Arctic and strategies for economic 
development. Since 2008, other federal policy documents refer to the Arctic such as the 2015 
National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (NSSRF), which also assures that “the 
development of equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic is of 
particular significance”. During a 2013 interview on Norwegian television former president 
Dmitry Medvedev commented on the significance of the Arctic region in Russian 
policymaking stating that “we have been paying a lot of attention for quite a while to the Arctic 
sector in our decision-making … we don’t harbour any secret plans: our polices are open and 
we hope that our partners and friends will abide by the same principles”. He also expressed his 
support for the strengthening of US-Russian relations in the Arctic through cooperation on a 
variety of issues but emphasised that “this should be peaceful cooperation”. On the role of non-
Arctic states and those with AC observer status such as China, Medvedev indicated that “We 
can trust China, but the rules of the game need to be imposed by the Arctic countries” (Office 
of the Prime Minister for the Russian Federation 2013).  
Current Arctic literature written from a realist/geopolitical perspective suggests that Russia is 
engaged in revisionist and increasingly militaristic policies in the Arctic due to its aspirations 
to claim large swathes of territory for oil and gas exploration in the High North. Yet these 
arguments can be refuted on several grounds. Firstly, Baev (2013:266) points out that the 
natural resources have proved to be limited in the Arctic and consist primarily of natural gas, 
which has become plentiful in the global market from a variety of unconventional sources and 
because of difficult operating conditions would require the expertise of Western partners. These 
economic realities “makes the wielding of military instruments to assert Russia’s Arctic claims 
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completely senseless” (ibid). Segunin and Konyshiev (2014) further highlight that 75 to 80 
percent of unproven hydrocarbon reserves lie within the Arctic coastal states’ exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ). This means that the majority of hydrocarbon reserves remain within 
national sovereign jurisdiction and therefore are uncontested. Since Russia has yet to extract or 
deplete its own natural reserves within its Arctic territory it is in no hurry to embark on military 
adventurism to seize offshore reserves at the risk of conflict with the West. Russia struggles to 
extract hydrocarbons from its own reserves for a number of reasons including: Western 
sanctions, the technological shortcomings of state-owned companies such as Gazprom and 
Rosneft, and the Russian state’s unwillingness to cooperate with private companies (Russian 
or foreign) with the relevant experience (Pritchin 2018). Therefore, under these conditions, it 
makes sense why Russia is content to adhere to international law and place its submission with 
UNCLOS for its claim to extend its nautical territory (Segunin and Konyshiev 2014). 
Furthermore, breaking out of UNCLOS would have involved Russia leaving a globally 
accepted regime that, “by privileging coastal states through its exclusive economic zone and 
extended continental shelf regimes, helps keep non-Arctic states away from the region” (Byers 
2017:17).  
Recognising this, in 2010, Russia demonstrated its willingness to peacefully resolve a maritime 
dispute with Norway over an area that has proven petroleum and natural gas deposits. The two 
states signed a new bilateral Treaty that ended a forty-year dispute over maritime borders in a 
‘Grey Zone’ area situated north of Russia’s Kola Peninsula and the Norwegian coast, with the 
agreement dividing the 175,000 sq. km (67,567 sq. mile) zone equally between them (Harding 
2010). While Russia advocated that it was seeking to prove its commitment to cooperation in 
the Arctic region and establish a model for neighbourly relations, the underlying reason behind 
Russia’s willingness to engage in this major compromise was that Moscow expected positive 
spinoffs such as a joint Russian-Norwegian venture for exploring the shelf of the formerly 
disputed zone (Baev 2013:267). Nonetheless, the agreement was and still is unpopular in 
Russia, and Putin has distanced himself from the initiative even though it is certain that 
Medvedev acted with his full consent (ibid). 
6.2.3. 2012-2020 Putin’s third and fourth term –future implications for Russia’s 
impending chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021 
Putin returned to power as president in 2012 – a decision made that essentially resulted in a 
switch of places with Medvedev who then stepped down from president and became Prime 
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Minister.  On the 24th of September 2011, during a congress of his political party, United 
Russia, Putin told the nation that he would leave the post of Prime Minister and return to the 
presidency, "I want to say it straight out…. the agreement over what will be done in the future 
was reached between us several years ago." Putin declared. This move, dubbed by Russian 
opponents as rokirovka - or castling, a term borrowed from chess that describes a move in the 
game in which the king and the rook switch places to protect the king (Schuster 2012). Prior to 
and after the presidential election on the 4th of March 2012, anti-Putin protestors in their tens 
of thousands marched through Moscow in a series of mass gatherings. The protesters demanded 
a rerun of the parliamentary elections, the resignation of the head of the central election 
commission, reform of the political system and the release of political prisoners (Parfitt 2012).  
Russian Arctic strategy has remained relatively consistent since the return of Vladimir Putin to 
the presidency in 2012. However, Russia has also had to contend with new Arctic challenges 
particularly when it comes to China and its growing economic interests in the region. China 
obtained observer status in the AC in 2013, which Russia initially sought to prevent out of fear 
that China would exert too large an influence in Arctic affairs. However, it conceded on the 
grounds that preventing China AC observer status would harm new oil and gas agreements. 
Russia clearly recognises the potential for Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic, including 
Chinese capital investment in new Siberian oil and gas fields, the development of the NSR and 
tying it to China’ One Road, One Belt (OBOR) policy - an initiative aimed at connecting the 
landlocked part of China with vital European markets via train routes and highways through, 
for example, central Asia and Russia (Sørensen and Klimenko 2017:24). 
Since 2014 Russia has accelerated its ‘pivot to Asia’, as a means of securing new eastern 
partnerships – primarily with China - as its relations with the west faltered in the aftermath of 
the Ukrainian conflict. However, the Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic is also complex 
and not without its difficulties. As Trenin (2020) explains  
China has much greater economic, financial, and technological resources than Russia, and the gap is 
growing. China’s economic dynamics also look stronger. While China is charging ahead, Russia is merely 
trying to protect its positions: its sovereignty, territorial integrity, national control over navigation, and the 
precedence of international law (i.e., interstate bargaining) over any kind of a universal rules-based order. 
 
In November 2016, President Putin released the latest Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation (FPCRF) which outlines Russia’s foreign policy principles and relations with other 
states. Devyatkin (2018) explains that the 2016 FPCRF contains the idea that Russia has re-
emerged as a key player in international politics and that Russian foreign policy should aim to 
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“consolidate Russia’s position as a centre of influence.” Under the section IV on “Regional 
Foreign Policy Priorities,” there is a paragraph that emphasises the Arctic’s strategic 
importance to Russia (No.76). Because the Arctic is seen as a region where Russia has 
historically exerted its polar ambitions, this, “lends some validation to the rhetoric that Russia’s 
policy in the Arctic is based on restoring its great power status” (Dervyatkin 2018). The FPCRF 
states that Russia hopes to pursue policies that “promote peace, stability and constructive 
international cooperation.” However, Russia also proclaims that the state will “be firm in 
countering any attempts to introduce elements of political or military confrontation in the 
Arctic” (mid.ru 2016).  
The FPCRF confirms Russia’s support for the preservation of the international legal framework 
of UNCLOS in the Arctic and for political cooperation through regional institutions. According 
to Putin “our policies will never be based on exceptionalism. We protect our interests and 
respect the interests of other countries. We observe international law and believe in the 
inviolable central role of the UN” (The Kremlin 2017). Article 76 of the FPCRF highlights that 
Russia endorses regional cooperation through the AC, yet two other channels are also 
mentioned: the Arctic Five (A5), and the Barents-Euro Arctic Council (BEAC). Yet, Russia’s 
commitment to interstate cooperation may be based less on notions of ‘common good’ or ‘joint 
responsibility’ than from a realist or self-interested basis. The inclusion of the A5 here suggests 
that Russia considers the Arctic Five as a legitimate mini-lateral setting for Arctic diplomacy 
or at the very least, a supplementary forum to AC institutional cooperation. Russia’s 
willingness to engage in and support the AC institutional structure is the result of being 
included as an equal with the Western Arctic states while also apparently satisfied with the 
outcomes of such processes. Thus, the benefits from membership to the AC and UNCLOS can 
go a long way towards explaining Russia’s willingness to play by the rules. If Russia is to be 
considered as a revisionist power in the Arctic, it would have to have demonstrated behaviour 
that contradicts this. For example, refusing to participate in AC Ministerial Meetings or forums, 
breaking rules or ‘spoiling’ the institutional structure of the AC would indicate Russia’s 
rejection of multilateral cooperation. This has not been the case in the Arctic as Russia has 
demonstrated its support through participation in AC meetings and has pledged a commitment 
to upholding international maritime law governing the Arctic (UNCLOS).   However, the above 
evidence does strongly indicate that for the most part, Russia acts like a status quo power in 
the Arctic region. 
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During an interview at the fourth International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk in 2017, Vladimir 
Putin emphasised the importance of the Arctic both economically and environmentally, going 
so far as to outline that the Arctic nations have a collective responsibility to preserve the Arctic 
region:  
The importance of the Arctic has increased manifold. The attention of many nations is focused 
on the Arctic as a region whose wellbeing determines the global climate, a treasure trove of unique nature 
and, of course, a region with a huge economic potential and opportunities. Preserving the Arctic 
as a territory of constructive dialogue, development and equal cooperation is a matter of fundamental 
importance. 
Yet there is an implicit message within Putin’s statement which implies that Russia is against 
the internationalisation of the region in order to protect access to natural resources. In article 
13 of the 2016 FPCRF, it is stated that “leadership in exploiting the resources of the world’s 
oceans and the Arctic is acquiring particular significance”. This suggests the growing 
importance of the Arctic as a strategic region for extracting natural resources; from oil and gas 
to precious and rare-earth metals. However, as Laurelle (2020:24) highlights, industrial 
pollution is becoming ever more difficult to tackle in the Russian Arctic because it directly 
contradicts the government’s economic policies. This is arguably a Soviet legacy that has 
continued into the 21st century where eight out of ten of the world’s largest Arctic cities - with 
over 100,000 inhabitants - are in Russia. These cities, Laurelle (2020:25) argues, now face two 
parallel phenomena, the ‘greening’ and the ‘browning’ of the land. The ‘greening’ phenomena 
is occurring in the tundra areas where the lengthened seasons contribute to favourable growth 
and the appearance of more southern flora and insects due to the rise of local temperatures 
linked to industrial production. At the same time, ‘browning’ occurs around industrial cities 
and is accompanied by a decline in land output due to pollution linked to extraction activities 
and multiple chemical contaminants from transport systems and urban activities (2020:25).  
While the Kremlin may have given the green light for more intense explorations for Arctic 
natural resources, Rohr (2014:8) highlights how Russia and Europe’s dependency on fossil 
fuels has come at a high price for the indigenous inhabitants of the regions where these natural 
riches originate. He outlines how  
One of the main problems of Russia’s indigenous peoples is, in fact, their invisibility: they are overlooked 
by corporations exploiting the natural riches of Siberia, by policy makers devising laws and strategies to 
shape the present and future of the Russian Arctic, by public and private donors, who deem Russia’s 
indigenous peoples ineligible for technical and financial assistance due to their geographic location in the 
developed world, and even by civil society activists who regard the situation of indigenous peoples as a 
negligible issue compared to the many other pressing human rights challenges facing Russia or to the 




Laurelle (2020:26) concurs that the situation of the indigenous peoples is most worrying since 
their living and health conditions have deteriorated since the end of the Soviet system. 
Furthermore, Russia is not a signatory of the UN Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
nor has it ratified the International Labor Organization’s 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention.  
The disparity of interests between the indigenous northern peoples of Russia and the federal 
government can be traced back to events from November 2012 onwards. In 2012, The Russian 
Ministry of Justice gave a warning to the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North (RAIPON) and told the organization that it had to close following irregularities in its 
organizational practices. However, a few months later the organization was taken over by a 
new leadership that was fully aligned with government structures (Nilsen 2019d). This 
takeover strategy was likely pursued by the Russian government in order to avoid the 
inevitable international backlash that would have occurred if it had closed down RAIPON 
since the organisation is one of the six indigenous groups to achieve permanent observer status 
in the Arctic Council. However, seven years later in November 2019, a Moscow city court 
ruled in favour of dissolving another NGO group that provides assistance to Russian 
indigenous people in Siberia, the North and Far East of Russia – The Centre for Support of 
Indigenous Peoples in the North (CSIPN). Russia’s Ministry of Justice brought the case to 
court and asked for the shutdown of the organization over multiple violations of the country’s 
NGO law (Nilsen 2019d). Although the court cited technical reasons for the ruling including 
the organization’s charter failing to comply with recent legislative changes and listing an 
invalid address, CSIPN director Rodion Sulyandziga said that the Russian government sought 
to prevent CSIPN from engaging in intergovernmental organizations in the Arctic or 
internationally (Magomedov 2019, Nilsen 2019e). Recognised as one of the most outspoken 
domestic voices in Russia on indigenous rights, since it was established in 2001, the CSIPN 
has had a history of conflict with the Russian authorities. In 2015, the CSIPN was listed as a 
‘foreign agent’ by the government – a branding that is given to groups that receive funding 
from abroad and are involved in what authorities define as ‘political activities’ resulting in the 
NGO being subjected to searches and interrogations (Nilsen 2019d). Yet, Nilsen suggests that 
Russia’s impending Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021 is another factor influencing 
the November 2019 ruling and may be seen as a way for the Russian authorities to ‘clear the 
way’ of any groups that may threaten Russia’s status as a leading Arctic state by raising 
attention to human rights violations against indigenous Russian northerners.  
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In May 2018, Putin was sworn in for a fourth term as Russia’s president. Although elected with 
more than 76% of the vote, (Putin’s best election performance to date) - widespread 
irregularities were reported by some international observers (BBC News 2018). The country's 
best-known opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, was barred from standing against Putin, on 
grounds of a conviction for embezzlement which he denies and alleges was politically 
motivated (ibid). Russia, during the fourth term of President Vladimir Putin - set to last until 
2024 - will likely continue its policies of ‘managed democracy’ and Putin’s brand of 
‘pragmatism’, while Russia’s Arctic policies have continued to focus on developing the North 
as a region of economic, strategic and national importance.  
Shortly after his re-election in May 2018, Putin signed an Executive order on ‘National goals 
and Strategic Objectives of the Russian Federation through to 2024’. Within this document 
there are nine key social and economic objectives relating to the development of strategic 
infrastructure and national projects. Of these, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) was identified as 
a priority and document instructs that the route will be further developed in order to increase 
its cargo traffic up to 80 million tonnes (The Kremlin 2018). In February 2019, Vladimir Putin 
signed an order to reorganise government structures that are responsible for Arctic 
development. Specifically, this involved the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far 
East to be renamed the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic. This 
was more than just a name change however as the new ministry was assigned the function of 
drafting state policy and contributed to the development of Russia’s new Arctic strategy – 
which was approved by government and the national Security Council in late 2019 and released 
in March 2020 (I discuss this further below).   
Furthermore, in mid-December 2019, Russia’s now-former prime minister Dmitry Medvedev 
signed a new document outlining major investments in the NSR and supporting infrastructure 
including the intent to build at least 40 Arctic vessels, upgrade 4 regional airports, construct 
railways and seaports and facilitate large-scale extraction of Arctic natural resources (Staalasen 
2019a). Medvedev also allocated €1.85 billion for building a bigger and more powerful 
nuclear-powered icebreaker. Around the same time, leaders of Russian government ministries, 
agencies and state companies assembled in Murmansk to discuss ways to boost the extraction 
of natural resources in the Russian north and reach the president’s annual shipping target for 
the NSR – set at 80 million tons by 2025. This meeting, referred to as the Arctic Commission, 
was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev and the outcome resulted in the creation 
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of a new Russian law to provide major tax cuts in five different sectors including; offshore 
petroleum projects, production of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG), the petrochemical industry and 
mineral extraction (Staalasen 2019a).  
In January 2020, Putin embarked on a sweeping reshuffle of Russia’s leadership, accepting the 
resignation of Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev and the cabinet in order to pave the way for 
constitutional amendments that would enable Putin to hold onto power until 2024 and possibly 
beyond65 (Roth 2020). Medvedev was then appointed to a new position as the deputy chairman 
of Russia’s Security Council, which is headed by Putin. Despite nationwide protests on March 
12th in major Russian cities including Moscow, St Petersburg and Ekaterinburg, Russia’s two 
chambers of parliament overwhelmingly approved the changes, once more securing Putin’s 
position as head of state (Radio Free Europe 2020).  
Meanwhile, on the 5th of March 2020, Russia’s new Arctic Strategy titled On the Basics of 
State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period Until 2035, was released. 
Within the new policy, there are elements of both continuity and change. The strategy sets out 
the development of the NSR as a “globally competitive Russian national transport route” and 
the policy plans to pave the way for massive industrialization of the energy-rich region. 
Covering a period until 2035, the new policy will replace Russia’s former 2008 Arctic strategy 
and has been authored by the Ministry of the Far East and Arctic (Staalesen 2020b). The new 
strategy aims to strengthen national sovereignty and territorial integrity, promote peace, 
stability and mutually beneficial partnerships, and improve the standard of living for the 
regional population (ibid). 
During an interview with the Arctic Council in March 2020, Nikolay Korchunov66, a career 
diplomat and the Senior Arctic Official of the Russian Federation, outlined that Russia is 
currently in the early stages of preparing the agenda for the Russian Chairmanship of the AC 
in 2021; 
There will be a number of priorities on the agenda of our Chairmanship, among them of 
course environmental protection and sustainable development, as well as new 
technologies for safeguarding the Arctic environment. The human dimension, the Arctic 
 
65 When he reaches the end of his fourth term in 2024, Putin will have been in power for nearly a quarter of a century (BBC 
News 2018). 
66 Korchunov has served as the Ambassador at Large for the Arctic Cooperation at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) and is a senior Russian official in the Arctic Council. 
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inhabitants including Indigenous peoples, will of course be stressed and underlined 
throughout our forthcoming Chairmanship.  
Korchunov also emphasised that Russia must strike a balance between environmental 
protection and socio-economic development. This turned out to be a timely assessment as 
Korchunov’s statement came just two months before a major oil spill in the Russian Arctic on 
29th May 2020. The spill happened when a fuel tank at a power plant near the Siberian city of 
Norilsk collapsed. Ground subsidence caused by warm weather and rapidly melting permafrost 
is believed to have caused the tanks to collapse. Thousands of gallons of oil spilled into the 
nearby Ambarnaya river, requiring Putin to declare a state of emergency. The accident is 
believed to be the second largest in modern Russian history in terms of volume, comparable to 
the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989 (see Chapter 4).The Russian Investigative 
Committee (SK) has launched a criminal case against the owner of the plant67 both for the 
pollution caused to the environment and for alleged negligence, as there was reportedly a two-
day delay in informing the Moscow authorities about the spill (BBC 2020).  
The Norilsk oil spill puts Russia in a difficult situation as it diminishes Russia’s legitimacy as 
a great Arctic power and as an energy exporter during a crucial time as it is preparing to take 
over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Efforts to clean up the spill may take years to 
complete and starkly highlights the environmental negligence of Russian companies alongside 
the inattention paid by the Kremlin to environmental protection and law enforcement. In order 
to demonstrate regional leadership during the Russian Chairmanship of the AC in 2021, 
Laurelle (2020:29) considers that in addition to environmental issues, Russia will also have to 
contend with a range of challenges that I discussed earlier including the Russian-Chinese 
economic relationship and investments along the NSR and managing international pressure on 
the rights of indigenous minorities. Finally, Laurelle also advises that Russia will have to prove 
its ability to launch international initiatives within the structures of the AC and have them 
supported by other countries in order to strengthen its soft power and exert diplomatic 
leadership in the Arctic – a feat not seen by Russia since the Gorbachev era.   
 
 




6.3 Evaluating contemporary political developments in the current Arctic 
order through ES analysis of Arctic regional society   
The purpose of this final section will be to demonstrate the expansion of ES institutions of 
regional society in the current Arctic order. In Chapter 2, Buzan’s (2012a) ES model of 
international society was utilised to demonstrate how the master institutions have evolved - 
from the original six envisioned by Hedley Bull - to eight contemporary institutions. I proposed 
that there is a causal relationship between regional security orders (RSCs) and regional society: 
the development of more integrated forms of regional society is contingent upon there being 
greater levels of security cooperation. In Chapter 5, I demonstrated how, at the end of the Cold 
War, the Arctic transformed from a coexistent regional society to a cooperative regional 
society, as per Buzan’s (2012b) typology. However, to date, the Arctic has remained as a 
cooperative regional society and has not yet evolved past this stage towards a convergence-
type regional society. This is mainly due to regional security overlap and the continuation of 
US/NATO based Cold War security structures. For such a society to exist, very high levels of 
integration need to be present in addition to all member states of the RSC demonstrating a 
shared sense of identity, political culture, values and behavioural norms as would be evident in 
a post-Westphalian security community such as the EU. Within these conditions, it would be 
inconceivable for one state to threaten or to utilise force against another state within the RSC. 
Therefore, if such stringent conditions were to be met then this would arguably require an 
integrated security order, where security is inclusive, indivisible and collectively organised (see 
Table 2.2, Chapter 2).    
Although the Arctic continues to have a cooperative society today, I will illustrate that it has 
nonetheless matured over the past twenty years as evidence from the range of regional 
institutions and derivative processes, many of which are specific to the Arctic (see Table 6.1). 
This demonstrate how Arctic regional society has expanded considerably since the former 
coexistent society of the Cold War era. At the same time, the contemporary Arctic regional 
society has built on the successes achieved during the early post-Cold War transition years, 
especially in the policy areas of indigenous participation and environmental governance.  
Within this current period of history, the Arctic has reached significant milestones: for 
example, with respect to self-determination and popular sovereignty, some of the largest 
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aboriginal land claims agreements have been successfully completed68 along with the 
resolution of the Norwegian -Russian maritime dispute in 2010.  
The current Arctic regional society has also witnessed the development of new institutions in 
the area of trade with the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council (AEC) in 2014. The 
AEC is the first circumpolar institution primarily focused on building trade and regional 
markets to promote Arctic industrial development. In large part the AEC is a Canadian 
initiative, created during Canada’s Chairmanship of the AC in 2013-2015. This demonstrates 
how Canada continues to foresee itself as having a regional leadership role in the Arctic through 
steering and envisioning the future direction of Arctic regional development.   
 
However, the key findings in this chapter as they relate to the current role(s) and foreign 
policies of the two regional powers demonstrate that issues of sovereignty, territoriality, 
diplomacy and great power management continue to take priority for the Arctic powers as they 
pertain to issues of high politics. As such, military security and defence issues are excluded 
from the AC forums or issues relating to sovereignty and territoriality are discussed within 
more exclusive mini-lateral (A5) or bi-lateral settings as demonstrated earlier in section 6.1.3. 
It is therefore difficult to determine if greater security cooperation will occur amongst the eight 
Arctic states in the future, as it is evident that the United States does not consider collective 
security arrangements to offer greater benefits than the US-dominated NATO, while at the 
same time, domestic factions within the US consider greater levels of institutionalism and 
legally binding multilateral decision-making to be a threat to American sovereignty. 
  
 
68 An unprecedented example of this is the establishment of the state of Nunavut in 1999, which was granted to the native Inuit 
people from the North-west territories. Another good example is the Greenlandic self-government referendum of 2008 which 
has begun to transfer national sovereignty from Denmark to Greenland, a process that will infer greater levels of decision-
making powers to Greenlanders from Copenhagen and perhaps eventually culminating in full independence for the island.   
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Table 6.0 Contemporary Institutions of Arctic regional Society operating within the 




 Secondary Institutions  
Master Derivative Examples 
   
Sovereignty Non-intervention 
International Law 





UNCLOS, Bilateral Treaties have also effectively 
been used to settle Arctic maritime disputes 
peacefully e.g. Russia-Norway agreement (2010) 
Diplomacy Bilateralism 






Bilateral defence treaties between the US and 
NATO Arctic states on long-term leasing of 
military bases  
US-Russian relations 
 
Arctic Council, The Arctic Circle Assembly, The 
Northern Forum 
 
The Arctic Five (A5) Forum, The BEAC 
Great power 
management  
Balance of Power 
Alliances 




The Arctic as a Westphalian regional system 
NATO 
NATO-Russian Council, the OSCE, the EU, the 
UNSC, NORDEFCO, Nordic Defence Cooperation  







Arctic Indigenous Peoples NGO’s including the six 












EU trade disagreement with Canada and Norway 
over the export of seal skins, meat and oil 
GATT/WTO, MFN agreements, IMF 
Arctic Economic Council, The Arctic Circle, The 
Northern Forum 
 
China’s ‘Polar Silk Road’ as a part of the ‘One 






Indigenous land claim settlements e.g. The creation 
of the state of Nunavut, Canada (1999) This was the 
outcome of the largest aboriginal land claims 
agreement between the Canadian government and 
the Inuit people 
 









The Arctic Council environmental forums and 
working groups 
 
The 2011-2013 legally binding agreement on oil 
spill response signed by the AC member states 
 
International agreements such as CITES, UNFCCC, 
Paris and Kyoto Protocol, IPCC. 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to outline key developments within the Arctic region in the 
post-Cold War era from 1996-2020.  
As Charles Krauthammer (1990/1:23) points out, roles “are not invented in the abstract: they 
are a response to a perceived world structure”. What would it take for the Arctic to lead the 
way to positive global change? As exhibited through the RPSF, regional leadership is required. 
While individual leaders from powerful states may seek to shape or reshape the role that their 
nation plays on the global stage, political culture and systemic factors also contribute to the 
creation of foreign policy. Both the United States and Russia’s Arctic foreign policies are 
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heavily influenced by their political culture as much as the personality of the individual leaders 
in power at the time. With respect to the United States – its foreign policy has been largely 
shaped by its pre-eminent role in global politics in the post-Cold War era and its tendency 
towards maintaining the status quo in the Arctic political order.  
Nonetheless, in section 6.1.3., I demonstrated how the US and other Arctic states have also 
previously embarked on foreign policy revisionism only to change their minds in favour of the 
status quo. This was demonstrated in section 6.1.3, with respect to the decision made by the 
US and Russia, in addition to the three small and medium Arctic coastal states, to engage in 
discussions on Arctic Ocean Management outside of the AC institutional structure during the 
period from 2008 to 2010. In the past decade, maritime sovereignty has become increasingly 
important for the Arctic powers, because this issue-area has foreign policy and defence 
implications. Although the A5 forum was not initially conceived of by the US or Russia, if they 
had continued to bypass the AC after 2010, this arguably would have resulted in loss of 
legitimacy for the AC and international condemnation directed at the Arctic powers.  
The reactions and political responses of the small Arctic states that were excluded from the A5 
negotiations were also observed. Iceland proves how small states can express their 
dissatisfaction through creative and unanticipated ways such as through developing alternative 
structures more favourable to their interests. Although the Arctic Circle Assembly was not 
intended to replace the AC it has, since its establishment proven to be a new and expanding 
forum for discussion. However, the fact that the other four members of the A5 followed the 
lead of the US when it chose to re-commit to the AC suggests that the US still has the power 
capability to play a regional leadership role in the region. For this reason, I justify my decision 
to categorise the current Arctic order as being uni-multipolar.  
Although during his tenure, President Obama sought to promote the US as an Arctic state and 
raise awareness on climate change, it has been shown in section 6.1.4., that at times Obama 
appeared uncertain in the face of trying to appease domestic political factions who favoured 
Arctic oil drilling and sought to promote industrial interests in the North American Arctic at 
the possible expense of environmental conservation. Yet prior to the conclusion of his second 
term in office, Obama sought to create his environmental legacy by passing a controversial bill 
banning offshore oil drilling in the American Arctic. While this was an unprecedented move, 
it was not a circumpolar endeavour and thus did not impact the Arctic regional order to a 
significant degree. In fact, the only other Arctic state willing to support Obama on this policy 
was Canada, which pledged a five-year ban on offshore drilling. In this section, I also discussed 
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the US Chairmanship of the AC from 2015-2017 which took place during the Obama 
presidency. I concluded that while there were some issue-specific achievements, the US’ AC 
chairmanship agenda did not propose any significant new developments in regional 
cooperation or exhibit strong political leadership.  
In section 6.1.5 it was shown that the Trump Administration’s strong stance opposing climate 
change policies has resulted in this president seeking to reverse practically all of Obama’s 
Arctic initiatives from overruling the ban on offshore drilling to leaving administrative 
positions relating to the Arctic vacant. The US recognises that it is now in great power decline 
and has chosen to revise its foreign policies towards a zero-sum strategy that focuses on a return 
to great power competition with Russia and China – a strategy that could  also encroach on the 
US’ capacity to engage in Arctic regional cooperation.  Furthermore, Trump’s foreign policies 
have already detrimentally affected AC meetings by preventing progress on important issues 
such as climate change policy and AC institutional reform.  
Russia’s Arctic strategies have remained relatively consistent throughout the timespan from 
1996-2020. From an in-depth analysis of Russian foreign policy and Arctic strategies in section 
6.2 it can be concluded that Russia also behaves as a status quo state in the Arctic. So long as 
Russia continues to be included as an equal and respected member of the AC and the 
international norms of UNCLOS are upheld - which Russia benefits from - there is no evidence 
to suggest that Russia is not satisfied with the present-day Arctic political order. Russia, like 
the United States, continues to struggle with finding the balance between economic 
development and environmental protection in the AZRF. As result, Russia may increasingly 
need to look to multilateral solutions and draw on the expertise of the AC. However, I argue 
that a key challenge for Russia is that continues to be dissatisfied with the Arctic security order 
so long as the Cold War NATO structures predominate the European security architecture, a 
topic that I will address in Chapter 7 as it pertains to regional security overlap.  
Last, in section 6.5 I summarised how the political development discussed throughout the 
chapter fit into the gradual expansion of regional society in the current Arctic order as 
illustrated through Buzan’s (2012) model. It was concluded that Arctic regional society has not 
radically transformed since the shift that occurred at the end of the Cold War. Instead, Arctic 
regional society remains cooperative but has, nonetheless, expanded in the past twenty years 
to include a wider variety of institutions. Since many of these secondary institutions or 
derivative processes are specific to the Arctic, this provides a strong indicator justifying the 
existence of a contemporary Arctic regional society. However, I explained that Arctic regional 
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society is unlikely to evolve to a higher level of integration until the issue of regional security 
overlap is resolved. In Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, I will contend with the issue of whether NATO 
intends to have a stronger role in the Arctic in the present, while considering the implications 




CHAPTER SEVEN:                                                                                     
THE PRESENT-DAY ARCTIC SECURITY ORDER   
7.0 Introduction – What is NATO’s role in the 21st century Arctic? 
From Chapter 6, it can be summarised that the Arctic political order and regional cooperation 
continues to be mainly based on shared environmental and maritime concerns structured 
through the AC. However, in this chapter and the next, I return to military security issues, 
arguing that through the lens of ES approaches and regional security overlap - it can be 
observed how the Cold War NATO security structure continues to influence the 21st century 
Arctic security order. I will again focus on the two Arctic powers, the United States and Russia, 
to examine how Arctic security is understood by these predominant actors, before turning to 
address the question – ‘what is NATO’s role in the 21st century Arctic?’. I do this by reviewing 
NATOs present-day security agenda in the High North while also evaluating Russia’s position 
on NATO in the Arctic. This also serves as the background for Chapter 8, when I turn to assess 
the relationship between NATO and the small and medium Arctic states, and their perceptions 
on the alliance’s role in the High North.        
I begin with a review of US and Russian Arctic defence strategies (section 7.1.1. and 7.1.2). 
Where NATO is concerned, I will seek to determine if the US envisions NATO as being the 
primary mechanism through which to implement its Arctic defence strategy. Up-to-date 
national US military and security policies such as the 2018 National Defence Strategy, the 2018 
Nuclear Posture Review, and the 2017 National Security Strategy will also be referred to in the 
following section, in addition to the latest June 2019 Arctic strategy issued by the DoD. A 
further intent is to provide valuable insights into how the current presidential administration of 
Donald Trump intends to shape the present and near-future security agenda in the Arctic. Here, 
I also discuss the United States-NATO relationship during the current Trump Administration 
to identify current challenges facing the alliance including domestic political contestation 
surrounding the future of NATO and the divisive issue of military spending amongst alliance 
members. 
In section 7.1.2., With respect to Russia I will attempt to trace changes in military strategy in 
the post-Ukraine period to examine whether Russia seeks to revise the Arctic security order 
through foreign policy revisionism and regional military hegemony. In section 7.2.1., I reflect 
on the role of NATO in the post-Cold War Arctic. It will be shown how NATO retained a latent 
presence in the Arctic in the immediate post-Cold War years, while the 2000s witnessed an 
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increase of NATO activities in the Arctic – gradually at first, then more rapidly in the aftermath 
of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian conflict in 2014 (section 7.2.2). Russia 
has, since the end of the Cold War, retained a constant anti-NATO stance that has only been 
strengthened in the post-Ukrainian era by Western sanctions, the suspension of the NATO-
Russian Council and other military and diplomatic channels of communications.  In section 
7.2.3 I identify Russia’s position on NATO and Arctic security post-Ukraine, by deconstructing 
speeches from Russian government officials including President Putin and Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov. I will show how Russia continued to support the AC in the aftermath of Ukraine, 
through political statements that declared the Arctic was a relatively peaceful region where a 
stronger NATO presence was not required. Last, I summarise the main points of the chapter in 
the conclusion, in section 7.3.  
7.1 The United States and Russian Arctic defence strategies 
7.1.1. The US Arctic defence strategies 
Having previously analysed the non-strategic aspects of the US’ Arctic strategy in Chapter 6 
(see section 6.1.1) here, I will review the military dimension of US Arctic strategy and national 
defence policies. As in Chapter 6, I will focus on the four most recent US Arctic strategies: the 
2008 H.W Bush presidential directive (NSPD-66), the 2013 President Obama Arctic Strategy, 
the updated 2016 version and the latest 2019 Arctic Strategy issued by President Trump. I refer 
to two other US strategic documents published in 2018; the National Defence Strategy and the 
Nuclear Posture Review - both of which provide valuable insights into how the current Trump 
administration intends to shape the present and near-future global security agenda. With respect 
to the Arctic this will assist in identifying if the US still behaves as a status quo power in the 
Arctic or if we are now observing foreign policy revisionism. 
Returning briefly to the 2009 G.W. Bush ‘s Arctic Strategy- the National Security Presidential 
Directive (NSPD)-66 document, it is important to observe how the language of the paper is a 
reflection of the US post-cold War grand strategy first formulated by the president’s father 
H.W. Bush in 1991 (see Chapter 5). Notwithstanding that the G.W. Bush Administration was 
at the time still heavily intrenched in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the NSPD-66 Arctic 
strategy implies the US, if necessary, will act unilaterally to defend the Arctic in the event that 
it is attacked or together with allies.  
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The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared 
to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests (NSPD-66 
2009:3). 
It is interesting that NATO is not specifically referred to in the NSPD-66. There may be three 
reasons for this; firstly, the Bush Administration may not have wanted to antagonise Russia in 
the Arctic – a region of little strategic interest in the immediate post-Cold War years and where 
US-Russian relations were cooperative and structured through the AC. Second, the reluctance 
of NATO allies to support the US’ GWOT in Afghanistan and Iraq had a fracturing effect on 
the alliance and as such, given that US-NATO relations had soured it makes sense that the US 
would choose, at this time, to pursue a unilateral rather than a multilateral defence strategy in 
the Arctic and globally. Third, if the US had explicitly referred to NATO in the Arctic this 
could had further exacerbated Russia at a time when military relations had already begun to 
sour as a result of the US withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In 2002, in the 
aftermath of 9/11, President G.W Bush withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic-Missile (ABM) 
Treaty. Although the Bush and Obama administrations claimed that proposals for a new 
European Ballistic Missile Defence shield (BMDS) was not aimed at Russia, issues of missile 
defence continue to be a major source of contention in US-Russian military security relations. 
This can be traced back to the early 1980’s when US President Ronald Reagan first proposed 
ballistic missile defence with his infamous SDI initiative (see Chapter 4).  
However, the drive to upgrade the US’ missile defence did not subside with the turnover in 
political leadership. Instead, newly elected President Obama announced on September 17, 
2009, that the U.S. would pursue a “European Phased Adaptive Approach” (EPAA) to missile 
defence in Europe (Reif 2019). The project is so called because it is designed to be deployed 
in three main phases from 2011 to 2020 consisting of sea- and land-based configurations of the 
Aegis missile defence system based in Eastern Europe69. The EPAA is the U.S. contribution to 
NATO’s missile defence system for Europe, with the aim of protecting it against short-, 
medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles launched from Iran. In NATO’s 2010 
Strategic concept, missile defence was adopted as a core alliance mission. From a Russian 
perspective, the fact that these new BMD sites are situated in Eastern Europe (with two out of 
 
69 As part of the EPAA, Turkey is hosting a radar at Kürecik, Germany is hosting a command center at Ramstein Air Base, 
(Phase 1 – operational since 2012) Romania is hosting an Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu Air Base (Phase 2 – operational since 




three sites located in post-Soviet states) is a strong indicator that ballistic missile and nuclear 
defence efforts are still being directed towards Russia. 
In the 2016 revised Obama Arctic strategy, the US Department of Defence (DoD) defines the 
end-goal for the Arctic as “a secure and stable region where US national interests are 
safeguarded, the US homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address 
challenges”. From this it can be understood that the US behaved as a satisfied, status quo power 
in the Arctic, given that the United States sought to defend the current order and recognised 
the value of cooperation through the Arctic Council. Stewart -Ingersoll and Frazier (2012:164) 
clarify that “…we might expect that a status quo regional power will be more associated with 
static or limited change in the security order. Thus, whatever exists is likely to continue given 
that the dominant powers have no motivation to change it”. 
There is also a marked difference in terms of language from the previous G.W Bush NSPD-66 
Arctic Strategy was more assertively unilateral. In contrast, the Obama Arctic strategy took a 
more benign approach yet still reserved the right to act unilaterally as can be seen in the two 
main objectives below;   
1) Ensure security, support safety, promote defence cooperation: and  
2) prepare to respond to a wide range of challenges and contingencies—operating in conjunction with like-
minded nations when possible and independently if necessary—in order to maintain stability in the region 
(US DoD 2016:2).  
 
To provide a clearer sense of what these objectives entail, the 2016 Arctic strategy points the 
reader towards the US Arctic Region Policy which identifies several national security interests 
in the Arctic including: missile defence and early warning, deployment of sea and air systems 
for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, a maritime presence, security operations and finally, 
ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight. Also stated within the strategy is how the DoD 
will utilise and update existing military facilities in the Arctic and near-Arctic. Because the 
Arctic remains primarily a maritime region, centred around the Arctic Ocean which, despite 
melting sea ice, remains practically unnavigable for eight to ten months of the year, the region 
poses significant logistical challenges to the US defence establishment. A US Naval report 
issued by Rear Admiral Titley (2010:42), identified specific problems including the lack of 
logistics support and infrastructure, environmental hazards such as drifting sea ice and icing on 
exposed surfaces, and communications difficulties. As such, even a hegemonic power such as 
the US will be faced with considerable difficulties due to the extremely harsh climate and 
difficult operating conditions of the Arctic. However, while the US military has few icebreakers 
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or other surface vessels capable of operating in the Arctic, it has significant nuclear submarine 
capabilities with the potential for increased capacity building should it decide to do so in the 
future. (Åtland 2014:154: Wegge 2010:169).  
Although the 2016 Strategy concedes that the Arctic region remains relatively peaceful, it 
suggests that friction points exist. The most significant disagreement, from a US perspective, 
involves the ways in which Canada and Russia regulate navigation in Arctic waters claimed 
under their jurisdiction. While Canada claims the Northwest Passage (NWP) as internal waters, 
Russia makes a similar historic claim to the Northern Sea Route (NRS). The 2016 Arctic 
Strategy outlines how the US considers these claims as “…inconsistent with international law 
and does not recognize them” (DoD 2016:6). This issue informs another key objective in the 
2016 Strategy: to ‘preserve the freedom of the seas in the Arctic’. 
While the 2016 Arctic strategy recognises the valuable role of the AC in promoting political 
cooperation in the Arctic, the paragraph ends on a very different note. The DoD refers to how 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine have induced a new urgency for the US to increase its regional 
security cooperation in the Arctic. Given that these two issues are situated together in the same 
paragraph, they can be implicitly understood as a reconfirmation of US political preferences in 
the Arctic: namely that military cooperation should remain excluded from the AC (justified on 
the grounds of Russia’s annexation of the Crimea) and that the security and stability of the 
Arctic region can be solely guaranteed through a US military presence. 
DoD recognizes the Arctic Council’s efforts to develop cooperative approaches to a growing range of Arctic 
challenges. …. DoD’s role in enhancing the regional security cooperation takes on new salience in light of 
Russia’s aggressive and destabilizing behavior along its periphery and its investment in military facilities 
and capabilities within the Arctic (DoD 2016:10). 
In this way, the DoD’s condemnation of the Russian annexation of the Crimea and its treatment 
of former Soviet states in the Eastern-European neighbourhood is the most conspicuous 
revision in the 2016 Arctic strategy. While the Pentagon does not consider the events in the 
Ukraine to directly impact Arctic security, it is strongly implied that Russia’s behaviour in the 
Ukraine serves as the justification for an increased military presence in the Arctic: 
In light of the Russian violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, 
and Russia’s efforts to intimidate its neighbors, DoD will continue a robust cycle of training and exercises 
in Europe under Operation Atlantic Resolve and will continue investments in improved posture and 
capabilities when needed by the combatant commanders (DoD 2016:10). Although few Russian activities 
or investments occur in the Arctic region itself, they signal a recommitment to deterrence and to build 
capability to defeat aggression against the United States and its allies in the Arctic as well as in other 
regions. DoD’s required capabilities include the full spectrum of US forces, including nuclear and cyber 
forces. Accordingly, DoD will continue to conduct training and exercises in the Arctic as elsewhere and 
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will assess its required force posture in light of the rate of environmental changes and geopolitical 
challenges. (DoD 2016:10). 
It can be seen from the above paragraph that while the DoD reluctantly acknowledges that 
Russia conducts relatively few military activities within the Arctic region itself, the US seeks 
to increase its military presence in the Arctic by conducting training exercises and assess the 
degree to which it will project military force on the basis of geopolitics and environmental 
change.  Elsewhere in the 2016 strategy, it is explained that such exercises will be conducted 
under the auspices of NATO while also envisioning an enhanced role for NATO partner 
countries including Finland and Sweden: a topic that will be discussed further in Chapter 8.  
Speaking in Bucharest Romania, in 2016, US Ambassador Hans Klemm explained that shortly 
after the crisis in Ukraine, the U.S. military announced the beginning of Operation Atlantic 
Resolve. He outlined that this was supported by a large financial commitment by the U.S. 
Congress called the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Together, the goal was to send 
more U.S. troops overseas to European postings, especially to the Baltic region in Eastern 
Europe (‘NATO’s eastern flank’) on a persistent, rotational basis. In addition to reassuring 
NATO allies –the aim was, according to US officials – “to build critical military infrastructure 
to support an increased presence; and to build the military capabilities of US Eastern-European 
allies” (US Embassy in Romania 2016). However, the key underlying rationale was of course, 
to deter against further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. In the Arctic, Norway too sought 
reassurance from the US and NATO which led to the restructuring of US naval command 
structures and the deployment of additional US troops to the Norwegian Arctic (see also 
section 7.2.2. of this chapter)   
The most recent US policy document on nuclear defence, the ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ (NPR), 
issued in February 2018, explicitly identifies Russia as a nuclear threat to the US. The NPR 
accused Russia of being in violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty70 
as a result of developing the SSC-871 - a non-compliant ground-launched intermediate range 
cruise missile. As a result, the NPR outlined that the US must take action against Russia for 
 
70 The INF Treaty made a major contribution to Europe and global security by eliminating all US and Soviet ground-launched 
ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. In January 2014, the United States informed its 
NATO allies of a Russian missile that violated the range and launcher regulations of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty. In a July 2014 official compliance report, the United States found the “Russian Federation in violation of its obligations 
under the INF treaty not to possess, produce, or flight test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability 
of 500 to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles  
71 The SSC-8 is a Russian GLCM labelled a “missile of concern” by the United States after being test launched from a road-
mobile launcher in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (Missile Defence Project 2019) 
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these violations. The document, while acknowledging Russian grievance about the US-NATO 
ballistic missile defence project – considers Russian actions to be hypocritical in light of that 
fact that Russia is now designing its own ballistic missile defence interceptor and modernizing 
its nuclear capabilities (NPR 2018:9). Russia, however, is not the only state identified by the 
DoD as a threat to the US in the Arctic and where a history of poor security relations could 
potentially lead to unnecessary military instability and risk. Increased concern over Chinese 
economic interests in the region is also evident in the 2019 Arctic Strategy in alignment with 
the US’ new global threat perceptions outlined in the January 2018 National Defence Strategy 
(2018 NDS). The NDS emphasises that inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism is now 
the primary concern of US national security;     
The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition 
by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China 
and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model – gaining veto authority over 
other nations’ economic, diplomacy, and security decisions (NDS 2018:2). 
While the paragraph contextualises China and Russia as rival powers it further identifies them 
as ‘revisionist’ states that seek to alter the global system to the detriment of the US. This is a 
stronger indication that the US is no longer a satisfied, status quo power in world politics but 
is now facing great power decline and the return of great power competition. This represents a 
major foreign policy shift that could also have significant implications for Arctic security.  
In March 2018, US Congress passed a spending bill (the National Defence Authorization Act - 
NDAA) that gave the US DoD an additional $82 billion, resulting in the overall defence budget 
for fiscal year totalling over $700 billion. The increase was the result of a bipartisan deal in 
early 2018 to boost spending by about $165 billion over two years, part of a deal with 
Democrats that raised spending on domestic programs by a like amount. As Myre (2018) 
explains, the defence increase matches or even surpasses Russia’s entire military budget each 
year and rivals the big military spending surges during President George W. Bush’s 
administration in 2003 and 2008, which went to fund the Iraq War. Defence Secretary Jim 
Mattis declared at the time that "Today, we receive the largest military budget in history, 
reversing many years of decline and unpredictable funding…. Now it's our responsibility in the 
military to spend every dollar wisely" (ibid). 
The defence spending increase came at a time when the Alaskan congressmen were still calling 
out the deficiencies in Arctic programs and seeking more spending on icebreakers, Arctic 
infrastructure and military preparedness in the region - all of which translates into billions in 
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future expenses to expand military operations (Cole 2018). For example, the Pentagon planned 
to accelerate the expansion of missile defense in Alaska, by installing 20 new ground-based 
interceptors, and assessing the cost of adding an entirely new missile field at Fort Greely. 
However, there was no acknowledgment by the Pentagon or President Trump that the costs of 
additional Arctic infrastructure and extra defence spending will have to be paid by someone at 
some time (ibid). The fact is that the Pentagon’s spending increase was not achieved through 
raising taxes to pay for it, but instead the President and Congress took the easy route by adding 
the extra defence expenditure to the US fiscal deficit, now closing in on $1 trillion a year (Cole 
2018). 
In February 2019, the US provided its six-month notice of its withdrawal of the Intermediate 
Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty which was signed in 1987 by US president Ronald Reagan 
and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (see Chapter 4). A US press statement by Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo on the 2nd of August 2019 proclaimed that “Russia is solely responsible 
for the treaty’s demise” for failing “to return to full and verified compliance of the treaty by 
destroying the non-compliant missile system in question – the SSC-8/ 9M729 ground-
launched intermediate range cruise missile” (US Department of State 2019). Although 
Pompeo’s statement declared that the US has subsequently suspended the treaty “with the full 
support of our NATO Allies (ibid)”, European political leaders from NATO member states were 
in fact divided on the issue. Particularly noteworthy is the response from influential European 
democratic nations such as France and Germany.  Contrary to Pompeo’s declaration of unanimous 
support from European/NATO allies, France and Germany expressed serious misgivings about 
the US decision. In October 2018 during a telephone call to President Trump, French president 
Emmanuel Macron reminded President Trump of the importance France ascribes to this treaty, 
for European security and “our strategic stability”. He emphasised how “France attributes 
great importance to conventional and nuclear arms control instruments” and called on all 
parties “to avoid any hasty unilateral decisions which would be regrettable”. However, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s response went further and illustrates her barely concealed 
frustration over the United States’ unilateral decision to withdraw from the treaty;  
For us Europeans, if I may be so bold, the really bad news this year was the announcement of the cancelling 
of the INF Treaty. After not decades, but years of violations of the terms of the treaty by Russia, this was 
unavoidable. We Europeans all understood this. Nevertheless – and I say this to our American colleagues 
– it leaves us with a very interesting constellation: a treaty that was essentially designed for Europe, an 
arms reduction treaty that directly affects our security, has been cancelled by the United States of America 
and Russia (the legal successor to the Soviet Union). And we are left sitting there. Given our elemental 
interest we will obviously make every attempt to facilitate further arms reduction. The answer cannot be a 
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blind arms race - Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, speaking at the 2019 Munich Security 
Conference, 16th February 2019 (Taheran 2019) 
Although the UK, Norway and Demark were amongst the most avid supporters for the US 
decision, Danish Defence Minister Claus Frederiksen also recognised the danger of the US’  
actions stating that “ Increased instability and risk of misunderstandings have unfortunately 
become the new order of the day” (Frederiksen 2019:34-35). Above all, the US withdrawal of 
the INF Treaty in early 2019 indicates that with respect to military security, the US is behaving 
in a reactionist manner. Although the US has blamed Russia for why the treaty failed, critical 
voices have argued that neither the US nor Russia did enough to save the treaty. This is 
because both states recognise that the global security environment is changing rapidly and as 
a result the two powers no longer want to be tied to arms control treaties that restricted their 
nuclear defence capabilities against the potential threat of the other. A long history of poor 
security relations between the US and Russia could potentially lead to unnecessary military 
instability and risk in the Arctic once more.  
However, Russia, is not the only state identified by the DoD as a current threat to the US in 
the Arctic The January 2018 National Defence Strategy (2018 NDS) maps out new global 
threat perceptions and a changing global security order. The NDS emphasises that inter-state 
strategic competition, not terrorism is now the primary concern of US national security;     
The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition 
by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China 
and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model – gaining veto authority over 
other nations’ economic, diplomacy, and security decisions (NDS 2018:2). 
While the paragraph contextualises China and Russia as rival powers it further identifies them 
as ‘revisionist’ states that seek to alter the global system to the detriment of the US. This is a 
stronger indication that the US is no longer a satisfied, status quo power in world politics but 
is now facing great power decline and the return of great power competition. This represents a 
major foreign policy shift that could also have significant implications for Arctic security.  
The 2018 NDS provides the foundation of US foreign policy upon which subsequent US 
Arctic policies are based on. For instance, the 2019 Arctic Strategy released by the Department 
of Defence (DoD) in June 2019 demonstrates a marked change from previous strategies with 
respect to China. As Humpert (2019b) explains, in contrast to previous Arctic documents, the 
U.S. now sees the region as a corridor between the Indo-Pacific and European theatres of 




Yet the US’ strategic approach in the Arctic it also notable for the fact that the US does not 
explicitly pursue a more proactive policy in the Arctic that may give it a greater advantage in 
the growing global competition with Russia and China. This may be because the US now 
implicitly recognises that it is facing an era of relative power decline and must seek to reserve 
and focus its resources. However, there is a conspicuous absence of any reference to US nuclear 
deterrence in the 2019 Strategy. In the section outlining service roles and missions in the Arctic, 
the DoD refer to how air and space assets are “especially crucial for the Arctic region…”  (p.15) 
before mentioning a list of activities the air force engages in including missile defence and 
power projection to situational awareness and search and rescue.  Although the Pentagon has 
depicted the emerging complexities in the region there are notable gaps on how to address 
them. For instance, there is no acknowledgement within the 2019 Arctic Strategy given to the 
detrimental environmental impact that increased US military and commercial activities could 
have in the region. Instead, the DoD is solely concerned with how thawing permafrost, storm 
surges and coastal erosion “adversely affects infrastructure including DoD installations” (DoD 
2019:3). 
To this end, the DoD identifies three key strategic objectives;  
1) Cooperate with US allies and Partners  
2) Ensure a credible deterrence in the Arctic 
3) Support other US Department, Agency and Community roles  
While the ordering of these three objectives draws immediate attention, it can be understood 
from the 2019 Strategy that these objectives will assist the US to strengthen the current “rules-
based order of the Arctic” (DoD 2019:8). By emphasising cooperation with allies, including 
Canada though the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) the DoD has 
implied that it must rely on partner states (i.e. Canada) to share military resources and the task 
of patrolling the North American Arctic. The Pentagon recognises that it currently has a limited 
capacity to operate in the region and while it must address capability gaps with respect to 
equipment and infrastructure by coordinating policy through various government departments 
and agencies - the focus is on maintaining a credible deterrence. As demonstrated earlier, US 
investment in the Arctic has been recently aimed at upgrading missile facilities for air defence 
rather than ports, icebreakers and maritime capabilities. In this regard, the 2019 strategy 
emphasises a very limited role for the US Navy in the Arctic, with the US Coast Guard serving 
as the mainstay for maritime patrol and monitoring activities. Instead the DoD highlights areas 
of investment in communications, surveillance and reconnaissance. This is significant because 
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it suggests that the US is not going to attempt to invest large sums of money to remilitarize the 
North American Arctic to the degree that it did during the Cold War, nor is it seeking to attain 
Arctic military parity with Russia; which is identified in the 2019 strategy as “the largest Arctic 
nation by landmass, population and military presence above the Arctic Circle” (p.4). Although 
NATO is not specifically mentioned in the 2019 strategy, when the US refers to Arctic allies 
and partners it can also be understood to mean NATO Arctic member states 
(Denmark/Greenland, Iceland and Norway) and EOP partners Sweden and Finland.     
The Corona-virus pandemic has hit the United States hard and the infection rate within the 
American military increased at an alarming rate during the early stage of the outbreak. In late 
March 2020, the US Army ordered a halt to most training, exercises and nonessential activities 
that require troops to be in close contact (i.e. formal parades, graduation ceremonies etc.). The 
pandemic also affected recruitment procedures and some troops have had their overseas tours 
extended. However, (Gibbson-Neff et al 2020a) explains that in a surprise turn of events, US 
military officials abruptly reversed the order just days later, which sparked confusion among 
the ranks and with commanders. This spread confusion and discord as various commands 
interpreted the Pentagon’s directives as they saw fit (Gibbson-Neff et al 2020b). Politically, 
the reversal of the decision is likely to have been based on the US seeking to prevent any gaps 
in its security forces which could leave it vulnerable to being attacked by a foreign power. This 
is telling given that instead of seeking to promote international solidarity, the US is responding 
to the virus as if the country is at war. The Pentagon’s mantra of “preserving the force” sums 
this up as it is military parlance for keeping a military that is fit, well-rehearsed and ready to 
deploy (ibid). Nonetheless the US has struggled to find the balance between military readiness 
and health. While the military was called on to help in the domestic crisis in hard hit urban 
centres such as New York, critics say that it is not enough and that the military should be at the 
forefront of the country’s efforts to fight the coronavirus.  
US Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper insisted that the armed forces will find a way to both 
protect troops from the pandemic while still performing the military’s essential operations 
(Gibbson et al 2020a). However, of all the military branches, the Navy has had the largest 
number of coronavirus cases – about a third of the total cases reported within the US armed 
forces. This is because the Navy faces the problem of sailors being deployed within tight 
confines of warships (ibid). For example, a serious outbreak occurred in March 2020 on the 
US aircraft carrier the Theodore Roosevelt, stationed off the coast of Guam. Captain Brett 
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Crozier wrote a letter to the Pentagon requesting the removal of the majority of personnel from 
the ship since it was impossible to isolate them onboard. Even though it seemed like an 
extraordinary measure, he considered it to be a ‘necessary risk’, before going on to state that 
“We are not at war. Sailors do not need to die” (BBC News 2020).  
Nonetheless, the pandemic has not stopped the Trump Administration from planning future 
Arctic maritime activities and in June 2020, President Trump issued the Memorandum on 
Safeguarding US national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The document calls for 
the administration to come up with a plan within 60 days that would include the construction 
of at least three heavy icebreakers to be built by 2029 (with the possibility of having a leasing 
arrangement from private contractors in the meantime) along with recommendations to build 
two new support bases in the US (Alaska) and two on foreign soil (Borger 2020). Regarding 
the latter, it must be assumed that the US will seek to construct its two planned overseas bases 
in a NATO Arctic state. Yet this raises questions as to the degree of support the US will have 
amongst its Arctic allies.  
Later in this chapter I outline the post-Cold War role of NATO in the Arctic, prior to addressing 
the question of whether there is consensus about the role of NATO in the Arctic amongst the 
small and medium Arctic states in Chapter 8. However, for now I will turn to addressing 
Russian military and defence strategies in the Arctic and seek to identify macro trends and 
throughout the time span of the post-Cold War Arctic regional order.  
 
7.1.2. Russian military reform and Arctic defence strategies 1996-2020 
It is important to place Russia’s security strategies in the Arctic within the overall context of 
post-Cold War military reform and modernization efforts (Flake 2017:20). When viewed this 
way, through the backdrop of wider military upgrades, Russian military developments in the 
Arctic appear less startling (ibid). However, rising tensions with NATO in recent years have 
undoubtedly contributed to the Kremlin accelerating plans for the modernization and 
reorganisation of Russia’s armed forces in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). 
For most of the 1990s, the Arctic was neglected in military planning since it was no longer 
considered to be an area of strategic priority for the Kremlin. Both the Russian Northern Fleet 
and armed forces appeared to occupy “a limbo space” between the mass-mobilized Soviet army 
and the transformed permanent-standing armed forces needed for a modern Russia (Kipp 
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1999). In 1994, when the Russian armed forces took on rebel fighters in Chechnya during the 
First Chechen war, the conflict revealed the deep-rooted degradation and disrepair of the 
Russian military. Although Yeltsin had attempted to implement military reform, the financial 
meltdown of August 1998 coupled with a deepening crisis of state finances and a vacuum of 
political leadership, meant that the momentum could not be sustained (ibid). However, as 
Falcon (2013:209) explains, Vladimir Putin did not address the military reform problem 
immediately after being elected to the presidential office in 2000, since his key priorities 
included focusing on “the anti-terrorist campaign” in Chechnya, strengthening the federal 
state’s authority over the subjects of the federation, and the redefinition of foreign policy (see 
also Chapter 6).   
However, a tragic event that occurred soon after obtaining the presidential office made Putin 
increasingly aware of the urgency to reform the military. On the 12th August 2000, an aging 
Oscar-class submarine vessel, The Kursk, sank in the Barents Sea resulting in the loss of all 
118 crewmembers. A huge explosion caused the submarine to sink and although the blast at 
sea was detected by international monitors, for two days, Russia kept silent about it. If Russian 
had instead called for help this could have saved 23 crew members that survived the original 
explosion but died from suffocation and lack of oxygen, trapped aboard the sunken submarine. 
It may be assumed that pride and loss of status were the reasons why Russia did not ask for 
aid, yet Putin faced severe criticism from the Russian media and the international community 
for not seeking assistance from other states (Rainsford 2015). Ultimately, the Kursk tragedy 
served to highlight the accumulated problems of the ageing Russian military infrastructure and 
naval search and rescue capabilities – an issue which Putin appeared committed to resolving 
(Baev 2009:24).  
Putin signed Moscow’s first Arctic Strategy in 2000 titled Basics of the Russian Federation 
State Policy in the Arctic. As Devyatkin (2018) highlights, this policy declared that all activities 
in the Arctic should be tied to the interests of “defence and security to the maximum degree.” 
For example, the document emphasised that the Russian military must prioritize the reliable 
functioning of sea-based nuclear forces for the purpose of deterring threats of aggression 
against Russia and her allies (ibid). As such, Devyatkin concludes that this early strategy 
concentrated much more on military issues than the documents that followed. Yet according to 
Buchannan (2020), the emphasis on military issues in this document was intended to serve as 
the basis for military modernization and reform in the Russian Arctic. However, it would take 
Putin a further three years in office before he would fully turn his attention to tackling this issue 
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of military reform. In his May 2003 annual address to the Russian Federal Assembly, Putin 
declared that the modernization and reform of the Russian Armed Forces was one of his top 
priorities (Falcon 2013).  
In 2001, Moscow made its first legal Arctic claim to extend its Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) beyond the 200-mile radius with a submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS). In this submission it argued that about 1.2 million square km of 
underwater terrain should be added to the Russian EEZ as this area lies between the Lomonosov 
and Mendeleev ridges, which it claims are a continuation of the Siberian shelf. Had Russia’s 
application been accepted, Russia would have been able to claim up to 45% of the Arctic. 
However, Russia’s request was postponed by the CLCS in 2002 due to insufficient scientific 
data (Kefferpütz 2010:3).   
Although relations with NATO remained difficult during the early years of Putin’s presidency, 
the 9/11 attacks and the so-called "Global War on Terrorism" provided the opportunity for 
Russia to reset relations with NATO on common ground of fighting terrorism – for Russia this 
meant overcoming problems with Islamic extremism in Chechnya, while the US was fighting 
its Global War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia, during this time, sought to strengthen 
its bargaining position with NATO and the West vis-à-vis obtaining a privileged status and 
securing a special relationship with NATO. In 2002, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was 
established as a replacement of the former Permanent Joint Council (PJC) created in 1997 (see 
also Chapter 5). A number of issues were identified by the NRC as suitable to be addressed 
jointly, with the help of specialist committees and expert groups, some of which were 
particularly relevant to the Arctic (Blunden 2009:133). These included the struggle against 
terrorism, counter-narcotics, airspace management, military-to-military cooperation, 
submarine crew search and rescue, crisis management, logistics and civil emergencies. 
However, as Adomeit (2008) clarifies, within the NRC framework, Russia is informed of 
NATO policy after it has been decided rather than included in consultation processes. 
Furthermore, Russia is no longer a partner engaging in a bilateral framework as it had 
previously been in the PCJ, but instead became an ordinary member in which all NATO 
member states and Russia meet as equals. This was especially discouraging for Russia as it was 
not granted a special status it felt it deserved. English School (ES) approaches (Chapter 2) 
advocate that international society –the norms, rules and socialisation of states – also pertains 
to recognition by other states regarding power status, sovereignty and statehood. The structure 
of the NRC was arguably designed in such a way as to further demean Russia’s status vis-à-vis 
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the US and NATO. This is because Russia, while still being excluded from NATO, was now 
considered an ‘equal participant’ with small European states while being unable to exert any 
real influence. At the same time, the ongoing expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe was 
perceived as threatening to Russia and undermined cooperation. In particular, the possibility 
that NATO would offer Georgia and Ukraine entry into the alliance provoked a strong negative 
reaction from Moscow. Moscow considers the membership of these two from Soviet countries 
in NATO a violation of Russia's traditional sphere of influence and a Western attempt to put 
into practice the idea of Russia's strategic encirclement. 
From 2004-2005, the Russian military prepared the concept of the new Strategic Command. 
However, there was fierce opposition within the armed forces that resulted in over 300 generals 
being dismissed (Petraitis 2011). The reform itself was planned to be carried out in three 
distinct phases. The first phase involved increasing professionalism by overhauling the 
education of personnel and cutting the number of conscripts; the second, improving combat-
readiness with a streamlined command structure and additional training exercises; and the third, 
rearming and updating equipment (Gressel 2015:3). During the first stage of reform the 
professionalism of the Russian armed forces was addressed. This involved dramatically cutting 
the number of officers in the Armed Forces in an effort to streamline command and control 
structures in addition to reducing the number of conscripts. Conscription reforms also involved 
cutting compulsory service from two years to one and changing the military’s management 
structure and education system (Zhabin 2020). However, bullying within the Russian army, in 
the form of hazing new recruits (dedovschina) still persists. Although extreme cases of hazing 
lessened after 2012, when the effects of the reforms became evident, conscripts nearing the end 
of their year-long stint still bully new arrivals through rape, beatings and humiliation, 
sometimes with tragic consequences (ibid). As Gressel (2015:.3) explains 
Since the early 2000s, Russia had experimented with hiring more professional soldiers instead of conscripts, 
but now financial resources were available to increase their numbers on a large scale. This allowed the 
troops to use more high-tech equipment (conscripts serve too short a period to be effectively trained on 
complex weapons systems) and increased the combat-readiness of elite forces (paratroopers, naval infantry, 
and special forces).  
As a part of the reforms, the Russian Armed forces also increased the number of military 
manoeuvres and exercises it conducted in order to ensure combat readiness and enhance troop 
performance. For instance, after the August 2007 North Pole expedition and flag planting 
expedition (see section 6.2.1 of Chapter 6), Russia resumed strategic bomber and Northern 
fleet patrols in its Arctic waters for the first time since the end of the Cold War. As Grajewski 
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(2017:156) explains, strategically, Moscow still considered the Kola Peninsula and the adjacent 
area of special strategic importance to Russia’s national security due to its direct access to the 
Atlantic Ocean, relatively close proximity to potential NATO targets, and fairly developed 
military infrastructure. Since the Cold War era, the peninsula has hosted two-thirds of Russia’s 
nuclear strategic submarine fleet which represents a key element of Russian defence policy. 
Russia seeks to compensate for its relative weakness in conventional forces by maintaining 
strategic nuclear capabilities (ibid). 
However, concerned at the unequal numbers of Russian conventional forces with NATO troops 
and creeping NATO expansionism towards the Russian border, in November 2007, President 
Putin withdrew from a key post-Cold War international arms treaty – the Conventional Forces 
in Europe (CFE treaty). Originally signed in 1990 and updated in 199972, the CFE was 
negotiated among the then-22 member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and was designed 
to limit the number of battle tanks, heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters 
deployed and stored between the Atlantic and Russia’s Ural Mountains (Stratton 2007). 
Moscow’s decision to withdraw from the CFE Treaty was based on its dissatisfaction with 
NATO enlargement and possibly the US’ withdrawal in 2002 from the ABM Treaty. While 
Russian military movements were limited under the CFE Treaty, Russia argued that NATO 
was building up forces closer to the Russian border, which Russia considered as an 
infringement on earlier agreements. As early as December 2007, the moratorium declared by 
Russia on the CFE Treaty no longer allowed foreign military inspectors to conduct inspections 
and monitor Russian forces (Petraitis 2011:145). The Russian Federation also stopped 
supplying information about its Armed Forces – a requirement of the CFE Treaty.  
Beginning on the 7th of August 2008, Russia engaged in a five-day long conflict with Georgia 
after Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili sent troops into the rebellious province of South 
Ossetia (Pruitt 2018). The roots of the conflict can be traced back to the early 1990s, when after 
the dissolution of the USSR, South Ossetia in eastern Georgia, and Abkhazia, on the north 
western coast—sought to declare their own independence. Russia, in support of South Ossetia, 
came to the province’s defence in 2008. From a Western perception, Moscow’s aggressive 
reaction to its long-simmering tensions with Georgia announced Russia’s re-emergence as a 
military power (ibid). In response, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) suspended all dialogue 
 
72 NATO and the west refused to ratify an amended version of the pact since 1999 as Russia had not pulled its forces out of 
Georgia and Moldova. 
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with Russia in the aftermath of the Georgian war.  However earlier that year, at a NATO 
summit in Bucharest, then NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop made a vague pledge to 
Georgia and Ukraine stating that; “We agreed today that these countries will become members 
of NATO” (Brunnstrom and Cornwell 2008). Although Pruitt (2018) considers that Russia saw 
an opportunity to rein in Georgia while warning the country’s leadership away from future 
NATO membership through a demonstration of Russian military strength, the Russian-
Georgian war also highlighted the Russian military’s tactical and operational weaknesses. It 
was the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union that Russia engaged in military actions 
outside of its borders. The lessons from Georgia essentially led into the second phase of 
military reforms which concentrated on increasing troop readiness, improving organisation and 
logistics and reorganising the entire structure of its armed forces – from strategic commands 
down to new combat brigades (Gressel p.3) By 2008, the Russian military entered a stage of 
systemic development with defence spending increasing almost four-fold from 2001 (Isakova 
2007:75).  
Russian Navy head Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky declared in April 2008, that “while in the 
Arctic there is peace and stability, however, one cannot exclude that in the future there will be 
a redistribution of power, up to armed intervention” (Global security.org 2019). This statement 
demonstrates how the Russian Naval Forces were essentially preparing to increase their 
activities in the region with the aid of bigger defence budgets and investment in new hardware 
and equipment. Admiral Vysotsky’s statements preceded the July 2008 deployment of Russian 
Northern Fleet missile cruiser Marshall Ustinov and anti-submarine ships to the coast of 
Svalbard to coincide with the fishing season, followed in September 2008 by the underwater 
transit of the Russian submarine Ryzan below the Arctic ice sheet for the first time since the 
end of the Cold War (ibid).  
2009 witnessed the release of a new sequence of policy documents and doctrines73, arguably 
beginning with the Foundations of the Russian Federation National Policy in the Arctic until 
2020 and beyond (abbreviated hereafter to Foundations 2009). Released on the 27th of March 
2009, by President Medvedev approved Russia’s Arctic policy. The main objectives of 
Russia’s Arctic policy include; the use of the Arctic zone as a strategic resource base to 
 
73 Giles (2015:4) observes that several documents defining the strategic direction for Russia were lined up for release in 
quick succession, with the aim of updating a whole range of previous statements which had been in force since for almost a 




promote socio-economic development, upgrade the NSR as a national, integrated transport 
and communication system and strengthen Russia’s maritime and border security. A 
second policy document was released in May 2009 namely Russia’s National Security 
Strategy to 2020 (NSS). With reference to the AZRF, the NSS refers to the challenge of 
protecting Russia’s borders and emphasises the improvement of border facilities in the Arctic 
region, the Russian Far East and the Caspian as particularly important areas. Because Russia 
is a transit point towards Europe and faces issues like human and drug trafficking, the NSS 
identifies the need for Russia to increase its border protections. A third document - The 
energy strategy for the Russian Federation for the period up to 2030 was adopted in 
November 2009 and emphasized Arctic seas, particularly the Barents, Pechora and Kara 
seas, and the Yamal peninsula as the most important regions for future development by 
the Russian oil and gas industry (Klimenko 2014:3).  
Not satisfied with its Foundations 2009 Arctic strategy, the Russian government decided 
to update the document with the release of a new version in 2013 titled Russian Strategy 
of the Development of the Arctic Zone and the Provision of National Security until 2020 
(abbreviated to 2013 Russian Arctic Strategy hereafter). Rather than setting out an entirely 
new domestic strategy for the AZRF, the 2013 Russian Arctic strategy focused on 
implementation and outlining a list of sub-programs for socioeconomic development. For 
instance, the 2013 Russian Arctic strategy placed considerable emphasis on the 
implementation of large-scale resource projects, the modernization of information, 
telecommunication and transport infrastructure, in addition to upgrading or constructing 
new infrastructure to support resource extraction industries. The 2013 Russian Arctic 
strategy further illustrated the re-emergence of Putin’s military-security priorities in the 
AZRF with its inclusion of efforts to protect and defend the NSR and the state border of 
Russia in the Arctic. In September of 2013, the Putin Administration demonstrated this 
view by stationing regular naval patrols along the shipping route (Rotnem 2018:4). At the 
head of the flotilla of ships was the heavy nuclear-powered battlecruiser Pyotr Velikii 
(Peter the Great). As the flag ship of the Northern Fleet this was a symbolic act to 
demonstrate that the NSR is an important geo-strategic asset to the Putin Administration 





In September 2013, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) officially announced the return of 
Russia’s military to the sub-arctic region. In a symbolic move, the Ministry sent 10 warships 
and support vessels along the Northern Sea Route to a destination in Kotelny Island in the 
Novosibirsk (New Siberian Islands) Archipelago (RT 2013a). During a meeting with the 
Defence Ministry board, Putin reminded Russia’s top military officials that the islands “have 
key meaning for the control of the situation in the entire Arctic region” (RT 2013b). Behind 
this endeavour was the Ministry’s decision to re-develop the Temp military base on Kotelny 
Island. Renamed Northern Clover (Severny Klever) the base can house up to 250 personnel. 
The base had been abandoned by the Russian armed forces in 1993, after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. However, during the upgrade and development of the base, conditions for 
construction workers were deemed critical as they lived in dilapidated buildings without proper 
sanitary facilities, were supplied with only a minimum of food rations, and salaries were low 
and payments irregular (Staalesen 2015). The workers ended up going on strike and reported a 
series of violations against their employer company Zapsibgazprom-Gazifikatsia (ibid). The 
working conditions at the Severny Klever military base highlights how Russia’s Arctic military 
ambitions may also be curtailed by socio-economic realities.  
Although Russia’s Arctic strategies emphasise that it perceives the international Arctic region 
as a zone of peace and cooperation, there are inherent complications involved with this 
approach. For although Russia affirms its support for Arctic multilateral cooperation on the 
one hand, on the other hand it is faced with having to unilaterally defend itself against potential 
security threats emerging from the West. As such, inconsistencies in Russian Arctic 
cooperation are better explained by regional security overlap than the oft-misused term of 
Russian revisionism. Russia’s participation in the Ilulissat process (2008-2013) demonstrates 
that it agrees with the other four coastal Arctic states that maritime security and governance in 
the Arctic Ocean must be guaranteed amongst themselves. The problem is that the other four 
states are members of NATO which Russia strongly opposes (Baev 2013:267). However, Lev 
Voronkov, leading researcher at MGIMO-University Moscow, clarifies that Russia does not 
engage in dialogue with NATO about Arctic issues, “it cooperates with Arctic states, including 
those that are members of the alliance, but sees no reason to involve NATO in such 
cooperation” (Barinova 2014). This stance has also been clearly articulated by high ranking 
officials such as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who outlined Russia’s stance on 
NATO in the Arctic:  
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Decisions about the conduct of affairs in the Arctic are taken by the ‘Arctic’ countries, that is, those who 
are members of the Arctic Council, including Russia and Iceland… any problems should be solved on the 
basis of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the decisions of the Arctic Council. There are no 
reasons for drawing NATO into Arctic affairs (Lavrov 2011 cited in Conley 2013) 
Influenced by political events in Ukraine, Putin issued The Military Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation, on December 25th, 2014 shortly after his return to the presidential office. In 
addition to highlighting the changing nature of Russia’s military strategies, the doctrine 
outlines the continuing military modernization programmes. In the 2014 Military Doctrine, the 
Arctic is mentioned as a region where the Armed Forces must protect Russia’s national 
interests even during peacetime (Devyatkin 2018). However, the document calls for a general 
military restoration based on defence rather than an increase of offensive capabilities (ibid). 
The 2014 Military Doctrine also serves the purpose of fleshing out the precepts of the 2009 
National Security Concept with respect to the military sphere (Arms Control Association 
2020). Sergunin and Konyshev (2017) explain that these functions include; protecting Russia’s 
sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf in the Arctic region, 
to protect Moscow’s economic interests in the North, prevent illegal migration and potential 
terrorist attacks against critical industrial and infrastructural objects, and to fulfil some dual-
use functions (such as search and rescue operations, monitoring air and maritime spaces, 
providing navigation safety, mitigating natural and man-made catastrophes) (ibid). These new 
roles, however, do not preclude military power from fulfilling its traditional functions, such as 
territorial defence, power projection, deterrence, and containment. For instance, the 2014 
Military Doctrine still considers NATO to remain as one of the most significant external threats 
to the RF; 
Build-up of the power potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and vesting NATO with 
global functions carried out in violation of the rules of international law, bringing the military infrastructure 
of NATO member countries near the borders of the Russian Federation, including by further expansion of 
the alliance  
Concerning changes to Russia’s conventional forces in the Arctic after Ukraine, Russia created 
the 80th Arctic brigade ahead of schedule in January 2015 and deployed it to Alakurtti, close to 
the Finnish border. Although the creation of the new brigade had already been planned by the 
Russian military authorities, the decision was moved forward  as a result of what Russia 
referred to as the “increasingly hostile activities of Western countries in the Arctic” and the 
need to protect Russia’s vast northern territories (Sergunin and Konyshev 2017:183). A second 
Arctic brigade was also formed but stationed east of the Urals, in the Yamal-Nenets 
autonomous region (ibid).    
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The re-militarization of the Russian Arctic can be understood on the basis of Russia seeking to 
ensure its political and economic interests in the region by re-exerting its sovereignty over 
northern waters and offshore resources in the AZRF amidst changing geo-political and 
environmental factors, while also seeking to protect its maritime domain against increased 
NATO activity in the North Atlantic and Barents Sea. The growing strategic importance of the 
Russian Arctic to the Russian Armed Forces can be witnessed through President Putin’s 
decision to create a new Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (NF JSC) in November 2014. 
Dubbed ‘Sever’ (North), the new NF JSC came into force on the 1st December 2015 (see also 
Chapter 8). These changes to the command structure also dovetailed with a new version of 
Russia’s Maritime Doctrine, released in July 2015. The document identified the Arctic along 
with the North Atlantic as two strategic regions where NATO activities and international 
competition for access to sea lanes and natural resources continued to grow (Konyshev et al 
2017:4). In the section of the Maritime Doctrine discussing the Arctic Region, there are 25 
priorities across the military and non-military spheres. I will focus on four strategic objectives 
which I discuss in turn below as they relate to military security. These include; 1) the 
construction of military bases along the NSR which the Northern Fleet can utilise to extend its 
area of operations, 2) the development of monitoring systems in the Arctic and 3) building a 
new nuclear icebreaker fleet and improving the safety of its operation by establishing support 
services. 
In April 2017, Russia opened its second new permanent Arctic military base; The Arctic Trefoil 
(Arkticheskiy Trilistnik) in Frans Josepf/Alexandra Land with an adjacent military airstrip 
called Nagurskoye. The base’s temporary gravel airfield was upgraded to a permanent 2,500-
meter asphalt runway during the summer of 2018 that can now accommodate any type of 
Russian military aircraft (Humpert 2019a). According to Sukhanin (2020a) in addition to the 
two above-mentioned bases on the New Siberian Islands and Frans Josef/Alexandra Land, 
Moscow plans to upgrade or construct four more military bases in the High North to secure the 
NSR and create a multi-layered defensive shield (see Image 7.1). The new bases are planned 
to be located at; the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago, Novaya Zemlya (Rogachevo), Cape 
Schmidt (Mys Shmidta) 74, and Wrangel Island in the Far East (Sukhanin 2020a). Huebert 
outlines that these bases serve three purposes. First, they provide extended protection of 
 
74 Cape Schmidt is located on the coast of the Chukotka Sea and hosts a Cold War era military base. Construction started in 
October 2014. As of 2017, a total of seven new buildings and facilities have been built on the compound. A further 17 buildings 
are under construction. The base is to be operated by the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet. (Staalesen 2017). 
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Russia’s increasing economic activity, including oil and gas as well as shipping. Second, they 
enable Russia to increasingly project their power over the region. And third, these forward 
bases protect and extend the country’s nuclear deterrent. “These bases will allow for both their 
most advanced bombers and fighter aircraft to operate from” (Huebert cited in Humpert 2019a).  
The ability to monitor the Arctic is considered as a way to reduce the level of threats to Russia’s 
national security that could emerge from NATO operating in waters near Russia’s western 
borders. In May 2019, the Northern Fleet completed its new Centre for Radio-Electronic 
Warfare. As Staalesen (2019a) explains,  
The powerful Murmansk-BN system has been deployed in Severomorsk, Kola Peninsula, and in 
Kamchatka, and is capable of covering the whole area of the Northern Sea Route. The range of the 
Murmansk-BN is 5,000 km and up to 8,000 km in good weather condition. In addition comes the Krasukha-
2 and Krasukha-4 systems that have been deployed in new military bases in Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya 
Zemlya, New Siberian Islands and in Chukotka, Izvestia reports. 
Scandinavian countries such as Norway and Finland have complained in recent years of Russia 
jamming GPS and radio systems that have affected commercial aviation traffic which has 
allegedly been caused by the Krashukha-4 system since it is reportedly able to jam satellite 
communications, GPS signals and drone communication (see also Chapter 8). Alongside the 
radio-electronic warfare systems, the Nothern Fleet have also installed up-to-date satellite 
systems (Arktika-M), which allows Russia to track and control a large part of the NSP 
(Sukhanin 2020a). Taken together these developments have created what some call ‘Russia’s 
Arctic Shield’.  
The 2015 Maritime Doctrine also emphasised the importance of modernising Russia’s nuclear-
powered icebreaker fleet by 2020 and beyond. In May 2019, Russia’s efforts to modernize its 
icebreaker fleet were realised with the launch of the first of three new nuclear-powered 
icebreakers. The ship, named Ural is expected to be handed over to Russia’s state-owned 
nuclear energy corporation Rosatom in 2022 after the two other icebreakers in the same series, 
Arktika (Arctic) and Sibir (Siberia), enter service. Alexey Likhachev, Rosatom’s chief 
executive, was quoted saying that “The Ural together with its sisters are central to our strategic 
project of opening the NSR to all-year activity,” By 2035, Putin said Russia’s Arctic fleet 
would operate at least 13 heavy-duty icebreakers, nine of which would be powered by nuclear 
reactors. Politically, Russia’s new icebreaker fleet is expected to give Russia a competitive 
advantage in the Arctic against Canada, the US, Norway and China (Reuters 2019). However, 
Russia drew the attention of the US military in October 2019, when launched its first ‘combat 
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icebreaker’ in the Arctic - The Ivan Papanin. Planned as one of two new military craft – The 
Ivan Papanin is 114 meters in length and capable of sailing through ice up to 1.7 meters thick 
(Parfitt 2019). The vessels will be utilised by the Russian Navy for missions such as monitoring 
and protecting Russian Arctic waters, search and rescue, escorting ships in polar waters, 
transporting special equipment and providing maintenance and support for service vessels 
(Laskin 2019).  
Customarily, icebreakers are armed with only light weaponry, however, the Ivan Papanin’s 
unique feature is that it is fitted with Kalibr cruise missiles capable of being deployed for anti-
ship/anti-submarine warfare in addition to being utilised for land-attacks (naval-
technology.com 2020). US Admiral James G. Foggo III, referred specifically to the Ivan 
Papanin during his address at the U.S. Naval Institute’s 147th annual meeting, declaring “Who 
puts missiles on icebreakers?” He then went on to caution that Russia has “taken an aggressive 
approach in the Arctic” (Humpert 2020). 
Turning to the strategic nuclear aspect of Russia’s military strategy, the RF has also outlined 
its nuclear weapon policy in its 2014 Military Doctrine.  
The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and 
other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression 
against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state 
is in jeopardy (Section III, para. 27) 
The most recent New START data exchange (1st March 2020), reports that Russia has a total 
of 1,326 nuclear warheads deployed on ICBM missiles, SLBM missiles and heavy bombers. 
This figure stands slightly lower than the 1,372 deployed warheads that the United States is 
estimated to have) (US Department of State 2020). However, as Baev (2015:11) points out, 
some influencing factors have worked in Russia’s favour –for example, the fact that the 2010 
START established ceilings that required Russia to implement no cuts whatsoever in the 
numbers of delivery vehicles or warheads. It only called for the retirement of old Soviet-era 
weapons systems to ensure that Russia remained well below the agreed limits. This provided 
Russia with relative freedom to pursue the development of new nuclear missiles and to continue 
to rely on the nuclear triad as an important element of national defence. While Russia’s nuclear 
triad has continued to modernize, Baev (2015) notes that Russian strategic plans emphasize 
deployment of nuclear submarines and on building elements of a strategic defence system. This 
has environmental and human security implications for the AZRF, which has long been the 
testing grounds for Russia’s nuclear weapons programs. There are growing concerns amongst 
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residents, neighbouring Scandinavian states and environmental groups such as Bellona and 
Greenpeace about increases of radioactivity in the Arctic and the potential for nuclear 
accidents. Sources of radioactive pollution have come not only from ageing nuclear reactors 
and poorly stored Soviet-era nuclear waste (Chapter 5) but also new sources such as ongoing 
testing of Russia’s 21st century weaponry that utilise nuclear components and are tested at 
military test sites in Arctic regions. For instance, after the August 2019 accident at the Nenoksa 
missile test site in the Arkhangelsk oblast there was a spike in radiation levels in the area (see 
Chapter 8 for more details).  
 
Image 7.0 - Map of Russian Arctic military bases (Source: Mike Nudelman/Business 
Insider 2015)  
 
 
As of the first half of 2020, Russian is in the throes of overhauling its long-term strategic 
planning documents for the next fifteen years (Buchanan 2020). This is because 2020 serves 
as a benchmark year for Russian military planners, with the armed forces finally transitioning 
past the tumultuous, expensive and difficult modernization programmes began in 2008 
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(Massicot 2019). While a new National Security Strategy and Russian Military Doctrine are 
due to be released later this year, the Arctic region already features “explicitly and implicitly 
in a number of documents as a major economic and security priority” (ibid).  On the 5th March 
2020 a new Arctic policy was released titled Foundations of State Policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic up to 2035 (hereafter abbreviated to Foundations 2035). The new 
strategy lists Russia’s priorities in the region as “strengthening national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, promoting peace, stability and mutually beneficial partnerships, high living 
standards for the regional population in the Arctic zone” and improving infrastructure and 
technology to help “settle the Arctic” (Brzozowski 2020). As mentioned previously in Chapter 
6, Foundations 2035 reflects a high degree of continuity. This is because the Kremlin’s 
interests remain focused upon ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity in the ARZR. At 
the same time, the new strategy also emphasises the preservation of the Arctic as a zone of 
peace and cooperation – a feature that was also inherent within previous Russian Arctic policy 
documents in addition to the “preservation of the Arctic ecological system”. However, 
Buchannan (2020) observes that there is a pointed military-security agenda within Foundations 
2035; 
Framed as a defensive militarization, the Strategy states Russia’s military modernization program in the 
Russian Arctic serves to ensure Moscow can deter foreign military aggression in the region. Moscow’s new 
strategy intends to increase the combat capabilities of Russia’s armed forces in the Arctic Zone as well as the 
improvement of integrated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Systems. A continued commitment to the modernization of Arctic military 
infrastructure and facilities is included.  
Nonetheless, economic realities may impinge on Russia’s defence budget in the upcoming 
years as the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic is expected to produce a global economic 
recession. As Boulègue (2020) succinctly observes, Russia’s Covid-19 response will be a stress 
test for the Russian military, however it also represents a unique opportunity for learning about 
military planning and crisis management. This includes the involvement of nuclear, biological 
and chemical protection troops to step forward and assume a large part of the ‘preventative’ 
emergency response within the Russian armed forces (ibid). In late March, an entire crew of 
the nuclear-powered submarine Orel was quarantined near one of the westernmost bases of the 
Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula after coming in contact with a civilian contractor who 
had come into contact with a person infected with the coronavirus (Nilsen 2020a). Yet in April 
2020, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu declared that Russia’s Armed Forces were fully 
prepared for the coronavirus, and not a single Russian soldier had been tested positive for the 
virus (Staalensen 2020c). Yet as the virus spread across the RF, the Putin Administration 
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tightened its grip over media and information sources on its Covid-19 coverage while it was 
also slow to report confirmed cases. By April 2020, a total of 3548 people were registered as 
carriers of the virus in Russia but in the following months the numbers rapidly increased. As 
of July 2020, Russia is the third highest country in the world affected by the pandemic - behind 
only the US and Brazil. Russia has had approximately 714,000 confirmed coronavirus cases 
and over 11,000 deaths to date.  
Russia’s bioweapons researchers have been working with health officials on developing a 
coronavirus vaccine, one of 47 that Russian officials say are in various stages of development 
(The Moscow Times 2020). In early June 2020, the Russian military said that it has finished 
its preclinical trials and the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that “Fifty military 
personnel, including five women, have volunteered to test the safety and effectiveness of the 
vaccine” (ibid). Yet a difficult reality that Russian policymakers must face is the fact that the 
country is no longer the vaccine developer it was in Soviet times and as a result, it is struggling 
to match virus research being carried out in the West. Although developing a vaccine is "a 
question of national prestige," for Russia, Alexander Lukashev, director of the Martsinovsky 
Institute of Medical Parasitology, warned that proving the long-term safety of a vaccine quickly 
is impossible (Antonova and Koreneva 2020). Yet the stakes to produce a vaccine are high and 
Russia has promised it will develop one by September 2020, even though international health 
experts say that the most optimistic timetable for a coronavirus vaccine is at least 12-18 months.    
7.2 NATO in the Arctic 
7.2.1. NATO in the post-Cold War Arctic from 1997-2014: an implicit military agenda? 
 
Returning to the issue of NATO in the Arctic, in this section I will discuss NATO’s post-Cold 
intentions for the region, arguing that from 1997-2014 the alliance implicitly and gradually 
began to resume defence operations, mainly in the form of multinational military exercises.  
After a period of significant demilitarization in the Arctic at the end of the Cold War (see 
Chapter 4 and 5) in the late 2000’s both the US and NATO gradually began to recognise the 
new strategic significance of the Arctic; a region where security, economics and the 
environment interact (Blunden 2009:121). Almost immediately after the United States issued 
its NSPD-66 Arctic Policy document on the 12th of January 2009, NATO held a seminar in 
Reykjavik on the 28-29th January titled Security Prospects in the High North. Hosted by the 
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Icelandic government, the purpose of the seminar was to address “emerging challenges 
affecting the Arctic region” such as global warming. Addressing the seminar, NATO Secretary 
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said: “we are here today, not in response to a specific threat, 
but in response to a change, and with a view to developing a better understanding of that 
change”. He further added:  
Should NATO, as an organisation, as an Alliance, discuss the possibility of stepping up its focus in the 
region? And if so, what form should this take? It might be worthwhile conducting practice search and rescue 
operations, or even disaster relief exercises, addressing some of the possible scenarios I mentioned earlier 
and to acquaint the relevant staffs and personnel with the unique challenges presented by the Arctic 
conditions. 
From this statement it can be discerned that even as early as 2009, NATO was considering 
how to increase its presence in the Arctic through tackling issues such as climate change, 
Search and Rescue (SAR) and emergency preparedness. Yet as Chamberlain (2012) 
succinctly points out “emergency and disaster preparation in the region are a natural 
corollary to economic exploitation but they should not be used as a cover for militarising the 
Far North”.  If Cold War Arctic history can yield an insightful lesson for the present-day 
policymakers, it is that both scientific and military activities in the Arctic require transparent 
and civilian oversight. This also involves greater transparency with Russia. Although 
Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer referred to building transparency and trust with Russia 
as part of this process, he emphasised that the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was the forum 
with which to achieve this, despite it being suspended at the time due to the Russian-
Georgian war in 2008 and having a poor track-record for strengthening relations with Russia;  
… I think we need to ensure transparency, build trust and work towards cooperation when it comes to these 
issues. And that includes with Russia... I think that NATO might also have a contribution to make. Of 
course, the Arctic Council should remain the focus for much of the discussions and cooperation amongst 
the Arctic rim states. However, once the conditions are right for resuming normal business with Russia in 
the NATO-Russia Council, and I hope we will see that development soon, I see merit in using that particular 
forum for including Russia in wider cooperation, and also as vital element in building mutual confidence.  
Yet the Secretary General’s real message came right at the end of the speech in the form of 
an implicit warning to Russia against seeking to become a regional power in the Arctic and 
undermining NATO. Because Russia has, since the end of the Cold War, perceived the Baltic 
and Black Sea regions as Russia’s ‘near-abroad’, and therefore areas of enduring strategic 
interest NATO became concerned that Russia will also seek to influence the security 
environment in the Barents-Euro Arctic region (BEAR). With this in mind, De Hoop 
Scheffer implicitly outlined that NATO will seek to prevent Russian-led regionalisation in 
the Arctic;  
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I would like to add a note of caution. The indivisibility of the security of Allies has always been a core 
principle of NATO. And it’s a principle we ignore at our peril. Clearly, the High North is a region that is of 
strategic interest to the Alliance. But so are the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean. There are 
many regions -- but there is only one NATO. And we must ensure that, as we look today at the High North, 
and perhaps in the future at other regions, we do not get drawn down the path of regionalisation – because 
that is the path to fragmentation. And that is a path we must avoid at all costs [author’s emphasis added] 
(NATO 2009b) 
However, there may also be a second message implied from De Hoop Scheffer’s statement; 
essentially that NATO will not tolerate any changes to the Arctic regional security order since 
this could potentially challenge primacy of NATO as the de-facto security institution in the 
Arctic. To ensure this remained the case, NATOs 2010 Strategic concept entitled Active 
Engagement, Modern Defence, demonstrated a shift in the alliance’s priorities towards a 
broader security agenda that emphasised non-military risks. As Chamberlain (2012) explains, 
at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO declared that it would set aside its traditional role as a force 
projector and deterrent in favour of monitoring sustainable development and political stability 
without linking it explicitly to security (Chamberlain 2012). In Chapter 5, I discussed NATOs 
post-Cold War transformation and outlined how NATO’s broadened security agenda served as 
the underlying rationale for its continued existence and for its expansion in Eastern Europe. 
However, as I once again demonstrate, this has implications for Arctic security cooperation, 
since for some security analysts, traditional and non-traditional issues are interchangeable. For 
instance, Armstrong and Ulrick (2017) claim that “NATO is currently working to transform 
and refine its security mission in a modern context. The inclusion of environmental security is 
an ideal bridge to Arctic security”. 
Herein lies the problem: what exactly is the implicit intention behind this particular NATO’s 
strategy and how would it be implemented in the Arctic region? Again, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer 
assists in answering this question, referring specifically to climate change and melting ice-caps;  
The changes caused by the progressive melting of the ice cap are of concern to many countries beyond 
those of the Arctic Council and NATO. Indeed, the whole of the international community stands to be 
affected by many of the changes that are already taking place. In this situation, NATO needs to identify 
where the Alliance, with its unique competencies, can add value (NATO 2009b). 
While NATO ventured to become more involved in environmental and human security through 
organising international workshops funded by the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) 
Programme (NATO 2010), these did not materialise into concrete policy objectives in the 
region. Arguably this remains outside of NATO’s sphere of activity since the AC already 
engages in such issues through its working groups. Therefore, NATO involvement in these non-
strategic Arctic policy areas remain superfluous – that is unless they were tied to military 
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security. As this is unlikely to happen, NATO’s “unique competencies” could only manifest in 
the Arctic in one way – through a stronger Arctic military presence by means of regular 
multinational military exercises in the Norwegian High North –a topic I return to in detail in 
Chapter 8 where I show that this served to aggravate NATO-Russian relations and contribute 
to the re-militarize the Barents-Euro Arctic region (BEAR).  
7.2.2 The increasing US and NATO Arctic military presence in the aftermath of Ukraine  
“In many ways, NATO is the ultimate expression of the ‘West’” – NATO Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2020. 
 
It has been shown that prior to Ukraine, there was a steady reintroduction of army, navy and air 
force components into the region by major Arctic players including the US, NATO and Russia. 
However, the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, witnessed the Arctic becoming increasingly 
important for NATO due to concerns that Russia would seek to project force from its northern 
bases in the Arctic Circle outwards to the North Atlantic. In this way, Lanteigne (2019) 
explains, that NATO’s interest in the Arctic and military concerns came about, in two ways: 
“gradually, then suddenly”. The aftermath of Ukraine witnessed a swifter militarization of the 
Barents-Euro Arctic region (BEAR) close to the Russian border from both NATO and Russia. 
All military cooperation between Russia and the West was suspended, including the Arctic 
states Defence Chief of Staff meetings and the NATO-Russian Council which only resumed 
functions in 2018, three years later.  
To date, NATO has not explicitly issued an Arctic strategy: however, media and defence 
reports have framed the events in Ukraine as having a strong spill-over effect on Arctic politics. 
The clarion call for a stronger NATO presence in the Arctic has come from various sources. 
These include former and current personnel of NATO, national military officials and some 
Western political analysts. Arguments to validate a stronger NATO Arctic presence tend (see 
Chapter 1) invoke neo-realist arguments that consider the Arctic as a region of realpolitik 
competition where state concerns over maritime sovereignty and resource ownership has led 
to the re-militarization in the High North. For example, some Arctic scholars such as Huebert 
(2012) and Armstrong and Urchlick (2017) see Ukraine as a bastion call for a greater NATO 
presence in the Arctic and the securitization of the region. Rob Huebert (2016) claimed that 
‘Russia’s provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory’ has given rise to 
a new militarisation occurring in the Arctic. NATO is perceived as a necessary security actor 
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in the region as a balancing force against Russian military expansionism. During the NATO 
summit in Wales in 2014, the alliance planned to conduct several high-profile military 
exercises in the forthcoming years with the Trident Juncture (TJ) exercise being one of the 
largest. The first edition of TJ was held in Portugal and Spain in 2015 but the fact that TJ 2019 
was held in the Arctic serves to demonstrate the growing importance of the region to the 
alliance.  
There have been calls by individuals both within NATO and from military leaders within the 
US defence forces arguing for a greater NATO presence in the Arctic. A 2017 Sub-Committee 
report from the NATO Parliamentary Committee spearheaded by Gerald E. Connolly (US) 
advocated that NATO action was urgently required in the Arctic in response to Russian 
militarization:  
the Arctic littoral states of the Alliance, and indeed all Allies, can ill afford to postpone an evaluation of 
NATO’s approach to the region indefinitely. Russia is already expanding its military footprint in the High 
North by establishing infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route and non-littoral countries like the PRC 
are becoming more engaged (Connolly, 2017:10). 
Connolly’s report also provides a set of recommendations that would be coordinated through a 
new ‘Arctic working group’ at NATO headquarters. His recommendations also included the 
following actions 1) identifying NATO territory in the Arctic ‘vulnerable to territorial 
infringement by non-NATO states’, 2) evaluate NATO’s deterrence, defence and maritime 
posture in the High North, 3) analyse Russia’s changing military posture and operations in the 
region as well as China’s strategy in the High North as possible implications on security in the 
Arctic, and 4) continue and strengthen Allied exercises on the Alliance’s northern flanks 
(Connolly 2017:10). Connolly’s report demonstrates that there are those within NATO who 
advocate a more assertive approach to Arctic security. While this may be the exception rather 
than the general opinion, it does raise the question as to whether such individuals are capable 
of influencing NATO policy, especially when they hold a position of significance within the 
alliance such as US European Commander Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, whom in March 2018, 
asserted that “In the Arctic, Russia is building up and could be in a position to control northern 
sea transit lanes in a matter of three years…We are not keeping pace” (Vandiver 2018).  
Since Trump began his presidency on the 20th January 2017, he has been outspoken critic of 
NATO, which he considered to be an ‘obsolete’ alliance. In Trump’s view, NATO is a relic of 
the past – one which focuses on long-gone adversaries rather than new-era threats, draining 
American resources while at the same time allowing European partners to free-ride and not pay 
290 
 
their share of defence spending (Baker 2017). During his election campaign Donald Trump 
summed up his foreign policy strategy through the slogan ‘America First’ – a phrase which to 
the president signified that “We are going to take care of this country first…before we worry 
about everyone else in the world” (Sanger and Haberman 2016). Trump’s policies have 
witnessed a resurgence of American nationalism and populist sentiment that echoes Trump’s 
worldview that the United States has become a diluted power and which needs to be restored 
to its former glory – encapsulated by another of the president’s phrases - “Make America great 
again”. The main mechanism through which Trump pledged to achieve this goal was to re-
establish America’s central role in the world through intensive economic bargaining 
(transactionalism), an approach where costs and benefits matter more than ideas and norms – 
and thus resonates with the president’s personal background in business and finance (Sperling 
and Webber 2019).  
It is not surprising then that Trump has also taken a similar transactionalist approach to NATO. 
For example, on the eve of accepting the Republican nomination for president, Donald Trump 
stated that he would not automatically seek to defend NATO allies if they were attacked but 
instead, he would first look at their financial contributions to the alliance (Sanger and 
Haberman 2016). While previous US presidents have also complained about NATO spending, 
Trump has taken a more assertive approach that has alarmed European partners. At the 2018 
NATO Summit in Brussels, Trump went so far as to threaten allies that if they did not meet the 
NATO spending goal of 2 per cent of economic output75, the US could “go its own way” 
signifying that he would attempt to withdraw the US from the alliance. According to data from 
the alliance, only nine out of 30 member NATO member states in total met the 2% target in 
2019, yet this figure still comes as an improvement on 2014 when only 3 member states met 
that threshold (Amaro 2020). 
While there was nothing in the 2018 Brussels Communique to suggest that the Arctic will 
become a new priority area for NATO, the Summit reinforced NATO’s resolve to improve 
“overall maritime situational awareness” in the North Atlantic (Bouffard and Buchanan 2020). 
Although Trump’s derision of NATO overshadowed the Brussels Summit, it nevertheless did 
not prevent him from signing a joint-training agreement with Norway that outlined how the US 
would stationing 700 US troops near the Norwegian-Russian border in the High North – thus 
 
75 Only five of the 28 NATO member states met their target of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defence 
in 2016 (Baker 2017) 
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contributing to strengthening NATO in the Arctic (Berglund 2018a). Then, as part of ongoing 
US defence reforms outlined in the NDS 2018, the US announced in May 2018 that it will 
reactivate its Second Fleet in Norfolk Virginia76, to bolster the US and NATO presence in the 
Atlantic Ocean and counter Russian great power competition (Associate Press Washington 
2018).  Following from this NATO sanctioned the military exercise Trident Juncture (TJ-18) 
to take place that year in the Arctic - the largest of its kind in Norway and for NATO since 2002 
and served to send Russia a very clear message that NATO is in the Arctic (TJ-18 is discussed 
further in Chapter 8).   
2019 marked the NATO alliance’s 70th anniversary and there were plans to hold a summit 
meeting in Washington to mark the day of the organisation’s founding in April 2019. However, 
the meeting was downgraded to a gathering of foreign ministers as some diplomats feared that 
Trump could use a Washington summit meeting to renew his attacks against the alliance 
(Barnes and Cooper 2019). Instead, NATO held a half-day summit in London later in the year, 
on the 4th of December 2019. In an effort to appease the US president, NATO members agreed 
prior to the summit to reduce the US’s contribution to the organisation’s $2.5 billion operating 
budget –to upkeeping the cost of running NATO’s headquarters, staff and other expenses 
(Lynch 2019). The reduction in the US contribution to NATO was reduced to 16 per cent, in 
line with Germany. As a result of this development, Trump did not raise the issue of NATO 
defence spending and left the Summit soon after it ended without holding a final press 
conference (Brzozowski 2019b).  In the aftermath of the London Summit NATO released a 
joint declaration that included a statement on Russia to the effect that “Russia’s aggressive 
actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security”, while in the same paragraph stipulating 
that “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance”. (NATO 2019d). 
For the first time in the history of the alliance, a NATO declaration recognised the challenges 
posed by China (Deutsche Welle 2019). In the London declaration, it is stated that; “we 
recognise China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and 
challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance” (NATO 2019d). The inclusion of 
China was likely to come at the insistence of the US and the NATO Secretary General whom 
prior to the London Summit meeting called on the alliance to formulate a collective response 
to Beijing’s rise as a world power (Brozozowksi 2019).  
 
76  The US navy had previously merged the Second Fleet Command with the navy’s Fleet Forces in 2011 to cut costs.   
Reactivating the Second Fleet command was recommended in a navy study conducted after two deadly ship collisions in 2017 
that killed a total of 17 sailors (Associate Press Washington 2018).   
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The global pandemic of Covid-19 in the spring and summer of 2020 is likely to impact 
NATO’s Arctic military activities and its relations with Arctic member states in a number of 
ways. First, the pandemic is likely to delay the completion of NATO modernization 
programmes such as plans to upgrade the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 
in addition to aircraft modernization and procurement of the Allied Ground Surveillance 
(AGS). Robert Baines, president and chief executive officer of the NATO Association of 
Canada, noted that the ability to justify large procurement projects will become harder due to 
the economic turmoil caused by the pandemic (Army Technology 2020). The same applies to 
hosting NATO military exercises in the Arctic. For example, on the 11th March 2020, shortly 
after the commencement of Cold Response – NATO’s bi-annual Multinational Military 
Exercise in the Arctic, the Norwegian Armed Forces decided to cancel the exercise due to 
concerns about the spread of the pandemic (see also Chapter 8). However, May 2020 
witnessed the re-emergence of NATO in the Arctic despite the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. 
The US and UK decided to hold a small bilateral exercise involving approximately 1,200 navy 
personnel in the Barents Sea above the Arctic Circle. This was the first US-led exercise of this 
type to take place in the Barents region since the end of the Cold War in the mid-1980s and 
involved five naval ships engaged in seven days of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) drills 
(Lanteigne 2020). However, Norway chose not to partake in the exercise, which may have 
been an attempt to prevent an escalation of tensions Russia. However, it is also probable that 
Norway may be reconsidering its stance in support of a stronger NATO Arctic presence since 
this would undoubtedly lead to greater involvement of non-Arctic states in the region. Russia’s 
Northern Fleet subsequently conducted a similar exercise in the area. In the aftermath, top US 
military officials increasingly warned of Russian aggression in the Arctic – for example 
Admiral James Foggo III, Commander of the US Naval Forces Europe and Africa, declared 
that Russia has “taken an aggressive approach in the Arctic” and elsewhere. Nonetheless, 
Arctic and other NATO military exercises have been scaled down or cancelled amidst ongoing 
concerns of Covid-19 and reduced defence budgets. Concerned that NATO would witness 
national governments continuing to reduce defence spending in favour of healthcare to tackle 
the Covid-19 pandemic, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg urged allies to keep up 
defence expenditure during a press-conference held in NATO’s Brussels headquarters in 
March 2020; 
It is clear that there will be severe economic consequences of the coronavirus crisis. And at least in the short 
term, there will also be severe consequences, not only for the total economy, but also for government budgets. 
When we speak about the long-term consequences, that is too early to say anything with certainty about what 
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the long-term consequences will be….. We have to remember that when NATO Allies decided to invest more 
in defence, they did so because we live in a more uncertain, more unpredictable world, and therefore we need 
to invest more in defence. This has not changed. So I expect Allies to stay committed to investing more in 
our security (NATO 2020).    
 
7.2.3 Russian’s position on NATO and Arctic security –post-Ukraine 
I am sure that NATO will eventually admit that security systems without Russia, or worse still, against 
Russia, cannot be viable or productive, that such systems only create risks and do not meet the interests of 
the bloc’s members (Alexander Grushko, Russia’s Permanent Representative to NATO, 2017)  
 
In October 2014, in the immediate aftermath of the Ukrainian conflict, Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov commented on the effects of the US and EU sanctions on Russia and 
the implications this had for cooperation in the Arctic. He stated that ‘No sphere of a country’s 
international activity is immune to unilateral sanctions or the influence of events taking place 
outside that sphere or region. Still, I think that Arctic cooperation is fairly stable’ (Lavrov 2014 
cited in Staun 2017:325). From Lavrov’s statement it can be surmised that the Putin 
Administration recognised the inexpediency of withdrawing from the AC – an institutional 
structure which it is a full member of and politically benefits from - in the aftermath of Ukraine. 
The Arctic represents a region where Russia’s political relations with the West are relatively 
congenial. Therefore, Russia was unwilling to let political and security tensions originating 
elsewhere in the world affect its political standing in the AC.  
Russian grievance can be better understood in light of almost three decades of NATO 
expansion into former Warsaw Pact and post-Soviet areas, the prospect that Georgia and 
Ukraine could join NATO, American efforts to orchestrate oil-pipeline routes from the 
Caspian Basin that circumvent Russia, the termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABM) during the George W. Bush presidency in 2002, and most significantly, US plans for 
deployment of missile-defence systems in Eastern Europe (ibid). To add further injury, 
Russia’s loss of great power status experienced at the end of the Cold War was portrayed 
through its continued exclusion by the West from European security structures and a 
diminished influence on the global stage.  However, while Russia is not powerful enough to 
dominate the international system as a global hegemon or to even be a full-peer competitor 




The events in the Crimea served as a pivotal example of this, with Western scholars and media 
being eager to demonstrate Russia’s breaking of international rules and norms, and strongly 
condemning Russia for its assertive, aggressive and revisionist tendencies (Staun 2017:314). 
In his 2014 Crimean address, President Putin conveys how Russian frustration with the West 
had reached to a tipping-point and this was realised through Russia’s actions in Ukraine. 
Russia’s position both in the Ukraine and internationally has reignited a fierce debate on how 
to view Russia’s foreign policy while also having implications for Arctic security with an 
increase of NATO activity and military exercises (see Chapter 8). Yet as demonstrated earlier 
in this chapter, in section 7.1.2., Russia has continued to adhere to the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START) in the aftermath of Ukraine, with respect to the number of nuclear 
warheads it can possess. However, Putin’s peculiar remarks at the press conference on 18th 
December 2014 allude to the ongoing importance that Russia has for its nuclear triad, which 
the President referred to as “the teeth and claws of the Russian bear”. This was a metaphor 
which served to illustrate that Russia’s great power status has, since the Cold War, been 
associated with its nuclear capabilities. As such Russia’s nuclear deterrence has consistently 
enjoyed high political attention and served as a means in which Russia can compensate for its 
disadvantage in conventional capabilities compared to the NATO. As such Russia’s nuclear 
forces served as a deterrent should the West have chosen to retaliate against Russia after 
Ukraine (Baev 2015:11). 
However, Russia consistently expressed its dissatisfaction with NATO in the aftermath of 
Ukraine given its decision to quickly increase its presence in the Arctic from 2015 onwards 
through more frequent large-scale military exercises. In late December 2019, Commander of 
Russia’s Northern Fleet Alexander Moiseyev said that NATO was building up its training and 
reconnaissance activities in the Arctic. According to Russian officials, NATO training 
exercises have increased by 17 percent in the past three years with reconnaissance activities up 
15 percent.   
During the Munich Security Conference held in February 2020, NATO’s secretary general Jens 
Stoltenberg and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met to discuss relations between 
Russia and the alliance. Afterwards, Lavrov told reports that NATO only exacerbates Ukraine’s 
problems and undermines efforts aimed at implementing the Minsk agreements (Tass News 
Agency 2020b). On the 12th June 2020, NATO made an announcement recognising Ukraine as 
an Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP). This day also happened to be ‘Russia day’ – a 
national holiday to commemorate the 1990 adoption of the declaration of Sovereignty of the 
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Russian Federation. Whether this day was chosen intentionally by NATO or not, Kremlin 
Spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that Russia has always carefully observed the process 
"when NATO absorbs new countries in various forms”. He also emphasised that “NATO’s 
attempts to expand its sphere of influence in other countries does not ramp up stability and 
security in Europe”. Referring to how NATO was created “as a mechanism of confrontation” 
he warned that Russia will be “forced to take measures to ensure our own security in this 
regard" (Tass News Agency 2020d).  
While, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the Russian military has scaled down its 
exercises near Russia’s borders with NATO countries amid the coronavirus pandemic (The 
Moscow Times 2020), in June 2020 Russia’s Northern Fleet engaged in an anti-submarine 
warfare drill in the Barents involving more than 20 ships. Russian News agency Tass and Navy 
Recognition (2020c) reported that the Northern Fleet’s manoeuvres were part of large-scale 
drills to defend sea lanes in the Arctic against a potential enemy’s attack. At various stages of 
the naval exercise, up to 20 warships, submarines and support vessels performed tasks in the 
Barents Sea. This exercise was likely to have been conducted in response to a joint UK-US in 
May 2020.   
To conclude, while NATO has not released an Arctic Strategy to date (July 2020), Russia 
nonetheless has essentially tied its security interests in Ukraine, the Baltic, and eastern Europe 
with the Arctic given these areas are within Russia’s political sphere of interest. Russia is likely 
to continue to resist any attempts by NATO to increase its influence in the Arctic through 
outspoken political statements that emphasise Russia’s position on NATO. It will also seek to 
strengthen deterrence through an increased naval and air force presence not only in the AZRF 
but in international waters in the Barents region. The ordering of large-scale military exercises 
and snap military drills in the Barents-Euro Arctic Region and the Russian Far East, is further 
seen by political and military leaders as a means to achieve this purpose of maintaining a high 
level of visibility and media attention. I will return to the topic of military exercises in Chapter 




337.3 Conclusion  
This chapter set out to discuss the military strategies of the US and Russia in the Arctic while 
also reviewing the continuation of the NATO alliance and defence activities in the post-Cold 
War Arctic security order.  
In Chapter 6, I have shown that the US has not distinguished itself as an Arctic regional leader 
in the post-Cold War era. Overall, the US Administration has exhibited a tendency towards a 
reactive foreign policy in the Arctic rather than demonstrating strong regional leadership 
tendencies. Beginning in 2007, when Russia symbolically planted the titanium flag on the 
seabed underneath the north pole, the Bush Administration responded by issuing an assertive, 
unilateral Arctic policy in 2008. Although the subsequent Obama Administration revised its 
Arctic strategy to be more multilateral and emphasised cooperation with US Arctic allies and 
partner states, overall, the US Arctic defence strategies continue to be tied to the broader post-
Cold War status quo structures. Essentially, this has resulted in the continuation of the NATO-
based Euro-Atlantic defence structure. In section 7.2.1 I outlined how NATO gradually 
increased its presence in the Arctic through a resumption of regular NATO military exercises 
in Norway from 2006 onwards. At the same time, NATO considered how it could expand its 
agenda to include non-traditional security issues such as environmental security and utilise this 
as a bridge to increasing its Arctic activities and military presence. However, in practice, 
NATO’s primary role in the Arctic remains as a collective defence alliance, a fact which Russia 
is quick to point out and has remained consistent in its opposition against a greater role for 
NATO in the Arctic region. 
Although it is possible to conclude from Chapter 6 that both powers behave as status quo states 
in the Arctic with respect to the political order, Russia’s dissatisfaction with the Arctic security 
order remains evident. While the US has, until recently, remained politically and militarily 
disinterested in the Arctic, owing to the assumption that the US/NATO-led Arctic security 
order would ensure that the region remains relatively peaceful– Russia, in contrast, has sought 
to re-claim its great power status which it lost with the demise of the Soviet Union.  The Arctic 
has a key role to play in this quest given its re-emergence as an important political, economic 
and military region to the Kremlin. Yet despite its successful military reforms and the 
modernization of NSR and Arctic base infrastructure, Russia, like the US, is faced with an 
unconventional security crisis caused by a virus rather than a conventional enemy. With 
changing political and security realities, the US and Russia have struggled both politically and 
militarily to react to the pandemic crisis owing to inherent weaknesses in political leadership.   
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Similar to previous chapters where I outlined the RPSF configurations for the Arctic powers, 
in Table 7.2. I have assessed the foreign policy orientations of the US and Russia for the 
duration of the post-Cold War Arctic from 1996-2020. I have divided the post-Cold War era 
into four distinct sub-periods of time that coincide with significant moments in global and/or 
Arctic politics that have influenced foreign policy shifts. These include; the immediate post-
war years 1996-2000, the post-9/11 years from 2001-2007, the Arctic revival years which 
coincide with the aftermath of the Russian flag planting event and the US’ new Arctic strategy 
in 2008, followed by the post-Ukraine and return to great power competition (2014-2020). I 
have also distinguished between the global foreign policy and Arctic foreign policy of the two 
powers. This serves the purpose of demonstrating that although the Arctic regional order 
exhibits different dynamics than the international system, the Arctic order remains connected 
to events occurring at the international level and as such is affected by external developments 
or ‘shocks’ to the system. Such global influences can, in turn, impact Arctic regional politics 
to a greater or lesser degree. For instance, although the Russian annexation of Crimea did not 
disrupt AC processes, the 2014 events nonetheless highlight the potential impact that external 
events can have on political and security processes within the region.  However, it must be also 
be observed in this case that the actions and reactions by Arctic states to global events may 
produce different political outcomes at the regional level than those occurring within the 
broader international system. It is possible to conclude that in the 21st century the Arctic has 
become globalized in the sense that it is intrinsically linked to the international system. Yet the 
findings from Chapter 4 also serve as a reminder for the present that at a previous critical 
juncture in global politics, the Arctic region served to influence a major shift in global politics. 
Thus, rather than a static receptive entity, the Arctic demonstrates that regional orders can be 
dynamic and serve to both influence - as well as be influenced by – global events. As such, it 
may be possible for the Arctic to once more be the site of global change however, I argue that 
regional leadership is required, in addition to revising the outdated Cold War era Arctic security 
order is essential. 
The US recognition of the ‘return to great power competition’ in its 2018 National Security 
Strategy is highly relevant to the Arctic regional order, where a more assertive Russia and the 
rise of China as an Arctic actor has heightened American apprehension about political and 
security changes in the region that are occurring as a result of climate change. Since the world 
is now facing a global climate change crisis that is directly affecting the Arctic, in addition to 
a shifting balance of power in the international system, the time may be nigh for the Arctic 
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region to once more be the site of significant global change. However, this will require strong 
Arctic leadership which neither the US nor Russia appears capable of. This has led to a flurry 
of new policies ranging from the restoration of overseas Cold War bases in Iceland and 
Greenland to the call for the rapid construction of new icebreakers. In the aftermath of Ukraine, 
both the Obama and Trump Administration has increasingly expressed its dissatisfaction with 
Russia’s military upgrades and Arctic military activities. While the US is now experiencing 
great power decline and seeks to protect the established post-Cold War order, both in the Arctic 
and globally, unanticipated external ‘shocks’ such as the Covid-19 pandemic has hastened the 
process of change and presented a new unconventional threat to the US status as a global leader. 
Thus, 2020 represents the year in which the West has grappled not only with the Corona Virus 
pandemic but also the breakdown of the post-Cold War order. Change in the Arctic is likely to 
once more mirror the broader international system, but the question remains as to what kind of 
change this will be. 
 
Table 7.1 The global and Arctic regional Foreign Policy Orientations of the US and Russia 
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CHAPTER 8                                                                                             
REVIEWING THE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL SECURITY 
OVERLAP IN THE PRESENT-DAY ARCTIC SECURITY 




In this chapter I will investigate how the small and medium Arctic states currently view 
NATO’s aspirations in the Arctic and their willingness to support NATO’s activities in the 
High North. In the previous chapter, (Chapter 7) it was argued that while NATO publicly 
declared that it did not intend on issuing an Arctic strategy at this time, it nonetheless sought 
to increase its military presence in the High North. In this chapter, I demonstrate how NATO 
has gradually increased its Arctic military activities in the last twenty-years primarily though 
Multinational Military Exercises (MMEs). The purpose is to demonstrate that instead of 
formulating new mechanisms of confidence building and security cooperation between Russia 
and the West in the Arctic in the aftermath of the Cold War, NATO-led exercises continued in 
the post-Cold War era, gradually increasing in frequency from the early 2000s onwards. MMEs 
therefore provide a focus which to assess the degree to which NATO is present in the Arctic 
and how it perceives its role in the region. The reason for focusing specifically on the Barents 
Euro Arctic Region (BEAR) is due to the relative proximity to the Russian border and the fact 
that the majority of Arctic MMEs have been concentrated in this area. The structure of the 
chapter is as follows; in section 8.1. I will focus on outlining the Arctic strategies of the small 
and medium NATO Arctic states as this serves to outline national military security and defence 
issues. Additionally, I will discuss individual state perceptions towards NATO and their degree 
of support for a stronger NATO Arctic presence. To this end, I will review Canada’s 
perceptions of NATO in the Arctic in section 8.1.1; followed by Norway, Denmark and Iceland 
in section 8.1.2, and the two non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland in section 8.1.3. With 
respect to the former three NATO Arctic states, I also provide an overview of developments 
and post-Cold War changes with respect to US basing agreements in addition to the growing 
influence of China in the Arctic and how this has created a new dynamic within the security 
order. Regarding the two non-NATO states, I outline how in the post-Cold War era these two 
states have attained closer ties to NATO via the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the Enhanced 
Opportunity Partnerships (EOP) programs leading to their increased participation in MMEs. I 
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will also ascertain the likelihood of Sweden and Finland seeking NATO membership in the 
near future and consider the impact this would have for Arctic regional security.  
In section 8.2, I analyse the intent and frequency behind conducting large-scale multinational 
military exercises (MMEs) in the European Arctic in the post-Cold War era. The purpose 
behind focusing on MEEs is threefold. First, in Section 8.2.1. I show how NATO is increasing 
its presence in the Arctic, particularly after Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine, when 
MMEs in the Arctic increased in size and frequency. Second, MMEs also serve as way to assess 
Russian responses to NATO MMEs and to review if Russia’s increased Arctic military 
activities are in response to NATO MMEs. I seek to demonstrate that there is a cycle of action-
reaction involved that serves to increase the potential for conflict and heighten the security 
dilemma rather than strengthening Arctic regional security. In Section 8.2.2. I therefore turn 
to evaluating Russian military exercises in the Arctic, discussing the structure of such exercises, 
when and why they occur and observe new developments involving the inclusion of other state 
participants including China. I highlight the times when Russia has declared snap exercises in 
the Arctic as a response to NATO exercises arguing that this serves both a political and strategic 
aim - while presenting an opportunity to showcase Russia’s military preparedness in the Arctic, 
I show how Russian Arctic exercises also serve the purpose of expressing Russia’s continual 
dissatisfaction with NATO exercises - which are perceived to be aimed against Russia.  
Next, in Section 8.3., I provide a general discussion on the political and military aims of MMEs, 
while also considering if there are certain rules and etiquette required for conducting military 
exercises in order to reduce the threat perception involved – this includes issues such as 
providing prior notice of the exercise, and where necessary obtaining permission to access 
northern indigenous peoples lands, in addition to setting limitations on the size of troops 
participating. This leads into the third and final reason for reviewing MEEs in the Arctic: to 
consider if MMEs have strengthened security in the contemporary Arctic regional order or if, 
on the contrary they have exacerbated the security dilemma between Russia and the West. 
Finally, in section 8.4. I will summarise the main points of the chapter while also concluding 
that the current Arctic security order is perpetuating the security dilemma and the problem of 
regional security overlap in the region. Throughout the chapter I will show how both NATO 
and Russian actions are part of this problem since they serve to reinforce the conflict between 
east and west that originated during the Cold War. Yet I argue that security cannot be attained 
for either side through deterrence and the increasing militarization of the Arctic.  
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8.1 The small and medium states and the Arctic regional security order – 
united in their support of NATO or divided by national differences? 
8.1.1 Canada 
For the past decade, Canada has resisted calls for a stronger NATO Arctic presence. Although 
previous conservative governments led by Stephen Harper (2006-2015) advocated an Arctic 
policy that sought to assert Canadian sovereignty – at the same time Canada has tried to 
discourage an explicit NATO presence in the North American Arctic. Charron (2017) explains 
that during the 2009 NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, member states were poised to release a 
statement on NATO’s role in the Arctic as part of the final declaration. Canada objected to this 
and as a result of NATO’s consensus-based decision-making, a muted paragraph was instead 
released. The statement declared that “Developments in the High North have generated 
increased international attention. We welcome the initiative of Iceland in hosting a NATO 
Seminar and raising the interest of Allies in safety and security-related developments in the 
High North, including climate change.” Again, at NATO’s 2010 summit, Norway wanted 
Arctic issues included in the text of the communiqué. Canada opposed the move and Norway 
was forced to back down. When the Norwegian foreign minister visited Brussels to brief the 
alliance on Norway’s views on the Arctic, Canada asked to remove the issue from the agenda 
of all future meetings (Ivison 2014). 
Nonetheless, Canadian national defence remains tied to NATO and NORAD and there have 
been efforts to modernise and upgrade elements of NORAD particularly the North Warning 
System (NWS) (formerly the DEW line) towards greater operability in the Arctic. For example, 
the May 2006 NORAD Agreement renewal added a maritime warning mission, which entails 
a shared awareness and understanding of the activities conducted in US and Canadian maritime 
approaches, maritime areas and inland waterways (North American Aerospace Command 
2016). However, Canada’s assertion that the North-west passage (NWP) is an internal 
waterway continues to be an ongoing source of contention with the US that can be traced back 
to the Cold War era. This has brought Canada closer to Russia as they both share the same 
concerns regarding their northern waterways.  
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the US seeks to preserve the freedom of maritime access to the 
Arctic Ocean and therefore maintains that the NWP it is an international waterway. This has 
led Canada and Russia to strengthen their bi-lateral relations on the basis that they have shared 
maritime interests in preserving their sovereignty over sections of the Arctic Ocean that they 
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each proclaim as internal waterways, in an effort to limit the levels of force projection of non-
Arctic states in the region. This point is demonstrated in the content of a leaked Arctic cable 
no.212098 that was sent by the US Embassy in Moscow on the 15th of June 2009. The cable 
relates Canadian Prime Minster Stephen Harper’s position on the issue of NATO in the Arctic: 
According to PM Harper, Canada has a good working relationship with Russia with respect to the Arctic, 
and a NATO presence could backfire by exacerbating tensions. He commented that there is no likelihood 
of Arctic going to war, but that some non-Arctic members favoured a NATO role in the Arctic because it 
would afford them influence in an area where “they don’t belong”. Strikingly, the comment by Harper 
provides a reminder, rather than a revelation about his strongly developed geographical imagination (Dodds 
2011: 200)  
As such, Canada has been particularly concerned that a greater NATO Arctic presence would 
lead to the inclusion of non-Arctic states into matters that it feels only concerns the five Arctic 
states with coastlines boarding the Arctic Ocean (Rozoff 2011).  
Canada released its first Northern Strategy in 2009, followed by its ‘Statement on Canada’s 
Arctic Foreign Policy’ in 2010. The Northern Strategy identified four pillars for Canada’s 
domestic regional priorities: “exercising our Arctic sovereignty; promoting social and 
economic development; protecting the North’s environmental heritage; and improving and 
devolving northern governance”. The Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy then 
placed these areas in an international context (Everett 2018). 
James Fergusson, a professor at the University of Ottawa, views the Arctic as a good example 
of a region where cooperation rather than conflict serves the basis of inter-state relations with 
Russia, and as such there is no need for formal involvement by NATO (Marlin 2018). However, 
since the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, there has been greater pressure on Canada to be seen to shore 
up its Arctic relationship with the United States and to reinforce its role in the alliance. As Ross 
Fetterly (2019) points out “Canadians need to understand that a great power competition is 
developing in the Arctic: and Canada will be directly affected by the outcome”. In 
consideration of this, changes in geo-politics will require the Canadian government to decide 
on an appropriate level of response in terms of a military presence in the North. With a limited 
Canadian icebreaking capability and a minimal military full-time presence in the Arctic, this 
may prove challenging for Canada as it seeks to strike the balance between investment in 
northern infrastructure and equipment on the one hand, and force projection on the other.  
In 2017, the Canadian government released a new defence policy titled Strong, Secure, 
Engaged, which outlined a list of capital equipment projects projected over 20 years and a 
modest increase in authorized military personnel strength (Fetterly 2019). The liberal 
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government of Justin Trudeau (2015-present) sought to tone down the former rhetoric on 
Canadian Arctic sovereignty favoured by the former government led by Stephen Harper and 
the conservatives. Adam Lajeunesse (2017) observes how the document mentions the threat 
posed by Russia, that is caused in part by Russia’s ability to “project force from its Arctic 
territory into the North Atlantic”. Although the 2017 strategy recognises that “a degree of major 
power competition has returned to the international system”, there is no discussion of any 
conventional threat to the Canadian Arctic. The fact that there is no mention of a significant 
threat in the defence document is an important recognition that, “while Russia’s Arctic forces 
may threaten other NATO regions, they do not pose an immediate danger to the Canadian 
north” (Lajeunesse 2017).    
Charron (2017) draws attention to paragraph 110 in Canada’s 2017 defence policy because it 
suggests that Canada will “conduct joint exercises with Arctic allies and partners and support 
the strengthening of situational awareness and information sharing in the Arctic, including with 
NATO”. Charron goes on to explain that if Canada intends to continue contributing to 
information sharing on the North American Arctic and the common NORAD maritime domain 
among NATO allies, this essentially amounts to upholding the status quo. However, in recent 
years, Canada has hosted MME Arctic exercises which could be interpreted by Russia as a 
provocation given the proximity of Russia to the North American Arctic territories (Charron 
2017). For example, in 2019, Canada hosted the Nanook-Nunalivut exercises whose aim was 
partially to help the forces of allies and partner states to match Russian readiness in extreme-
cold climates (Cooper 2019). Participating states included France, Norway, Finland and 
Sweden. However, the United States only sent observers, and did not have troops partaking in 
the exercise. While the Nanook-Nunalivut exercise was not a NATO-led exercise, Charron 
(2017) nonetheless warns that Canada’s decision to host Arctic exercises and particularly 
NATO exercises in the future could negatively impact Arctic cooperation and make it more 
difficult to engage with Russia on Arctic security issues. Instead, Charron advises that it would 
be more helpful to reinvigorate the Arctic Chief of Defence meetings involving the eight Arctic 
states, starting with issues concerning military support and Search and Rescue (SAR). 
On the 10th of September 2019, the Government of Canada released a new Arctic and Northern 
Policy Framework one day prior to the start of Canada’s national election campaign. The new 
Arctic policy framework was released with little media attention. Considered by government 
officials as representing a “profound change of direction for the Government of Canada”, Prime 
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Minister Justin Trudeau proclaimed that “Canada is committing to co-develop a new Arctic 
Policy Framework, with Northerners, Territorial and Provincial governments, and First 
Nations, Inuit, and Métis People that will replace Canada’s Northern Strategy” (PMO, 2016, 
para. 6 cited in Everett 2018). The new policy document was the result of two years of bottom-
up initiatives and consultations between more than 25 indigenous organizations, along with the 
governments of Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, Yukon, Maintoba, Quebec and 
Newfoundland-Labrador (Bell 2019). The Northern Framework represents the first phase of a 
continuing process and will replace Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 2009 
Northern Strategy and the Harper government’s 2010 Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign 
Policy (Bell 2019).   
Although this new approach to northern policy making was undoubtedly a welcome 
development, the Government of Canada still retained overarching authority over decision-
making on matters relating to Canadian defence, foreign policy and security. Within a specific 
chapter on ‘safety, security and defence’ the Northern Framework outlines that while “Canada 
sees no immediate threat in the Arctic and the North”, the circumpolar north is nonetheless 
becoming an area of strategic international importance due to climate change. As a result “both 
Arctic and non-Arctic states are increasingly expressing a variety of economic and military 
interests in the region” (Government of Canada 2019). The framework also explicitly identified 
how easier access to the Arctic may contribute to greater foreign presence in Canadian Arctic 
waterways; On this matter, “Canada remains committed to exercising its sovereignty, including 
in the various waterways commonly referred to as the Northwest Passage”.  
Although the above statement reiterates previous Canadian governments in their stance on the 
Canadian Arctic and the NWP – it nonetheless serves as an important element of continuity 
between the former conservative government and the present liberal one. However, there are 
also observable differences between former Canadian Arctic policies and the new Northern 
Framework. For instance, a realpolitik perspective is evident which hints at Canada’s growing 
concern about great power competition in the Arctic. Although the Northern Framework does 
not mention any specific states, the paragraph cited below is nonetheless implicitly directed 
towards Russia and China;   
While the circumpolar Arctic can and should continue to benefit from a deeply ingrained culture of 
international cooperation, this cooperation must not result in complacency at a time of increased interest 
and competition from both Arctic and non-Arctic states who see the region's political, economic, 
scientific, strategic and military potential. In some cases, states with interests in the Arctic are using a 
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broad range of military capabilities and other state-controlled assets as they work to collect intelligence 
and position themselves to access or control sensitive sites, infrastructure, and strategic resources — 
potentially under the appearance of productive activities. In addition, rapid changes in military and 
strategic technologies including remotely-piloted systems, as well as the rise of competition in new 
domains such as space, artificial intelligence, and cyber, are likely to have a significant impact on the 
way states pursue their interests, and gives them the ability to project military force in the Arctic and 
North America. The long-term objectives of some of these states remain unclear, and their interests may 
not always align with our own (Government of Canada 2019). 
 
While Canada interprets Russian actions to be based on developing new military capabilities 
and increased information gathering in the Arctic, China by contrast is seen to be acting 
covertly, disguising its military and political objectives in the Arctic behind economic 
cooperation. In 2014, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced that he wants China to become 
a ‘polar great power’ and released a Chinese Arctic strategy in 2018.  Concerns over the rising 
power of China dominated the debate at the Halifax International Security Forum that took 
place in late November 2019. The session was framed by a brief paper, (written by none other 
than Thomas Axeworthy) titled ‘The End of the World: The Arctic’. In this paper, Axeworthy 
(2019) suggests that strategy documents are critical indicators of which countries will dominate 
Arctic geopolitics. Focusing on Chinese and Russian dominance in the Arctic, he argues that 
these states expressed both decisiveness and long-term thinking in their respective Arctic 
strategy documents (High North News 2019).  In contrast, Axeworthy views the Canada’s most 
recent strategy document, the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, as being a “simple 
laundry list of objectives” and critiques the paper for its lack of detail and clarity. As such, he 
concludes that Canada is still not serious about becoming an Arctic power.  
In recent years, China has taken an express interest in buying commercial assets in the High 
North – particularly mines and port facilities. As Luedi (2019) points out, Canada is not without 
its share of Chinese investment. The first shipment of nickel ore from Deception Bay, Quebec 
to China via the Northwest Passage occurred in 2014. There are also several Canadian-Sino 
joint mining ventures in the Canadian Arctic such as in Nunavut and Yukon, while Quebec is 
also looking at potential Chinese investment to bolster its 25-year, $70 billion ‘Project Nord’ 
development strategy (ibid).  
The incentive towards accepting Chinese investment in the Canadian Arctic arises due to the 
excessive costs incurred by northern projects. As Leudi explains, costs are 250 percent higher 
than comparable projects in southern Canada, and these high costs have stymied Ottawa’s 
development efforts over the years. Thus, while China’s influence in Canadian Arctic projects 
should be closely monitored, “Logistical hurdles and a lack of political will on Ottawa’s part 
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has in turn forced northern communities to look to outside help in order to realize their 
economic ambitions” (Luedi 2019). This is a reoccurring theme also observable in other Arctic 
states, particularly Greenland and Iceland and to a lesser extent Norway. In Greenland, Chinese 
ambitions have been directly thwarted by the US and NATO – an issue which I will return to 
in section 8.1.2., when I review aspects of continuity and change within the security policies 
of the three small NATO Arctic states and their ongoing relationship with the US and NATO. 
  
8.1.2 Denmark/Greenland, Iceland and Norway 
8.1.2.1 Denmark and Greenland  
An important change that occurred in the post-Cold War era with respect to the Danish-
Greenlandic-USA/NATO relationship revolves around the emergence of a trilateral 
agreement on Thule AFB. Throughout most of the Cold War, decisions on Greenlandic 
security were often made on a bilateral basis between the US and Denmark (see Chapter 3 and 
4). However, the rise of the Inuit movement, the airing of colonial grievances, and Greenland’s 
quest for independence and full sovereignty, have all led to a re-evaluation of security policy. 
The outcome of this process resulted in greater inclusion of local government structures in 
decision-making on security issues – even though foreign and defence policy still remain 
under the Danish realm. In December 2002, then US Secretary of State Colin Powell made a 
public request to upgrade the radar at Thule AFB and the results of these negotiations led to 
what has been called the ‘Igaliku Agreement’ which came into force on the 24th of May 2004 
(Ackrén 2019). This was essentially an amendment of the 1951 Agreement that gave 
Greenlanders increased influence on matters concerning Thule AFB, and the Greenlandic 
government is a cosignatory on the amendment (ibid). In June 2009, a landmark agreement 
was ratified where Greenlanders obtained ‘Selvstyre’ or Self-Government Rule. The self-
governance agreement provides Greenlanders with a pathway towards independence should 
they seek it in the future. However, this would mean that Denmark would cease to be an Arctic 
state while also raises further questions as to whether Greenland would apply for NATO 
membership after independence. At present however, Greenlandic defence remains under the 
authority of the Danish realm – and as such, is outlined in Danish policy documents.   
Denmark’s Arctic strategy – released on August 24, 2011 is titled, “Denmark, Greenland and 
the Faroe Islands - Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020’. It begins by 
outlining that “The Kingdom of Denmark is centrally located in the Arctic. The three parts of 
308 
 
the Realm – Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands share a number of values and interests 
and all have a responsibility in and for the Arctic region” (p.7). While acknowledging that the 
a large part of the Arctic is covered by the NATO treaty Article 5 on collective defence, 
Denmark considers the enforcement of sovereignty and defence in the Arctic as being the 
primary responsibility of nation states. The Danish Defense Agreement for 2010-2014 
outlined how increased activity in the Arctic region will put extra pressure on the country’s 
armed forces and as such, military facilities in Greenland required upgrades to enable Danish 
warplanes to monitor the area. A key part of these proposed Danish defence upgrades was the 
creation of the Arctic Command on the 31st of October 2012, uniting the Island Command 
Greenland and the Island Command Faroes with a new headquarters situated in the 
Greenlandic capital of Nuuk. The primary tasks of the Arctic Command are maritime 
surveillance and enforcement of sovereignty, in addition to several other tasks including 
fisheries inspection, support for scientific expeditions, ammunition disposal, and patrolling. 
In Greenland, the defence forces are also responsible for search and rescue services, 
hydrographic surveys, environmental surveillance and pollution control (Danish Defence 
Ministry 2019).  
In 2014, Thule AFB again became a site of political controversy surrounding the unfair 
tendering process for contracting services for the base that resulted in Greenlandic companies 
losing out to US firms. Before 2014, Greenlandic firms held three contracts with the US Air 
Force to provide transport and maintenance services for Thule AB (McGwin 2017a). Since 
1950, maintenance of the base had been under Greenlandic or Danish control providing jobs 
and valuable work training to residents (The local.dk 2015). However, in 2013, the Danish 
government was warned that its agreement about control of the base might be in violation of 
EU law. The government then decided to put the contract up for tender and in October 2014, 
Exelis - a subsidiary owned by the US firm Vectrus, was awarded the 411 million USD contract 
for base maintenance services. However, responding from pressure from parliament and 
complaints that this would lead to a costly loss of jobs in Greenland, Danish Foreign Minister 
Martin Lidegaard requested the US Air Force to suspend the tender process (ibid). In May 
2015, the US Court of Federal Claims ruled that Exelis, the American subsidiary firm did not 
meet the necessary requirements and Greenland Contractors continued to oversee the 
maintenance at the base (The Local.dk 2015). Possibly as a result of the court decision, in 
September 2014, a corporate decision was made to ‘spin-off’ Vectris making it an independent 
company. This decision had implications for Thule as in in June 2016, the US Court of Appeals 
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overturned the former ruling by the US Court of Federal Claims, handing Vectrus “a victory in 
pursuit of a contract to provide base maintenance services” at Thule (Censer 2016). Danish and 
Greenlandic firms lost a second contract in 201777 and led both Greenlandic and Danish 
politicians to question whether the tendering process for Thule violated competition laws 
because it favoured American firms (McGwin 2017a). 
The US Air Force and NATO presence in Greenland remains a complicated matter for 
Denmark not only in terms of US-Greenlandic-Danish relations concerning Thule but also 
regarding a broader Arctic security strategy. Rahbek-Clemmenson (2011) outlines that while 
on the one hand, Denmark is aware that NATO probably is the best body for handling an 
assertive Russia, on the other hand, Denmark is hesitant about letting outside organizations into 
the region while at the same time it is also concerned that a stronger NATO military presence 
in the Arctic will serve to fuel the security dilemma vis-à-vis Russia. In this way, Denmark’s 
Arctic Strategy seeks to strike a balance between defence and reassurance. Although Russia is 
not specifically referred to by name, in the following paragraph this is inferred through the term 
‘Arctic partner countries’:  
While the Kingdom’s area in the Arctic is covered by the NATO treaty Article 5 regarding collective 
defence, the enforcement of sovereignty is fundamentally a responsibility of the Realm’s central authorities. 
Enforcement of sovereignty is exercised by the armed forces through a visible presence in the region where 
surveillance is central to the task…. Within the entire spectrum of tasks, the Kingdom attaches great 
importance to confidence building and cooperation with Arctic partner countries (Kingdom of Denmark 
Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020). 
From this approach it is possible to deduct from a Danish perspective “NATO should quietly 
develop contingency plans for future activities in the Arctic without scaring the Russians” 
(Rahbek-Clemmenson 2011). This approach may explain why, in the aftermath of Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, Denmark did not increase its defence spending, nor did it make 
any changes to its armed forces development strategy (Szymański 2018). However, Danish 
defence forces did start to pay more attention to deterrence in the Baltic region, by adapting 
Danish forces to meeting NATO’s new priorities – namely reinforcing collective defence and 
leading to an increase in Denmark’s NATO military presence in the Baltic states (ibid). This 
may be justified as a result of an incident that occurred in March 2014, when a Russian military 
 
77 In 2017 a Greenlandic company, Royal Arctic Line, lost a two-year contract valued at 8.5 million USD, to provide sea-lift 
services to Thule AB. According to company officials, it had submitted an offer that was half as expensive as the winning bid 
obtained by an American company – Schuyler Line. Lars Borris Pedersen, a Royal Arctic Line executive said that his company 




plane that had its transponder switched off came within 100 meters of a Scandinavian Airlines 
passenger jet that had taken off from Copenhagen. A collision was only avoided due to the 
good visibility and the alertness of the passenger plane’s pilots. As Frear et al (2014:2) explain, 
had these two planes collided with a major loss of civilian life comparable to the downing of 
flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, it would have led, at the very least, to a new round of 
Western sanctions on Russia and increased NATO patrolling in the Baltic Sea. However, it 
could also have resulted in further rounds of ‘dangerous brinkmanship’ involving un-logged 
or blind air activity that could threaten civilian lives and require forceful pre-emptive action 
by the West (ibid). 
While Denmark currently sees armed conflict between Russia and NATO as highly unlikely, 
from Copenhagen’s point of view, the Baltic and the Arctic could become a new theatre for 
Russia to test NATO’s credibility and unity. In the Danish Defence Agreement (2018-2023) 
the Danish Ministry of Defence proclaim that “NATO remains the cornerstone of Danish 
defence and security policy” and to this effect pledges its ongoing support for the alliance 
through meeting its responsibilities as a core NATO member. Similar to the previous defence 
agreement, the new document emphases the need to strengthen its presence in the Arctic, 
while at the same time the government draws attention to the Arctic Agreement of December 
2016 which outlines new initiatives such as funds for cleaning up abandoned US military 
installations in Greenland, protection against pollution in waters around Greenland, and to 
improve conscription enrolment (The Danish Government 2018). In its 2018 Foreign and 
Security Policy Strategy, the Danish government reasserts its ‘dual-track approach to Russia’ 
which requires “… on the one hand building a credible capacity to deter and defend against 
unacceptable actions, and on the other hand advocating dialogue when it is in our interests – 
for instance, in relation to maintaining the Arctic as a low-tension area (The Danish 
Government 2018:13).However, in the document, the Danish government also cautions that 
it will be following geo-political developments in the Arctic closely and is wary of a Russian 
Arctic military build-up. Russia has rebuilt six military bases within the Arctic Circle, and it 
is estimated that from those bases, Russian fighter jets will now be able to reach Thule AB in 
Greenland (Gielda 2019). The Danish Defence Intelligence Service has revealed that Russia 
is seeking to rebuilding and expand forward bases on the Russian Arctic Islands as well as 
ongoing preparations for the deployment of tactical fighter aircraft. This has drawn attention 
to Greenland’s vulnerability, not only to physical threats but to cyber-attacks as well. As 
Gielda (2019) explains, current Danish legislation (specifically the NIS Directive) requires 
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the Danish Center of Cyber Security to carry out authorised tasks to protect IT security 
networks and information systems. However, the same directive does not apply to Greenland. 
John Foley, a former Security Officer in the Danish Military of Defence stated that “it is 
deeply worrying that we have such an important area that is neither protected by the NIS 
Directive nor by the Defence Intelligence Service” (Gielda 2019). In December 2019, during 
a side-meeting at the NATO summit in London, Mette Frederiksen, the Danish Prime Minister 
presented the US President Donald Trump with a plan to triple Denmark’s defence spending 
in the Arctic. Denmark, like other NATO members, has been attacked by Trump for not 
meeting its commitment to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. The 
announcement was a result of Danish intelligence warnings of increasing tensions between 
Russia, the US and China in the Arctic that “had a direct and increased significance for the 
Kingdom of Denmark” (McGwin 2019). Fredricksen told Danish media that the money will 
go towards building up Danish capacity to monitor the airspace around Greenland as well as 
detect Russian submarines sailing close to the island. However, Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, an 
academic with the Royal Danish Defence College – also justifies the decision on the grounds 
that “when Americans begin to take an interest in a foreign policy issue, then Denmark 
automatically becomes interested in it too. Because America is Denmark’s most important 
ally”. 
Yet Russia is not the only concern for Denmark as growing Chinese involvement in the Arctic 
has created a new dynamic in Danish-Greenlandic-US relations. One of the first instances of 
this was in 2016, when a Chinese firm expressed interest in buying Grønnedal - a disused naval 
base built by the US military during WWII – located in southern Greenland that had previously 
been up for sale. As McGwin (2019) explains, Denmark changed its mind about selling the 
naval base in order to prevent the Chinese company from buying it, even though the firm had 
permission to mine iron nearby and seemingly sought to utilise the port for transportation 
purposes. The Danish prime minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen was said to have personally 
intervened and asked party leaders to support a plan that involved taking Grønnedal off the 
market and reopening it as a military facility for the Danish navy (Breum 2016). 
As in Canada, Chinese interest in Greenland is primarily focused on mining and exploitation 
of natural resources. China has obtained shares in Greenlandic mining projects as Greenland 
holds a quarter of the world’s rare earth metals. China, which is currently the world’s top 
exporter of rare earth elements (REE) warned back in 2012 that its supplies were diminishing, 
despite quotas to limit exports. Beijing's top officials said in a memo: "After more than 50 years 
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of excessive mining, China's rare earth reserves have kept declining and the years of guaranteed 
rare earth supply have been reducing (Harvey 2012). In 2018, a review of the US National 
Defence Industrial base revealed that 50% of defence contractors depend on rare earth imports 
from China which are used in radar and sonar systems, missile guidance, jet engines and 
armoured vehicles (Soare 2020:5). Jorgen Waever Johansen, a former mining minister of 
Greenland, considers that the U.S. needs to find a way to be less reliant on China. "When you 
are so dependent on natural resources coming from one place then you are making yourself 
more vulnerable than you ought to be" (Northam 2019). The US realises that access to 
Greenland's resources could help break U.S. dependency on China for rare earths (ibid). Yet at 
the same time, Chinese investment has been encouraged by the Greenlandic government as a 
way to strengthen the mining and tourism sectors of the economy with the hope that one day 
the country will become financially and politically independent from Denmark (McGwin 
2017b). Already a Chinese state-owned company named Shenghe Resources has more than a 
12% stake in the Kvanefjeld deposit (Northam 2019, Breum 2016). Situated in the south of 
Greenland near the town of Narsaq, the Kvanefjeld project is one of the largest rare earth 
deposits in the world and the sixth largest deposit of uranium.  
Trump’s sporadic proposal in August 2019 announcing that the US should buy Greenland can 
therefore be better understood as an uncouth geo-political response to the growing competition 
with China for access to Greenland’s REE and strategic infrastructure. However, the Danish 
foreign ministry was quick to respond to the US proposal to buy Greenland by emphasising 
that the decision to sell Greenland was not Denmark’s to make and instead the choice resided 
with the people (Blocher and Gulati 2019). Sara Olsvig, a Greenlandic politician and leader of 
the opposition party stated that  
To talk about buying a whole nation and people, is, I think, extremely imperialistic and should not be 
something that we hear world leaders say in 2019. It shows that we are still living in a world where 
indigenous peoples, or self-governing nations even within states are seen as something that can be bought 
and sold (Simmons-Duffin 2019) 
Although Greenland was granted control of its underground resources in 2009, both the US 
and Denmark have been putting pressure on Greenland to limit Chinese access to mining and 
infrastructure projects (McGwin 2018, Soare 2020:5). Danish lawmakers suggested in 2015 
that Denmark should control export of ore from Kvanefjeld due to concern that the rare earths 
and uranium could be considered strategic materials (McGwin 2018). Nuuk and Copehnhagen 
eventually reached an agreement that would place Kvanefjeld’s uranium exports under Danish 
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oversight to ensure compliance with international laws and prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons (ibid).  
Trump’s offer in 2019 was likely to have been further motivated by events that occurred a year 
earlier when in 2018, a state-owned Chinese company expressed an interest in building three 
new airports in Greenland. Alarmed US Pentagon officials worried that Greenland's aid-
dependent government could struggle to repay a loan for the $555 million project, and after a 
few missed payments, China's government could take control of runways (Hinshaw and Page 
2019).Although Greenland’s self-rule authority decides on most domestic matters, as 
mentioned earlier, foreign and security policy is handled by Copenhagen. However, foreign 
investment in infrastructure projects is something of a grey zone (Matzen and Daly 2018). 
While a greater Chinese presence in Greenland would greatly support China’s economic 
interests in accessing new shipping lanes and resources under the Arctic's retreating ice - the 
Pentagon’s main concern is that the runways could potentially be used by Chinese military 
aircraft to attack nearby Thule AFB, its BMDS and other strategic radar infrastructure 
(ibid).Prior to Chinese interest, the Danish authorities had repeatedly turned down requests to 
lend money for international airports on the island (Hinshaw and Page 2019). However, after 
a meeting between then US secretary of Defence James Mattis and Denmark’s defence minister 
Lars Løkke Rasmussen in 2018, the Danish government rapidly put together a funding package 
of 700 million kroner to finance the upgrading of the Nuuk and Ilulissat airports as well as a 
potential new civilian facility at Qaqortoq (Shi and Lanteigne 2019). In September 2018, the 
Pentagon issued a non-legally binding statement announcing potential investment in 
Greenland. The announcement indicated that the investment would focus on infrastructural 
projects that would have a “dual civil and military benefit” and would “seek to enhance US 
and NATO capabilities in the North Atlantic” (US Embassy Denmark 2018).  
In April 2020, the Greenlandic self-rule government – the Naalakkersuitsut – accepted an 
American investment of 12 million USD with plans to open an Agency for International 
Development office at the new US consulate in Nuuk, the Greenlandic capital. When the deal 
was announced, Carla Sands, the US's ambassador to Denmark, said the deal was designed to 
protect Greenlanders from "malign influence and extortion" from Russia and China (The 
Local.dk 2020).  However, Russia has criticised the US’ aid deal with Greenland as 
“confrontational” and “inappropriate”, while Russia’s Ambassador to Denmark, Vladimir 
Barbin said that US’ shift in policy and rhetoric over Greenland was threatening the peace in 
the Arctic (ibid).  It is telling that the US consulate in Nuuk is to be housed within the building 
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occupied by the Danish Arctic Armed Forces Command (Krog 2020). While this situation 
allegedly allows Denmark “to keep an eye on the activities of the Americans” (ibid), in reality 
US investment in Greenland is decidedly of a military nature and can be summarised by Mc 
Gwin (2018) as serving the purpose of ‘keeping NATO in, China out and Russia at bay’. 
 
8.1.2.2 Iceland 
Any attempt to discern the nature of Iceland’s present and future Arctic strategy is a challenging 
task with respect to security, as discussions centre around the ongoing predicament of Icelandic 
defence provisions. As Iceland has no military of its own, it is dependent on the US vis-à-vis 
NATO to provide for national defence. The United States’ recognition of the growing 
importance of the Arctic and its need to reassure European allies, in addition to Icelandic fears 
of a resurgent Russia in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, has essentially resulted in Iceland 
embarking on foreign policy revisioínism from 2016 onwards. In this section I will demonstrate 
how Iceland’s defence policy altered from a stance of non-militarization and cooperation on a 
wide range of security issues in 2009 - to a parliamentary resolution in 2019 to invest millions 
into the refurbishment of Keflavík for US and NATO troops. However, this requires tracing 
events from 2001 onwards.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the immediate aftermath of the Cold War witnessed a significant 
reduction of fighter planes and US troops serving at Keflavík. In 2001, when the 1996 
understanding78 between the US and Iceland was due to expire, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
used the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 1951 US-Icelandic Defence Agreement79 (see 
Chapter 3) to affirm that the US administration still felt that Keflavík base and other facilities 
in Iceland were needed for the defence of the United States as well as Iceland (p.129). However, 
as Jóhannesson explains “discussions on an extension of the 1996 Agreed Minute and on other 
aspects of the US-Icelandic defence relationship had not reached a conclusion when the events 
of 11 September 2001 occurred” (2004:129).   
 
78The 1996 Agreed Minute was an understanding between the US and Iceland that to last for five years and allowed for a 
minimal force to remain at Keflavík with a minimum of four and maximum of six aircraft serving on a rotational basis 
(Jóhannesson 2004:128).   
79 Although the US-Icelandic 1951 defence treaty remains intact it was amended in 2006 so that the US defence guarantee no 
longer required troops to be permanently situated in the country. Although the US is still responsible for the defence of Iceland 
it has pledged to defend the country with rotational forces (Winger and Petursson 2016).  
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Although American defence planners turned their focus towards combatting terrorism in the 
Middle East while also seeking to maximise the defence of American cities, the Icelandic 
government held onto the expectation that the US would nonetheless uphold its responsibilities 
for the defence of Iceland while at the same time it sought to meet the country’s minimum 
defence requirements to uphold its NATO membership. However, this proved not to be a strong 
enough argument for keeping the base opened when it was no longer perceived to be of strategic 
value to the US. In 2006, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfield ordered the withdrawal 
of all US forces from Iceland, thereby closing Keflavík’s military base (Winger and Petursson 
2016). At the time of the announcement, the base was home to 2,500 servicemembers and 
civilians (Schogol 2006). In June 2006, the US Air Force formally dissolved its command unit 
at Keflavík, and a month later, the 56th Rescue Squadron and 56th Maintenance Unit moved 
from Iceland to England. Yet despite the closure of the base and removal of troops, US 
Assistant Secretary of Defence for Reserve Affairs Thomas Hall, who served as chief 
negotiator during the turnover of US facilities to Iceland, vowed to continue to defend Iceland 
from “any and all threats” after the base closed (Schogol 2006). However, as the last US forces 
left in September 2006, US military outlet Stars and Stripes predicted that “US troops haven’t 
seen the last of Iceland” (ibid). Winger and Petursson (2016) explain that “even as the US 
military’s tenure in Iceland came to an abrupt end the seeds of a potential return were already 
being planted”. Since 2008, Iceland’s air space has been patrolled by NATO allies as part of 
the Icelandic Air Policing operation (Pettersen 2015). Thus, while attempting to appease the 
Icelandic government, the NATO Air Policing Missions also guaranteed that the US and 
NATO would not have to relinquish access to Keflavík and could continue to use the facilities 
on occasion.  
However, Winger and Petursson (2016) recount that in 2006, shortly after the Icelandic 
authorities assumed formal responsibility for all base facilities at Keflavík, a squadron of 
Russian reconnaissance bombers came near Iceland’s airspace. Although the authors 
acknowledge that Russia had not flown military planes that close to Iceland since two singular 
flights in 1999 and 2003, they considered the 2006 ‘intrusion’ by Russian bombers as the 
beginning of a pattern that has continued to this day. However, others such as Corgan (2006) 
recognise that while the appearance of the blackjack bombers conducting a missile firing 
exercise near Iceland’s air defence zone “was a reminder that remnants of a once mighty Soviet 
military arsenal still exist”, it nonetheless represents an isolated incident.  
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Two years later in 2008, (the same year as NATO initiated the Air Policing Missions), the 
Icelandic government established a Defence Agency that operated under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated at 
the time that  
… By establishing the Defense Agency we are taking responsibility for our own defenses and also 
contributing to the security of our neighboring countries in the North Atlantic and our allies in NATO. In 
that way we are fulfilling our duties as an independent sovereign state (Icelandic Review 2008).   
However, a 2009 parliamentary report officially stated the absence of any real military threat 
to Iceland, and in 2011, the organisation was dissolved, possibly due to budgetary issues. The 
staff from the agency were relocated to the newly established Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Although Iceland’s NATO relations remained the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the new Ministry of Internal Affairs was expected to execute civic defence and safety 
projects that were previously the responsibility of the National Commissioner of the Icelandic 
Police, the Coast Guard and the Sea Traffic Guard (Icelandic Review 2010). Árni Thór 
Sigurdsson, chairman of the Althingi parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that it 
was the government’s clear policy not to have the new institution connected with military 
aspects in any way.  
The Icelandic parliament further advocated a non-military stance towards the Arctic region - 
when on March 28, 2011 it passed a resolution stating that  
Iceland is against the remilitarization of the High North [author’s italics] while emphasising the 
importance of increased civilian cooperation with neighbouring countries, both within and outside the 
Arctic, to prevent and respond to civilian and environmental crises. Long term security in the High North 
will depend on close cooperation between all the Arctic states, including both NATO and Non-NATO 
countries and other relevant stakeholders (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Iceland 2017) 
What is starkly apparent in this statement is that Iceland viewed its security as being achieved 
primarily through civilian means. Security issues are defined as one of the twelve principles 
addressed in Iceland’s Arctic policy of 2011 yet in the same paragraph on security it is re-
iterated that Iceland seeks to work against any kind of militarism in the Arctic (Government of 
Iceland 2011). Iceland continues to have no military forces of its own and instead, the country’s 
coast guard fulfils most civic responsibilities while at the same time, they are responsible for 
maintain Keflavík as a military installation (Pettersen 2015). According to Voronkov (2013), 
the Icelandic parliament’s resistance towards Arctic militarization was further emphasised by 
a parliamentary suggestion that a nuclear-free zone should be created in Northern Europe 
declaring that “For the first time ever such an initiative was put forward by a NATO country”. 
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According to Dr David Auserwald (2019) – a professor of security studies at the US National 
War College, another reason for Iceland’s inclusion of the objective aimed at promoting 
multilateral solutions in its 2011 Arctic strategy was to increase cooperation with China. He 
outlines how Chinse investment in Iceland accelerated following the 2008 financial crisis, 
when Iceland was particularly vulnerable economically. In a discussion between Auserwald 
and Icelandic foreign minister Ossur Skarphedinsson – who was in power at the time the 2011 
Arctic strategy was released; Skarphedinsson stated that Chinese investment would help the 
Icelandic economy and could be used as geopolitical leverage with the European Union and 
the US. The same year, a Chinese businessman tried to buy land in northeast Iceland for a golf 
resort. This was viewed favourably at the time since the Icelandic economy was desperately in 
need of an injection of capital. However, Icelandic Prime Minister Ogmundur Jonasson 
rejected the deal because it did not comply with Icelandic law and he also worried about the 
geopolitical implications (Auserwald 2019). Nonetheless, China and Iceland signed a bilateral 
energy accord in 201280 and a free trade agreement the following year (2013) 81.  
However, heightened insecurity in the aftermath of Ukraine led Iceland to radically revise its 
stance on military security. Foreign Minister of Iceland, Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson stated that 
the growing international importance of the Arctic region has increased the Arctic’s connection 
with security developments occurring in other parts of the world (Oskarsson 2014). In April 
2015, a US Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft visited Iceland to 
assess the facilities at Keflavík. The US identified the need for new equipment and upgrades 
to the base and as result the US plans to spend $19 million to renovate Keflavík’s existing 
facilities (Winger and Peetursson 2016). However, at the time, the Navy only expressed an 
interest in short-term deployments since a permanent patrol mission would require long-term 
diplomatic discussions between Icelandic and US officials (ibid). During his visit to Iceland in 
2015 that coincided with the Navy surveillance, US Deputy Secretary of Defence Bob Work 
discussed future operations at Keflavík Air Base with Icelandic officials. He justified the US’ 
return to Keflavík on the basis that “Iceland has become increasingly concerned with the 
Russian activity...the Russians have long done transit flights where they pass close by Iceland, 
 
80 Subsequent Chinese investments in Iceland include a northern light research facility in 2016, an agreement to assist China 
with geothermal expertise in 2018, and a deal between Huawei, the Chinese telecom giant and Icelandic mobile phone 
companies to test 5G technology was signed in February 2019 (Auserwald 2019). 
81 The Iceland-China free trade agreement was signed the same day that Icelandic President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson 
announced the creation of the Arctic Circle conference (see Chapter 6). China’s use of the Arctic Circle meeting has 
accelerated since its 2018 release of its Arctic Policy (ibid). 
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but they’ve recently made serval circumnavigational flights – flying completely around the 
island nation”. Work concluded that as a result, “Iceland is interested in increasing military 
cooperation” (Cavas 2015) 
In September 2016, the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs confirmed that two Russian 
bombers (Tupolev Blackjack Tu-160) flew directly below an Icelandic passenger jet on its way 
from Keflavík International Airport to Stockholm, Sweden. According to the statement, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs has repeatedly criticized and filed reports to Russian authorities 
with regards to the flight of unmarked Russian planes around Iceland due to the dangers this 
can cause to general air traffic (Iceland Monitor 2016). However, Diplomat Alexey Shadskiy 
at the Russian Embassy in Reykjavik believed that the Icelandic media hyped up the story about 
the Russian bombers as a pretext to re-opening a military base in Keflavík. He declared that 
the media was trying to awaken a Russian scare (ibid). By this time however, the Icelandic 
government had already signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’ with the US on 
the 29th of June 2016, in order to “facilitate future cooperation”. Deputy Secretary Bob Work 
and Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs Lilja Alfreðsdóttir agreed to 
retain a resilient defense plan for Iceland, maintain reliable arrangements for timely and effective 
communications in times of emergency, continue senior-level and expert-level bilateral discussions, and 
explore additional options for increased cooperation (US Department of Defense 2016).  
With the signing of the new declaration, the United States ‘reaffirmed’ its 65-year-old 
commitment to the defence of Iceland, while Iceland agreed to continue allowing the United 
States and NATO to use Icelandic facilities in order to reinforce mutual security (ibid). 
However, this monumental decision was made without the consent of the Icelandic people and 
raising apprehension about Icelandic sovereignty. Paul Fontaine (2016), an Icelandic journalist, 
explained how “it was especially troubling that we never got the chance to put this important 
matter to a vote”. To make matters worse, the Icelandic people were not informed of the news 
by either the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, nor any other representative of the Icelandic 
government. Instead, the country learned about the Navy’s plans from local translations of 
coverage from Stars & Stripes, the US’ military media outlet.  
In December 2017, Iceland’s Left-green party formed a new coalition government with the 
Independence party (centre-right) and the Progressive Party (a populist agrarian party). 
Historically, the Left-Greens, which leads Iceland’s new government, have been opposed to 
militarisation in Iceland and have long called for Iceland to withdraw from NATO (Fontaine 
2007). However, the ruling coalition government revoked this political stance and instead 
319 
 
asserted that Iceland will continue to be a NATO member country (ibid). From July 29th to 
August 10th, 2019 NATO held the Icelandic Air Surveillance 2019 military exercise at 
Keflavík, to practice scramble alerts and intercept missions. Moreover, it served a political 
purpose of reminding the Icelandic nation of the importance of a US presence. For instance, a 
US captain from the 480th Fighter Squadron who participated in the exercise emphasized the 
strong levels of cooperation between the US, NATO and Iceland. He stated that this “really 
reflects the common understanding that maintaining NATO fighter aircraft at Keflavík helps 
keep Icelandic airspace safe and secure” (Johnson 2019).  
Yet ongoing Icelandic uncertainty regarding the long-term intentions of the US’ defence 
commitments in Iceland remain. Cold War history has shown that there is a changeable 
relationship between the two states surrounding the use of Keflavík. The United States’ 
unilateral decision to withdraw from Kevlavik in 2006 “once the base had outlived its apparent 
usefulness” will remain in the collective memory of Icelandic leaders and may encourage 
Iceland to diversify its defence arrangements (Winger and Petursson 2016). This may also be 
a result of the growing awareness that the United States will need to increasingly rely on the 
defence capabilities of other Arctic allies and partners can perhaps explain two new defence 
agreements Iceland has signed with the Nordic countries and the UK respectively. In November 
2018, the Icelandic government signed the ‘Nordic Defence Cooperation Vision 2025’ (a 
NORDEFCO agreement) with other Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and 
Iceland with the aim of supplementing and adding to the value of’ existing military 
arrangements with the UN, NATO and the EU even though it has been criticized as being 
superfluous (Fontaine 2018). Then, in March 2019, the foreign secretaries of Iceland and the 
UK signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence and security cooperation 
(gov.uk 2019). To summarise, Iceland’s ongoing security dilemma and its concerns over 
Russian assertiveness in the Arctic in the aftermath of Ukraine has led Iceland to reconfirm 
that its security remains tied to the US and NATO. Yet policy learning from the Cold War and 
the immediate post-Cold War years has taught Iceland to consider a broader, multilateral 
approach to security. As such it is now seeking to reinforce its national defence through 
bilateral and multilateral agreements (the UK, and NORDEFCO) though these agreements are 
mainly serving the purpose of enhancing the long-established US/NATO security guarantees 
rather than provide defence alternatives. However, Iceland’s excessive difficulties during the 
2008-2011 financial crisis also resulted in economic security remaining a key national 
objective. It has also been an influential factor that led Iceland to avail of Chinese economic 
320 
 
investment even though Icelandic government officials remain cautious about China’s 
underlying geopolitical objectives in the Arctic region.   
 
8.1.2.3 Norway 
Norway has been considered one of the most stalwart and vocal adherents of NATO 
considering the organisation to be the cornerstone of Norway’s security strategy (Norwegian 
Ministries 2017:18). However, Norway has also begun engaging in new regional defence 
initiatives as a means of enhancing its security with Nordic partners. In February 2009, 
Thorvald Stoltenberg, Norway’s former foreign minister, proposed stepping up cooperation by 
the five countries of Nordic Europe in the defence sphere. The result was the establishment of 
the Nordic Defence Cooperation – NORDEFCO in 2010 (Voronkov 2013). Close cultural ties, 
policy cohesion and long-standing cooperation between the Nordic countries serves as the 
justification for forming a Nordic cooperative defence institution. Yet, an alternative 
perspective on the establishment of NORDEFCO can be observed through a statement made 
by former Norwegian Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen who urged Norway to take greater 
national responsibility towards the High North because Norway should not expect the alliance 
to come running in the event of a crisis (Rottem 2013:247). This may suggest a lack of 
confidence in NATO, but from a practical standpoint Diesen believes that since NATO 
members do not face a common existential threat anymore, this has weakened the ‘substance 
of the collective security guarantee’. Although some see NORDEFCO as the re-emergence of 
the historic proposal for a Scandinavian Defence Union (SDU) (see Chapter 3), NORDEFCO 
claims it is not the Scandinavian alternative to NATO. Rather it is a mechanism of sharing the 
burden of military defence and equipment amongst Scandinavian states and operates in 
alignment with NATO policies. 
At the same time, Norway’s relations with China were becoming more problematic. In 2010, 
the Oslo committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. Chinese 
authorities blocked bilateral business and trade, much to the despair of Norwegian companies 
(Staalesen 2016). However, despite the six years stalemate, there have been continued contact 
and talks between the two countries on Arctic issues (ibid). Norway worked diligently to repair 
the diplomatic rift and in 2013, the China–Nordic Arctic Research Center was established in 
Shanghai (Kopra 2019). Norway demonstrated its willingness to look past China’s human 
rights abuses in favour of developing new trade and commercial Arctic shipping ventures, 
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particularly in the ports of Tromsø and Kirkenes. In 2017 this paid off with a new free-trade 
deal between the two countries.  For the first and second decade of the 21st century, Norway 
did not explicitly identify China as a military threat in the Arctic, nor did it block China’s 
accession to become an observer of the AC in 2007.  
However, Rob Huebert (2016) emphasises that Norway has been pushing the US and NATO 
for some time to place greater emphasis on common defence in the Arctic, calling for greater 
levels of NATO military activities in the region. This can be traced back to 2009 when Norway 
reoriented its defence strategy towards a greater focus on the north, and relocated its Armed 
Forces Operational Headquarters to Bodo, north of the Arctic Circle. This implies that the 
Norwegian forces consider that any threat to national security will emerge from the north and 
seeks a NATO deterrent against increasing levels of Russian military activity in the BEAR 
(Wilson 2013). In the aftermath of Ukraine, US Deputy Secretary Bob Work visited Oslo as a 
part of a seven-day trip to the European Arctic NATO states in September 2015 to focus on 
“the northern problem” of a resurgent Russia (Cavas 2015). During his time in Norway it was 
likely that Work met with Norwegian officials to discuss the possibility of increasing the 
US/NATO military presence in Norway (ibid). The following year, the Norwegian Military of 
Defence published its new Long-term defence plan: Capable and Sustainable. The document 
outlines that the international security situation has deteriorated, and Norway must therefore 
address the current and future challenges in four ways; First, Norway seeks to strengthening its 
national defence through investment in the military and improve readiness levels. It also aims 
to increase the NATO allied military presence in Norway through more frequent exercises and 
training. This ties in with the second and third objectives to “strengthen NATO’s ability for 
collective defence”, and “contribute to international crisis management” respectively. Fourth, 
Norway seeks to further develop the “Total defence concept” which it defines as the “mutual 
support and cooperation between the Armed Forces and civilian authorities” (Regjeringen.no 
2016:10).  
In 2017, when Norway released its new Arctic Strategy, it explicitly referred to the Long-Term 
Defence Plan and increasing Russian military activity in the High North;  
Over the last ten years, Russian military activity in the north has increased. This increase in activity is not 
considered to be targeted at Norway, but it is nevertheless an important factor in Norway’s security and 
defence policy. The role played by the Norwegian Armed Forces in exercising sovereignty and authority 
and providing situational awareness in the north is an important element of the Government’s overall Arctic 
policy. The Long-term Defence Plan emphasizes the need for the Norwegian Armed Forces to be able to 
operate together with Allied forces in the north (Norwegian Ministries 2017:18).  
322 
 
While the Norwegian strategy states that Russian military activity in the Arctic is not 
considered to be targeted at Norway there is nonetheless a strong emphasis on building up 
forces and operating with NATO allies. The same year, the US revealed a new military 
investment in Norway – the presence of two Marine Corps companies – which although 
stationed below the Arctic, are nonetheless in proximity to the Norwegian-Russian border, 
therefore making their presence strategically notable (Rodman 2019). In an interview with 
Russian news agency Tass in June 2018, Alexander Grushko explicitly expressed his 
disapproval regarding the increase of US military presence in Norway.  
We have commented more than once on the expansion of foreign military presence in Norway. We 
believe that these actions contradict Norway's policy of non-deployment of foreign military bases in 
peacetime and the traditions of neighbourliness. These actions may increase tensions and destabilize the 
situation in the northern region. We view them as an element of US-led military preparations, which 
have become more active against the backdrop of anti-Russian propaganda hysteria. 
 
While the US troops may have been requested by Norway as a way of deterring against a 
Russian build-up of troops and increasing military activity near the Norwegian border, it is also 
likely to have been endorsed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (who is Norwegian) 
as a way of reaffirming NATO’s commitment to its Norwegian ally. In a 2018 Foreign Policy 
interview Jens Stoltenberg clearly stated that “NATO is in the Arctic”, explaining that because  
We see increased tensions in the North, but we have to continue to strive for lowering the tensions and 
build cooperation we have developed with Russia over decades. Even during the Cold War, we saw 
cooperation between NATO allies and the Soviet Union up in the north. So we have to be present, but in a 
proportionate, defensive way (Jens Stoltenberg NATO Secretary-General, 2018). 
The problem with Stoltenberg’s assessment is that he has not clearly explained how NATO has 
contributed to lowering tensions or developing cooperation with Russia in the Arctic since the 
end of the Cold War – particularly since the NATO-Russian Council (NRC) was suspended in 
the aftermath of the Georgian conflict in 2008 and again after Ukraine in 2014 for two years. 
Even though the NRC resumed in 2016, NATO defence cooperation with Russia is still kept 
to a minimum. At the same time, it will be shown through an assessment of NATO and Russian 
military exercises in the BEAR that an increased NATO presence has not lowered tensions in 
the Arctic but rather has served to increased them.  
The Svalbard archipelago is a good example here since it is a particularly controversial topic 
in Norwegian-Russian relations. Tensions over Svalbard have risen between the two countries 
in the past few years. As the Svalbard Treaty marked its 100-year anniversary on the 9th 
February 2020, Norway aims to strengthen its sovereignty over the island archipelago. As 
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Zimmerman (2018:113-114) clarifies, Norwegian attempts to exercise sovereignty over 
Svalbard has been met with strong objections from Russia because the Svalbard Archipelago, 
including Bear Island, sits just to the west of the Northern fleet’s home port in Murmansk. The 
islands act as a bottleneck with the north cape of Norway which Russian surface vessels and 
submarines must pass through to proceed into the North Atlantic. This explains why Russia 
protests so stringently to the mere potential military use of Svalbard by NATO (ibid). However, 
Russia has demonstrated that at times it is willing to push the treaty to its limits. In 2015, 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin made a stop-over at Svalbard on his way to Camp 
Barneo, an annual Russian temporary base on the sea-ice near the North Pole. The visit created 
an outcry from Norway as Rogozin is on the EU’s and Norway’s sanction list and is 
consequently barred entry to Norwegian territory because of his involvement in the Ukrainian 
conflict. However, since Svalbard is a visa-free zone, Moscow protested Norway’s attempt to 
restrict any citizens undisputed right to visit the archipelago (Nilsen 2017). While Rogozin’s 
visit to Svalbard did not violate the treaty in and of itself, it may have been the catalyst for 
subsequent Russian actions – namely in 2016, when Chechen special forces used Longyearbyn 
airport for transportation of personnel and equipment for an airborne drill near Camp Barneo. 
In adherence with the Svalbard Treaty of 192082, the Norwegian government white paper on 
Svalbard stipulates that “all foreign military activity in Svalbard is prohibited and would entail 
a gross infringement of sovereignty” (ibid).  
However, NATO has also pushed the limits of the Treaty by utilising Svalbard as a location 
for NATO Parliamentary Assembly meetings – first in 2012, and then in May 2017 (Nilsen 
2017). Although the 2017 meeting focused on environmental security and economic prospects 
as a result of climate change in the High North, Moscow nonetheless viewed this meeting as a 
provocation against Russia and protested that the meeting went against the spirit of the 
Svalbard Treaty (ibid). The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement of protestation in April 
2017, prior to the NATO Assembly meeting on Svalbard; 
Russia operates based on the premise that all the states that are party to the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920 
should be interested in ensuring that Spitsbergen remains an archipelago of peace and neighbourliness. In 
the context of NATO's current policy of ‘containing’ Russia, accompanied by unprecedented military 
preparations near the borders of our country, the attempts to bring Spitsbergen under the wing of this 
military-political bloc, and to hold its meetings there are at odds with the spirit of the 1920 Treaty. We 
consider this to be a provocative policy (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2017a). 
 





While there are proponents such as Zimmerman (2018) who argue for a stronger NATO 
presence in the Arctic and particularly for the development of a rapid response force designed 
specifically to deter potential Russian military aggression on Svalbard, pre-emptive NATO 
militarism near the Svalbard archipelago is likely to deteriorate rather than enhance security in 
the BEAR and lead to a rapid Russian response.  
Yet despite the abovementioned problems, Norway does not believe that changing the security 
order in the Arctic through developing a new cooperative framework is the solution. During 
the Arctic Frontiers 2020 conference held annually in Tromsø in the Norwegian Arctic, 
Norway’s Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide reiterated Norway’s support for NATO and 
the status quo. Søreide stated that “We cannot give up the structures of cooperation that are 
actually working today, and what we do know from international politics nowadays is that if 
something is working then please do not try to revise it or put it on the table of negotiations” 
(Staalesen 2020a).  
This is a stark indicator that the Norwegian government still views the current NATO-based 
Arctic security order as essential and non-negotiable for change. Yet Søreide’s statement relies 
on the assumption that most of the tension and problems in the region are caused by Russia, 
while NATO functions to deter this. However, in its annual ‘Focus’ report for 2020, the 
Norwegian Intelligence Service identifies both Russia and China as having “the strongest 
impact on the threat environment facing Norway and Norwegian interests” (Forsvaret.no 
2020:9). As such, I contend that Søreide’s endorsement of the status quo is a very short-sighted 
approach to security given that the Arctic has evolved to include a far greater number of state 
and non-state security actors, while at the same time there is a lack of reflection concerning the 
deficits of NATO – both as an institutional structure and its contentious role in the Arctic. 
Harkening back to Cold War times, in June 2020, NATO decided to berth US nuclear powered 
submarines in Tromsø harbour and another at Grøtsund after the Russian military conducted a 
naval exercise in the Barents Sea (see table 8.5) earlier in the same month (Berglund 2020). To 
conclude, Norway must now contend not only with an increased NATO presence but the 
increased risk of retaliation that nuclear deterrence brings to the BEAR - particularly to 
northern cities and densely populated areas such as Tromsø.  Norway’s insecurity vis-à-vis 
Russia and its continual support of NATO and the status-quo has also had a knock-on-effect in 
the decision-making of Sweden and Finland. This is because these states have increasingly 
looked to Norway in the post-Cold War era for security leadership in the Nordic area vis-à-vis 
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NORDEFCO – an arrangement that has served as a mechanism to bind the formerly neutral 
states closer to NATO.       
 
8.1.2.4 Non-NATO members – Sweden and Finland 
Both Sweden and Finland have arguably been at a crossroads with regards to their security 
policy since the end of the Cold War and their accession to the EU in 1995. Brommessson 
(2016:4) considers there are two options available: to seek NATO membership or to engage 
within various bilateral and multilateral forums of cooperation, where Swedish-Finnish 
cooperation has a special role. Sweden was the last Arctic state to issue an Arctic Strategy in 
2011, releasing Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic region just before taking over the Arctic 
Chairmanship. The Swedish strategy states that “The current security policy challenges in the 
Arctic are not of a military nature (Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic region 2011:14). In the 
post-Cold War years, Sweden dramatically cut its manpower by almost 90% and this has led 
to serious concerns by the Swedish military that it would not be able to defend itself in case of 
an attack.   
However, it outlines a greater focus on Nordic defence with an increased role for Sweden under 
a Norwegian-led Scandinavian collective security forum, notably the Nordic Defence 
Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and the EU. Sweden outlines its security policy in the Arctic in its 
Arctic strategy stating that 
Europe is today characterised by mutual dependence. Furthermore, Sweden’s security policy position based 
on “security in cooperation” means that the security policies of the EU Member States and Nordic countries 
will strongly influence Swedish security policy. The recently adopted Nordic Declaration of Solidarity, 
reinforcing and enhancing the solidarity declaration adopted in 2009, has led to Sweden’s security policy 
becoming even more closely interwoven with the political priorities of the other Nordic countries. Sweden’s 
unilateral declaration of solidarity and a stronger Nordic declaration of solidarity may hence involve new 
areas of responsibility and higher expectations for action as far as Sweden is concerned. (Sweden’s Strategy 
for the Arctic Region, 2011:.15).   
At the Munich Security Conference in February 2017, during a panel on ‘Arctic Security’, 
Swedish Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist referred to Nordic cooperation as a method for 
responding to Russian militarization (Government offices of Sweden 2017). All four 
NORDEFCO countries admit that the closer cooperation has been spurred on by Russia, as 
well as a desire by non-aligned Sweden and Finland to stay close to NATO without full 
membership (Mc Gwin 2019). While Sweden has neither an Arctic coastline or a land border 
with Russia, it is concerned about its strategically located islands in the Baltic Sea, particularly 
the island of Gotland, which gained the same demilitarized status as the Finnish Åland islands 
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in 2005 as the threat from Russia was considered to have diminished (Møller 2019:239). 
However, both countries still recognise the need to collaborate with Russia, particularly on 
Arctic issues.  
Finland has continued to successfully pursue its policy of Finlandization and ‘good relations’ 
with Russia, which it began during the Cold War. According to Michael Byers (2015) this 
means in practice maintaining mutually beneficial links of cooperation between Finland and 
Russia through trade and mutual trust, while maintaining a high level of military deterrence. 
Finland has a population of about 5.5million with mandatory military service for men within 
its 320,000-strong reserve army (ibid). In 2013, Finland published its Strategy for the Arctic 
region which outlines how Finland seeks to engage Russia in bi-lateral partnership 
opportunities: for example, the document refers to an Arctic partnership launched by the 
Heads of State in 2010 to intensify cooperation between Finland and Russia (Prime Minister’s 
Office Publications, Finland 2013:46). Furthermore, the Strategy recognises that  
While the sovereignty of the States must be respected, it should not discourage genuine recognition of 
mutual dependencies. All efforts should be made to build up mutual trust and the most efficient tool in 
achieving this goal is transparency (p.43). 
In the aftermath of Ukraine, Sweden and Finland signed a military agreement in May 2014 to 
strengthen joint defence resources83. The US DoD also signed bilateral Statements of Intent 
with Sweden and Finland in 2016. The aim of this agreement (in the words of the DoD) was 
to “promote security in the Baltic Sea region by reinforcing transatlantic linkages, 
strengthening stability in northern Europe, and building interoperability between the United 
States and two of its most capable and likeminded partners” (Trilateral statement of Intent 
2018).  
In 2016, Finland updated of its Arctic strategy to correspond to its accession to the AC 
Chairmanship. Under the aim of strengthening security policy and stability in the Arctic, 
Finland aimed to promote the interests of indigenous peoples as a priority issue and has 
emphasised the importance of creating greater synergy between Arctic and Nordic issues of 
concern. At the same time Finland emphasised its support for EU’s efforts to consolidate its 
Arctic policy (Prime Minister’s Office Finland 2016). In contrast to Norway and Sweden, 
Finland has adopted a soft-politics approach to security in the Arctic, and there is not a single 
 
83 Sweden and Finland's defence ministers, Karin Enström and Carl Haglund, signed the deal in Helsinki in May 2014 (Gee 
2014). Both Enström and Haglund said the deal would shore up the two nations' ability to deal with "crisis management" since 
the plan will enable both armed forces to have access to each other's military bases (ibid). 
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reference to NATO or Finnish EOP or PfP membership throughout the entire text of its 2013 
Arctic Strategy. While neither Sweden or Finland currently hold full NATO membership, both 
are involved in NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners (EOP’s) program, meaning that they 
are more involved in NATO decision-making processes by participating in earlier and higher 
levels of political consultations84. Another NATO partnership program that these two states 
are involved in is the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, that aims to build bi-lateral 
relations between states from the former Soviet bloc (including Russia) and the West. In the 
Warsaw Communique, these two states were invited to join NATO leaders at the top table at 
NATO’s summit dinner including then US President Barak Obama and NATO secretary –
General Jens Stoltenberg. Noting both countries’ location on the Baltic Sea, Stoltenberg stated 
that ‘we are inviting Finland and Sweden because they are really close friends of NATO’ 
(Baczynska 2016). Although Paragraph 23 of the NATO Warsaw Communique explicitly 
refers to Sweden and Finland as security partners with whom NATO engages with, NATO 
has not explicitly given any guarantees that it will defend these countries based on their EOP 
status should there be a need to do so.  
The matter of Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO is something that comes up regularly 
in the two countries — and results in a prompt warning from Moscow of the consequences of 
either country seeking outright membership (Mc Gwin 2019). An official Swedish inquiry on 
NATO membership in 2016 concluded that NATO would most likely welcome Sweden as a 
member of the Alliance, and the accession process could be compressed to take about a year 
(Wieslander 2018). In 2017, Putin said that “If Sweden joins NATO this will affect our 
relations in a negative way because we will consider that the infrastructure of the military bloc 
now approaches us from the Swedish side.” He also added that “We will interpret that as an 
additional threat for Russia and we will think about how to eliminate this threat.” However, he 
dismissed the possibility of military action against Sweden, saying it would represent a 
“hysterical” reaction that the Kremlin would never take.  
There have been several incursions in recent years where Russian aircraft have breached 
Swedish and Finnish airspace. There was also an incident in 2014 when Sweden launched a 
massive hunt for a foreign submarine in the Stockholm archipelago over a seven-day period 
 
84 NATO has five EOPs in total. Australia, Georgia, and Jordan are the three other partner countries in addition to Sweden and 




(Milne 2014). While news reports and the general public implied that it was likely to be a 
Russian vessel, the Swedish government declined to comment on the nationality of the 
submarine. Nonetheless, Rear Admiral Grenstad said it was “probable” there had been at least 
one mini submarine in Swedish waters, adding that it was “completely unacceptable”. 
Although Russia issued denials and attempted to ridicule Swedish concerns, the Swedish 
Supreme Commander General Sverker Göranson underlined that Sweden was ready to use 
“armed force” to bring the vessel to the surface if necessary (Frear et al 2014:3). The hunt 
ended unsuccessfully on the 24th of October 2014, yet it nonetheless cost about SKr20m 
($2.8m). Critical voices argued that it was a ploy to increase Swedish defence spending and 
raise public approval ratings for NATO membership, since after the incident, the Swedish 
centre-left government unveiled a modest proposal to boost defence spending. Some maritime 
experts said that historically it has proven almost impossible to successfully hunt down a 
submarine and pointed to the challenges of doing so in an archipelago where sonar readings 
are difficult to understand (Milne 2014). However, the fact that Sweden attempted to do so 
demonstrates its ongoing insecurity vis-à-vis Russia and more importantly had the submarine 
been found and force used by Swedish authorities, this may have resulted in casualties and a 
further Russian military response (Frear et al 2014:3). 
Finland in contrast, has traditionally taken a more conciliatory approach towards Russia based 
on dialogue and détente. This can be observed with respect to the Finnish response to Russian 
military flights breaching their air space. During a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to 
Finland in July 2016, Putin agreed to the Finnish proposal that Russia should use transponders 
on aircraft flying in the Baltic Sea region. The Finnish proposal that both Russian and NATO 
planes should fly with transponders in the Baltic Sea region was suggested as a way of 
improving air safety. The use of transponders would ensure that flights could be monitored and 
would also help to prevent breaches of national airspace. Putin conceded to put the issue on the 
agenda of a meeting in Brussels between NATO and Russia which duly happened.  However, 
NATO rejected the proposal on the grounds that not all Russian planes had transponder devises, 
while some NATO member states including Norway and the US “occasionally operate without 
transponders while flying national reconnaissance or surveillance missions” (Barnes 2016). 
The unwillingness of NATO to accept this proposal and others to improve security in the 
Barents-Euro-Arctic region demonstrates the inherent contradictions within the Alliance’s 
dealings with Russia.  
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Should both Sweden and Finland seek NATO membership simultaneously, it would bring 
NATO another step closer to absorbing the entire European Continent into the transatlantic 
security community. The key point is that enlargement to the north would result in NATO 
having greater strategic influence in Arctic security. Several of the pro-NATO narratives 
invoke the Warsaw communique’s call for closer partnership and cooperation between with 
Sweden and Finland as a sign that a NATO Arctic Strategy should include a cooperative 
framework for Sweden and Finland to enhance their connection to NATO towards future 
membership (Stavridis 2015, Armstrong and Ulrick 2017, Huebert 2017).  The argument 
behind such a proposal is that Swedish and Finnish NATO membership would strengthening 
the effort to counter Russia’s Arctic regional build-up (Armstrong and Ulrick 2017). This 
would provide NATO with a stronger justification for developing an Arctic strategy on the 
grounds that Swedish and Finnish accession to the Alliance would create new obligations for 
NATO in the region, not just in the Baltic Sea but also along the Finnish-Russian border that 
stretches into Lapland in the Finnish Arctic.  
Sweden is a significant air power and according to a RAND report, the air-to-air relationship 
will remain an important point of contact in the bilateral relationship between Sweden and the 
US. However, Swedish NATO membership would also imply greater access to the Baltic Sea 
area. Domisse (2016:3) explains that currently;  
The setup of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems (i.e. air defence systems and anti-ship missiles) in 
Kaliningrad restricts NATO’s access to the strategically important Baltic Sea region, impeding the defence 
of the three Baltic states in the event of an attack. Should Sweden become a NATO member, Swedish 
airspace could be used automatically, i.e. without any prior approval of the government, to reinforce the 
Baltic allies. A further interesting option is to create an air force base on the Swedish island of Gotland, off 
the southern coast of Sweden. NATO could thus strengthen its position throughout the Baltic Sea region. 
Finland could also provide critical information about Russian activities in the region.   
 
Similarly, a 2016 report commissioned by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland on ‘The 
Effects of Finland’s Possible NATO Membership’, stipulates that Finland would be able to 
provide NATO with a comparative advantage with respect to intelligence on Russian 
activities, cyber defence, and so-called hybrid or ambiguous warfare; tactics that “Finland has 
particular expertise in due to the traditional Finnish concept of comprehensive security which 
aims to increase the resilience of the whole of society” (Bergquist et al 2016:43).  
While there are pro-NATO advocates in both countries that want these two states to obtain 
membership in order to fully participate in the alliance’s decision-making structures and 
contingency planning, there are also opposing national opinions in Sweden and Finland that 
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consider current ties with NATO as already being too strong (Baczynska 2016). In a survey of 
1000 Swedes carried out by Swedish pollsters Sifo for newspaper Svenska Dagbladet in June 
2016, 49 percent said they did not want Sweden to join NATO, 33 percent said yes, and 18 said 
they were undecided (TheLocal.se 2016). Similarly, a February 2017 poll in Finland found that 
51 percent of respondents opposed joining the military alliance while just 21 percent were in 
favour of NATO membership. A further 28 percent of respondents were undecided. While 
some 38 percent of respondents said they would apply to join NATO if Sweden did, 44 percent 
of those who answered were opponents of allying with the US-led bloc even if Finland's 
western neighbour joined (yle.fi 2017). Interestingly, the Swedish Defence Minister Peter 
Hultqvist stated at the time that  
Whatever will happen, the countries around the Baltic Sea need to keep together, to be tighter. But the 
solution for us isn’t NATO membership. We have our geographic position and our own history, as does 
Finland (Milne 2016) 
However, non-NATO membership did not prevent Sweden from hosting the Aurora 17 MME 
in September 2017 with the biggest contingent of foreign troops coming from the United 
States. Although Aurora-17 did not take place in the Swedish Arctic it was significant as it 
was the largest military exercise conducted in Sweden since the early 1990s. Winnerstig 
(2017) explains that 
the simple fact of the exercise itself also constitutes evidence of the dramatic turn in Swedish security policy 
that has taken place during the last years. Only five to ten years ago, an exercise of this kind would have 
been absolutely unthinkable in Sweden, as it would have been seen as undermining the credibility of 
Sweden’s non-aligned policy. 
 
Aurora 17 also represented the first time that a major military exercise held in Sweden 
anticipated a scenario that relied on foreign military assistance. The exercise (see table 8.1) 
arguably served both a strategic and political purpose – to test Swedish defence force 
capabilities against a larger opponent and increase public approval towards the US and NATO 
by favourably influencing the internal Swedish debate – towards an acceptance of US and 
foreign troops on Swedish territory. It also gives a clear sign to Russia that Sweden’s foreign 
and security policy is clearly and implicitly aligned with the West. The following year, in 
2018, both Sweden and Finland signed a trilateral Statement of Intent with the United States 
to enhance the bilateral defence relationships between the US’ DoD and the two countries 
Ministries of Defence. When asked by a Swedish reporter what the US would get out of the 
agreement, US Secretary of State James Mattis spoke in vague terms about the need for 
democracies to stick together to respect human rights, territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
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temper any aggressive designs by neighbouring states. Swedish Defence Minister Peter 
Hultqvist stated more simply that Sweden was striving for peace and ‘long term stability’ in 
the area (Svergie Radio 2018). While the agreement is not legally binding and does not amount 
to a Treaty between the three countries, in practice it will result in closer bilateral cooperation 
with the US and more military exercises. Other objectives include developing interoperability 
at the policy and military levels, and greater levels of information sharing on situational 
awareness in the Baltic Sea region. Trident Juncture 2018 (TRJE-18), the biggest NATO 
exercise in decades which partially took place in the BEAR (see section 8.2.1), witnessed both 
Sweden and Finland participating as partner states. 600 Finnish troops took part in TRJE-18, 
while the city of Rovaniemi in Finnish Lapland hosted a major military exercise as part of 
TJ18. Commander of the Lapland Air Command, Col. Antti Koskela commented that “It is 
to Finland’s advantage to take part and see how NATO operates in a crisis situation. It is also 
NATO’s advantage to see how military non-aligned countries Finland and Sweden operate” 
(Yle 2018). However, Russia is greatly concerned about the growing participation of the two 
NATO partner countries in NATO MMEs. In a comment from the Russian Foreign Ministry, 
press spokeswoman Maria Zakharova says that the decision made by Finland and Sweden to 
participate in TRJE-18 “does not lead to a strengthening of stability and security in northern 
Europe, nor in the European continent as such” (Staalesen 2018). 
However, Antii Kaikkonen, Finnish Minister of Defence, spoke in Washington D.C. in 
December 2019, about how the changing international security environment and emerging 
great power competition demands greater European-US cooperation. He also outlined 
Finland’s perceived role in Arctic regional defence; 
…I would like to emphasize that when we are dealing with defense issues we need to integrate both 
continuity and change into our perspective. The main task of the Finnish defense forces in the 2020s and 
2030s will be the military defense of Finland. Still, we, too, must adapt to the change in security 
environment and changes in the character of war. During the last 100 years, there has always been a 
transatlantic response to any significant security threat. We, Europeans and the United States, must continue 
to cooperate. The emerging great-power competitions and changing character of war demand it. …. yes, 
there has been more and more activity in the Arctic region, and we are following very carefully what 
happens there. For example, there has just been a very – quite big Russian military exercise in the Arctic 
region. Of course, we are following everything what happens in the region. And, well, I’d say Finnish 
defense forces and Finnish defense – I’d say we don’t have some special Arctic capability because we are, 
in the whole, an Arctic nation, and everything is actually Arctic capability. So, it is easy to work in these 
conditions for us. We have very good knowledge of this region and special details, how to work in the 
region (CSIS 2019). 
As an endorsement for the increased cooperation with the United States, Finland hosted a 
military exercise named Bold Quest that was held in central Lapland in 2019. Created by the 
US Army in 2003 as an annual exercise, Bold Quest 2019 represented the third time the exercise 
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was held outside the US and involved over 2,000 soldiers as well as heavy military equipment 
from 14 countries (The Warsaw Institute 2019).  The fact that US planners chose Finland for 
the location of the exercise sends a clear message to Russia that the US is now taking a greater 
interest in Finland and seeks to participate in the defence of the Finnish-Russian border region. 
Such an occurrence also demonstrates that times have considerably changed since the Cold 
War era when Finland was detached from Western military assistance due to the Friendship 
and Mutual Assistance pact it signed with the Soviet Union (see Chapter 3 and 4).  
To conclude, it appears that both Sweden and Finland are seeking to openly engage with the 
US on a bilateral and trilateral basis as a feasible ‘work around’ to full NATO membership. As 
a result, in the 21st century it stands to reason that neither country can proclaim to still be neutral 
in the traditional meaning of the word - since both countries have made their allegiance to the 
US and the West clear. Although they may continue to proclaim their neutrality as part of their 
political identity and foreign policy, the fact that these states have hosted US-endorsed MMEs 
demonstrates that a political shift is occurring in these countries that is gradually altering the 
concept of neutrality in both countries. While a NATO exercise would have raised alarm and 
evoked political and public outrage, it appears that US-endorsed exercises have politically 
caused less friction. To summarise, it is evident that the traditional ‘Nordic Balance’ that helped 
to sustain peace in the BEAR during the Cold War no longer exists. Instead, both states take 
part in NATO-led exercises through the EOP and PfP programs, are members of NORDEFCO 
and the EU, and have implicitly pursued Western security guarantees as a deterrence against 
Russia in the Arctic and Baltic Sea regions.  
 
8.2 Reviewing MMEs in and near the BEAR – a security necessity or an 
ongoing source of agitation in NATO-Russian relations?  
Having compiled a list of large-scale MMEs that have taken place in or near the Barents Euro 
Arctic Region (BEAR) I organise the exercises into seven categories.  
A – NATO-endorsed MMEs held fully or partially within the BEAR 
B – NATO-endorsed MMEs hosted by an Arctic state but not located within the BEAR 
C – An MME hosted by an Arctic state that is fully or partially located within the BEAR 
D – An MME hosted by an Arctic state not located within the BEAR   
E – US-endorsed MMEs hosted by an Arctic state that may or may not be held in the BEAR 
F – Russian led military exercise held fully or partially in the BEAR 




When engaging in a discussion on military exercises held in or near the BEAR it is important 
to outline that not all multinational military exercises (MMEs) are led by NATO or Russia – 
there are cases where national exercises are hosted by Arctic states (that can be either NATO 
or non-NATO Arctic countries) which invite overseas troops from other allied states (category 
B and C exercises). Participating states may be NATO allies (e.g. Norway, Denmark and 
Canada) or in the case of Sweden and Finland, NATO partner countries. Previously, in section 
8.1.2.4., I referred to one category E exercise - Bold Quest 2019 that was a US-endorsed 
exercise hosted by Finland. When analysing MMEs conducted by NATO and non-NATO 
states (excluding Russia) it can be seen from Table 8.2 that category A exercises (NATO led 
MMEs held within the BEAR_ – remain the predominant type of MME, while category D 
exercises (NATO MMEs hosted in an Arctic state but not located within the BEAR) – appear 
to be very much in the minority (i.e. Noble Ledger 2015, Dynamic Mongoose 2020). This 
demonstrates that the BEAR holds an enduring interest to military planners from NATO, 
Russia and the Scandinavian states.  
With regards to the two categories pertaining to Russian military exercises (category F and 
G), in Table I have simplified Russian-led exercises on the basis of those that are held within 
the BEAR (category F) and those that are held in other parts of the Russian Arctic, e.g. the Far 
East (category G). Again, there is an underlying trend that is in evidence – namely that Russian 
Arctic military exercises are primarily conducted in Russian territory or international waters 
adjacent the north-western military district – home of Russia’s Northern Fleet.   
In the next section (8.2.1), I will focus primarily on NATO-led exercises (category A) and 
examine the impact that MMEs have had on Arctic security over the duration of 14 years. This 
corresponds to the time span from 2006 with the beginning of the long-standing NATO Arctic 
military exercise Cold Response (CR), which continues up to the present day (2020).  While it 
is not possible to discuss each exercise in detail, I will refer to specific exercises as they serve 
the purpose of outlining that there is both a political and military dimension to MME planning 
and objectives. I argue that while the military or strategic goals may be relatively 
straightforward, the political agenda behind NATO MMEs, (which also include normative 
elements) are less frequently analysed. By discussing two exercises prior to Ukraine (I focus 
on Loyal Arrow 2009 and CR-10) I demonstrate that exercise scenarios can reveal significant 
insights into the security perceptions of NATO planners while also producing unanticipated 
problems. I then turn my attention to investigating the changes in size and increased frequency 
of NATO Arctic MMEs in the aftermath of the Ukrainian conflict, referring to several exercises 
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that took place in 2015 in the BEAR (Joint Viking, Arctic Challenge and Dynamic Mongoose) 
- of which the first two resulted in an instant response from Russia. Following from this I 
discuss NATO’s Trident Juncture 2018 (TJ-18) exercise - the largest NATO MME since 2002 
– and assess that Russia staged subsequent military exercises, both conventional and nuclear, in 
response.  
 




8.2.1 NATO military exercises in the BEAR - Category A Exercises 
Since its inception in 2006, Cold Response (CR) has been organised eight times (2006, 2007, 
2009, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2020). Although originally designed as an annual exercise, 
Cold Response began to involve increasingly larger number of troops and participant states – 
and as a result the organisers decided to hold it every two years from 2012 onwards. Officially, 
the Norwegian Armed Forces describe CR as a multinational crisis response military exercise 
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that focuses on cold weather amphibious operations, interoperability of expeditionary forces, 
and special and conventional groups operations. (see table 7.1).   
However, there are many additional dimensions to military exercises other than training. As 
Heusner and Simpson (2017:20) explain, “even training in and of itself has multiple purposes 
and is not simply about exercising the core military skills of one’s own troops”. Lieutenant 
Colonel Ivar Moen, a Senior Spokesperson at the Joint Operation Headquarters in Norway 
concurs stating that a significant purpose behind CR is to ensure that allies also have winter 
competences to ensure that NATO allies in addition to Norway can form a credible defence in 
a crisis situation (Danilov 2020). 
Frazier and Hutto (2017:379) add to this, by explaining that MMEs also work as tools to shape 
the shared beliefs of allies and partners. Similar to English School concepts of state 
socialization, the authors suggest that the use of MEEs for doctrine development socializes 
states in terms of identifying common threats and subsequently sharing a process by which to 
address them. While sounding positive, this process of socialisation through the NATO 
collective defence alliance can also have negative consequences on the security order because 
the alliance must have a rationale continuing to exist and for binding members together, in 
other words there must be a common external threat – an enemy ‘other’ (see section 2.3.1 in 
Chapter 2). The authors further elaborate on this point by stating that “Over time the shifting 
interests of partners through regularized interaction spurred by MEEs may create space for 
alterations in state identities and deepen military socialization, specifically through changed 
threat perceptions” (Frazier and Hutto 2017:388). In section 8.1.3. I showed how Sweden and 
Finland have moved away from their traditional state identity of neutrality in the post-Cold 
War era in favour of closer ties with NATO, a decision which could have serious implications 
for Arctic security. At the same time, Norway, with the assistance of US troops under the 
auspices of NATO - have also increased their Arctic military presence – gradually since 2006 
and then more suddenly after 2014. This in turn has elicited responses from Russia and greater 
militarisation of the BEAR – thus creating a situation that seems to confirm NATO’s threat 
perception of Russia in the Arctic, while dismissing that NATO threat perceptions of Russia 
and NATO-led MEEs in the BEAR could also have also contributed to the self-realisation of 
the present-day security environment.     
Furthermore, I argue here that poor planning procedures associated with NATO MMEs in the 
Arctic in years past have led to political protests by northern indigenous peoples and ethnic 
minorities. Heusner and Simpson (2017:20) explain that there is often a lack of political 
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sensitivity in the design of exercises and in the conduct of troops. While exercise planners seek 
to make the scenario realistic and mirror political realities as much as possible, designing such 
scenarios require walking a fine line between attaining a degree of realism while at the same 
time evading political scrutiny. For instance, planners must avoid implicating a particular state 
or people as an enemy as this could raise political objections and increase security tensions - 
even when disguised as a fictitious country or nation. In the context of Arctic MMEs this 
applies not just to preventing tensions between the West and Russia, but also within the host 
nation. A clear example of this can be seen through an analysis of the poorly devised fictional 
scenario created by NATO for the Swedish-hosted exercise Loyal Arrow which took place in 
northern Sweden in 2009 (see table 8.1).     
The exercise scenario for Loyal Arrow centred on a fictitious situation in which the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) was deployed to a theatre of operations called ‘Lapistan’ a “non-
democratic revolutionary nation with hard-core rulers and training camps for terrorists” 
(Ohlsson 2009). The exercise’s scenario centred over a conflict over oil and natural gas with 
Bothnia, a fictitious neighboring NATO country, with some presence of nearby neutral 
fictitious countries Nordistan and Suomia, who refer to Norway and Finland, respectively 
(Rozoff 2012). 
The Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet reported that the name of the fictional enemy nation 
‘Lapistan’ evoked a strong reaction from both Saami indigenous peoples and Swedish Muslims 
(Ohlsson 2009). This is because the ‘Lap’ prefix denotes a racist and derogatory name for the 
Saami people while the ‘istan’ reveals a mental connection with NATO’s war on terrorism in 
Afghanistan (Rozoff 2012). Stefan Lindgren, Deputy Chairman of the Afghan Solidarity 
Association, made a formal complaint to the official Ombudsman against the Swedish Armed 
Forces for discrimination. He stated that the ‘-istan’ ending creates the image that Sweden is 
surrounded by malicious enemies, which is insulting to Muslims (Ohlsson 2009). At the same 
time, Anders Blom, associate director of the Saami National Federation highlighted another 
issue of grievance, namely the poor timing of the exercise. NATO had disregarded the fact that 
the exercise was to take place during the reindeer calving period and resulted in several Saami 
reindeer owners being affected. A spokesperson for the Swedish Armed forces made a 
statement to the Aftonbladet newspaper explaining that it was NATO’s decision to name the 
fictitious country in the exercise. The spokesperson then went on to express that “Sweden only 
hosts the exercise. I don't think NATO would listen to us if we had any views on the name 
choice” (Ohlsson 2009). While this statement reveals an interesting insight into the unequal 
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relations between Sweden and the NATO – it could also be understood as an attempt by the 
Swedish Armed forces to evade responsibility over a contentious issue by simply ‘passing the 
buck’. However, as Mello and Saideman (p31) clarify “when countries transfer control of a 
unit to a multilateral force, as much as they might like, they do not transfer responsibility”. 
There also appears to be a lack of learning from Loyal Arrow as the following year, during CR 
10 - the first year that Sweden participated in CR - NATO again failed to notify or seek 
permission from the Saami reindeer herders to access their land during CR 10. Swedish Sami 
Radio reported that the Sami reindeer herders in the area opposed the exercise as it occurred 
without first consulting the reindeer herders (Nilsen 2010). It can be discerned that in 
2009/2010, NATO MMEs in the Arctic and elsewhere reflected the US’ main security concern 
in the post-9/11 era – namely non-state threats (terrorism). Yet the exercise scenario outlined 
in Loyal Arrow -09 could hardly be considered a credible threat in the Arctic – one that 
imagined military separatists operating from a non-democratic state in Swedish Lapland 
engaging in a hostile takeover of neighbouring countries with the intent of pursuing control 
over oil and gas in the Baltic region?? The argument here is that NATO’s threat perception in 
the Arctic and subsequent MMEs have, and continue to be, largely influenced by American 
security interests that do not accurately reflect political realities in the region but are instead 
constructed. 
Reinforcing this argument, a brief glance at Table 8.2 below shows that prior to 2014, when 
tensions between the US/NATO and Russia were much lower, NATO still regularly conducted 
MMEs in the BEAR such as Cold Response (CR) and Dynamic Mongoose (DMON). The table 
clearly illustrates how CR gradually increased in size from approximately 7,000 participating 
troops in 2009 to over 16,000 troops in 2014 (CR-14 was held prior to events in Ukraine). 
Therefore, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014 
cannot be solely used as the pretext for an increased NATO Arctic presence since NATO was 
already in the process of gradually expanding the size and scope of its MMEs in the BEAR.  It 
was at the September 2014 summit in Wales when NATO leaders agreed to step-up the 
Alliance’s exercise regime and formed a spearhead within the existing NATO Reaction Force 
(NRF) called the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) (NATO 2018a). The purpose 
of the VJTF is to be able to deploy within 48 hours, at the periphery of NATO’s territory, with 
troops, artillery, air, maritime and special operations components. However, Ringsmose and 
Rynning (2016:2) explain that rather than focusing on the projected military improvements of 
the NRF, it is more important to observe its political reframing. Although the NRF was created 
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back in 2002, and modelled on the US Marine Expeditionary Force, it lacked operational 
purpose85. However, in the aftermath of Ukraine, the NRF began to be explicitly linked to 
collective defense and NATO’s Article 5. The justification is of course, Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine, which “have convinced policymakers that the eastern-most allies need assurances 
(and Russia deterrence)” thus, thus the NRF has gained “a real operational purpose for the 
first time” (Ringsmose and Rynning 2016:2). In support of this, Norway hosted Noble Ledger 
in September 2015- an MME exercise solely focused on testing the preparedness of the NRF. 
Although this exercise took place in the south-east of Norway rather than the BEAR, it does 
suggest that the VJTF could potentially be deployed to the High North. Also, it should be noted 
that because Nobel Ledger took place in the south of the country, it makes it only one of two 
category B exercise on the list – namely a NATO exercises hosted in an Arctic state but not 
held within the BEAR86. There was of course a very rational reason for this decision; 
conducting an MME in the Arctic to test NATOs Response Force readiness so shortly after 
Ukraine would likely have escalated tensions with Russia that could have sparked an armed 
conflict. 
 
Russia’s Ukrainian adventure also led to a re-emergence of Cold War style questions 
concerning whether a nuclear threat could become real. Kristensen (2015) outlines that NATO 
became concerned about a revived Russian nuclear threat for three key reasons: “First that they 
(the Russians) may have lowered the threshold for use of nuclear (weapons). Secondly, they 
seem to be integrating nuclear with conventional forces in a rather threatening way and (third) 
….at a time of fiscal pressure they are keeping up their expenditure on modernizing their 
nuclear forces”. However, according to a NATO official, the Alliance’s “nuclear readiness 
levels have not changed” in the aftermath of Ukraine and NATO has mostly continued with its 
standard calendar of nuclear-related exercises. (Durkalec 2015:20). Yet this did not stop the 
Nonetheless it did not stop NATO officials from considering whether to reinstate nuclear 
escalation exercises to counter Russia and as such, the military began quietly adjusting the 
 
85 Ringsmose and Rynning (2016:2) further outline that the NRF was perceived as a “vehicle of transformation” – and – if 
need be- an operational capacity for out-of-arena operations”. However, despite being utilised for emergency relief in Pakistan 
and to protect Olympic sites in Greece, the NRF lacked operational purpose because it was created during the time when the 
alliance’s resources and focus was being drained on the war in Afghanistan.  
86 The other category B exercise listed in the table is Dynamic Mongoose 2020 which was held in Iceland rather than Norway 
- possibly owing to Norway’s strict lockdown measures to curtail the Covid-19 pandemic 
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nuclear posture (Kristensen 2015). For example, as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve87, 
NATO established a new set of military operations and exercises in order to provide “a unified 
response to revanchist Russia”. This resulted in US European Command (EUCOM) forging a 
new link between STRATACOM bomber assurance and deterrence missions to NATO 
regional exercises. Perhaps not surprisingly, one of the first exercises of nuclear deterrence was 
conducted in the BEAR. Kristensen (2015) highlights that  
One of the first examples of this new “link” was Operation Polar Growl, a bomber exercise in April (2015) 
where four B-52 bombers took off from the United States and flew a non-stop strike mission over the North 
Pole and North Sea. The bombers did not carry nuclear weapons on the exercise but were equipped to carry 
a total of 80 air-launched cruise missiles with a total explosive power equivalent to 1,000 Hiroshima bombs 
– a subtle warning to Putin not seen since the Cold War. 
 
Norway hosted no less than three MME exercises in the BEAR in the first half of 2015– Joint 
Viking (JV), Arctic Challenge (ACE) and Dynamic Mongoose (DYMON). Although the first 
two exercises can be categorised as national MMEs led by Norway (category C), they 
nonetheless included NATO allies such as US, Germany, France, Netherlands and Britain. 
Lieutenant General Morten Haga Lunde of the Norwegian Armed Forces declared that JV-15 
was planned prior to the crisis in Ukraine. However, he also added that “the security situation 
in Europe shows that the exercise is more relevant than ever” (Forsarvet.no 2016). This implies 
that the exercise would have gone ahead even if the Ukrainian conflict had not occurred, yet at 
the same time, Ukraine conveniently serves to validate the increased NATO presence in the 
High North. It was perhaps not surprising that both the JV-15 and ACE-15 exercises invoked 
a strong response by Russia in the form of snap exercises and counter-military manoeuvres 
conducted by Russian armed forces at the same time as the NATO exercises. Although Russia 
had been informed in advance of the JV-15 exercise as a token courtesy by NATO, when the 
exercise was underway Putin ordered a Russian exercise involving 40,000 soldiers and 
mobilized the entire northern fleet. Then, in response to the ACE-15 exercise Russia decided 
to conduct an unscheduled manoeuvre of similar size (approx. 4,000 troops) in northern Russia 
such as in Komi and the Urals (Defence News 2015).   
A third exercise –a NATO-led MME (category A exercise) - named Dynamic Mongoose 
(DYMON-15) was hosted in Norway in May 2015. Although DYMON is an annual anti-
 
87 Since April 2014, the U.S. Army Europe has led the DoD’s Atlantic Resolve by bringing US-based units to Europe on a 
rotating basis for up to nine months at a time. There are approx. 6,000 soldiers participating in Atlantic Resolve at any given 
time, conducting operations and exercises in 17 NATO countries (US Army Europe 2020) 
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submarine warfare (ASW) exercise held off the coast of Norway in the North Sea, American 
officials still felt the need to clarify that DYMON-15 exercises “are not sabre-rattling military 
movements aimed at nearby Russia” (Makuch 2015). DMON-15 also appears to be the 
exception as of the three exercises held early in 2015 it was the only one that did not invoke a 
Russian military response. Aboard the USS Vicksburg, the lead vessel in the exercise, US 
commander of the operation Rear Admiral Williamson told Reuters that “the exercise is not a 
response to Russian action but does bring relevance to the operation” (ibid). Predictably, this 
statement appears to be almost the exact same response as the one given by the Norwegian 
armed forces about the JV exercise. However, the Canadian Department of National Defense 
contradicted this with a statement of their own declaring that DYMON-15 is part of "Canada's 
response to Russia's military aggression toward Ukraine” (Makuch 2015). 
However, by far the NATO exercise that has garnered the most attention in recent years is 
undoubtedly Trident Juncture (TRJE-18) which took place from the 25th of October to the 23rd 
of November 2018. TRJE-18 occurred just weeks after Russia staged Vostok-18 (see section 
8.2.2) - Russia’s largest military exercise since the Soviet era (Masters 2018). Although TJ 
takes place every three years and was last hosted by Italy, Spain and Portugal in 2015, TRJE-
18 was the largest NATO MME in over 20 years with approximately 50,000 troops 
participating. While TRJE-18 mainly took place in central and eastern Norway, maritime and 
air operations also took place within the BEAR, as well as the surrounding areas of the North 
Atlantic and the Baltic Sea, including Iceland and the airspace of Finland and Sweden (see 
image 8.3). 
Amongst all the NATO MMEs listed in Table 8.2, TRJE-18 is perhaps the most significant 
because it involved forces from all 29 NATO states as well as Finland and Sweden. It served 
as an article 5 exercise that simulated NATOs collective response to an armed attack against 
one ally. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that “This is a necessary exercise" that will 
be "fictitious but realistic" in order to "send a strong signal of unity." Yet Stoltenberg also said 
that the purpose of TRJE-18 was "purely to prevent, not to provoke," an armed attack. 
However, Russia was not reassured by this statement, and Russian Defense Minister Sergei 
Shoigu responded on the 24th of October 2018, stating that "NATO's military activities near 
our borders have reached the highest level since the Cold War,", adding that TRJE-18 will be 
"simulating offensive military action." Russia's Foreign Ministry also said that while NATO 
says the exercise is defensive in nature, "this show of military force is clearly anti-Russian". 
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Similarly, Kremlin spokesman Maria Zakharova accused the USA for wanting to “lower the 
level of security in Europe” (Staalasen 2018). However, complaints made by Russian officials 
were not just about the scale of the NATO exercise but also served to signal dissatisfaction 
with Sweden and Finland regarding their tightening relations with NATO (The Warsaw 
Institute 2018). 
Table 8.1 – List of large-scale multinational and/or NATO military exercises held near or 
















A 2006 Held in Northern 
Norway 
10,000 soldiers 







Held in Northern 
Norway 
8,500 soldiers 















from 13 nations 









Held in Swedish 
Lapland 
8 NATO states + 
2 PfP states  
Over 50 aircraft 
Loyal Arrow caused a political 
backlash in Sweden with protests 
from Saami Indigenous peoples 















from 14 nations –  
After CR 2009 it was decided that 
larger NATO exercises would be 
held every second year. 
Sweden participated for the first 




A 2012 Held in Troms, 
Northern Norway 
near the Russian 
border and 
northern Sweden  
16,000 soldiers 
from 15 nations 
A Royal Norwegian Air Force 
helicopter crashed during the 
exercise in north Sweden on 15th 
March 2012. All five crew on 







Finland, Kallax in 
Sweden and Bodø 
and Ørland in 
Norway. 
 The goal of ACE-13 was to 
enhance Nordic cooperation in the 
field of defence under 
NORDEFCO and develop 
capabilities for combined 














Dynamic Mongoose is a NATO-


















from 16 countries. 




Red Cross also 
participated 
Cold Response 14 occurred prior 






Held in the 
northern county of 
Finmark, Norway.  
 
5,000 troops Russia had been informed in 
advance of Joint Viking exercise 
however when the exercise was 
underway Putin ordered a Russian 
exercise involving 40,000 soldiers 








 12 warships, four 
submarines, and 
military troops 

















Kallax in Sweden 
4,000 soldiers 
from 9 countries 
with 115 aircraft 
In response to ACE-15 Russia 
decided to conduct an unscheduled 









mainly held near 
the towns of Rena 











of troops that 
participated in the 
exercise is 
unknown 
Noble Ledger prepares troops 
from the High-readiness NATO 
Response Force for their 
responsibilities as the first to react 
in case of emergency. The 
exercise was likely to test the 
newly established spearhead force 
namely ‘The Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force’ 
(VJTF) established at the Wales 
Summit 2014 in response to 











from 14 countries 




CDR 16 was the first time the 
exercise was moved out of the 
Arctic Circle – possibly to prevent 
a Russian reaction such as 

















700 soldiers from 
the United States 








Off the coast of 
Norway 
3,000 troops from 
eight NATO allies 
16 submarines 











   




The exercise was 
held on the island 
of Gotland and 
other strategically 
important areas 
such as Arlanda 
Airport outside 
Stockholm. 






addition to some 
1,300 US troops in 
addition to forces 





and Norway.  
 
The exercise was intended to test 
Sweden’s defense capability 
against a larger, sophisticated, 
opponent.  
Aurora 17 is the largest Swedish 










8 NATO allied 
nations converged 
on the North 





2 submarines, 7 







Spain, Turkey and 
the United States 












 50,000 soldiers 
from 31 nations 
250 aircraft, 65 
vessels and 
10,000 vehicles 
The exercise has been the largest of 
its kind in Norway and for NATO 
since 2002  
Due to the size of the exercise, 
Norway was obliged to invite all 
OSCE participating States to 











Northern Sweden 10,000 soldiers 
Approx. 7,000 
from Norway, 
Finland, US and 
UK   
The exercise and joint training 
served to test defence cooperation 
between Sweden and Finland 








Held in the 
municipality of 
Sodankylä in the 
central part of 
Lapland, Finland 
2,000 soldiers 
from 14 countries, 
700 from Finland, 
100 from the US 






Bold Quest is an annual MME 
initiated by the US Army General 
Staff. This is the third time the 








Held northern in 
Sweden, Finland 


























The main part of 
the exercise was in 











Sweden – as well 
as Norwegian 
forces – 




The exercise was cancelled on the 
11th March with a controlled 
closure due to the Corona Virus. 
There was only 1 known case of 
Corona amongst the soldiers, but 
the armed forces quarantined 244 














exercise off the 
coast of Iceland. 
As the host nation, 
Iceland offered 
logistical support 










Norway, the UK 
and US took part. 
Source: Naval-technology (2020) 
345 
 
Prior to the end of TRJE-18, the Russian navy informed NATO that it would carry out its own 
military exercises on international waters off the west coast of Norway including manoeuvres 
of the Russian naval forces and rocket tests from 1st-3rd November an area that partially 
overlapped the zone where TRJE-18 occurred (The Warsaw Institute 2018). The Russian navy 
also scheduled tests to take place farther north between the 6th and the 9th of November 2018. 
However, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg dismissed any concerns that the TRJE-
18 exercise would be disrupted by the Russian test launches. Although Stoltenberg 
acknowledged that Moscow had significant naval forces off the Norwegian coast, he didn’t 
consider this to be a potential risk factor as Russia regularly holds naval manoeuvres there 
(Luhn 2018). However, this was offset when both Norway and Finland claimed that Russia had 
intentionally affected the accuracy of their global positioning system (GPS) systems before and 
during the TRJE-18 exercise, arguing that this directly affected civilian air traffic in the region. 
Stoltenberg described the GPS jamming as “dangerous and irresponsible”, especially when 
“taking into account the importance of GPS signals for civil aviation, not least for search- and 
rescue, for emergency services.” (Gorey 2019).  
To conclude, NATOs decision to hold frequent MMEs in the BEAR have had a detrimental 
impact on Russian relations with the Nordic states and led to greater insecurity vis-à-vis 
Norway and Russia. What is notable is that NATO exercises in the BEAR have gradually 
increased in size and frequency prior to the Ukrainian conflict, signalling that NATO perceived 
Russia as a threat before the events in 2014. However, Ukraine served as a further rationale for 
NATOs presence in the BEAR, enabling it to revive the concept of Russian deterrence and 
Cold War threat perceptions, while also providing a new operational purpose for NATO’s 
Reaction Force. Having evaluated MMEs held in the immediate aftermath of Ukraine and in 
the following year (2015), it can be determined that while the majority of MMEs held in the 
BEAR were pre-planned or conducted as annual exercises – they nonetheless provoked a 
military response from Russia and continue to be a source of contention in NATO-Russian 
relations. The same can also be said for TRJE-18. However, what distinguished this exercise 
was its size – as NATO’s largest MME to date – this exercise was a clear statement that NATO 
is in the Arctic because it perceives Russia to be a threat. Yet it also served the political purpose 
of reassuring allies and bolster alliance cohesion at a time when the future of the alliance 
remains uncertain. It would seem then that NATO needs Russia to be the external threat or 
‘glue’ that continues to bind the alliance together. In the next section, I will turn to addressing 
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Russian military exercises, engaging with the question of whether these are a tit-for-tat 
response against NATO. 




8.2.2 Russian Arctic military exercises – instigating military aggression or a tit-for-tat 
response against NATO? 
For the most part, Russia’s large-scale military exercises are scheduled and predictable. 
However, following President Vladimir Putin’s 2013 decree to increase military readiness, the 
annual strategic exercises have been augmented by no-notice snap exercises comparable in size 
and scope or even larger than most annual strategic exercises (Johnson 2017). These snap 
exercises are conducted without warning to the units involved, thus avoiding the requirements 
for prior notification set out in paragraph 41 and 41.1 of the OSCE Vienna Document 88. These 
 
88 The Vienna Document is an agreement between OSCE participating states outlining a set of guidelines on military exercises 
that serve the purpose of increasing confidence and security building measures). The Vienna Document stipulates that prior 
notification must be given at least 42 days in advance for exercises exceeding 9,000 troops. However, military activities carried 
out without advance notice to the troops involved are exempted from this requirement. 
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short ‘snap’ exercises also occur in the days leading up to, or sometimes after, the main 
scheduled exercises and are typically based on short warning time with an emphasis on 
strategic and tactical mobility.  
Traditionally, Russia hosts one scheduled large-scale military exercise drill each year that bears 
the name of one of four of its strategic military theatres: Vostok (East), Zapad (West), Tsentr 
(Center), and Kavkaz (South) (see image 8.3). Russian Exercises are hosted on a rotating basis; 
Vostok (2010, 2014 and 2018), Zapad (in 2009, 2013 and 2017)89, Tsentr (2011, 2015, 2019) 
and Kavkaz (2008, 2012 and 2016). In table 8.4 I list the Vostok, Zapad and Tsentr exercises 
from 2009 up to 2019. However, I have chosen to omit the Kavkaz exercises from the table on 
the basis that they are unlikely to include snap exercises in the BEAR region.  
In recent years, Russia has succeeded in restoring a major part of the Soviet military potential 
in the Arctic (Sukhanin 2020b). This has partially emerged from military reform efforts to 
consolidate command and control (C2) of Russia’s northern regions, resulting in the creation 
of the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (NF JSC) in 2014. Based in Murmansk, the NF 
JSC essentially combined forces from several parts of the Western, Central and Eastern military 
districts with the aim of coordinating every military unit in the Arctic (Aliyev 2019). As a 
result, the NF JSC assumed full military-strategic responsibility over Arkhangelsk Oblast, the 
Komi Republic, Murmansk Oblast and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug putting the entire NSR 
under the fleets direct control (Sukhanin 2019, 2020b). Since 2014, there have been snap 
exercises called in the NF JSC located in the north-western Russian Arctic close to the border 
of Scandinavia. In August 2019, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) proposed to formally 
legitimise the status of the NF JSC as an independent military district. In reality this had already 
occurred back in 2014 however, it was only officially declared by President Vladimir Putin in 
June 2020. The decision to upgrade the status of the NF JSC would seem to be driven by 
Russia’s wider goal to increase its military-political weight in the Arctic and out of concerns 
of increasing NATO activity close to Russia’s north-west borders. Beginning on January 1, 
2021, the Sever (North) Unified Strategic Command will have the same status as Russia’s four 





Having outlined the military command structure and recent developments impacting Russian 
military exercises in the Arctic, I will now provide an evaluation of the three most recent 
Russian exercises, Zapad 2017, Vostok 2018 and Tsentr 2019 while providing further detail of 
other exercises in table 8.4. 
Image 8.3 - Map depicting Russian Federation Military Districts (NATO 2017) 
 
Of the four Russian military districts and their corresponding exercises, Zapad exercises 
conducted since the end of the Cold War have can be considered the most threatening to NATO 
and Western Europe. As Petraitis (2017-18:229) explains, Zapad exercises are used to test the 
concept and planning of a potential Russian war with a strong opponent in the West. An entire 
operation (war) is planned to be waged in three stages.    
 
The first stage is a sudden attack and a capture of bridgeheads, later entrenching and defending them. This 
might last from one to a few weeks. The second stage is safeguarding and extending achievements and 
trying to stabilize/terminate the conflict. This stage could last from one to three months. And the third 
stage is a massive (total) state defense all state assets involved and even moving onto a nuclear war if the 
defense fails. 
Zapad-17 was a bilateral exercise involving both Russian and Belarussian troops. The Russian 
MoD announced that a total of 12,700 Russian and Belorussian troops would participate in 
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ZAPAD, with 7,200 Belarussian troops and 5,500 Russian troops. However, Johnson (2017), 
writing for NATO Review, accused Russia of ‘fudging the numbers’ because the total number 
of troops participating fell just shy of the limits requiring mandatory invitation of foreign 
observers under the Vienna Document (13,000 troops is the threshold) and Russia declined to 
notify the exercise because they claimed that only 2,000 troops would exercise on its territory 
as part of ZAPAD. NATO estimates that up to 70,000 troops participated in Zapad-17 (ibid). 
This figure is probable considering that Zapad-17 was conducted as many smaller exercises 
held across the district on a number of ranges - both land and sea – a trend that is consistent 
with how Russia has historically conducted its exercises.   
During the first phase of the rehearsed scenario for Zapad-17 – ‘illegal armed groups’ from a 
fictitious Baltic state called Veyshnoriya90 ‘penetrated’ Russian and Belarusian territory 
(Boulégue 2017). In a counter-offensive response to this fictitious enemy, Russia and Belarus 
tested troop deployment, set up advanced field posts and C2 components and essentially 
practiced a defensive, tactical anti-terrorist exercise. However, in the second stage, Russia 
changed the exercise narrative and descriptions of the Veyshnoriyan terrorists increasingly 
became about thwarting a ‘conventional enemy’. As Boulégue explains, in this way, 
‘Veyshnoriyan troops’ went from initially conducting lightly-equipped border incursions to 
launching massive air strikes and land attacks with tremendous fire power, air 
supremacy capabilities, submarines, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. This meant that 
Zapad-17 became a drill about a limited conventional war against a technologically advanced 
enemy. This could only imply the exercise was really about fighting against NATO-
interoperable armed forces (Boulégue 2017). Tennis (2017:23) similarly outlines how many of 
the Zapad-17 drills featured defence operations against technologies that only the United States 
would possess such as high-speed drones. 
As part of the Zapad-17 exercises, maritime drills featuring a large number of units from 
Russia’s Northern Fleet took place in the Barents and Baltic Seas. According to Petraitis (2018) 
a pre-Zapad submarine exercise involving the Northern Fleet took place in the Barents Sea on 
July 5th 2017. A nuclear submarine ‘Smolensk’ launched a SLCM against sophisticated naval 
targets. However, the main exercise involving the Northern Fleet began concurrently on the 
first day of Zapad-17 (14th September 2017). The exercise drills were headed directly by 
 
90 The fictitious country of Veyshnoriya was allegedly situated at the Belarusian border with Poland and Lithuania in an area 
known as the Suwalki gap and where NATO troop levels were low 
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Russian Navy Head Commander Vladimir Korolyev and included about 50 ships, submarines 
and support vessels and approximately 5,000 sailors. However, fighter planes and helicopters 
from the Air Force and Air Defense were also deployed (Staalesen 2017b). On September 21, 
the Russian MoD announced that the “Northern Fleet warship battle group…supported by 
fighters repelled a massive air attack” which included attacks by six cruise missiles (Schneider 
2017). 
From this it can be concluded that the Northern Fleet involvement in Zapad-17 was intended 
for strategic deterrence and the maritime defence of northwest Russia – including areas of the 
BEAR. Russian maritime activity in the High North during the exercise indicates that Russia 
sought to protect its north-western border with Norway, while also anticipating that any 
potential war with NATO would likely include a conflict over the Baltic states (Tennis 
2017:23-24). Felgenhauer (2017) also observes how on the last day of Zapad-17, intense 
military activity was spread out across the Western MD but included the Barents Sea in the 
north. Two supersonic Tu-22M3 Backfire jet bombers overflew the Baltic and Norwegian Seas. 
These deployments would seem to indicate an escalation of the conflict with Western NATO 
forces, with the potential of going nuclear, but possibly in a limited fashion, to scare the West 
into submission and retreat (ibid). Similarly, Schneider (2017) is of the opinion that “the 
apparent nuclear attacks at the end of Zapad 2017 seemed designed to deter or prevent a NATO 
counterattack”. 
During the Russian Zapad-17 exercise, at least one bystander narrowly escaped death when a 
Kamov Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter fired an S-8 missile at a group of parked vehicles. 
Shrapnel from the explosion reportedly injured three people on the ground and hit an army 
Kamaz truck and a Niva SUV (Felgenhauer 2017). The accident occurred at the Luzhsky firing 
range near St. Petersburg. A video released from the online news portal 66.ru showed two Ka-
52 helicopters swooping over a field at treetop level; the second helicopter suddenly fired a 
missile seemingly targeting real people and vehicles instead of decoys (Kraemer 2017, 
Felgenhauer 2017). The Russian military, after initial denials, acknowledged that the “the 
targeting system of one of the helicopters took on a wrong target” (Felgenhauer 2017). 
However, the MoD statement strongly denied that the strike occurred on September the 18th, 
when President Putin visited the firing range (ibid), suggesting that the main priority of the 
Russian MoD was the safety of the Russian president (Kraemer 2017). However, the incident 
had political ramifications as Belarus’ President Alyaksandr Lukashenka apparently refused to 
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join Putin at the Luzsky firing range having told reporters, “What if a projectile hit us both 
[Putin and Lukashenka]? (Felgenhauer 2017). A special investigation commission was 
established to determine what went wrong. As Felgenhauer summarises,  
Since the Ka-52 is one of the most modern and electronically savvy Russian attack aircraft it would be 
highly disturbing if it turns out to be true that its C2 system can indeed select and fire on wrong targets at 
will. Russian aircraft often buzz by Western warships and aircraft in the Baltic. If a missile is 
“unintentionally” fired during such a flyby, a war on Russia’s Western borders could become a reality. 
The next year, Russia conducted Vostok-18, from early July to 17 September 2018. Although 
Vostok-18 did not include military drills in the BEAR, it deserves mentioning for two reasons: 
first it was the largest military exercise ever held in Russia, with more than 300,000 troops 
participating, including soldiers from China and Mongolia – described by Johnson as “an 
exercise of unprecedented scale not seen since the Soviet-era Zapad 1981” (ibid). Second, 
although the size and scale of the exercise clearly served to draw the desired level of foreign 
attention to Vostok-18 - Chinese participation in the exercise also served to send a message to 
the west. In particular, it signifies that Western sanctions and restrictions on NATO-Russian 
military dialogue have increasingly pushed Russia closer to China that in turn could reframe 
Arctic security.  
According to Johnson (2018), Vostok-18 was, in effect, two events. The first – and militarily 
more significant – took place at multiple locations in the Far East from early July until 
September. An example of this includes a series of exercise drills conducted by the Russian 
military at the very eastern edge of the Russian Arctic, as part of the much larger Vostok-18 
exercise. Russian marines and elements of the Arctic motorized rifle brigade of the Northern 
Fleet conducted a mock amphibious landing assault on the coast of the Chukchi Sea near Cape 
Vankarem, (a historic first according to the Russian MoD) followed up the next day by 
exercises to search and destroy enemy commando groups in Chukotka, according to Russian 
officials (Sevunts 2018). Although the drills took place more than 7,000 kilometres from 
Russia’s main base in Murmansk near the border with Norway, the Vostok-18 exercise involved 
units of the Northern Fleet, in addition to ground forces, Russia’s elite Airborne Troops, and 
long-range and military transport aviation of its Aerospace Forces.  
The second element of Vostok-18 was a scripted show of force, that took place on the 13th of 
September at the Tsugol training range in the Trans-Baykal Region. This show of force 
included live-fire exercises and a massive parade of military vehicles carried out under the 
observation of President Putin and the Chinese Minister of Defence (Johnson 2018). This 
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served as a carefully orchestrated military demonstration staged for media cameras rather than 
a real military exercise and served to demonstrate Russia’s military strength to domestic and 
foreign observers. Importantly, it also sent a message to the West that despite economic 
sanctions and marginalization, Russia does not stand alone and has important allies - namely 
China. 
Finally, turning to investigating the Tsentr-19 exercise which was held during August and 
September 2019 - military drills took place not only on the territory of the Central MD, but 
also in the BEAR under the joint strategic command of the Northern Fleet. An estimated 
130,000 troops were involved including troops from China, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirgistan (Staalesen 2019b). The inclusion of new states 
demonstrates that Russia is potentially seeking to expand its alliance structure by welcoming 
central and east Asian states to participate, including former Soviet states. Buchanan and 
Boulégue (2019) outline that Russia had three main goals for conducting Arctic exercises as a 
part of Tsentr 2019;  
First, Russia wants to demonstrate its area denial capabilities in the Arctic as well as its maneuverability in 
the NSR. Second, Tsentr 2019 will demonstrate Russia’s intentions to maintain a strong presence in the 
Arctic. But that agenda is not surprising or new; sheer geography makes Moscow the largest Arctic player, 
and the Kremlin has never hidden its desire to keep the lead. Finally, the exercise seeks to demonstrate that 
Russia can protect its energy investments in the Arctic. 
In August 2019, Russia conducted a snap exercise in the BEAR maritime region named Ocean 
Shield and involved exercises in the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea in addition to the Baltic. It 
was interpreted by the Norwegian intelligence and military personnel as a reaction to NATO’s 
TJ-18 MME. The Norwegian Chief of Defense Haakon Bruun-Hanssen explained that during 
the Ocean Shield exercise, Russia sent a majority of the vessels from its Baltic Sea Fleet and 
the North Fleet to the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea; “They first practiced closing off access 
to the Baltic and Norwegian Seas, then they practiced bastion defence in the Norwegian Sea” 
(Tømmerbakke 2020). Brunn-Hanssen considered the Ocean Shield exercise as a signal from 
the Russians that they can get in place fast – prior to NATO forces – and that they hold the 
weapon capacity and ability to prevent NATO from arriving with planes and vessels into the 
area (ibid).  
Another smaller Arctic exercise occurred just a few days before Tsentr-19 commenced. The 
exercise, involving approximately 500 troops, took place on Bolshevik Island in the 
archipelago of Severnaya Zemlya. Located at 78 degrees North, the waterway surrounding the 
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island is used by ships sailing on the Northern Sea Route. The archipelago may have been 
chosen to simulate an offensive operation on Svalbard. Staalesen (2019b) outlines how a team 
of armed divers first made it to the shore followed by two high-speed light boats and two Ka-
27 helicopters. Larger landing vessels subsequently put ashore amphibious vehicles and troops. 
A large anti-submarine vessel named Vice-Admiral Kulakov was also reported to be in the area 
by the Northern Fleet command (ibid). 
Following Tsentr -19, in October 2019, Russia conducted a further exercise - Grom-19 in the 
North Atlantic to test the Russian strategic nuclear forces91. According to the Kremlin, 
command was conducted from the National Defence Management Centre of the Russian 
Federation and overseen by the Russian President as the supreme commander-in-chief of the 
Armed Forces. The exercise involved about 12,000 service personnel, 213 launchers of the 
strategic Missile Forces, up to 105 aircraft, 15 surface ships, five submarines and 310 units of 
combat and special equipment (The Kremlin 2019). However, the West was notified in advance 
of the exercise in accordance with the OSCE’s Vienna Document. Late in 2018, Defence 
Minister Sergey Shoigu said that the task set by the Ministry for 2019 was to bring the share 
of cutting-edge weaponry in the strategic nuclear forces up to 82% in order to “guarantee 
nuclear deterrence” (Tass 2018). Grom-19 therefore served the purpose of testing the command 
and control of the participating forces in addition to the efficiency of the nuclear triad 
(McDermott 2019). In the Grom-19 exercise, Russian Northern and Pacific fleet nuclear-
powered submarines (SSBNs) fired submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from the 
Barents and Okhostsk Seas92. At the same time, surface ships of the Northern Fleet and the 
Caspian Flotilla launched Caliber high-precision cruise missiles striking targets on the shore 
(Russian Ministry of Defence 2019). According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the tasks 
set out during the exercise were completed in full and all missiles reached their targets. 
However, the Ministry did not mention that one submarine failed to launch a second missile as 
a result of a systems failure; Two informants close to the Ministry of Defence told the Russian 
news agency Vedomosti that an emergency occurred during Grom-19. It was planned that the 
SSBN submarine K-44 Ryazan93 would carry out two launches of the R-29R intercontinental 
 
91 ‘Grom’ is the Russian word for Thunder 
92 The Russian missiles were launched from the Kura testing ground on Kamchatka and the Chizha testing ground in the 
Arkhangelsk region 
93 The nuclear submarine K-44 Ryazan is the last remaining vessel of the Kalmar Project 667BDR. It is armed with liquid R-




ballistic missile (ICBM) at the Chizh test site in the Arkhangelsk region. While the first launch 
was successfully carried out on October 17, the second R-29R did not come out of the silo 
launcher. An emergency call was made and according to the source, the submarine likely 
reported a failure of the systems responsible for the launch command (RIA Novosti 2019). 
Although a special commission was established to determine the exact causes of the emergency 
the results have not been made public.  
Although exercises like Grom-19 are considered to be a standard test of the nuclear deterrent 
forces and frequently follow the annual strategic-level military exercise held each September, 
it nonetheless suggests that Moscow may be preparing to face nuclear deterrence and conflict 
escalation in a post–arms control era94 (Moskovsky Komsomolets cited in Mc Dermott 2019). 
Nilsen (2019) considers how the Caliber missile has a range of at least 1,500 kilometres which 
means it can hit targets all over northern Scandinavia, including military airports like Bodø, 
Luleå and Rovaniemi, or Western naval vessels operating in the northern part of the Norwegian 
Sea.  Taking into consideration the role that military exercises (both conventional and nuclear) 
have in reflecting the broader geopolitical situation with respect to arms control and power 
competition, I will now turn to considering the inherent risks involved behind conducting 









94 See Chapter 6 for further reference to the US’ 2019 withdrawal from the 1987 INF Treaty and the uncertainty surrounding 
the renewal of the START Treaty which faces expiration in 2021 
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Table 8.4 Russian Large-scale military exercises from 2009 – 2019. Some of which 
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8.3 A risk assessment of increased military activity and MMEs in the Arctic  
In order to distinguish different factors of risk associated with NATO and Russian military 
activity in the BEAR, I adapt Frear et al’s (2014) categorisation of risk that includes three types 
of risk on a scale of escalation.     
The first category, ‘routine incidents’ describe encounters between NATO and Russia that do 
not deviate from the long-standing pattern of routine encounters. However, what is noticeable 
is that these routine incidents have increased since 2014 on both sides. Incidents include more 
frequent air patrols close to – or in violation of – national airspace and interceptions of 
reconnaissance aircraft. The second category is defined by Frear et al (2014:2) as as serious 
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incidents with escalation risk. Russian radar and GPS jamming after TRJE-18 could also come 
into this category.  
While the increasing number of Russian-caused incidents have the potential to result in 
accidents impacting both military personnel and civilians, I argue that NATO is, to a degree, 
also partially responsible for this continuing. In section 8.1.3. it was mentioned how NATO 
refused Russia’s offer to implement Finland’s proposal regarding the use transponders in the 
Baltic region – a potential solution to resolving the ongoing dispute surrounding military flight 
sorties. This demonstrates that while practical solutions were proposed, NATO has not done 
enough to engage with Russia to resolve disputes. This may come down to individuals within 
NATO having strong opinions that Russia should not be rewarded for its misdeeds and 
unprofessional military behaviour. Yet such behaviour, though unacceptable, also needs to be 
understood as the result of thirty years of marginalization and frustration with the unsustainable 
security order created by the United States.  In the category of High-Risk Incidents, I have 
included three examples – two I adapt from Frear et al (2014) and have mentioned earlier in the 
chapter: the near collision between a Russian fighter and a SAS civilian plane flying from 
Copenhagen (see section 8.1.2.) and the Swedish submarine incident (see section 8.1.3). A 
further incident – involving Russia conducting strategic bomber flights across the north and 
west coast of Norway armed with nuclear weapons (section 8.2.1.) – is the third example that I 
have included as it illustrates a high-risk incident to have occurred in the BEAR.  
Returning to large-scale military exercises and the question of risk involved, there are two ways 
of approaching the issue. The first concerns routine accidents that can occur during the exercise 
as a result of human error, technological or equipment failure, or poor operating conditions – 
the latter being a constant danger of any Arctic exercise. For example, during CR-12, a Royal 
Norwegian Air Force C-130 Hercules crashed into a mountain in north Sweden on 15 March 
2012, killing all five crew members on board the aircraft. The aircraft’s mission was to fly from 
Evenes (Norway), to Kiruna (Sweden), to pick up material and personnel (The Local.se 2012). 
The Swedish Accident Investigation authority’s final report outlined that the accident was 
caused by both pilot error and organisational shortcomings in safety95. In section 8.2.2. I 
previously referred to the misfiring Russian helicopter during a Zapad-17 exercise. Yet the 
 
95 According to SHK, a central circumstance is the fact that the pilots and the air traffic controllers did not fully understand 
each other's intentions and chart a course through the surrounding terrain and airspace. The pilot mistakenly flew the aircraft 
in tactical mode which does not trigger a terrain warning. However, the crew did not have sufficient working methods to 
prevent the aircraft from being flown below the minimum safe flight level on the route (SHK 2013:135,139).    
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Russian incident – if due to a systems failure – could arguably have a higher level of risk. Had 
this incident occurred during a routine flying mission in the Baltic or the BEAR it could have 
targeted and misfired on a civilian or NATO aircraft which could easily have triggered a 
political and military crisis between Russia and the West. However, the evidence would suggest 
that the risk of such incidents occurring during exercises are usually played down by national 
defence ministries and NATO.  
The second aspect of risk involved with conducting military exercises in the BEAR concerns 
the political and strategic ramifications. There has regularly been a negative reaction to CR and 
other MME exercises from Russia. This not only includes a verbal statement by Russian leaders 
opposing the exercise and critiquing Norwegian involvement in NATO but more recently, there 
have also been snap-exercises and/or Russian military activity in the vicinity of the Norwegian-
Russian border. Throughout the Cold War, NATO conducted military exercises to 
simultaneously deter Soviet aggression and strengthen the confidence of the member states 
(Heuser and Simpson 2017:22). However, history has shown that even routine exercises can 
be interpreted by the other side as threatening (recall for example the Soviet panicked response 
to the NATO exercise Abel Archer 1983 -see Chapter 4). Also, for soldiers participating in 
NATO-led MMEs in the Arctic, they may not be aware of the potential thermonuclear 
dimensions of the exercises. For instance, Klare (2020) draws attention the fact that the 
Finnmark region of Norway - where CR exercises have been held for several consecutive years 
– is adjacent to the Russian border and arguably one of the most likely battlegrounds for the 
first use of nuclear weapons in any future NATO-Russian conflict; 
Because Moscow has concentrated a significant part of its nuclear retaliatory capability on the Kola 
Peninsula, a remote stretch of land abutting northern Norway—any US-NATO success in actual combat 
with Russian forces near that territory would endanger a significant part of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and 
so might precipitate the early use of such munitions.  
 
Today, there are many individuals within NATO who consider military exercises in the BEAR 
and near-Arctic to be a demonstration of the alliance’s continued resolve to defend its allies and 
partners in the 21st century through an active strategy of deterrence, justified under the banner 
of maintaining peace and stability in the broader Euro-Atlantic region. Thus, in NATO’s view, 
the exercises are not a problem, but a virtue (Kearns 2015:9). Yet as Kearns surmises, the total 
effect is to generate a growing sense of insecurity on both sides.  
This is because Russian exercises are seen as a provocation in the West, while NATO exercises 
and new deployments in the Arctic are seen as threat in Russia. Kearns (2015:9) indicates that 
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despite protestations by both sides that the exercises are aimed at no particular adversary, it is 
clear that each side is exercising with other in mind; in other words, the Russian military is 
preparing for a confrontation with NATO and NATO is preparing for a confrontation with 
Russia. Such a confrontation may involve conventional and nuclear forces. It is therefore likely 
that NATO will also seek to include nuclear components to its Arctic MME exercises in future, 
that is - unless new arms control agreements are formulated to assist in de-securitising the 
Arctic or at the least, maintaining present force levels.  
Two fatal nuclear accidents that occurred in the Arctic during the summer of 2019 have 
already demonstrated the urgent need for a new nuclear arms reduction treaty. On July 1st, 
the nuclear-powered special purpose submarine Losharik caught fire when on a mission 
outside the Kola Peninsula. Six weeks later, on 8th August 2019, a Russian nuclear-powered 
cruise missile exploded while being recovered from the seabed outside Nenoksa naval 
weapons testing site in the White Sea. President Vladimir Putin later said the mishap occurred 
during testing of what he called ‘unparalleled new weapons systems’ (The Moscow Times 
2019). Although five nuclear engineers were killed in the blast and radiation levels were 
recorded as being up to 20 times the normal levels in nearby cities, the Russian authorities 
gave a muted response to the explosion, and nuclear radiation monitoring stations went silent 
for two days after the explosion (Barnes 2019, The Moscow Times 2019). The secrecy 
surrounding the accident has led outside observers to speculate that the explosion involved 
the Burevestnik nuclear-powered intercontinental cruise missile, dubbed the SSC-X-9 Skyfall 
by NATO.  
The two accidents served as a wake-up call for radiation emergency authorities monitoring 
Arctic waters (Nilsen 2019f). Despite Russia’s reluctance to share information about what 
happened during the accidents, it nonetheless agreed to an Arctic Council proposal to establish 
a dedicated expert group on radiation and nuclear incidents. Nilsen (2019f) reports that  
The formal decision was taken at the meeting of the Arctic Council’s Working Group on Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) in Reykyavik on December 4th. All eight Arctic states will 
appoint experts and observer states are encouraged to participate. To strengthen the group’s role, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is invited to join the meetings. 
While the AC’s initiative to develop the expert group on radiation and nuclear incidents is 
certainly one positive outcome from the Russian nuclear incidents, it must also be asked what 
measures could be taken to reduce the possibility of conflict escalation in the Arctic and prevent 
the occurrence of military accidents? There are currently two US-Russian bilateral agreements 
362 
 
in place that help to reduce the level of risk and the occurrence of military related incidents; 
The 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas, (usually known 
as the Incidents at Sea Agreement), and the 1989 Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous 
Military Activities. Kearns (2015:11) outlines that these two Cold War agreements could serve 
as the basis for a more multilateralised arrangement that could include all NATO members, 
NATO partners such as Sweden and Finland, Russia and even China.  
Hueser and Simpson (2017:24) advocate that there is a need to include confidence-building 
measures in exercises by communicating the size of the exercise, as well as its format and scope 
to potential adversaries. The Vienna Document was last updated in 2011 to include measures 
for greater military transparency (e.g. in exercises and manoeuvres), military confidence-
building (e.g. building up contacts) and conflict prevention (e.g. preventing and mutual 
reporting of military incidents) (German Federal Foreign Office 2019). Under the OSCE’s 
politically binding Vienna Document of 2011 (VD11), exercises involving more than 9,000 
personnel (3,000 if it uses amphibious landing) must be reported in advance to the OSCE. 
However, the problem is that both NATO and Russia have, since the final years of the Cold 
War, continued to evade advance notification of exercises by claiming that they were running 
several smaller exercises separately (ibid). Russia is particularly susceptible of doing this in its 
annual large-scale military exercises. As such, the VD11 needs to be updated to ensure full 
compliance by all OSCE member states. during the Portuguese chairmanship of the OSCE in 
2016, a meeting was held with the intent of updating the document. However, a statement from 
the Russian Federation essentially blocked this process from occurring. Russia’s explanation 
for doing so was that “the fate of the Vienna Document is inseparable from the general situation 
regarding European security” (OSCE 2016). In the statement Russia outlined that over the 
years it had proposed several times that the VD should be modernized but were refuted by 
Western states.  
According to Russia, the document should have been updated in 2012 or 2013 (prior to 
Ukraine?) but as of 2016 it considered that the window of opportunity had passed. Russia 
reiterated that its refusal was primarily due to the continuation of NATO policies;  
The anchoring in NATO documents of a policy of military containment of Russia and the Alliance’s 
concrete steps in the military sphere rule out the possibility of reaching agreements on confidence-building 
measures. We can envisage prospects for the modernization of the Vienna Document 2011 only if the North 
Atlantic Alliance abandons its policy of containment of Russia, recognizes and respects Russian interests, 




Table 8.5 - Frear et al’s (2014) Categorization of Risk Incidents  
Near Routine Incidents Serious Incidents with 
Escalation Risk 
High Risk Incidents 
 
Incidents that do not differ 
significantly from pre-
Ukraine modes of 
behaviour and as a result 
are less likely to likely to 




Incidents that involve 
close encounters of a 
more aggressive or 
unusually provocative 
nature and therefore 
bring a higher level of 
risk of escalation (p3). 
 
Incidents that have a high 
probability of causing 
casualties or a direct military 
confrontation between Russia 
and Western states. 
 
Examples 




• US/NATO shadowing 
Russia’s Long-Range 
Aviation missions in the 
vicinity of national 
airspaces 
• Observation of the other 
side’s exercises 
• Emergency scrambles 
of NATO planes to 
intercept Russian planes 
approaching the 
airspace of the Baltic 
states 
• Brief violations of 
national air-spaces.  





• Russia’s conducting of 
‘snap’ exercises in the 
BEAR in response to 
NATO MMEs  
• More aggressive 
encounters by Russian 
fighter jets ‘harassing’ 
other planes or ships 
• Russian jamming of 









conversations of two 
Long-range Russian Tu-
95 bombers revealing 
they had a nuclear 
payload on board. The 
aircraft flew around the 
coast of Norway and 
were intercepted by 
Norwegian fighter jets 
• 3rd March 2014 - The 
close encounter 
between a SAS 
passenger plane taking 
off from Copenhagen 
and intercepted by a 
Russian reconnaissance 
aircraft – collision 
avoided due to rapid 
response by civilian 
pilot 




hunt – the Swedish 
supreme commander 
had issued the use of 
force to bring the vessel 
to the surface if 
necessary. Had the 
submarine been found it 
could have resulted in 
causalities and a further 
Russian response  
 
 
Russia’s response– while disappointing and perhaps self-defeating - is nonetheless consistent 
with its stance on Euro-Atlantic and Arctic security. As mentioned previously, Russia’s 
increasingly hard-line attitude towards security cooperation is the outcome of more than 
thirty-years of marginalization and frustration with NATO policies. This grievance towards 
the West will not subside due to increased NATO deterrence in the High North. Instead 
increased military activity by NATO in the BEAR will only serve to exacerbate it.  
8.4 Conclusion  
Through an in-depth evaluation in section 8.1 of defence policies and Arctic strategies of the 
five small and medium Arctic states, it can be concluded that no unanimous consensus exists 
calling for a greater NATO Arctic presence. While Norway remains the most consistent of all 
the NATO Arctic member states regarding its support for the alliance and its calls for a greater 
NATO Arctic presence – there are marked differences amongst the other small and medium 
Arctic states.  Canada, for example, repeatedly prevented NATO from issuing a statement on 
its objectives in the Arctic after previous NATO Summit meetings. It has also blocked NATO’s 
attempts to develop an Arctic strategy on at least two occasions. While Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine and the Crimea in 2014 led to a reappraisal of Arctic security and an increased US 
military presence in Iceland; the most surprising changes are visible in the two non-NATO 
Arctic states Sweden and Finland. Both these countries have become more forthright about 
their increasing alignment towards the West and the United States. Both states have steered a 
foreign policy path away from their traditional Cold War neutrality, as evident through the 




In Chapter 3 and 4, it was demonstrated how tight and loose alliance configurations existed 
amongst NATO members during distinct periods of the Cold War. While these patterns 
reflected the general level of support NATO members have for the alliance, it was clear that 
the cohesion of the alliance largely depended on the existence of an external collective threat 
that served as the glue that bound members together and served as the overall legitimacy and 
cohesion of the alliance. What history can tell us about the present situation is that the rationale 
for a stronger NATO Arctic presence will depend firstly on US perceptions of Russia and the 
ongoing security competition. In chapter 6, it was shown how the United States has emphasised 
the return to great power competition and explicitly labels Russia (and China) as being global 
competitors and rival powers to the US.  
The problem is that Russia has exacerbated this situation due to its actions in Ukraine and as 
such has “revived elements of the Cold War mindset, and associated fears, that NATO 
countries may potentially be under threat” (Heuser and Simpson 2017:22). While rationally, 
the small and medium Arctic states acknowledge that the region has been relatively peaceful 
and cooperative since the end of the Cold War owing to the success of the AC, at the same time 
the unresolved tension that exists as a result of regional security overlap has caused these Arctic 
states to be concerned about a deteriorating security situation with Russia. This in turn has led 
them to seek new assurances from the US and NATO. If the threat from Russia appears 
significant enough to warrant a new consensus amongst the NATO Arctic states, then this is 
most likely to result in NATO producing an Arctic strategy and increasing its Arctic presence 
exponentially. However, should NATO do so, this will only intensify the problem of the Arctic 
regional security overlap and quite possibly lead to the further deterioration of security relations 
with Russia.  Buchanan and Boulégue (2019) warn that “the most likely avenue for conflict in 
the Arctic is still miscalculation”, however exacerbating the situation is the fact that the present-
day NATO-based security order - and particular the NATO-Russia Council - is entirely ill-
suited for resolving any potential disagreements or political crises that could occur in the 
region. A salient point is raised by Wilson (2014) who argues that instead of NATO jumping 
into re-securitizing the Arctic, greater clarity and agreement needs to emerge amongst all Arctic 
member states about the nature of the Arctic security order. This is because there is still a 
considerable amount of uncertainty surrounding the near future of the Arctic. Wilson points 
out that the timeframe for melting ice sheets, the settlements of maritime claims and ongoing 
mapping of the Arctic all need to be resolved. 
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However, I argue that the role of the small and medium states cannot be overstated in 
preventing a re-securitized Arctic. It has been shown in during the transition stage (Chapter 5) 
that Russia’s attempts to legitimately object to NATO’s strategy of transformation and 
expansion at the end of the Cold War have all but been ignored. This has essentially led to a 
self-fulfilling prophecy of Russia’s military revival in the 21st century. The only way to combat 
the security dilemma in the Arctic is to provide a more effective security architecture that is 
inclusive of Russia and one that can achieve tangible results with respect to military dialogue 
and security cooperation. It therefore falls to the small and medium Arctic states to reject 
proposals for a stronger NATO presence in the region and to reconsider hosting and/or 
participation in NATO-led MMEs. Rationally, this could only be done if there are effective 
agreements in place to ensure that Russia’s current risky military behaviour including 
violations of airspace and aircraft interceptions come to an end. This only serves to aggravate 
NATO-Russian tensions and heighten military activity in the BEAR. In addition to this, the 
OSCE Vienna Document needs to be updated to ensure adherence and due notification for 
exercises. Of course, both NATO and Russian exercises are a considerable part of the problem 
and greater efforts must be made by both sides to increase transparency and safety of exercises 
in the BEAR. A key element of this requires both sides to resist the urge to increase their 
dependency on nuclear weapons as this will cause even more friction and further diminish the 
chances that nuclear arms control measures will be successful in the near future (Sauer 
2016:20).    
While the present security situation in the Arctic continues to reflect the Cold War order with 
lines of potential conflict drawn between the NATO and Russia; the rise of China has created 
a shift to the global and Arctic regional balance of power.  Throughout the chapter it has been 
suggested that China is seeking to increase its role in the Arctic. However, the US and Russia 
have responded to an emerging Chinese Arctic presence in contrasting ways. While the US 
seeks to strengthen the existing order (for example, Washington’s new investment in 
Greenland), Russia has demonstrated that it seeks to challenge the existing security order 
(Russia-China economic and joint military cooperation in the Vostok 18 exercises and Pacific 
region). However, as Lanteigne (2017:126) suggests, although the Sino-Russian relationship 
will probably grow stronger, it will likely retain “the characteristics of a marriage of 
convenience rather than a regional alliance”. This is because as an external actor, China’s 
potential role in the Arctic remain uncertain to both the West and Russia. Nonetheless, China’s 
entry into the region will require all Arctic actors to adjust to the long-term changes that a 
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Chinese presence and political influence will undoubtedly bring (Breitenbauch, et al 2019). 
However, the US and NATO should be careful not to escalate tension in the Arctic by reacting 
offensively against the Chinese that so far has remained solely economic and has not extended 
into the military domain. Therefore, “NATO should carefully consider the possibility that an 
increased Chinese maritime presence in the region is not necessarily a zero-sum challenge to 
maintaining sea lines of communication” (Breitenbauch, et al 2019). 
I will finish this chapter by underlining the importance of developing new mechanisms for 
confidence building as an alternative to increased military build-ups and deterrence. Of all the 
eight Arctic states, only Denmark (section 8.1.2.) expressed a desire within its Arctic security 
strategy to develop confidence and security building mechanisms to promote Arctic security 
cooperation. However, it did not elaborate on how this would happen or suggestions for doing 
so. While there are currently agreements that promote security cooperation between Russia and 
other Arctic states in non-strategic areas, these are ad-hoc and issue-specific. Examples include 
the Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR) AC working group, in addition 
to the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) agreement involving coast guard cooperation 
between the US, Norway and the Russian Federation. Although a welcome development, I 
argue that these ad-hoc arrangements are insufficient to promote long-term peace and security 
in the Arctic region. Instead, I advocate that it is necessary to develop new regional institutional 
mechanisms to accommodate for military security cooperation in the Arctic. I will continue 
with this discussion in the next and final chapter of this thesis Chapter 9, when I summarise 
the arguments of each chapter, before exploring the future potential for resolving regional 
security overlap by developing new institutional mechanisms for security cooperation in the 




9 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time.  
-T. S. Eliot 
9.0  Introduction  
Throughout this thesis, I have traced the transformation of the Arctic throughout three major 
stages of political development: from the Cold War, through the critical juncture of the 1990s 
and onwards to the twenty-first century Arctic. Through ES approaches and the RPSF I have 
demonstrated how each of these time periods reveal their own significant findings and 
outcomes. First, in section 8.1, I will provide a summary of Chapters 1 and 2 before turning 
in section 8.2. to address the key findings from the historical Cold War Arctic order in Chapter 
3 and 4. Next, in section 8.3, I will analyse the main arguments from Chapter 5 which engaged 
with the post-Cold War transition period spanning the years from 1989 to 1996. Since this was 
a lengthy chapter composed of three parts I will deal with the findings from this chapter 
distinctly. From there, I will turn to reviewing the findings from Chapter 6 and 7 in section 
8.4 which engaged with the current Arctic order from 1996 onwards. While Chapter 6 focused 
mainly on the Arctic political order, in Chapter 7, I engage with the current status of the Arctic 
security order, especially as it pertains to NATO’s 21st century role in the Arctic. From this I 
move on to providing some suggestions for further research on Arctic security cooperation in 
section 8.5, that builds on the findings of this thesis by seeking to resolve the issue of regional 
security overlap. Here, I will engage with debates surrounding the potential for developing 
collective security arrangements in the Arctic. While weighing up both sides of the arguments 
I utilise the ES and RPSF to advocate the overall benefits that an inclusive Arctic security 
institution could have on the regional order. Last, in section 8.6, I leave the reader with some 
final thoughts to conclude this thesis. 
 9.1 Key Findings Chapters 1-2  
In Chapter 1, I outlined the main argument of this thesis, advocating that the present-day Arctic 
region has, since the end of World War II, been shaped by pre-conceived ideas of order, 
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security and stability held by the leaders of the most powerful Arctic states.  Having taken a 
historical approach to regional change, it was shown how the Arctic is a historical structure 
contingent upon temporal, social and political conditions that have influenced the present-day 
regional order. This order, which can be understood as an imagined political construct, consists 
not only of the eight Arctic states but also of an Arctic regional society: that simultaneously 
influences - and is influenced by – political developments in the broader international system.  
In support of this proposition, I identified key trends within the current Arctic literature that 
spans from the Cold War period through the transitional stage of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
to the post-Cold War order and the present day. I adopted Hønnenland’s (2015) ‘waves’ of 
Arctic regional literature to shown that ideas of Arctic regionalization emerged during the 
transition era during the first wave and primarily focused on environmental management to the 
exclusion of security issues. In contrast, the second wave of Arctic regional literature that 
emerged from 2007 onwards, took the opposite approach and instead advocated a new Cold 
War and ‘race for the Arctic’. Much of the second wave literature exhibits a regressive and 
overtly militaristic approach to Arctic politics that have been influenced by political rhetoric 
without subscribing to a comprehensive approach to Arctic politics.  
As such, I argued that both of these waves were fundamentally out of balance with the reality 
of the Arctic. Through a retrospective analysis of Arctic political history, I have shown that the 
environmental movement in the Arctic that emerged in-force in the late 1980s was intimately 
connected with Cold War security issues, particularly arms control. I proposed the idea that it 
is now possible to re-balance the literature from the first and second waves by introducing a 
third wave of Arctic regional literature. Literature that would be included in this new wave 
would include sources that advance a holistic approach to Arctic security. Through engaging 
with the dynamic ES theoretical concepts of international society and security orders, it is 
hoped that this thesis will serve to further promote this third wave literature and encourage 
more researchers to consider the ongoing development of Arctic regional society and future 
possibilities for Arctic regional security cooperation.  
By writing a revisionist account of Cold War Arctic history I have sought to achieve a balance 
between providing a narrative of superpower relations, with an account of events occurring 
within the Cold War Arctic - inclusive of the small and medium Arctic states as well as 
accommodating for indigenous and Arctic environmental history perspectives. One of the aims 
of this approach is to demonstrate the role that small and medium states had in accepting or 
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rejecting the historical Cold War Arctic regional order, while also recognizing their political 
contribution towards the peaceful end to the Cold War.    
In Chapter 2, I applied English School (ES) theory to the research question of how to identify 
the Arctic regional order both past and presently. Firstly, I explained how traditional realist 
approaches failed to account for the global rise of regions in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
Since realism could not explain the macro-level change occurring in the Arctic in the post-Cold 
War era, I justified the adoption of an ES approach as it bridges both traditional IR explanations 
of security and liberal institutional approaches. The ES has the ability to explain both the 
historical and contemporary changes in the Arctic security order, in addition to being able to 
engage with normative understandings of how security has changed in the post-Cold War era. 
The ES also effectively highlights how, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the development of 
regions and regional institutions greatly contributed towards changing security practices 
towards more cooperative endeavours and in turn, the way in which security is understood by 
politicians, policy planners and states.   
Two key ES concepts that I utilised were international society and regional security complex 
theory (RSCT), both of which provide an overarching structure upon which I developed my 
political analysis of Arctic regional development. I showed how, when combined, these two 
approaches can provide a detailed explanation of the evolution of the three historical regional 
orders within the Arctic, while at the same time demonstrating the international sources of 
systemic change.  To achieve this, I merged two different typologies together: Buzan’s (2012b) 
typology of regional society and Bailes and Cotty’s (2006) typology of regional security 
cooperation.    
In conjunction with the ES approaches of regional society and RSCT, I utilised Stewart-
Ingersoll and Frazier’s (2012) RPSF to demonstrate how the regional leadership tendencies of 
the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation has significantly influenced change 
in the Arctic throughout the three historic stages of Arctic regional development. Specifically, 
I utilised the RPSF for its analytical ability to discern whether each of the two Arctic regional 
powers chose to engage in collective security arrangements with other states within the region 
during each of the three historical periods. To identify the type of regional leadership that exists 
within a region, I outlined the different leadership and foreign policy configurations advocated 




9.2 Key Findings - Chapters 3 and 4: The Cold War Arctic order 
The tight and loose Cold War bipolar era was the focus of Chapter 3, whereas the subsequent 
period of incipient multipolarity, outlined in (Chapter 4) demonstrates how the pace of change 
became more pronounced during this period of détente, especially during the transition stage 
that began in the mid-1980s under the Reagan/Gorbachev leadership.  
As per the RPSF, I categorised the US and the USSR as being dissatisfied powers throughout 
the Cold War, since the irreconcilable political and ideological differences between the two 
superpowers served to motivate a competitive military rivalry both in the Arctic and globally, 
that threatened the very survival of the other. While the Arctic never witnessed 'hot' conflict, 
militarisation served as a defensive strategy that both sought to prevent superpower expansion 
into the other’s bloc and to deter against a nuclear attack emerging from the polar region. Arctic 
defence efforts were therefore mainly focused on nuclear deterrence, despite the realisation 
that should conflict break out in the Arctic periphery, it could escalate into total nuclear war.  
The high levels of superpower tension and militarization in the Arctic during the Cold War can 
be explained through the RPSF by categorizing the Cold War Arctic as a strength-based system, 
(see Table 7.1) since it lacked inclusive, institutionalised regional security mechanisms. There 
are many disadvantages of this type of system, the most important one being that strength-
based systems are less than effective for providing peace and security within the RSC. This is 
because by their nature, strength-based systems are competitive, divisive and exclusive and 
operate along the mandates of a traditional balance of power system. These features were also 
observable within the broader international system indicating that the Arctic mirrored the Cold 
War bipolar international security order.  
Within Buzan’s (2012b) typology of international societies, I identified the Cold War Arctic 
as operating within a coexistent international society, described by Buzan as a society where 
the basic institutions are intact and whereby this society of states functions within a pluralist 
Westphalian system. In Chapter 2, it was explained how alliances are likely to be the 
corresponding form of security cooperation within a coexistent society since states adhere to 
traditional Westphalian understandings of security. This has proven to be accurate with respect 
to the Cold War Arctic where the NATO security alliance had a considerable influence not 
only on security outcomes in the region but also on the growth of regional society. I concluded 
that the political socialization of Arctic states was heavily restricted during the era of bipolarity 
by the parameters of the strength-based, BOP alliance system.  
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My analysis of the Cold War Arctic as a strength-based security order operating within the 
confines of a coexistent/Westphalian international society illustrates why the regional 
leadership was less than optimal and produce negligible security outcomes. Since the Arctic 
regional powers were focused primarily on systemic survival and national security objectives, 
they created alliance structures that were exclusionary, had limited aims, and arguably, limited 
collective benefits, since they primarily served superpower interests. At the same time, these 
alliance structures, through their collective defence guarantee locked member states into the 
respective blocs.  
For most of the Cold War, the two superpowers pursued mainly protectionist and reactive 
foreign policies. However, there were two periods of exception to this is when, during the early 
tight bipolar era in the immediate years following WWII: the US pursued a proactive revisionist 
policy, resulting in the creation of new institutional security structures including NATO and 
NORAD. Secondly, during the era of incipient multipolarity both the US and the Soviet Union 
sought to revise the Cold War order through different strategies. In Chapter 4, it was shown 
how a combination of circumstances including the deepening Soviet economic crisis, another 
close-call nuclear scare in the early 1980s, in addition to Soviet leadership change, eventually 
led to new forces of change in superpower relations. I advocate that a main contributory factor 
was the dynamic individualism and political leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, who broke with 
precedence and pursued a radically different foreign policy from his predecessors. Gorbachev’s 
revisionist foreign policy can be largely contributed to the peaceful end of the Cold War and 
with initiating significant and positive long-term changes in the Arctic region. In this way, I 
advocate that the Soviet Union demonstrated regional leadership attributes in the Arctic during 
the era of incipient multipolarity.  
However, under the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) the US once again engaged in 
a proactive foreign policy in the era of incipient multipolarity with less positive results. This is 
because Regan sought to promote a ‘Star wars’ program of space-based militarization and 
missile defense, which he believed would annihilate the threat of nuclear weapons, thus ending 
the Cold War. Had it been successful, the Star wars program may have drastically changed the 
systemic balance of power, most likely in America’s favour – thus aggravating the superpower 
conflict rather than ending it.  
Chapter 4 outlined and explained the processes of accelerated change that transformed the 
international political system from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian world. These changes 
were already occurring during the final years of the Cold War, at the sub-state, supra-state 
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(regional) level and international levels of the political system. During his Murmansk speech 
in 1987, Gorbachev initiated his strategy of appeasement, outlining that the Arctic should be 
an area which the west and Russia could collaborate on. In this way, Gorbachev introduced 
new and long-term changes in the Arctic that began with developing international Arctic 
cooperation in non-strategic areas, which then led to the de-securitization of the region. 
However, military security remained under the aegis of the superpowers who chose to engage 
in exclusive bi-lateral talks for arms reduction and did not invite the other Arctic states to 
attend. Gorbachev’s Murmansk initiative nonetheless enabled the Arctic to finally break free 
from Cold War constraints and become one of the central sites for fundamental political change 
and in just a few short years bring about the peaceful end to the Cold War.  
In the Arctic, these changes included the development of a circumpolar indigenous political 
movement, the anti-nuclear campaign, the expanding membership and integration agenda of 
the EU, in addition to the growth of environmental activism alongside scientific advancements 
in Arctic environmental and climate change research. Arctic indigenous and environmental 
movements emerged during the late 1970s and early 1980s to critique Cold War militarization 
and to broaden the security agenda beyond that of the nuclear conflict. As a result, security had 
begun to be reconceptualized in the era of incipient multipolarity towards a broader and 
multifaceted concept that extended beyond traditional military understandings.   
An Arctic regional society began to emerge during this period which resulted in the formerly 
coexistent international society - operational in the Arctic during the era of tight and loose 
bipolarity, gradually transitioning to a cooperative regional society. The emergence of a 
cooperative Arctic regional society during the period of détente also signified that the Arctic 
had transitioned from a strength-based system to a concert-based system as categorised through 
the RPSF. The Arctic demonstrated emerging features of a concert-based order at this time 
since there was a growing level of cooperation (on specific, agreed upon security issues) 
amongst the most powerful states within the region. In agreement with Stewart-Ingersoll and 
Frazier (2012:80) I consider that it is possible for a concert-based order to occur within a bipolar 
regional order, and demonstrate this by reviewing how, from 1987 onwards, Arctic states took 
up Gorbachev’s proposal for east-west Arctic cooperation on specific, non-strategic issues. 
There was a growing awareness amongst Arctic states, and non-state actors, that institutions 
could exert considerable power in reshaping the political landscape.  The accession of 
European Arctic states to EFTA membership in the 1970s and the progress made towards 
European integration, demonstrates that the rise of regionalism was a global project. It is 
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important to emphasize here the significant finding of there being a direct causal relationship 
between the growth of regional society and the development of cooperative regional 
institutions. Owing to Gorbachev’s Murmansk initiative, an Arctic security regime began to be 
discussed and imagined. However, the crucial idea of establishing an Arctic regional institution 
was slow to emerge owing to the indifference of the superpowers towards establish an inter-
governmental institution for the Arctic. Although Gorbachev had initially proposed 
international cooperation in the Arctic, this served as a means for appeasing the West and 
bringing the US to the negotiating table for strategic arms reduction talks. His proposal did not 
extend towards the creation of institutional structures. Yet Gorbachev’s ideas were 
enthusiastically taken up and expanded upon by the small and medium Arctic states. Finland, 
made a significant contribution during the era of incipient multipolarity from 1989 to 1991 
towards the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) which in 
turn, provided an institutional template for the Arctic Council almost a decade later. 
While conventional accounts of Cold War history tend to present NATO history as an 
uncomplicated and unanimous alliance solidified under US leadership, a revisionist account of 
Cold War Arctic history has revealed that this was not the case. Despite the hopes of the small 
and medium Arctic states that NATO would provide a multilateral forum through which 
security could be brokered with the US, the reality shows that throughout the Cold War, the 
relationship between the NATO Arctic member states and the US were predominately bi-
lateral. In Chapter 3 it became evident that even during the height of the superpower tensions, 
when US/NATO security guarantees were considered essential, the security and political 
interests of the small and medium Arctic states were often ignored or not satisfactorily met. 
Therefore, in my revisionist account of Cold War Arctic history I have drawn attention to the 
security dilemma faced by the small and medium NATO Arctic states who were restrained 
from being able to pursue alternative security outcomes that could have lessened the threat of 
superpower and nuclear war. In the case of neutral Sweden and Finland, they too were 
restrained from alternative pathways out of concern of negatively impacting the Northern 
balance.  
A secondary finding in Chapter 3 reveals that Finnish and Swedish neutrality played a vital 
role in preserving an essential buffer zone between the East and Western Arctic during the Cold 
War. Although Finland expressed considerable anxiety over the Friendship and Mutual 
Assurance Treaty that it had been required to sign with the Soviet Union at the beginning of 
the Cold War, the treaty also had significant advantages, for it kept the Soviets content and 
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Finland out of the Warsaw Pact. This also contributed to the creation of a conflict-free zone 
consisting of neutral Sweden and Finland that resided between the Western-NATO bloc and 
the Soviet Union in the Arctic: a necessary precaution to prevent tensions escalating into open 
conflict along border zones.    
Small and medium Arctic state relations with the US during the tight and loose bipolar era can 
be summarised as being less than satisfactory. Decreasing levels of trust and political support 
occurred amongst the small and medium Arctic states as they became more concerned over the 
excessive and often reckless policies of militarisation that the superpowers stubbornly pursued. 
Another key issue surrounding Arctic NATO member-states’ dissatisfaction with the US 
involved America’s lack of concern about seeking permission or informing host-states about 
the deployment of nuclear weapons on overseas territories (Greenland and Iceland). This 
understandably led to resentment which was expressed by these states in several ways, one of 
which was the reluctance to concede to US military demands through the revision of military 
defense agreements, while the decision by Arctic states not to pursue their own nuclear 
weapons programs also contributed to the growth of anti-nuclear policies (Canada, Sweden, 
Finland). As such, it can be concluded that the small and medium Arctic states also played a 
role in the gradual structural alterations witnessed within the bipolar Cold War Arctic order.  
9.3 –Key findings – Chapter 5: The post-Cold War Arctic transition period 
Efforts towards strengthening Arctic regional cooperation that had begun during the period of 
incipient multipolarity continued during the post-Cold War transitional period. The 1990s 
proved to be a pivotal time in Arctic history and is immensely important for understanding the 
structure of the current Arctic security order.  
In Chapter 5, an analysis of the post-Cold War Arctic revealed that a political vacuum left by 
the retreating superpowers at the end of the Cold War created new opportunities for regional 
cooperation and development. The United States unmistakably demonstrated signs of being a 
status quo power during the 1990s and early 2000s due to its disinterest in promoting policies 
that would initiate long-term changes to the Arctic security order. Significant findings from 
this chapter can be grouped into three categories. The first group of findings involves the United 
States and why it was unwilling to behave as a regional leader, instead choosing to maintain 
the Cold War status quo security order. The second group of findings focus on Russia’s 
inability to play the role of reginal leader in the post-Soviet transition period owing to domestic 
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instability, while the third set of findings reveal how and why Canada took up a regional 
leadership role in place of the US. 
With respect to the United States, there are three points of importance here. Firstly, the lack of 
leadership by the H.W. Bush Administration during the critical juncture resulted in the failure 
to produce a new post-Cold War American grand strategy. Continued mistrust of Russia led to 
the retention of Cold War perceptions and political structures, including the NATO concert-
based alliance. In Chapter 5 it was shown how US-Russian relations played out during the 
post-Cold War critical juncture from 1989-1994 when opportunities for a new European 
security architecture were being raised. Besides the option of retaining NATO, there were two 
other potential solutions that could have been adopted: Gorbachev’s OSCE-based ‘Common 
European Home’ initiative and Russian NATO membership. Although it was shown that the 
OSCE represented an inclusive, alternative structure for European security cooperation, the 
US, was unwilling to consider this option since it would most likely have meant a loss of US 
power within the institution. As such the OSCE was not granted the necessary decision-making 
powers to supersede NATO.  
Secondly, the post-Cold War reinvention of NATO ultimately led to the security overlap that 
exists in the Arctic region today. The idea behind regional security overlap, as promoted by 
Adler and Greave (2009) suggest that when two regional orders operate simultaneously, this 
produces different and often contradictory political and security processes. I conclude that 
without effective leadership from one of the great powers in the Arctic (the United States or 
Russia), the transformation of the post-Cold War Arctic was incomplete. While a lack of US 
interest in the region allowed the space for the Canadian AC initiative to emerged from civil 
society, the original plans were altered owing to US resistance and as a result an integrated 
security order was not created. The American preference for excluding military security 
dialogue and policy-making from the AC served a dual purpose: first to protect American 
sovereignty and hegemony in the Arctic from being eroded by a new international institution 
(the AC), and secondly, it ensured that NATO, led by the US, remained the predominant 
security actor operating in the region. An additional point to consider is that by keeping security 
off the AC agenda, the US has chosen to sustain the Westphalian, Cold War balance-of-power 
system in the region. The US decision can also be understood from a broader Euro-Atlantic 
context and the preservation of NATO in the post-Cold War European security architecture.   
Having argued that the US did not take on the role of regional leadership or create a unipolar 
regional hegemony in the Arctic, my third finding reveals that the United States instead adopted 
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a regional custodianship role in the Arctic, a position it continues to hold in the present day. 
As explained through the RPSF, a regional custodian is said to be a status quo power that has 
little interest in changing the regional security order but is instead content to provide a 
stabilizing function within the existing order. For the United States, this role involved 
maintaining the status quo, NATO-led security order established during the Cold War. As such, 
the US retained a military presence in the region through strategic overseas airbases such as 
Thule AFB in Greenland, and Keflavik AFB in Iceland. Since the US proved that it was capable 
of stepping up at a critical moment to exert significant political influence and prevent change 
to the Arctic security order, this demonstrates that the post-Cold War Arctic can best be 
described as a uni-multipolar regional order.  
In the second group of findings, it was illustrated how the RF, struggling in its post-Soviet 
transition, was unable to take up a regional leadership role in the Arctic. Although the Yeltsin 
Administration professed its support for the AC initiative it was financially restricted from 
actively participating at the crucial stage of negotiations resulting in Russia being almost 
entirely absent for the first two years the AC was operational (1996-98). The immediate years 
of the post-Cold War era also proved contentious for US-Russian Arctic security relations 
especially regarding US naval activities in the Russian Arctic. Russia’s perceived military 
vulnerability vis-à-vis the United States which led to a lack of trust and meant that it took longer 
to shift Russian attitudes away from Cold War attitudes.   
Canada, rather than the United States, took on a regional leadership role in the post-Cold War 
era. As a middle power, Canada envisioned the Arctic as a multipolar regional order and 
therefore sought to develop an inclusive institutional structure that would provide the eight 
Arctic states with a multilateral forum through which they could engage in political 
cooperation. Canada’s leadership role was most evident through its heavy involvement in the 
overall design process for creating the institutional architecture of the AC. I showed how 
Canadian civil society and indigenous Arctic groups were heavily involved in the development 
of an Arctic regional institution. These groups included Canadian indigenous leaders and the 
arms control movement working in tandem towards redefining the post-Cold War Arctic 
security agenda. This demonstrates how military security, environmental conservation and 
indigenous rights in the Arctic were not initially seen as separate issues but were instead 
considered to be inter-connected.   
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9.4 – Key findings Chapters 6, 7 and 8 
In Chapter 6, I identified key political developments that have occurred within the current 
Arctic region order from 1996-2020. As with previous historical chapters, I show how 
leadership turnover (or lack thereof in the case of the Soviet Union and present-day Russia) 
has shaped regional and foreign policy. This in turn has assisted in identifying the RPSF roles 
and foreign policy orientations of the United States and Russia during the post-Cold War era 
of Arctic regional development (see table 6.2 in Chapter 6). However, I began the chapter by 
demonstrating how systemic factors and political culture also impact decision-making 
processes. In section 6.1.1, I discussed two factors identified by Steinburg (2014) that 
implicitly steer the direction of US policymaking in the Arctic: namely institutionalization and 
territorialisation. I argue that these enduring elements of US Arctic policy help to explain why 
key features of American Arctic strategies have remained relatively consistent despite changes 
in political leadership. 
In section 6.1.2 I analysed the US’ participation in the AC from 1996-2008, including the two-
year period when the US first held the AC Chairmanship from 1998-2000. It has been shown 
that the US did exhibit leadership in the area of climate change research during its first 
chairmanship through the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) which has been 
considered as one of the most influential reports ever published by the AC working groups. 
However, the US has also demonstrated a lack of institutional loyalty to the AC that has 
undermined support for its processes, for instance between 2009 and 2010 the US chose to 
engage in a series of inter-state negotiations outside of the AC with the four other Arctic coastal 
states that resulted in the creation of a new Arctic Five (A5) forum. In section 6.3, I showed 
how the A5 forum served to circumvent the AC framework to create a new Arctic Ocean 
management regime, namely the Ilulissat Declaration. The Ilulissat process demonstrated the 
role that the US played in deciding to re-prioritise the AC over the A5 forum. The fact that the 
other four members of the A5 followed the lead of the US when it chose to re-commit to the 
AC suggests that the US still has the power capability to play a regional leadership role in the 
region and hence, I categorise the Arctic regional order as uni-multipolar. Nonetheless, the 
Ilulissat process highlights the latent ability (power) the US still has to act as a regional leader 
in strengthening or weakening Arctic institutional processes. The political responses of the 
small Arctic states excluded from the A5 negotiations also deserves mentioning since the 
Icelandic response demonstrated how small states can express their dissatisfaction through 
creative and unanticipated ways. For Iceland this involved developing an alternative forum, 
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namely ‘the Arctic Circle’ assembly. Although not intended to replace the AC, the forum has, 
since its establishment, proven to be a new and expansive mechanism for Arctic dialogue.  
Following from this, In section 6.1.4. I discussed the changes to US Arctic policy during the 
Obama Presidency (2009-2017) outlining how during this era of American politics the Obama 
Administration strived to balance domestic energy security interests with an active climate 
change policy in the Arctic. The Obama Administration’s efforts to implement bureaucratic 
reform could arguably be said to have been only marginally effective. This is because they 
were enacted with the aim of streamlining US Arctic policy and to prepare for the US’ second 
chairmanship of the AC from 2015-2017. However, I conclude that although President Obama 
envisioned that the US would demonstrate Arctic regional leadership during the US’ second 
chairmanship of the AC, the successes it achieved were small and issue-specific at best, without 
any significant long-term innovations to further develop Arctic regional cooperation.  
The election of republican candidate Donald Trump to the American presidency in 2016 
heralded the beginning of a turbulent period of global politics and rising uncertainty about the 
future of climate change politics in the Arctic. In section 6.1.5 I explained that although the 
Trump Administration initially expressed its support of the AC, Trump’s denial about the 
existence of climate change has significantly undermined AC processes. During an AC SAO 
meeting held in Rovanemi in 2019, the US spoke aggressively about Russian and Chinese 
policies in the Arctic while blocking any consensus agreement on climate change action. I 
highlighted the long-term implications of the US’ actions with respect to delaying progress on 
the AC’s Strategy plan for future reform of the organisation. The US DoD’s 2018 National 
Defence Strategy served as a watershed for US foreign policy as it outlined how the US no 
longer perceived terrorism as the key threat to homeland security but instead emphasised the 
return to ‘inter-state competition’ with China and Russia. The US perceives that great power 
competition is also occurring in the Arctic and is identified as a potential threat to US national 
interests since both Russia and China are active players in the region. Since the US identifies 
both of these states as being active players in the Arctic region, the US will likely seek to 
counter any perceived threat to the status quo order in the Arctic. In this way, I argue that the 
US continues to be a status quo power in the Arctic that pursues a predominantly reactive 
foreign policy. This is because the US has not demonstrated the ability to proactively steer the 
future direction of Arctic regional development. As such, it is likely that the US will continue 
to pursue its national objectives in the Arctic through limited forms of multilateralism while 
seeking to defend the status quo order through protectionist foreign policy strategies.  Finally, 
380 
 
the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020 has led to an international crisis 
and raised questions about lack of US global leadership. This could also have far reaching 
impacts on the future of the Arctic regional cooperation. As a region with little security 
architecture, shifts in the global balance of power may have a significant impact on inter-state 
cooperation in the Arctic and require significant reforms of the AC.   
In section 6.2.1 I presented an overview of Russian political developments from 1996-2007. 
This period witnessed the transfer of power from President Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin who 
began his long reign in 2000. During the first and second terms of Vladimir Putin, I outlined 
how a revived interest in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) led to the 2007 
flag planting expedition in the North Pole. Although considered as a political stunt to rally 
support for the Putin regime, this event also raised international concerns and rebuke and was 
also a catalyst for the West to become more engaged in the Arctic. In this way I consider Russia 
to have been proactive in shaping the Arctic regional order during this time.  I also analysed 
the impact of the Putin presidencies on Russia’s ability to contribute to the AC and Russia’s 
performance during its first Chairmanship of the AC from 2004-2006. Following from this, in 
section 6.2.2., I recounted developments in Russia’s Arctic polices during the brief intermittent 
period from 2008-2011 when Dmitry Medvedev was appointed president while Putin stepped 
down and became Prime Minister. Russian economic interests and great power status continued 
to be the driving force influencing the Kremlin’s Arctic strategy as detailed in policy 
documents such as Foundations of the Russian Federation’s National Arctic Policy to 2020, 
issued in 2008. In section 6.2.3., I then reflect on political developments during Putin’s third 
and fourth term from 2012-2020. Despite Western sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of 
Ukraine, I demonstrated that Arctic regional cooperation remained amicable. This I argued was 
because Russia values that it is a full member which benefits from the collective decision-
making structures of the AC in addition to the international maritime rules-based system of 
UNCLOS. This all suggests that Russia is satisfied with the political order in the Arctic. 
Similarly, Russia has recognised the A5 forum in national policy documents as a legitimate 
entity through which to conduct more exclusive forms of Arctic cooperation. I conclude that 
Russian satisfaction with the political order could partially explain why Russia does not feel 
compelled to take on a stronger regional leadership role in the region.  
I reviewed the Russia’s new Arctic strategy in March 2020 and concluded that the document 
exhibits more continuity than change in its policies however it remains to be seen if Putin’s 
ambitious targets for the NSR to increase shipping to 80 million tonnes per year by 2021 will 
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be achieved. The lack of leadership by Putin during the Covid-19 pandemic in Russia has been 
an unanticipated challenge to his popularity ratings and could his plans to change the 
constitution and pursue a further presidential term to 2024. Recent events in the Russian Arctic 
pertaining to the Norilsk oil spill has also raised questions about Russia’s international 
reputation and its impending chairmanship of the Arctic Council due to commence in 2021. I 
concluded by stating that this may impact Russia’s relations in the Arctic. In order to 
demonstrate that it is capable of Arctic regional leadership, in a number of key areas including 
climate change action, scientific cooperation and support for indigenous northerners and 
human rights. Russia has a lot to prove and will have to prepare an ambitious agenda if it seeks 
to gain international respect as a leading Arctic power – however it remains to be seen if Russia 
can do so.    
In section 6.4, I engaged with how political developments in the contemporary Arctic order fit 
into the gradual expansion of regional society. By utilising Buzan’s (2004) ES model of 
regional institutions, I illustrated how political processes in the Arctic today continue to be 
derived from those traditional ES institutions identified in Chapter 2 including: the balance of 
power, great power management, territorialisation and sovereignty; all of which continue to 
influence foreign policy and security priorities of the Arctic regional powers. However, I 
argued that because of regional security overlap, the Arctic RSC has not yet evolved from a 
cooperative to a convergent regional society. This is because the continuation of the Cold War 
security structures has prevented the emergence of new, institutionalized forms of security that 
would lead to an integrated security order.  Although Arctic regional society has not evolved 
past a cooperative society it has nonetheless built on the successes achieved during the post-
Cold War transition years and has expanded considerably over the past 22 years. Strong 
evidence of this can be observed through the growing range of issue-specific institutions in 
existence in the Arctic region (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 6), especially in the policy areas of 
indigenous rights and participation, but also with respect to Arctic environmental governance. 
More recently, the Canadian initiative to establishment of the AEC may imply that economic 
cooperation may be the next step towards greater levels of regional integration in the Arctic. 
In time, this could lead to the development of an Arctic security institution. However, first the 
problem of regional security overlap must be overcome. Only then it will be possible for Arctic 
regional society to evolve to a higher level of integration.  
In Chapter 7, I returned to military security issues, beginning with a review of US and Russian 
Arctic defence strategies (section 7.1.1. and 7.1.2) in order to assess the Arctic powers 
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influence in shaping the post-Cold War Arctic security order. I argue that American political 
culture and its post-Cold War global agenda continues to influence the 21st century Arctic 
security order. Where NATO is concerned, I outlined that although the US does not explicitly 
refer to NATO as being the primary mechanism through which to implement its Arctic defence 
strategy, the latest US Arctic strategy, issued June 2019 by the DoD, reveals that the US seeks 
to coordinate its Arctic strategies with “allies and partner states” indicating potential NATO 
involvement while the US intends to focus on upgrading missile defence and communications 
networks. Significantly, the 2019 Arctic strategy indicates that the US does not seek to become 
an Arctic military hegemon and that any investment in maritime capabilities will be limited.  
In section 7.1.2., I traced Russia’s attempts to modernize its military strategy and to implement 
military reform in the Putin era. I argued that to understand Russia’s Arctic defence strategies 
in a clearer light, it is important to view them within the overall context of military upgrades 
and reform rather than excessive militarisation. While there have been increasing levels of 
military activity in the High North, Western fears over Russian remilitarization need to be put 
into perspective given that upgrades to Russia’s military hardware were long overdue from 
years of neglect during the 1990s. At the same time, fluctuating oil prices, economic sanctions 
and a struggling national economy imply that Russia’s military programs will not reach 
previous Cold War levels of spending. The AZRF has witnessed a revival of the Northern Fleet, 
and recently in June 2020, it has attained the status of military district, signifying its promotion 
to higher levels in the military command structure amidst the growing strategic importance of 
the Russian Arctic. Ongoing efforts to upgrade or construct six new Arctic military bases along 
the NSR also indicates the economic and military importance of the region. However, Russia 
recognises that a return to the securitization of the High North as witnessed during the Cold 
War is not in its best interests, nor does it have the capacity to sustain high levels of military 
spending to protect its vast northern coastal regions should tensions escalate. In the post-
Ukraine period of Russian politics, Russia revised its military strategy through putting its 
nuclear forces on high alert and creating new Arctic brigades deployed to its north-western 
borders. Yet I conclude that Russia did not seek to actively revise the Arctic security order 
through foreign policy revisionism in the aftermath of Ukraine but instead acted defensively in 
eventuality of a Western response.   
In section 7.2.1., I considered the role of NATO in the post-Cold War Arctic by reviewing 
NATOs present-day security agenda in the High North. The fact that NATO remains the 
primary security institution in the Arctic region signifies that the Cold War security system 
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remains intact. As such regional security overlap continues to underlie the security order in the 
Arctic. Due to the inherent nature of NATO’s political and organisational structure as a Cold 
War alliance created to fight a specific enemy – I argue that NATO obtains its modus operandi 
through political and military conflict with Russia. While NATO has sought to expand its 
security agenda in the post-Cold War years, I argue that the primary means through which 
NATO can continue to justify its existence is to protect the West against a perceived Russian 
threat. The problem is that Russia has exacerbated this situation due to its actions in Ukraine 
and has revived elements of the Cold War mindset and led to concerns amongst Arctic states 
that they may be under threat from Russia. Through an analysis of US Arctic strategies and 
foreign policy documents in chapter 6, it was shown how the United States now perceives the 
return to great power competition in the international system and has explicitly identified 
Russia and China as being global competitors and rival powers to the US.  
In the Arctic I outlined how the 2000s witnessed a return of NATO activities in NATO Arctic 
states through the multinational military exercises such as Cold Response which was initiated 
in 2006. These exercises increased both in size and frequency - gradually at first, then more 
rapidly in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian conflict in 
2014. In section 7.2.2 I reviewed NATO’s reaction to the Ukrainian conflict and how this 
impacted the Arctic security order. I also discussed the US-NATO relationship during the 
current Trump Administration to identify current challenges facing the alliance and how the 
Trump Administration could seek to shape the present and near-future security agenda in the 
Arctic. Specific issues include the divisive issue of military spending amongst alliance 
members and the possibility of Trump withdrawing the US from the alliance.   
In section 7.2.3 I identified Russia’s position on NATO and Arctic security post-Ukraine, by 
deconstructing speeches from Russian government officials including President Putin and 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Russia has, since the end of the Cold War, retained a constant 
anti-NATO stance that has only been strengthened in the post-Ukrainian era by Western 
sanctions, the suspension of the NATO-Russian Council and other military and diplomatic 
channels of communications.  Nonetheless, it was shown how Russia continued to support the 
AC in the aftermath of Ukraine, with various statements made by high ranking Russian officials 
declaring that the Arctic was a relatively peaceful region where a stronger NATO presence was 
not required. I therefore concluded that Russia will likely maintain its status quo position within 
the Arctic region providing that no detrimental changes to the Arctic security order occur such 
as pre-emptive NATO action or an escalation of NATO military troops near the Russian border. 
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This would undoubtedly destabilise the Arctic balance and potentially lead dangerous scenarios 
including a rapid escalation and concentration of force could lead to armed conflict: a situation 
equally undesirable for all Arctic states, while also undoing much of the positive developments 
of regional transformation.  
In Chapter 8, I began by reviewing the defence policies and Arctic strategies of the five small 
and medium Arctic states in section 8.1, in addition to how these small and medium Arctic 
states currently view NATO’s aspirations in the Arctic. A key finding revealed that no 
unanimous consensus exists amongst these states calling for a greater NATO Arctic presence 
nor was there a strong agreement to support NATO’s activities in the High North. Although 
Norway has remained the most consistent of all the NATO Arctic member states regarding its 
support for a NATO presence in the Arctic – the other small and medium Arctic states have 
exhibited difference perspectives. Canada, for example, repeatedly prevented NATO from 
issuing a statement on its objectives in the Arctic after at least two NATO Summit meetings 
on the grounds that it is against a stronger international presence in the region. With respect to 
the three European NATO Arctic states; Denmark/Greenland, Iceland and Norway, I illustrate 
that the US has sought to revive its basing agreements with these states in the post-Cold War 
era. Additionally, the growing influence of China in the Arctic has also created a new dynamic 
within the security order and increased US interest in these states which China has been 
economically courting. Regarding the two non-NATO Arctic states (Sweden and Finland), I 
advocated that although the possibility of Swedish and Finnish NATO membership remains 
unlikely in the near future, these two countries have nonetheless attained closer ties to NATO. 
For instance, Sweden and Finland are now members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
and the Enhanced Opportunity Partnerships (EOP) programs resulting in these states no longer 
retaining their ‘neutral’ foreign policies. The two states have also become more forthright about 
their increasing alignment towards the West and the United States as can be witnessed through 
the signing of the Trilateral defence agreement between Sweden, Finland and the United States 
in 2018.  
In the Arctic, I demonstrated how NATO has gradually increased its military activities in the 
last twenty-years primarily though Multinational Military Exercises (MMEs). In section 8.2, I 
analyse the intent and frequency behind conducting large-scale multinational military exercises 
(MMEs) in the European Arctic in the post-Cold War era. An analysis of the frequency of 
Arctic MMEs served the purpose of assessing the degree to which NATO is present in the 
Arctic and how it perceives its role in the region. I chose to specifically focus on the Barents 
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Euro Arctic Region (BEAR) due to the relative proximity to the Russian border and the fact 
that the majority of Arctic MMEs have been concentrated in this area. I showed how NATO 
has increased its presence in the Arctic through MMEs, gradually throughout the 2000s and 
then more rapidly after 2014 when Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine triggered concerns 
amongst Arctic states. Second, MMEs also serve as way to assess Russian responses to NATO 
MMEs and to review if Russia’s increased Arctic military activities are in response to NATO 
MMEs. In Section 8.2.2. I therefore focused on evaluating Russian military exercises in the 
Arctic, discussing the structure of such exercises, when and why they occur and observe new 
developments involving the inclusion of other state participants including China. I highlighted 
the times when Russia has declared snap exercises in the Arctic as a response to NATO 
exercises arguing that this serves both a political and strategic aim. While Russia has sought to 
showcase its military preparedness in the Arctic, Russian Arctic exercises have also served the 
purpose of expressing Russia’s continual dissatisfaction with NATO exercises - which are 
perceived to be aimed against Russia. Having evaluated the political impacts that MMEs have 
had on the Arctic security order, I conclude how there is a cycle of action and reaction involved 
that serves to increase the potential for conflict and heighten the security dilemma rather than 
strengthening Arctic regional security. Both NATO and Russian MMEs are a considerable part 
of the problem and greater efforts must be made by both sides to increase transparency and 
safety of exercises in the BEAR. I also consider how the small and medium Arctic states have 
a role to play in rejecting proposals for a stronger NATO presence in the region and to 
reconsider hosting and/or participation in NATO-led MMEs. Rationally, this could only be 
done if there are effective agreements in place to ensure that Russia’s current risky military 
behaviour including violations of airspace and aircraft interceptions come to an end. An 
increased Arctic military presence through NATO and Russian-led MMEs only serve to 
aggravate tensions in the BEAR. I ague that both sides need to resist the urge to increase their 
dependency on nuclear weapons as this will further diminish the chances that nuclear arms 
control measures will be successful in the near future (Sauer 2016:20). I also advocate that the 
OSCE Vienna Document needs to be urgently updated to ensure full compliance and due 
notification for all exercises. At the same time, new mechanisms of confidence building and 
security cooperation between Russia and the West must be formulated. I concluded this chapter 
by stating that the only way to combat the security dilemma in the Arctic is to provide a more 
effective security architecture that is inclusive of Russia and one that can achieve tangible 
results with respect to military dialogue and security cooperation.  
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9.5 – Suggestions for further research – exploring alternative collective 
security arrangements in the Arctic  
In the past two decades the AC has expanded its fora from the original environmental-led focus 
of the AEPS in the 1990s to a broadened security agenda that includes non-strategic issues in 
addition to economic security and interdependence, as witnessed with the more recent creation 
of the Arctic Economic Council (2014) which functions as an independent body. Authors such 
as Chamberlain (2012), Myers (2016) and Oskarsson (2014) consider the inclusion of ‘soft’ 
security issues to be a necessary development in the AC multilateral forums since the Arctic 
region is tied to security developments in Europe and elsewhere. However, an unanticipated 
event such as the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 – followed by further events or crises such as an 
environmental disaster, (natural or manmade) i.e. the Norilsk oil spill in the Russian Arctic in 
May 2020,  followed by a potential global recession or economic crisis could all trigger policy 
change in the Arctic at a faster rate. Furthermore, The AC observes that “Indigenous peoples 
of the Arctic have historically almost always been severely impacted by pandemics and have 
shown a higher mortality rate than communities further South” (Arctc Council 2020). There 
will likely be long-term impacts from Covid-19 on multiple dimensions of Arctic security 
ranging from human security and health to economic, political and military security. However, 
the long-term effects from the pandemic on the Arctic region cannot yet fully understood. 
Although the pandemic did not originate in the Arctic it nonetheless significantly impacted the 
political, economic and security activities of Arctic states. In this way, Diehl (2003:4) suggests 
that it is important to pay special attention to regional threats that have negative externalities 
or potential for spillover effects that could originate outside the Arctic. The geopolitical 
situation in the Arctic is also said to have deteriorated as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, 
which has exacerbated the growing power disparities between the US and other regional and 
global powers. While the US failed to provide global leadership during the pandemic, it is now 
actively seeking to counteract the increasing amounts of Russian and Chinese activities in the 
Arctic through a stronger political and military presence. Depending on the responses of Arctic 
states, there is the possibility that the AC, despite having working groups for emergency 
preparedness and disaster response, may be unable to formulate an appropriate response if the 
security situation declines. This is because security cooperation is limited to specific areas such 
as Search and Rescue and maritime safety and pollution monitoring. The ongoing exclusion of 
military security issues and the AC’s limited powers in the creation of legally binding 
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agreements are two such obstacle that could prevent the AC from being able to coordinate an 
effective multilateral response to a potential Arctic security crisis in the future.  
The merits and demerits of institutionalising security is a strongly contested topic. Both sides 
of the argument will be considered here while also applying the findings from the RPSF on the 
Arctic regional order to determine the potential for collective security arrangements in the 
region. The unique combination of events that contributed to the development of the Arctic 
region at the end of the Cold War gives evidence that strong regional leadership during periods 
of critical change can influence long-term change, regional stability and cooperation. While a 
collective Arctic security arrangement was not proposed at the end of the Cold War, nor has it 
been considered to date, history would suggest that the potential exists for the development of 
new security mechanisms. It has been shown in Chapter 4 that Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts 
towards greater Arctic security cooperation in the final years of the Cold War were successful 
and led to the development of an Arctic regionalisation. Then, in Chapter 5 I showed through 
Gorbachev’s Common European Home initiative, he envisioned a new, post-Cold War security 
architecture for Europe, with the OSCE becoming the overarching collective security 
organisation within the Euro-Atlantic area. This unfortunately, was prevented from occurring 
by the US who sought to maintain the Cold War structures through NATO in order to retain its 
regional military hegemony. Thus, through the RPSF, it can be seen how it is not only 
leadership that is required for new collective security mechanisms to develop, but also 
compromise and agreement between powerful states. If Russia’s role as an Arctic regional 
leader was due largely to Gorbachev’s leadership, then it may be unlikely to occur again, at 
least under the present Putin regime. However, since America is also unwilling to change the 
regional order, any attempts by Canada or another Arctic state towards developing collective 
security arrangements would be unlikely to succeed unless the US revises its foreign policy on 
account of changing domestic or international circumstances, or if a crisis demands it.    
Paul Diehl (2003:4) raises four key questions that can assist to identify general security trends 
in the region and the potential for collective security arrangements. Firstly, he asks ‘what 
security problems are on the regional agenda?’ Diehl explains that the effectiveness of security 
arrangements and conflict management in a given region will depend centrally on the kinds of 
challenges addressed. In this manner, Diehl (2003:4) also suggests that we should pay special 
attention to regional threats that have negative externalities or potential for spillover effects. 
Katherine Keil (2016), disagrees with this idea by stating that if an Arctic security forum 
existed during the time of the Ukrainian crisis, it would be the first to suffer should security 
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tensions arising in Europe or elsewhere spill over into the Arctic. However, I suggest an 
alternative perspective by considering that if Russia was included in security arrangements in 
the Arctic or the greater Euro-Atlantic area that it benefited from – it would have more to lose 
from engaging in expansionist ventures, especially if such actions resulted in loss of status, 
expulsion from decision-making processes and isolation. While it is not possible to say that 
Ukraine would not have happened if an Arctic security forum had been established, it may have 
had a considerable impact towards alleviating Russian frustration with NATO and its continued 
exclusion from European security affairs. Within the AC structures, Russia has shown to be 
capable of adhering to international law and behavioural norms when it is included as an equal 
partner. Also, having demonstrated earlier that the AC forums were not disrupted during the 
Ukrainian crisis, this further verifies that Russia values the AC and was unwilling to let events 
occurring elsewhere disrupt the positive political processes of the AC. Therefore, institutional 
vulnerabilities notwithstanding, the AC has shown resilience and durability in the face of an 
external crisis. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I have demonstrated how traditional or hard security and defence issues 
have become increasingly connected to non-traditional security threats in the Arctic, including 
climate change, Arctic environmental conservation, maritime safety and pollution since the end 
of the Cold War. This leads on to Diehl’s (2003:4) third question which asks what incentives 
do regional actors have to act upon, or ignore, the broadened security agenda and the associated 
problems in the region? Given the broadening of security in the post-Cold War era the AC now 
engages in issues closely linked to traditional high security. Page Wilson (2016) however, is 
sceptical, arguing that it is unlikely that the AC will develop a security agenda or be reimagined 
as a security actor because the United States remains in a strong position to resist any changes 
to the status quo. She advocates that the United States would present a formidable obstacle 
against transforming the AC from a non-legally binding forum to one that has substantial legal 
power to enforce political decisions and treaties. Without a formal legal personality, the AC 
does not have the ability to enforce decisions, as a result there would be no guarantee that states 
would permanently adhere to any outcomes agreed upon during forum discussions.  
Yet if the Arctic powers are against the creation of an AC security forum, then the AC will 
retain its current role as a non-binding forum without developing legal mechanisms. Wilson 
evaluates that the AC may best be described at present as being a regional society actor, as per 
English School theory. Wilson explains that an AC which remains true to its origins as a legally 
non-binding society of Arctic states may be the preferred outcome for the Arctic states. This is 
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because, as the AC currently stands, Arctic states retain a level of freedom to pursue their own 
interests without constraint. However, if the AC does not develop legally-binding mechanisms, 
it could arguably still play a role as a security actor in the future. Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 
(2012:30-31) stipulate that in the RPSF, a region does not need to have a Wilsonian collective 
security arrangement to be categorized as an integration-based order. Instead they define an 
integration-based order by “the intentional promotion of various types of interdependence 
across the system as the primary means through which security problems are addressed” (ibid). 
While the probability of inter-state conflict in the Arctic remains low so long as NATO and 
Russia continue to act with military restraint – on the other hand, new security threats are 
increasingly demanding coordinated responses from all eight Arctic states, particularly with 
respect to Search and Rescue (SAR). Despite US reluctance to allow the AC to act as a 
decision-making body, it nonetheless conceded to ratifying three legally binding treaties to date 
including SAR in 2011 and the Oil Response Agreement in 2013. It has been proven that US-
Russian coast guard cooperation for Arctic SAR missions has successfully endured in the face 
of Russian sanctions and an embargo on Western-Russian military cooperation. When relations 
between Russia and the West deteriorated after Ukraine in 2014, most forms of SAR 
cooperation between the coast guards of various Arctic states including the US, Norway and 
Russia remained unimpeded (Østhagen 2016). This is because maritime collaboration was 
indispensable since the coast guards perform not only military tasks but also a whole range of 
civilian tasks. Therefore, the cost of tearing down long-standing bilateral relationships was 
considered too high by Norway and the US (ibid). Developments such as the SAR Agreement 
may indicate that if the AC is to develop into a security actor, then this will happen 
incrementally where cooperation and policy coordination in one area will have a positive spill-
over into other policy areas.  
Taken together, the 2011 SAR Agreement, the 2013 Oil-spill response agreement and the 2014 
Polar Code, all indicate that there is an increasing demand for the AC to engage in security 
issues. Eventually, this could encourage the AC towards creating a comprehensive security 
framework in the Arctic including military security cooperation agreements. While it is 
difficult to say if the AC’s decision-making powers will be strengthened in the future, the AC 
would appear to be a promising institutional setting for security dialogue and for promoting 
greater levels of security cooperation in the Arctic RSC. As I hypothesised in Chapter 2, since 
security orders and regional society are causally connected, the development of Arctic security 
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mechanisms would then result in a progressive transition from a cooperative to a convergence-
type regional society.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Diehl’s (2003:4) third question asks what regional actors are involved in collective conflict 
management activities? We know that five out of eight Arctic states are NATO member states, 
but Diehl goes further by stating that “capabilities or lack thereof of those actors, are critical 
for assessing prospects for regional conflict management”. In other words, identifying which 
regional powers have the capacity to enforce security and are willing to make a positive 
commitment to take action will also be important, given that the cost of collective security will 
vary across different contexts (Diehl 2003:45). Opinions vary on this point, for instance, we 
have seen how the Arctic Five engaged in the Ilulissat process in order to take action that would 
prevent the creation of an international Arctic Treaty. This was achieved by reinforcing their 
shared commitment to peacefully preserving the status quo in the Arctic Ocean. Yet calls for 
greater action by the Arctic Three (The US, Canada and Russia) may also indicate that these 
three states have the greatest capacity to act and contribute to a collective security arrangement 
and are therefore likely to lead an Arctic security forum. On the other hand, Iceland as the 
smallest Arctic state, would have a considerably smaller contribution to make since it has no 
standing army of its own leading to fears that small states may ‘free ride’ on collective security 
structures at the expense of the larger states. Yet considering how the Arctic security agenda 
has broadened beyond traditional military defence, it is plausible that even the smallest Arctic 
state could contribute to operations such as maritime patrols, sea-ice monitoring and other 
activities that strengthen inter-state regional cooperation rather than aggravating great power 
rivalries.  
The fourth and final question which Diehl asks is ‘what nonregional actors might have the 
incentives and capabilities needed for involvement in regional conflict management?’  
Relevant actors Diehl observes, may include specific great or middle powers, ad hoc coalitions 
or global IGOs. Another relevant point here to consider is whether an Arctic security council 
or forum would be best achieved through the creation of a new, autonomous Arctic security 
institution, within the existing AC structures or within another security organisation. I suggest 
that further research on this topic would involve an analysis of key security institutions already 
in existence and which operate within the Arctic region, including the UN, the OSCE, NATO 
in addition to the AC itself.   
Greater coherence amongst existing institutions may serve to create a new Arctic security 
framework. Two potential ways in which this could be achieved include: a strengthened role 
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for the existing institutional structures of the OSCE or through the creation of an AC Security 
Council. While the large pan-European membership base of the OSCE may deter Arctic states 
from utilising this forum to discuss issues of specific concern to the Arctic, the OSCE has 
excelled in creating confidence and security building measures (CSMBs), which, if adopted in 
the Arctic, could strengthen military cooperation amongst Arctic states and serve to keep 
militarisation at low levels. Furthermore, if CSMBs were utilised in an inclusive multilateral 
setting they may greatly facilitate security cooperation and dialogue through promoting 
transparency and information sharing. Hence, rather than phrasing the question as ‘which 
institution could provide the most suitable institutional setting for Arctic security?’ it may be 
that existing structures such as the OSCE and the AC may serve a purpose in different ways. 
The overarching security framework devised through the OSCE may provide the basis through 
which collective Arctic military security cooperation and defence diplomacy could be 
organised as originally conceived of by the Arctic Panel and their proposal of CASC in 1990 
(see Chapter 5). Alternatively, OSCE mechanisms could be coherently pursued, outside of, or 
in tandem with NATO. For instance, in 1999, the OSCE launched the Platform for Cooperative 
Security that aims to strengthen coherence and cooperation between European security 
organisations. However, Sacchetti (2015:119) explains that the Platform’s full potential as an 
instrument for multilateral coherence remains unexploited due to the OSCE’s peripheral 
position in the European security architecture and also due to the competition for political 
influence between institutions (ibid). Nonetheless, the Arctic may provide a productive setting 
to refine the Platform initiative and develop functioning mechanisms for security cooperation 
on a multi-institutional basis.  
Nevertheless, the argument put forward in this thesis is that the biggest obstacle impeding the 
creation of Arctic security cooperation mechanisms will likely be opposition from large Arctic 
states such as the US or from non-state actors such as NATO. With its continued monopoly on 
European security, NATO may perceive an Arctic security forum as challenging the European 
security hierarchy and/or create a conflict of interests. Jervis (1982:360) considers that if a 
security regime is to be created and maintained, certain conditions must be met. He outlines 
how the great powers must want to establish a security regime and express a preference for a 
more regulated environment than one in which all states behave individualistically. This would 
require a comprehensive overview of the benefits that collectivising Arctic security would 
bring, while also considering further incentives to get reluctant states such as the US to agree.  
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According to Duffield (2003:45) a necessary requirement of a collective security arrangement 
is that states must be willing to fight for the status quo. This is a timely and salient point 
considering that I have previously identified that both the United States and Russia exhibit 
satisfaction with the regional order and consider the regional status quo as just and legitimate. 
Duffield (2003:45) elaborates that only when states are satisfied with the status quo order can 
consensus be developed surrounding security actions: this is because    
Generally, collective security actions are designed to protect or restore the status quo in the event of an 
outbreak of violent conflict. This presumes some consensus that the status quo is just, or at the very least it 
presumes the availability of peaceful mechanisms for change in the status quo as an alternative to war. 
An Arctic Security Council would have to guarantee to provide a more comprehensive and 
effective way of managing new security challenges that are unique to the Arctic than the current 
ad-hoc agreements. It must also be inclusive of all eight Arctic states, and possibly 
accommodate for dialogue with external state and non-state observers. This is to ensure that 
the security council can engage with security issues from a level best capable of dealing with 
the policy problem or security threat –while many would argue that this is best achieved at the 
regional level, international responses may at times be necessary. Bailes and Cottey (2006:200) 
point out that regimes with functional security goals do not necessarily require a membership 
that is contingent on geography. The argument here is that states which are external to the 
region have valid interests in the Arctic and that regimes may work best when inclusive and 
global. While Arctic climate change policy and Arctic ocean management has gained 
international attention from state and non-state actors, there are strong concerns from Arctic 
states that increasing participation by external states and non-state actors in the region could 
lead to diverse and potentially negative security outcomes for Arctic states.  Interest in the 
Arctic has emerged from rising powers such as China and India, supra-national organisations 
such as the EU, and the UN, and international organisations (IOs) including Greenpeace, and 
the World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWFN): all of which request a voice in discussions. 
However, for the Arctic states to concede to such an arrangement, there would have to be 
structures in place that safeguard their sovereign interests while also prioritising Arctic states 
in decision-making procedures, possibly by ensuring that it is consensus-based. A final 
consideration in favour of an inclusive, international Arctic security council is that if 
successful, such an institution could in the long run, strengthen European and global security 
as a model of best practices, possibly by applying what has been tried and tested in the Arctic 
to other European sub-regions such as the Baltic to increase cooperation with Russia.  Franklyn 
Griffiths (2009:8) is of the view that Arctic regional objectives and global strategy must be 
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integrated because ad-hoc and incremental agreements will fall short of intent. Although 
Griffiths does not refer specifically to security here, he nonetheless emphasizes that if Arctic 
cooperation is coordinated through a central institution of governance, “Arctic collaboration 
would be capable of making a global contribution (p.8). 
9.6 Final Thoughts 
The transformation of the Arctic in the past seventy years is a revealing example of how 
significant changes have been wrought in the global security architecture, while at the same 
time, demonstrating how international society has significantly evolved and expanded to 
increasingly include non-state actors and transnational forces in the post-Cold War era. Change 
in the Arctic can, in this light, be considered as fundamental change with the twin processes of 
globalization and regionalization radically transforming the region over a relatively short 
timespan of history. For instance, not only did these changes impact the circumpolar Arctic, 
the intensity of these changes meant that they affected the international, regional, domestic and 
sub-state levels of the international system. To understand the nature of contemporary Arctic 
politics, it is therefore essential to acknowledge that regionalism has occurred as both an 
exogenous process - where regionalisation is intertwined with changes occurring in the broader 
international system: as well as endogenously, where regionalisation is shaped from within the 
region itself. A major research component of this thesis was to historically reconnect these two 
elements to provide a more comprehensive account of the Arctic regional order (see table 9.0). 
To evaluate the impact these changes had for regional peace and security cooperation in the 
Arctic, I focused on the conditions that encouraged the two great powers to revise the Arctic 
regional order at critical moments in global politics. Through utilising the RPSF, the causes 
and conditions of the changes that precipitated Arctic regional transformation were identified. 
A historical approach to regional change served to demonstrate the fundamental role that the 
Arctic regional powers: the US and Russia, had in shaping the regional order at specific times 
during the Cold War. However, a Cold War analysis of the Arctic revealed that regional 
leadership also requires consensus from the small and medium Arctic states. It is therefore 
important to recognise that these states were also capable of contributing to revisions in the 
regional order by utilising existing structures (as Sweden and Finland did with the CSCE in the 
1970s and 80s) or through promoting new initiatives for institutional cooperation (Finland with 
the AEPS and Canada with the AC). However, a shift in the distribution of power at the global 
level first preceded such changes. 
394 
 
The current Arctic order (1997 – to 2020) has been revealed as distinct, yet at the same time, a 
product of, former Arctic security orders. The single defining feature of the current order is the 
AC. This institutional structure has changed the processes of interaction amongst Arctic states 
as per ES understandings of international society. This is in stark contrast to how security 
systems (especially the BOP) were traditionally conceptualised as being outcomes of state 
interaction. Overall, Arctic regional development from the Cold War to the present day can be 
considered as progressive and positive, moving along the scale from enmity during the bipolar 
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It remains to be seen if the compromise struck with the Americans over the AC design in 1996 
will impede the long-term development of the Arctic region. As Alder and Greave (2009:64-
65) explain, if a region finds itself in a transition between a balance of power system and a 
security community system of governance then this will manifest politically as a set of two 
distinct practices (regional security overlap). The longevity of NATO, and the post-Cold War 
transformation of this institution needs to be understood not as something that was 
predetermined or inevitable, but rather as a historical decision taken by the United States during 
a critical juncture in political history where other pathways were available but were not chosen. 
As we approach the third decade of the 21st century, the internal cohesion of NATO and US 
perceptions on the validity of retaining this institution are changing. What was once considered 
by the US as the best way to serve America’s unilateral foreign policy and preserve American 
hegemony in the Euro-Atlantic area is now beginning to appear as an economically imprudent 
and increasingly redundant strategy. I conclude that in the long-term the fateful decision by 
President George H.W. Bush to reinvent the Cold War security order at the end of the Cold 
War is not a long-term solution to Euro-Atlantic and Arctic security, nor is it sustainable. In 
the Arctic, it has been recognised that a greater NATO military presence would be counter-
productive to cooperation efforts developed over the past thirty years. While the small and 
medium Arctic states remain cautious as to Russian intentions in the aftermath of Ukraine, they 
nonetheless acknowledge that in the Arctic, Russia will remain a key actor in the region and is 
an essential member state in the AC. Russia has proven capable of being a ‘normal’ state in the 
Arctic with respect to its continued participation in multilateral cooperation while it has also 
demonstrated its commitment to bi-lateral agreements and international law. While Russia’s 
commitment to arms control agreements may appear more controversial given the recent 
accusations of Russia’s violation of the INF treaty in 2019, (Chapter 7), I nonetheless 
demonstrate that the United States is not without fault either and has more often than not 
increased the security dilemma vis a vis Russia, owing to its foreign and security policies. As 
such, this thesis has argued that the best guarantee for establishing an enduring Arctic regional 
security order is to evaluate prospects for an integrated Arctic security regime, where military 
security cooperation and arms reduction is included on the circumpolar agenda, as envisioned 
by the indigenous Canadian architects of the AC.  
In Section 8.5, of this chapter I sketched out how further pathways of Arctic security research 
arguing that an in-depth analysis of potential security institutions needs to be conducted to 
investigate ways of increasing Arctic security cooperation. While the debate concerning 
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security rages fiercely between those who are vehemently opposed including security issues in 
the AC and those who are strongly in favour of it – such debates are necessary to shed light on 
the ongoing impact of regional security overlap while also considering the overall benefits that 
developing an integrated Arctic security order could have for political and security cooperation 
amongst Arctic states. 
Utilising the RPSF, it was evaluated that there is the potential for collective security 
arrangements in the region. However, the question of what level of the international system an 
Arctic security council or forum should be pursued at was also raised. Arctic climate change 
policy and Arctic ocean management has gained international attention from state and non-
state actors. There are strong concerns from Arctic states that increasing participation by 
external states and non-state actors in the region could lead to diverse and potentially negative 
security outcomes for Arctic states.  The creation of an Arctic security Council, therefore, may 
alleviate some of this concern by outlining new rules and norms for Arctic security and 
clarifying the positions of Arctic and external states alike. I identified three potential ways in 
which an Arctic security Council may be created: 1) through the creation of a new, autonomous 
Arctic security institution, 2) within the existing AC structures or 3) within another security 
organisation.  
Through the RPSF, it can be seen how it is not only leadership by that is required for new 
collective security mechanisms to develop, but also compromise and agreement between 
powerful states. Therefore, any attempt by Canada or another Arctic state towards developing 
collective security arrangements would be unlikely to succeed unless the US revises its foreign 
policy. US foreign policy revision may come as a result of leadership turnover or if a crisis 
(domestic or international) demands it. Otherwise, the pathway towards an integrated Arctic 
security order may occur organically through incremental change, resulting in the AC gradually 
emerging as a true security actor in the Arctic, as envisioned by Canadian indigenous and civil 
rights groups twenty years ago.  
It has been shown however, that fundamental change in the Arctic has occurred in the past 
when an Arctic state has taken up the role of regional leadership. The question therefore 
remains as to which state is willing to take up a 21st century Arctic regional leadership role to 
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